Ambiguities

The aim of the book is to illustrate the relationship between the current debate on the theory of consciousness and Sartre's philosophy. It contains twenty-three contributions from experts in this field. At the center is the concept of Prereflective Consciousness. It is hoped that this discussion will show that the apparent distance between Sartre and modern philosophy of mind can be overcome.

This research programme arouses ambivalent ideas in a lover of Sartre's philosophy. On the one hand, it seems worth comparing Sartre's existentialism with analytical philosophy of consciousness. The result could be the realization that Sartre has been wrongly marginalized by academic philosophy. On the other hand, history of philosophy speaks against such contact, because it is to be feared that thinkers who tend to analytical philosophy will have a hard time developing an understanding of Sartre's kind of thinking.

There is for example the physicist Albert Einstein, who is said to have said about Jaspers that for him this is 'like in Hegel the drivel of a drunk'. The affair 'Carnap versus Heidegger' shows that this is not an isolated case. While Carnap puts Heidegger's 'Das Nichts nichtet' under suspicion of futility, Heidegger returned with the sentence 'Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht'.

Obviously, the relationship between human existence and science is disputed here. Analytical Philosophy and existentialism have completely different views on how to interpret this relationship. The abyss can perhaps be described as such: Sciences try to explain human existence and existentialism tries to understand sciences.

Even Bertrand Russell, who had close political ties to Sartre, showed little understanding of Sartre's philosophy. Russell mentions he couldn't claim to understand what Sartre wants to say. So it seems that analytical philosophy on the one hand and philosophy of existence on the other are fundamentally different perspectives, similar to theism and atheism. People talk past each other or declare one another crazy. All they can do is accuse mutually or avoid each other.

Is there an interface between a scientifically oriented philosophy and existentialism? Isn’t existentialism a way of thinking that consciously turns away from academic philosophy in order to take its own path? For example, is the claimed scientifcity of academic philosophy compatible with individual hermeneutics in the sense of Sartre? Doesn't analytical philosophy have a strong tendency towards naturalism, while existentialism is anti-naturalistic? These are questions from an adherent of Sartre's philosophy.

This pessimistic view is not without alternatives. Times are changing and analytical philosophy is no longer what it used to be. It has alleviated its exaggerated scientism and thus brought itself closer to continental philosophy. With Wittgenstein, it has created a philosopher, who problematizes the sciences. There are even works in which an affinity is claimed between Wittgenstein and the existential philosopher Kierkegaard. Moreover, Sartre is not Heidegger, but an independent thinker who has worked intensively on the philosophy of consciousness, so that an interface between analytical philosophy and existentialism can be identified. And isn't the task to bridge the gap between explanation and understanding, to create a
balance between science and existence? Furthermore: It is always good when people of different mindsets come into conversation with each other. So why should there not be a discussion between analytical philosophy and existentialism?

The problem with this alternative viewpoint, however, is that the concerns raised earlier do not become meaningless. It is rather the case that the pessimistic viewpoint mixes with the optimistic viewpoint and knotts together to form a problem cluster that is difficult to solve. In other words, the perhaps well-intentioned efforts of analytic philosophers to do justice to Sartre can make the true Sartre a cheap imitation. At this caricature one then discovers all sorts of “defects” that need to be corrected. In the end, existentialism, which is a philosophy of freedom, becomes a naturalistic theory within the framework of analytical philosophy. The discourse between analytical philosophy and Sartre would then have resulted in the destruction of existentialism. From the point of view of an existentialist, however, that would be disastrous. The following quotation from a contribution of the book to be discussed here is to clarify this danger:

*The choice of Sartre (instead of Husserl) as the subject of this chapter may seem unfortunate. Sartre rarely discusses methodology in any significant detail, his jargon can be impenetrable, and his views on consciousness appear to be highly revisionary and, hence, controversial. Consequently, looking to Sartre for resources to develop an error theory of introspection may seem like a dubious task that needs justification...*

*First, Sartre's texts up to but not including Being and Nothingness read much more like rigorous academic philosophy, and they follow the spirit of Husserl’s (1913) phenomenological method very closely. Sartre’s incisive analyses based on astute descriptions shine through in these early works, and they sharply contrast his obscure language and hyperbolic claims that appear rather suddenly in Being and Nothingness. Thus, those sympathetic to careful applications of the spirit of Husserl’s method, but who are understandably unwilling to suffer through the semantic jungle of Being and Nothingness, will find much more clarity in Sartre’s earliest works... (Matthew C. Eshleman, A sketch of Sartre’s error theory of introspection)*

Philosophers who see themselves as scientists want a clear methodology. This can be found at Husserl, but not at Sartre. They then differentiate between the young Sartre, who is still committed to Husserl's method, and the Sartre, who wrote Being and Nothingness. This main work of Sartre is described as obscure in terms of language and beyond a clear methodology. One may even admit that one has not read this work, because it is unreasonable for a scientifically oriented philosopher to begin the path of suffering through the semantic jungle of Being and Nothingness.

The underlying objective problem is clear. Husserl and Sartre pursue different goals. Husserl intended a philosophy as strict science, Sartre wanted to describe the concrete human reality. Husserl's phenomenology is a good approach, but not sufficient. Sartre therefore clearly distances himself from Husserl's phenomenology in order to turn to phenomenological ontology in Heidegger's sense. If now an interpreter ignores this distancing and still claims to be a Sartre-interpreter, then one finds oneself in exactly the situation described above of the fundamental problem of communication between analytical philosophy and existential philosophy.

Analytical philosophy recognizes a certain affinity to Husserl's phenomenology and would like to transfer this relationship to Sartre. If this does not work, because Sartre has clearly distanced himself from Husserl's phenomenology, they make their own Sartre, a Sartre prepared for scientific processing, which will replace the real Sartre. In this way, an artificial clarity is created which, in reality, amounts to a simplification of Sartre's philosophy. In short: There is the danger of being presented with a caricature of Sartre.

These difficulties with Sartre's philosophy are due to the fact that human reality, the description of which is Sartre's goal, requires an intricate reasoning. The crucial question is whether the sciences with their
Sartre is not primarily concerned with methodical clarity, but with an adequate understanding of human reality. Husserl's method is clear, but inadequate. One aspect of this inadequacy lies in the ahistorical nature of his thinking. Husserl believes he can detach himself from the history of philosophy and dare a new beginning with the method he invented. Analytical philosophy has similar goals. Sartre, on the other hand, thinks genuinely historically, takes a serious look at the history of philosophy, uncovers the weak points of his predecessors and tries to make suggestions for improvement. In this respect one can say: Sartre's thinking may not be clear, but it is adequate.

One of the scientific methods is to divide the world into sub-areas and try to solve corresponding sub-problems with the help of defined methods. For example, you want to explain consciousness or time. Sartre, on the other hand, does not want to solve partial problems, but to create a philosophy of the concrete human reality. For him, terms such as 'consciousness' or 'phenomenon' are abstractions. These are important for the theoretical analysis, but must always be seen in the overall context. Part of this overall context is that one cannot scientifically explain man's being-in-the-world, but that science is to be understood as special undertakings of being-in-the-world. If this approach is not acknowledged, it is difficult to see how a discussion with existentialism should be possible.

Sartre's philosophy can therefore only be understood if one considers the overall context of his thinking. This includes his philosophy of freedom. At the centre of the book to be discussed, however, is the concept of pre-reflective consciousness. Some even speak of the 'lasting value' of Sartre's thinking, meaning the pre-reflective consciousness, and at the same time insinuating that the rest of his philosophy, his theory of freedom, is obsolete. This suggests that Sartre's philosophy of freedom has no lasting value.

But this destroys the unity and coherence of existentialism. The author of this review, here called the existentialist, sees his task in rejecting this kind of approach, which may be in the interest of analytic philosophy but is contrary to the interests of existentialism.

Sartre is best understood when one develops sufficient hermeneutic competence, when one tries to empathize with Sartre's way of philosophizing. The reader should try to find out what the author wants to say. This requires a minimum of goodwill and the willingness to think at least temporarily within the framework set by Sartre, instead of approaching him with demands that he cannot meet on the basis of his self-image.

**Hermeneutic competence**

Sometimes one has the impression that certain interpreters do not have this will for hermeneutic competence, because they pursue other goals. They want to solve a particular problem, for example, to provide a theory that explains how time is possible. They look at various theories of time, for example those of the analytical philosophy, the time-theory Husserl's and Sartre's. It is noted that Sartre does not explain time. This fact is then called a 'shortcoming' of Sartre's philosophy.

The problem is that it cannot be a shortcoming of Sartre's philosophy, because it is not Sartre's intention to explain time. His approach is rather that temporality is an inexplicable basic concept. He is of the opinion that all previous attempts at explanation have failed and had to fail, because temporality cannot be explained. It can not be explained, because it is a fundamental intuition of human reality. The same applies, by the way, to consciousness. According to Sartre, consciousness is the prerequisite for all explanations and therefore cannot be explained. Consciousness corresponds to the unveiling of being and the attempt to explain consciousness means to unveil the unveiling of being, which is impossible.
In contrast, Gerhard Seel sees shortcomings in Sartre’s theory of time in his essay, which lead Seel to return from Sartre to Husserl. These alleged shortcomings are supposed to consist above all in a lack of evidence and explanatory power. His return to Husserl is of course a total break with Sartre’s philosophy. Seel tries to give the impression, however, that it is possible to adopt certain aspects of Sartre’s theory of time and still try to explain the concept of time in Husserl’s sense. Seel tries to use fragments of Sartre’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology for the purpose of his own theory of time. It is legitimate to use Sartre’s philosophy as a quarry and to integrate it into other contexts, but it should be said that then one no longer has to do with Sartre’s philosophy.

For a supporter of Sartre’s philosophy, a bland aftertaste remains after reading Seel’s essay, because he has the impression that Sartre is being abused here, for behind the alleged inadequacies of Sartre’s theory of time, which Seel lists, is a big question mark to put. These are not so much shortcomings of Sartre’s theory, but rather shortcomings in the attempt to reconcile analytical philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism.

Sartre, for example, is accused of not arguing in the style of analytical philosophy. For example, he does not know the term ‘event’, which is fundamental in the time theory of the analytical school. Analytical philosophy is based on physics. But it is clear that such an accusation is absurd, because one of the basic concerns of existential philosophy is to question these naturalistic approaches. Sartre is required to adopt the prerequisites of a philosophy that contradict those of his own philosophy. Since he does not do so, his theory is called inadequate. However, this discrepancy is not a sign of the inadequacy of Sartre’s thinking, but an expression of the fact that analytical philosophy and existentialism are two fundamentally different approaches.

Furthermore, Sartre is expected to explain how temporality is possible, whereby the word ‘explanation’ means an argument in the style of Husserl. Once again, Sartre is expected to fulfill requirements that he cannot meet a priori, because his philosophy is based precisely on the total rejection of Husserl’s attempt to explain time:

But if the Cogito Husserl’s is initially given as instantaneous, there is no way out of it. In the previous chapter, we have seen how the “protentions” collide in vain with the windows of the present without being able to break them. The same applies to the retentions. Throughout his philosophical career, Husserl was haunted by the idea of transcendence and transgression. But the philosophical instruments at his disposal, above all his idealistic conception of existence, took away from him the means to shed light on this transcendence: his intentionality is only its caricature. Husserl’s consciousness can in reality transcend neither to the world nor to the future or past. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 220)

Sartre clearly diagnoses here the failure of Husserl’s theory of time. Husserl’s attempt to explain temporality using the terms ‘Rentention’ and ‘Protention’ is in vain in Sartre’s eyes. Husserl begins with an abstraction and he does not have the means to transcend this abstraction. In any case, the instruments he chooses are the wrong means. Husserl’s phenomenon prevents him from concretizing his abstractions towards human reality. That is why Sartre rejects Husserl’s phenomenology in the end.

If, like Seel, one believes that one has to return from Sartre to Husserl, then one should at the same time acknowledge that this return cannot be in the spirit of Sartre. Seel said goodbye to Sartre and he should make that clear. His attempt to turn Sartre through the mincer together with Husserl and analytical philosophy can only lead to Sartre no longer being recognizable at the end.

Seel repeatedly diagnoses ‘shortcomings’ in Sartre’s philosophy. These diagnoses are incomprehensible with sufficient hermeneutic competence. For example, the term ‘instantaneous cogito’ is of crucial importance. All three philosophers - Descartes, Husserl and Sartre - recognize the functional aspect of this instantaneous cogito, namely being a momentary evidence experience of being an epistemological fundamentum inconcussum. The problem lies in the transition from instantaneous to temporality. For
Sartre, both, Descartes and Husserl, failed because of this problem. Sartre's theory of the 'ecstatic unit of the three dimensions of time' solves this transition problem because it introduces this ecstatic unit as an axiom.

Seel rightly points out that Sartre speaks of the instantaneity of pre-reflective consciousness, but then repeatedly emphasizes the temporality of this consciousness. Seel seems to see this as a contradiction, a contradiction which in turn should serve as proof of the inadequacy of Sartre's theory of time:

- So according to Sartre, thetic time-conciousness must ultimately be founded in a pre-reflective consciousness of time which has itself – ontologically speaking – duration. The problem is, however, that the “reflection-reflecting” structure will not do this job. For – as it was introduced in the first-place – it is completely lacking duration...In another passage Sartre speaks of the ‘instantaneity’ of the reflection-reflecting. Consequently the reflection-reflecting is not consciousness (of) duration. (Gerhard Seel, Pre-reflective and reflective time consciousness)

This impression that Seel wants to see a contradiction in Sartre theory is reinforced when one suspects that he interprets the word 'instantan' in the sense of 'timeless' and thereby transforms the difference between 'instantaneous' and 'temporality' into a conceptual antinomy. But such a conceptual incompatibility does not exist in Sartre, because 'instantaneous' in Sartre does not mean 'timeless', but 'momentarily'.

Of course, the momentary nature of the instant, for example of an evidence experience, does not contradict the temporality of consciousness. The moment is rather an aspect of temporality. Here Sartre sees a starting point to find within the instantaneous cogito the dialectical instruments that are to make it possible to cross this instantaneous cogito towards the full temporality of human reality.

Seel identifies a problem in Sartre's theory of consciousness, which is not due to this philosophy, but to Seel's own interpretation. This is remarkable, because Sartre himself leaves no doubt about the meaning of the word 'instantaneous' and because he clearly identifies the historical context in which this word must be seen:

- An investigation of human reality must begin with the Cogito. But the Cartesian "I think" was conceived in an instantaneous perspective of temporality. Can a means be found within the Cogito to transcend this instantaneousness? If human reality were limited to the existence of "I think", it would only have a momentary truth. And it is true that it is an instantaneous totality in Descartes, since it does not in itself make any claim to the future, since it takes an act of creatio continua to let it pass from one moment to the next. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 181)

Sartre speaks here of the instantaneistic perspective of temporality, which makes it clear that for him the words 'instantaneous' and 'temporal' are not contradictory. Just as the moment is a moment of temporality, so the word 'instantan' suggests an aspect of temporality. This is also clear from a historical context. For the purpose of epistemology, Descartes reaches his cogito through hyperbolic doubt by means of abstraction. He regards this cogito as a momentary experience of evidence. Since concrete consciousness is not momentary, but temporal, the problem arises for Descartes as to how he can transfer the momentary experience of evidence to temporal consciousness, for example to memory.

The mistake with Descartes is that he substantializes this momentary Cogito by perceiving it as an existing thing. This exacerbates the problem of transferring the cogito to concrete consciousness. Descartes needs the goodness of God and the theory of creatio continua to explain this transformation.

Sartre naturally rejects the theistic theory of creatio continua. That is why he is looking for a new theory of temporality, although he wants to recognize the Cogito as a momentary experience of evidence. Sartre
finds a new approach to the problem in the idea of an 'ecstatic unity of time dimensions'. It just needs to be unfolded.

Sartre adopted this theory of temporality from the existential philosophers Kierkegaard and Heidegger, while consistently disdaining Descartes and Husserl's theories of time. In this respect one can say that Sartre's philosophy is an attempt at reconciliation between Descartes' theory of consciousness and Heidegger's philosophy of existence. There is therefore a special historical context in which Sartre is to be interpreted. The authors of the introduction to the book to be discussed here correctly point out this connection (page 3 of the book).

Nothing of this can be seen in Seel's reconstruction of the problem. Instead, he constructs a conceptual contradiction between instantaneous consciousness and temporal consciousness by translating the word 'instantan' with 'timeless':

*According to the insights of this first step, the For-itself was determined as self-consciousness of the object explained as negation of the In-itself. This structure did not imply any form of temporality. For the pre-reflective cogito determined as "reflection-reflecting" (reflet-reflétant) appeared to be completely intemporal. (Seel, Pre-reflective and reflective-time-consciousness)*

Sartre, however, does not claim that the Cogito is 'intemporal'. He wants to say that the Cogito is instantaneous as the epistemological core of consciousness, in the sense of instantaneous evidence, but he is naturally convinced from the outset that the ontological totality of consciousness is temporal. He is even convinced that an exact analysis of the instantaneous cogito provides the instruments for the transition to the temporality of consciousness.

Seel sees correctly that Sartre is not satisfied with this mere 'instantaneousistic perspective' and therefore - like Descartes and Husserl - is looking for a theory of temporality. Seel interprets Sartre's dissatisfaction as a revision of his original theory of the pre-reflective Cogito and uses this alleged revision as an argument for the inadequacy of Sartre's theory of time:

*We have to acknowledge, though, that in passages that belong to the chapter on temporality, Sartre seems to shift away from his first position. (Seel, ebd.)*

At Sartre, however, there is no revision, only a progressive concretization of his approach. It is a question of transforming an abstraction, namely the current cogito, into a more concrete unity, namely temporal consciousness, as one can even say that Sartre is always about a progressive concretization of the initial abstractions. As has already been said: The aim is to grasp human reality. Terms such as 'consciousness' and 'phenomenon' are abstractions that need to be concretized. They should therefore not be regarded as independent entities.

If this is not taken into account, there is a danger of reifying abstract internal differentiations of the 'being-in-the-world'. For example, Sartre speaks of a 'pre-reflective' and a 'reflective' consciousness, which, if misinterpreted, could lead to assume two types of consciousness. But that's not Sartre's opinion. For him there is only one consciousness, that is, the reflective consciousness is the pre-reflective consciousness. These terms are only an internal differentiation of one consciousness. Reflective consciousness is the attempt of the pre-reflective consciousness to objectify and internalize itself. Through this attempt, however, consciousness does not split into two independent entities, but only enriches its internal structure. The differentiation between the pre-reflective and the reflective consciousness must not be exaggerated.

Here lies a fundamental problem of a philosophy in the style of the the Analytical Movement. It tends to reify terms relating to abstractions and pretends to describe these terms as isolated entities. Then suddenly an 'instantaneous cogito' exists on the one hand and a 'temporal consciousness' on the other, and the transition from one to the other is interpreted as a revision of theory. In fact, there is not even a consciousness when one considers this as an isolated concrete entity. The word 'consciousness' is a
necessary abstraction that must always be seen in the context of the concrete human reality of being in
the world:

The concrete can only be the synthetic totality of which both the consciousness and the
phenomenon only form moments. The concrete thing is man in the world with that
specific union of man with the world which Heidegger calls 'being-in-the-world', for
example. (Sartre, ibid., p. 50)

That is why Sartre should not be seen as a phenomenologist or as a theorist of consciousness. He is not
Husserl's successor, but a philosopher who tries to mediate between phenomenology and the philosophy
of existence in the sense of Heidegger and Kierkegaard.

The lack of hermeneutic competence becomes clear again and again in Seel's essay. For example, in the
following quotation, which deals with Sartre's concept of 'pure reflection':

Sartre thinks that 'pure reflection' can be reached from 'impure reflection' by an act of
catharsis. But it remains unclear how this process of catharsis proceeds. The problem
with pure reflection is that there seems to be no phenomenological evidence for it. One
has the impression that it is a philosophical invention which Sartre needs to close the
gap between what his ontology says about the For-itself and what impure reflection
reveals to the For-itself about itself. (Seel, Pre-and reflective time-consciousness)

The existentialist can only be surprised at this point. Sartre has thus discovered a gap in his ontology and
invents 'pure reflection' only for the purpose of closing this gap? In reality, however, the concept of
'impure reflection' cannot be understood without that of 'pure reflection'.

In the case of 'impure reflection' it is a matter of about projections of the 'pour-soi' into the 'en-soi'.
Experiences become fixed characteristics of the Ego. For example, if someone says, "I hate my brother," he
ascribes to himself an Ego whose attribute is hatred of the brother. Sartre means that this attribution is
exaggerated, that it is a construction that cannot be justified by the phenomena. The 'pure reflection'
corresponds to a purification of these exaggerated attributions. One recognizes through this catharsis that
one temporarily feels a reluctance towards one's brother, but that this reluctance does not arise from a
timeless entity called 'hate', which dwells in the psyche and unfolds a magical power there.

The existentialist believes that this type of purification is phenomenologically verifiable, that it even occurs
relatively frequently. Moreover, pure reflection is even the prerequisite for phenomenological reduction,
for according to Sartre this also leads to an experience of evidence that cannot be ascribed to 'impure
reflection'. Seel's criticism of Sartre in this regard is absolutely incomprehensible.

Obviously, Seel Sartre doesn't do justice. Instead, a caricature is created to pursue his own interests. It is
said, for example, that Sartre took a big step forward in the explanation of consciousness:

He [Sartre] made a big step forward in the explanation of consciousness and was the
first to give a convincing explanation of the flowing of time. (Seel, ebenda)

This praise is irritating because Sartre, in particular, attaches importance to the fact that consciousness
cannot be explained, because it is the prerequisite of all explanations. It must therefore be regarded as an
absolute.

After this praise of Seel, which is intended to ensure Sartre's connectivity with analytical philosophy,
however, follows the reprimand, which is intended to prove the lack of explanatory power in Sartre's
theory and the necessity of a return to Husserl:

It is, however difficult to understand how such a consciousness (of) flow or of once
possibilities as one's future is possible. Sartre offers no such explanation. (Seel, ebenda)
Here the praise that Sartre gave a 'convincing explanation of the flow of time' is withdrawn and recognition must give way to the reproach that Sartre does not provide an explanation of the flow of time. The truth is, however, that Sartre denies the possibility of an explanation of temporality from the outset and instead introduces the 'ecstatic unity of temporality' as an axiom into his theory.

In the end, Seel gives Sartre the shot of mercy by presenting Husserl as a shining example:

\[
\text{Sartre's blindness is the more astonishing as he perfectly new Husserl's early theory of time-consciousness, where these problems are clearly articulated. (Seel, ebenda)}
\]

For a supporter of Sartre's philosophy, this 'back and forth' between Husserl and Sartre is unsatisfactory. Sartre does not stand in the tradition of Husserl's theory of time and it is by no means the case that these two philosophers differ only in a few details. Rather, Sartre rejects Husserl's theory of time totally. So there is only the possibility to argue within the framework of Husserl's philosophy or to join Sartre. A decision is needed here. It's either Sartre or Husserl. There is no possibility of a balance between these theories.

Seel seems to have an eagle's eye on philosophy. He sees the analytical philosophy, the phenomenology of Husserl and the existentialism of Sartre from the very top. He does not choose between these theories, but picks out the best raisins for him in order to develop his own theory of time. That's legitimate. But it is also legitimate for a supporter of Sartre's philosophy to defend the unity of existentialism against this mixture of phenomenology, existentialism, analytical philosophy, Kantian transcendental philosophy and a presumed future success of neuro-biology.

If one takes Seel's essay as the basis for a judgement about the attempt of a talk between analytical philosophy and existentialism, then an existentialist would have to declare this attempt a failure.

**Cherry-picking**

This picking of raisins is a serious problem for the existentialist. For him, existentialism is not only a philosophy, but also a way of life. This way of life includes the concept of freedom and responsibility. For Sartre, freedom and temporality are the same:

\[
\text{Thus freedom, choice, neantisation, temporization are one and the same thing. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 806)}
\]

If the concept of temporality is removed, the concept of freedom also disappears. But what remains of the way of life of the existentialist when the concept of freedom no longer exists? So when a philosopher like Seel now claims that the concept of pre-reflective consciousness is the lasting value of Sartre's thinking, while the concept of temporality is obsolete, then for the existentialist this is synonymous with the rejection of Sartre's philosophy, for with temporality Seel also says goodbye to the concept of freedom.

It is a recurring motif in the essays of this book that Sartre's concept of freedom is either ignored or even rejected. While the raisin pickers speak of the "lasting value of Sartre's thinking," by which they mean the special raisin that they can use for their purposes, in reality they destroy existentialism as a unified philosophy and way of life. They turn it into a quarry where anyone can help themselves at will.

**False friends**

Raisin-picking is a frequent occurrence in the book to be examined here. Kenneth Williford admits in his essay that he admires the phenomenologist Sartre, but not the ontologist and metaphysician Sartre:

\[
\text{But it is Sartre as a phenomenologist I admire most, and not Sartre as an ontologist or metaphysician. (Kenneth Williford, Degrees of self-presence)}
\]
But it is an essential part of Sartre's existentialism that this is a phenomenological ontology with a metaphysical epilogue. Furthermore, Husserl's phenomenology is rejected as a phenomenism, so that there is no possibility of turning Sartre into a pure phenomenologist or even to regard him as such. Williford should therefore be sincere enough to profess to be anti-Sartrean and not to suggest a positive attitude towards Sartre's philosophy. The fact that Williford is an anti-Sartrean is immediately obvious when you look at his naturalistic basic position:

Indeed, I put my money on the idea that consciousness is a specific type of suitably circular computational process implemented in the neuronal hardware of the brain. (Williford, ibd.)

It is clear that Williford's confession contradicts everything Sartre wanted to say. Williford is committed to naturalism and consequently to a rejection of the philosophy of freedom. His naturalism and Sartre's existentialism contradict each other, just as the theism of Saint Augustine and the materialism of an epicure claim the opposite.

Reading Williford's essay clearly reveals the threat that lies in a discourse between a scientifically oriented philosophy and existentialism. There is a risk of capture. You defuse your opponent by showering him with kindness and praise. At the decisive moment, however, you strike and win the fight, since your opponent has fallen asleep gently in the meantime.

Therefore, I would like to reiterate: Sartre is a philosopher of freedom and every philosopher who denies freedom is an anti-Sartrean, an opponent of existentialism. All agreements on detailed questions cannot change this. Therefore, the existentialist should make sure that he does not lose the overview.

Sartre's theory of freedom is based above all on his theory of consciousness and on the distinction between the 'en-soi' and the 'pour-soi'. The principle of the 'en-soi' is identity, the principle of the 'pour-soi' is lack of identity. This lack of identity of consciousness, i.e. the lack of coincidence of consciousness with itself, is the basis of freedom. If one now denies this lack of coincidence, then one also destroys freedom. But all existentialism, all existential psychoanalysis, the theory of insincerity, the theory of radical conversion is null and void. Anything! You can forget the entire Sartre. Kenneth Williford proposes precisely this radical destruction of existentialism:

So though I am inclined to reject Sartre’s view that consciousness does not coincide with itself (in the sense of not being identical to itself), I think that the phenomenological data that made this description seem salient to him are important and should not be ignored, no more than should the phenomena connected with the “origin of negation”. It seems we can capture the latter by recourse to the idea that consciousness is acquainted with itself as well as its internal differentiation. It seems that we may be able to capture the phenomenology of various kinds of “self-distancing” in terms of circularity and projective geometrical structure. If so, there’d be no need to reject the “Law of Identity”, and we could preserve the spirit of the project of B&N without sticking to its letter. (Williford, ibd.)

So instead of the basic assumption of existentialism that the freedom of consciousness is based on a lack of identity, Williford wants to replace it with a structure of Projective Geometry and yet preserve the spirit and project of Being and Nothingness. For the existentialist, this is a strange idea.

This example shows that here the discourse has not only failed, but has also fallen into dangerous waters. Sartre is to be abused here for purposes that are alien and hostile to his cause. Someone is trying to turn existentialism into a scientific system! Consciousness is to be explained by means of a structure of Projective Geometry. But the basic statement of existentialism is that consciousness cannot be explained, that it is a gap in being, a spontaneity. This lack of identity is
a core statement of existentialism. The assertion that one can eliminate this core statement and still maintain the program of Being and Nothingness is absurd.

Insincerity

Another variation of raisin picking can be found in Joseph Levine's essay. Levine says explicitly, however, that he does not want to judge Sartre's overall philosophy, but only to propose a partial concept, namely the 'pour-soi', as a solution for problems of the current philosophy of consciousness. He calls his theory 'Quasi-Sartrean'. He writes:

> For Sartre, as I understand him, the distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself is intended to mark a fundamental ontological cleavage in reality. I do not endorse all of the features of this distinction that play crucial roles in Sartre’s philosophy (especially his account of human freedom), but I do want to take on board the idea that the for-itself, consciousness, is a basic phenomenon in nature, not reducible to the in-itself. (Joseph Levine, “Quasi-Sartrean” theory of subjective awareness)

For an existentialist such formulations are irritating. Isn't it true that freedom comes into the world with the 'pour-soi'? How, then, should it be possible to take the concept of the 'pour-soi' on board but reject the concept of freedom? Isn't human freedom based on the fact that human existence can't be reduced to the 'en-soi'? There is a taste of dishonesty in this proposal, because 'pour-soi' is just another word for freedom. Levine confirms this fact even when he paraphrases the terms "en-soi" and 'pour-soi' with 'being' and 'nothingness'. For Sartre, nothingness and freedom are the same thing.

The part and the whole

A common phenomenon in the book to be studied is the attempt to demolish Sartre's theory of freedom. One finds this attempt with Seel, who wants to replace Sartre's concept of freedom as temporality by his own hybrid time theory. This attempt is also the case with Williford, who intends to exchange the freedom of consciousness for a construction of Projective Geometry. The same applies to Levine, who wants to take the 'pour-soi' on board but rejects the concept of freedom. All these attempts, if successful, would result in the destruction of existentialism.

The fear, unity and coherence of existentialism could be damaged by contact with analytical philosophy, unfortunately is confirmed time and again when reading the treatises. One prefers to examine certain aspects of existentialism with the logical microscope, to skewer allegedly questionable details and to present them to the public in triumphal procession. A good example of this is Uriah Kriegel's treatise 'Perception and Imagination'. This essay is about the differentiation between perception and imagination. Kriegel distinguishes three theory variants:

(No-difference-version oder ND): “There is no phenomenal difference between perceiving O and imagining O.”

(Degree-difference-version oder DD): “There is a phenomenal difference-in-degree [...] between perceiving O and imagining O.”
Kriegel explains that the third variation corresponds to Sartre's philosophy. He clearly shows his sympathy in principle for this theory of the imaginary. In this respect, the existentialist can agree with Kriegel's treatise.

Things are getting difficult with the 'improvements' that Kriegel proposes. He distinguishes between an 'initial view' and a 'refined view' Sartre allegedly takes in his theory of the imaginary, and he suggests deleting the refined view and leaving it at the initial view. With this proposal one should bear in mind that it amounts to returning from Sartre's existentialism to Husserl's phenomenism and replacing a complete philosophy of freedom with a mutilated theory of imagination. Once again, it's about discrediting Sartre's theory of freedom. Kriegel writes:

> What is this categorial difference between perceptual and imaginative experience? In the final chapter of The Imagination Sartre articulates an initial view whose inspiration he finds in Husserl's Ideen (Husserl 1913). However, in the final pages of The Imagination Sartre argues for a need to go beyond this initial view, and in the opening chapter of The Imaginary [...] he articulates a refined view that goes beyond Husserl. I am much more attracted to the initial view, which I present and develop in the next section. In the section after that, I will turn to Sartre’s argument for refining his initial view and offer reasons to resist it.”

[Kriegel, Perception and imagination, S. 253]

Kriegel correctly explains here that Sartre has published two books on imagination, 'The Imagination' and 'The Imaginary'. Sartre explicates his actual theory of imagination in 'The Imaginary'. Above all, in this book he shows the close connection between imagination and freedom. The book 'The Imagination', on the other hand, contains only preliminary considerations. Among other things, Sartre here deals with Husserl, to whom he devotes a chapter of his own and whose theory of the image he considers a decisive advance over classical theories. In particular, Sartre accepts Husserl’s thesis that the difference between perception and imagination is a question of attitude. In perception the object is set as existing, in imagination as non-existent. This is the 'initial view' Sartre’s, which Kriegel prefers.

Sartre is of the opinion, however, that this difference in attitude is necessary but not sufficient to distinguish between perception and imagination. There must also be a difference in content. Sartre explains this difference in content in his work 'The Imaginary'. There he shows that perception always implies an observation, while the imagination allows only a quasi-observation. The perceived object allows an infinite number of perspectives and shows an infinite number of aspects depending on the perspective taken. It is always good for a surprise and is not exhaustible. There is always a difference between the aspect and the totality of the perceived object. On the other hand, the imagination is immediately given. The imaginary object offers no surprises in terms of content. It only allows a quasi-observation. Nevertheless, there are many interrelationships between the reality of what is perceived and the unreality of the imaginary. This theory of the imaginary is a support of Sartre's philosophy of freedom. It is therefore of crucial importance for existentialism.

Kriegel now thinks he has to distinguish between Sartre's 'initial view' and a 'new view'. But in reality it is not about an 'initial view' and a 'new view'. It's about a preliminary consideration and the actual theory. If Kriegel prefers the 'preliminary view' and rejects the actual theory, then he refuses Sartre's theory of the imaginary as a whole. He basically turns to Husserl back. This is the same problem as in
Seel's essay. The question is: why do these philosophers take the detour via Sartre to return to Husserl in the end?

If one now follows Kriegel's arguments in detail, the same pattern always becomes visible: hard theses are formulated and assigned to Sartre. Subsequently, these theses are refuted, which is supposed to invalidate Sartre's philosophy as a whole. Existentialism, Sartre's theory of freedom, is thus also suspended.

A specific problem is now to be examined in more detail. Sartre is of the opinion that Husserl's theory of the image is a great step forward compared to previous theories, but he also stresses that ambiguities remain. He attributes this to the fact that Husserl only worked out his theory of the picture on the side. Despite Husserl's excellent preparatory work, Sartre believes there is still much to be done.

Sartre sees ambiguities in connection with the phenomenological reduction with regard to the distinction between perception and imagination. The phenomenological reduction is a learned operation that consciously opposes the natural attitude. According to Husserl, the main difference between the learned operation and the natural attitude is the attitude towards the perceived object. In the natural setting, the real existence of the object is taken for granted. During the learned operation, however, the reality of the object is suspended and one adopts an attitude that aims at mere essence knowledge.

It is assumed that the essence of an object can be analyzed without reflecting on the ontology of this object. In this way, one hopes to avoid metaphysical problems, for example, to be able to keep away from a decision regarding realism and idealism. In this context, however, Sartre has the problem of how to distinguish between perception and imagination during the learned operation when the only criterion for differentiation is attitude, because it is the attitude we are about to give up.

Sartre also sees a problem in the fact that some of Husserl's statements can be read in such a way that the object perceived in the phenomenological reduction, the so-called Noema, is unreal. For example, Husserl writes:

\[
...\text{todos Erlebnis ist so geartet, daß die prinzipielle Möglichkeit besteht, ihm und seinen reellen Komponenten den Blick zuzuwenden und ebenso in der Gegenrichtung dem Noema, etwa dem gesehenen Baum als solchem. Das in dieser Blickstellung Gegebene ist nun zwar selbst, logisch gesprochen, ein Gegenstand, aber ein durchaus unselbständiger. Sein esse besteht ausschließlich in seinem „percipi“ – nur daß dieser Satz nichts weniger als im Berkeleyschen Sinne gilt, da das percipi das esse hier ja nicht als reelles Bestandstück enthält. (Sartre, Die Imagination, S. 236)}
\]

...every experience is of such a kind that there is the fundamental possibility to turn the gaze to it and its real components and also in the opposite direction to the Noema, for example the seen tree as such. What is given in this viewpoint is now itself, logically speaking, an object, but a quite dependent one. His esse consists exclusively in his ‘percipi’ – only that this sentence applies nothing less than in Berkeley's sense, since the percipi does not contain the esse here as a real component. (Sartre, The Imagination, p. 236, translation by Alfred Dandyk)
Husserl makes a clear distinction here between the real components of an experience and the 'Noema', the meaningful representational correlate of these real components. Consequently, it cannot be entirely wrong to describe this Noema as unreal. That's why Sartre can write:

This 'noematic sense', which belongs to every real consciousness, is itself nothing real. (Sartre, ibid., p. 235)

Sartre is of course perfectly clear about the fact that this interpretation is problematic. He himself expressly points out that Husserl clearly distinguishes between perception, fantasy, visual representation, memory and so on in the noematic correlates. (Sartre, ibid. p. 237) But that does not change the point that the facts remain unclear. That is why Sartre continues to write:

But how can you understand that? Can I animate any imaginative matter at my own discretion as perception or image? (Sartre, ibid., p. 237)

That's the point! There must be another distinguishing criterion so that the attitude is not arbitrary. And indeed: If it were only the attitude that distinguishes perception and imagination, then this attitude would be arbitrary and one could set an impressionelle matter as perception or as an image at will. This is indeed sometimes possible, for example when looking at a painting, but what about a mental image, for example the idea of a centaur?

Sartre does not really want to make theses in this context, but rather to point out problems. He wants to say here that Husserl's theory of the image is, on the one hand, a great step forward, but, on the other hand, too vague to really be able to satisfy. In this context, Sartre believes that he still has to do some educational work. For this purpose he wrote the book 'Das Imaginäre'.

Kriegel, however, is not convinced of the need for further work and invents a whole series of subtle - not to say hair-splitting - arguments to remove Sartre's concerns. He thinks that everything is clear with Husserl and that there is no reason to go beyond that or even to accept any ambiguities with Husserl.

Kriegel's arguments are based in principle on exaggerations regarding the clarity of Husserl's theory on the one hand and the theses allegedly expressed by Sartre on the other. Kriegel assumes, for example, that Sartre misinterpreted Husserl's phenomenological reduction. For this reduction contains only a suspension of the decision regarding the question of reality, but not the assertion of a definite unreality of the object. Consequently, there is indeed a postural difference within the phenomenological reduction. In terms of perception, it is a suspension of ontology, in terms of imagination, it is a definitive statement of the unreality of the object.

While Sartre actually claims that Husserl has an uncertainty about the unreality of the Noema, Kriegel assumes that this uncertainty does not exist, but that the learned operation in no way claims the unreality of the Noema, but only the suspension of the question about its reality. Sartre, however, sees this suspension as a problem when it comes to distinguishing between perception and imagination in the context of the learned operation. At this point it becomes clear that Sartre refuses to accompany Husserl's phenomenology to its bitter end. He sets his own realism against Husserl's phenomenon.

Kriegel also tries to reduce Sartre's overall argumentation, which his second book is intended to justify, to a few theses which he can then refute. Thus, he splits Sartre's argument, which refers to the perceptual-imagination conflict within the learned operation, into four subarguments:

[...] imaginative experience and neutralized perceptual experience are introspectively discriminable;
[...] there must be a phenomenal difference between them;

[...] there is no attitudinal difference between them;

[...] there must be some non-attitudinal difference between imaginative experience and neutralized perceptual experience. (Kriegel, Perception and imagination, S. 262)

Kriegel accepts the first and second thesis, but rejects the third. According to this third thesis, Sartre would clearly assert that there are no posture differences between perception and imagination in the context of phenomenological reduction. Kriegel now countered by implying Sartre’s misinterpretation of Husserl’s reduction. According to this, there is indeed a postural difference within the framework of the learned operation, namely that between the assertion of the unreality of the object in the case of imagination and the suspension of the ontological judgement in the case of perception. Therefore Sartre's argument is wrong. Consequently, there is no need for a new view of things. Consequently, Sartre's second book 'The Imaginary' is superfluous. Consequently, Sartre's theory of freedom, insofar as it is based on the concept of the imaginary, is unfounded and so on.

It should be noted that Kriegel's logical reconstruction produces no clarity, but only a pseudo-clarity. For Sartre's decisive argument does not appear in this reconstruction. Sartre says that even if there were a postural difference, it would be arbitrary if there were no reasons for it that lie outside the posture itself. For this reason, Sartre is of the opinion that a new and more in-depth investigation should be undertaken.

Kriegel's argument misses therefore the goal. He accuses Sartre of making a definitive statement against Husserl, where Sartre in fact sees only an ambiguity and vagueness in Husserl. Kriegel also ignores Sartre's real argument for the need for further investigation. This real argument is that if there are no other reasons for this attitude that are outside this attitude, then this attitude is arbitrary. The whole theory is then unsatisfactory and a new investigation is necessary.

Successful dialogue
There are also essays in the book to be discussed which the existentialist can support, for example when it comes to counteracting trivial misinterpretations of Being and Nothingness. Interpretations seem to exist that declare the 'pour-soi' as disembodied. Such interpretations make a strange impression on the existentialist, because a glance at the table of contents of Being and Nothingness would have to suffice to eliminate this error. For example, there is a chapter with the title: 'The body as being for itself: The 'factuality'. Furthermore, the table of contents shows that in Sartre's theory of consciousness the action and the situation are decisive terms for the relationship between consciousness and the world. For example, there is a chapter entitled: 'Freedom and Facticity: The Situation'.

In short: For Sartre, the consciousness of man is nothing more than the way he is in the world. For the existentialist, these are trivialities. In the context of Anglo-American consciousness theory, however, it seems to be one of the latest insights in cognitive science. This theory is called 'enactivism'. One of these cognition scientists writes:

Practically since its inception cognitive science has been committed to a very explicit set of key ideas and metaphors which can be called representationalism, for which the inside- outside distinction is the centerpiece: an outside (a feature- full world) represented inside through the action of complex perceptual devices. In
recent years there has been a slow but sure change toward an alternative orientation [which treats] mind and world as mutually overlapping, hence the qualifying terms embodied, situated, or enactive cognitive science. (Varela 1996, p. 345, emphasis in original) (Kathleen Wider, Sartre, enactivism, and the bodily nature of pre-reflective consciousness)

The existentialist is astonished and surprised. Heidegger's 'being in the world' and Sartre's 'situation' belong to the basic equipment of his thinking, so deeply that he is almost no longer aware of it and he has great problems in understanding what this is supposed to be: 'representationalism'. But at some point it dawned on him too that this must be an attempt at a naturalistic interpretation of consciousness, which is not easily in the horizon of his thinking and which will therefore repeatedly cause him difficulties in understanding. But even the existentialist can be pleased that Anglo-American philosophy has now arrived at the insight after great detours that the basic concepts of existentialism are suitable for elucidating the relationship between consciousness and being. Here the dialogue between analytical philosophy and existentialism seems to have succeeded.

Critical voices

There are also essays in the book that take a critical view of the whole dialogue between analytical philosophy and existentialism. Katherine J. Morris identifies in her essay the main obstacle to a dialogue between Anglo-American philosophy and Sartre in the different positioning of science. Anglo-American philosophy prefers a scientific view of the world, while for Sartre science is a human enterprise in the context of being in the world. The existentialist can only agree with this identification of the fundamental problem of a discussion between Anglo-American philosophy and existentialism. Because of these profound differences, Morris sees only limited scope for a dialogue between analytical philosophy and existentialism:

We have seen that Sartre and Anglo-American philosophy may be able to converse around the periphery in ways that don’t depend on resolving these fundamental differences in philosophical outlook. But, I submit, those fundamental differences in philosophical outlook make it unlikely that the dialogue can go any deeper. (Katherine J. Morris, Sartre and Anglo-American philosophy of mind)

Morris clarifies her scepticism on the basis of the concept of physicality. She distinguishes between 'Körper' and 'Leib'. Only the 'Körper' is accessible to scientific observation, but the 'Leib' is an expression of human existence. For example, if man's freedom is expressed in the harmony of physical movement or his sadness in the slackness of his posture, then it will not be possible to explain these phenomena purely naturalistically. This is an example of the limited scope of a scientific approach.

Sartre distinguishes between the body as being-for-oneself and the body as being-for-others, to name this difference. He stresses that these two types of physicality cannot be reduced to each other, but must be seen as complementary perspectives.

Naturalism, on the other hand, would have to interpret the 'Leib' as a 'Körper', i.e. it would have to explain scientifically the nature of the special human being to exist his body. However, it is completely unrecognizable how this should be possible. One can, of course, like Williford, bet that the natural sciences will solve such questions in the future. An existentialist would answer, however,
that even Kierkegaard, referring to Fichte, has mocked the system, which is not yet finished, but will certainly be finished soon. Maybe next week.

A serious dialogue would require agreement on such fundamental issues: Are there phenomena that cannot be explained with the help of the natural sciences? For the existentialist at least it is clear that such phenomena exist. Existentialism is even based on this assumption. A deeper discussion between analytical philosophy and existentialism will only be possible if such fundamental questions are included. When reading the book one often gets the impression that this circling around detailed questions is only an escape from the basic problems.

Kierkegaard and Sartre
Iker Garcia Plazaola seems to be of the same opinion when he postulates a deep affinity between Sartre's theory of consciousness and Kierkegaard's philosophy of existence. Both philosophers emphasize the scientific inexplicability of the individual. Plazaola points out that the usual idea of the nature of the individual, which he also finds in the context of Anglo-American philosophy, is incompatible with that of existentialism. This is also a fundamental question that must be discussed in advance. Is the concept of the individual in the sense of existentialism somehow integrable into the thinking of analytical philosophy? As long as this has not been clarified, all detailed discussions about the nature of pre-reflective consciousness, for example, are futile efforts:

We typically think of the concepts of instance and kind as interrelated: an instance of a kind is an individual item that belongs to a given category that includes (if not factually, at least conceptually) further individuals. In the case of consciousness and subjectivity, I take Sartre and Kierkegaard to argue, this doesn’t hold: they constitute an ontological category of its own that undercuts the interrelation between instance and kind. (Plazaola, Sartre and Kierkegaard)

Usually the word 'individual' is interpreted in the sense of a specimen of a genus. If one interprets human beings biologically, then the human individual is a specimen of the biological genus human, i.e. a mammal. Plazaola points out that Kierkegaard and Sartre mean something else with the word 'individual'. They are aimed at the unique and unmistakable person who can be understood humanly but cannot be scientifically explained. You don’t understand the individual Martin Heidegger if you see him as a mammal. This does not mean that Martin Heidegger was not a mammal, it just means that one has not grasped the essential individuality of Martin Heidegger with this designation.

Behind this, of course, is the basic statement of existentialism: in humans the existence precedes the essence. The biological genus 'human being' becomes an individual by inventing itself. Personalizing is not the genre, but the individual design of the self.

It should be added, however, that for Sartre every self-design is also a world-design. This means that the self-design of the individual binds the whole of humanity, so that the individual bears the responsibility for all people. This duplicity of freedom and responsibility at Sartre reflects the relationship between sin and original sin at Kierkegaard. This fact also confirms the affinity between Kierkegaard and Sartre. It goes without saying that there are also great differences between these two thinkers.

In existentialism, therefore, it is not the genre that determines the individual, but the individual who has the meaning of the word "human". It is clear that these ideas of existentialism are a mockery of a scientific view of the world. But a strict rejection of these ideas would make the discussion with existentialism impossible. I think Plazaola wants to say that these are the crucial questions.
Local affinities and global differences
In her article, author Kathrin J. Morris rightly claims, that a dialogue between the Anglo-American way of philosophy and existentialism in the sense of Sartre can only be superficial as long as this dialogue does not include the really fundamental differences. One of these abysses is the difference between a scientific and an existentialist world view. The scientific world view is reductionist, the existentialist world view is anti-reductionist.

Existentialism in the sense of Sartre claims that consciousness cannot be scientifically explained. Rather, it is the prerequisite for all explanations. It can be regarded as the result of a metaphysical principle, which Sartre calls 'the ontological act'. This ontological act corresponds to an internal negation of being, the result of which is the 'pour-soi'. This 'pour-soi' is contingent, that is, it cannot be explained by the 'en-soi', neither scientifically nor dialectically. It's something fundamentally new.

On the other hand, the scientific view is that consciousness can be reduced to the "en-soi", i.e. there are states of the "en-soi" from which one can derive the "pour-soi" according to certain principles. An example of this would be neurocentrism, which argues that consciousness can be reduced to a certain form of existence of the brain.

One of these reductionist theories is the so-called HOT theory of consciousness, to which Rocco J. Gennaro refers in his essay 'The "of" of intentionality and acquaintance'. Gennaro sees certain affinities between his HOT theory and Sartre's philosophy. He writes:

*I hope I have shown, however, that one can usefully bring together Sartre’s theory and a reductionist version of HOT theory in an effort to make sense of ubiquitous pre-reflective self-awareness. (Gennaro, The “of” of intentionality and acquaintance, S. 337)*

Regardless of whether or not there are real affinities between Sartre and HOT theory, one can certainly say that Sartre's philosophy and a reductionist version of HOT cannot be brought together, for Sartre's existentialism is a priori anti-reductionist and must therefore be incompatible with any reductionist theory, this theory is now called HOT or otherwise.

The point is that a reductionist theory wants to explain man's being-in-the-world, while existentialism, by definition, assumes that every scientific theory corresponds to a certain behavior of being-in-the-world, that is, presupposes the world-being of man.

In short: It is impossible for man to explain his own being in the world, because every explanation, including scientific explanation, presupposes this being in the world. A scientific world view thus corresponds to the postulate of an objective world eye, a pure spirit or a divine view of the world, while being in the world just denies the realizability of such beings.

The conclusion is that even if local affinities exist between existentialism and a reductionist theory, the global view prevents the identification of these theories. Before such points have been discussed, a dialogue between Anglo-American philosophy and existentialism in the sense of Sartre will always move on the surface, as Katherine J. Morris rightly noted.

Sartre - a Caricature
In the book to be discussed here, these basic questions are usually avoided. Perhaps because they are not considered worthy of discussion? The problem with this evasion, however, is that no consensus can be reached on detailed issues. They try to solve marginal problems without taking into
account the metaphysical and ontological prerequisites of Sartre's philosophy. So the basics are missing and Sartre's terms seem to be obscure.

The task of Analytical Philosophy is then seen to clarify the confusion of concepts of existentialism and to draw up a ranking list of obscurities. In the end, it is time to make your own proposals, often to say the opposite of what Sartre said. An example of this is Joshua Tepley's essay. You will find the following sentence there:

> Setting these questions aside for now, let us turn our attention to Sartre's concept of the ego, which is even more obscure than his concept of consciousness. (Joshua Tepley, Sartre’s non-egological theory of consciousness)

Tepley wants to elucidate the relationship between the ego and the consciousness at Sartre. He refers to *Transcendence of the Ego* and to *Being and Nothingness*. He points out the differences between these two works and concludes that Sartre is wrong in every respect, for Tepley's thesis is that consciousness is inhabited by a subject and that this subject is the ego.

For the existentialist, the problem now is to judge this inversion of Sartre's philosophy. He must admit that this task was difficult for him. You can't say that Tepley's argument is wrong. Rather, his theses are inadequate. These theses do not fit Sartre's philosophy. The honest effort to translate Sartre's remarks into a language he understands may well be conceded to Tepley. The question is whether this attempt at dialogue will result in more than empty talk in the end.

According to the existentialist, the main source of understanding problems is a lack of hermeneutic competence. Hermeneutic competence consists in conforming as closely as possible to the author's thinking, trying to do justice to him, to understand what he wanted to say. Hermeneutic competence is the preferred way the lover approaches the author. Tepley sees himself more as a scientist. For the scientist the scientific discourse is in the foreground. The scientific discourse deals with the available secondary literature.

This type of discourse may conflict with hermeneutic competence, because the actual goal of understanding the author must retreat before the goal of the discourse, to discuss the opinion of scientists about the author. The problem of finding an adequate interpretation is thus enormously complicated. This problem can be clearly felt in Tepley's essay:

> If my interpretation of Morris's interpretation of Sartre is correct, then it is certainly true that the ego and the body-subject are numerically distinct, for the body-subject is a substance, not a property. (Tepley, ebenda)

Tepley's goal here is to elucidate the relationship between ego and consciousness in Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. To this end, however, he does not examine Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, but Phyllis Morris' interpretation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. This is perfectly legitimate in the context of a scientific discourse. For the existentialist, however, the situation is considerably complicated. Because now he has to ask himself the following questions:

- Is Phyllis Morris' interpretation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* correct?
- Is Joshua Tepley's interpretation of Phyllis Morris' interpretation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* correct?
- Is the Existentialist's interpretation of Joshua Tepley's interpretation of Phyllis Morris' interpretation of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* correct?

One wonders why Tepley does not directly discuss Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*. Why the detour via Morris? Is Tepley perhaps one of those scientists who cannot be expected to make their way
through the semantic jungle of *being and nothingness*? What if Phyllis Morris’ interpretation is wrong? Then what’s Tepley’s essay worth? This example illustrates why the existentialist believes that hermeneutic competence and scientific discourse can contradict each other in certain cases.

For further clarification, a specific problem will be discussed here. Tepley develops a fundamental difference between Sartre’s *The Transcendence of the Ego* (TE) and Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness* (BN). This difference should consist in the fact that there is no subject of consciousness in TE, while Sartre accepts such a subject in BN:

1. there is no subject of consciousness, from which it follows that the ego is not the subject of consciousness; and
2. there is a subject of consciousness, but the ego and it are numerically distinct. As I read him, Sartre holds (1) in *The Transcendence of The Ego* and (2) in *Being and Nothingness*. (Tepley, ebenda)

The existentialist must now ask himself whether Sartre's position can actually be reflected by means of this clear and unambiguous formulation of Tepley. Basically, the quest for clarity in analytical philosophy must be acknowledged. But what if the facts are not as clear as one would like them to be? With regard to the concept of a subject, Sartre's terminological ambiguity, both in TE and in BN, is more to speak of than clearly formulated theses. For example, Sartre writes in TE:

> At present I chop wood, that is, that the action is realized in the world and the concept I [Je-concept] is the objective and empty support of this action. (Sartre, ibd.)

The question of whether or not there is a subject of consciousness in TE can only be answered by clarifying the meaning of the word 'subject' beforehand. For example, if by 'subject' we mean the 'Je-concept', then such a subject also exists at least facultatively in TE. However, if by 'subject' we mean the 'transcendental ego' in Husserl's sense or the 'deep ego' in Bergson's sense or the substance ego in Descartes' sense, then there is no subject of consciousness.

The word 'subject' can mean a label to designate the unity of an action. For example, when someone says: 'I chop wood'. But the word 'subject' can also mean the source of consciousness, which is the case with Husserl's 'transcendental Ego'. Or it can mean a substance which is the case with Descartes. Therefore the statement 'there is a subject of consciousness' means nothing as long as the question of the meaning of this word has not been clarified.

Also in BN the situation is not as clear as Tepley suggests. It seems, for example, that Sartre prefers the concept of subjectivity rather than that of a subject; in any case, depending on the context, Sartre's terminology is somewhat indeterminate:

> Thus we would have reached the ontological basis of knowledge, the first being to whom all other phenomena appear, the absolute to which every phenomenon is relative. This is not the subject in the Kantian sense of the word, but it is the subjectivity itself, the immanence of itself to itself. (Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 28)

Here Sartre specifies his concept of subjectivity. This subjectivity has the following characteristics:

- It is the being to which all other phenomena appear
- It is the absolute in relation to which all phenomena are relative
- It is the immanence of itself to itself
- It is not the subject in Kant's sense
Whatever may be the meaning of these designations, they show that for Sartre the words 'subjectivity' and 'subject' are problematic. In particular, a distinction must be made between subjectivity and the subject and, above all, between the different versions of the subject concept of different philosophers.

This fact shows the problem in Tepley's formulation. This is not to say that Tepley's formulation is wrong, but that it is too simple in relation to Sartre's statements. It seems that Tepley is inclined to simplify the matter in his quest for clarity. The question remains: what does Tepley mean with the word 'subject'. In other words: Tepley's seemingly crystal-clear formulation conceals a thousand ambiguities. This kind of rational reconstruction produces no clarity, but only a kind of pseudo-clarity.

This impression is reinforced when one considers that Sartre has to distinguish between the natural attitude of 'being in the world' and the learned operation of the 'phenomenological reduction'. One must therefore distinguish between the 'empirical consciousness' and the 'transcendental reflection' during the suspension of worldliness.

In terms of the empirical consciousness, Tepley's statements about Sartre's thinking do not at all agree with those of Sartre. Because Sartre writes:

\[
\text{As ego we are subjects de facto and de jure, active and passive, willingly acting, possible objects of a judgement of value or responsibility. (Sartre, ibid., p. 307)}
\]

Obviously, Sartre claims in BN that there is not only an empirical subject, but that it is even identical to the ego. He formulates Tepley's thesis, which Tepley uses as an argument against Sartre. Obviously there are fundamental misunderstandings here. The reason for these misunderstandings is that Tepley does not sufficiently address the requirements of Sartre's philosophy. He simply tries to grasp Sartre's thinking with the prerequisites of his own philosophy. However, such an attempt is doomed to failure.

One could argue that Tepley does not refer to the empirical consciousness, but to the transcendental consciousness. But there is also an intimate connection between the subjectivity of consciousness and the ego with regard to transcendental consciousness. Because of this intimate connection it is at least questionable whether one should speak of a numerical difference here. This becomes clear in the following text of Sartre:

\[
\text{But the ego is by no means the personalizing pole of consciousness, but on the contrary, consciousness in its fundamental selfhood makes possible under certain conditions the appearance of the ego as the transcendent phenomenon of this selfhood. (Sartre, ibid., p. 212)}
\]

According to this, Sartre claims the following theses:

- The person is not the source of consciousness
- Consciousness corresponds to a fundamental selfhood
- This fundamental selfhood of consciousness enables the appearance of the ego under certain conditions
- The ego is the transcendent phenomenon of the fundamental selfhood of consciousness

Accordingly, there is a 'fundamental selfhood' of consciousness and the ego is the 'transcendent phenomenon' of this selfhood. If one compares this text with Tepley's statement that there is a subject, but that it is numerically different from the ego, one recognizes a certain similarity, which nevertheless seems to be inadequate. Sartre says that the ego is the 'transcendent phenomenon' of
this selfhood. So the question is rather whether the transcendent phenomenon of selfhood is numerically different from this selfhood or whether the connection is so intimate that one should better speak of an internal differentiation of one being.

The problem in Tepley's essay is that his remarks are somehow not quite wrong, but somehow not quite right either. He cultivates the art of "talking past each other". Thus he places the word "subject" in the foreground, although this word does not enjoy this prominent position in Sartre's thinking. He attaches particular importance to the fact that the subject and the ego are numerically different, although Sartre does not say something like this anywhere in this clarity.

In the background of this difficulty lies the problem of numerical identities. Questions of numerical identity cannot be solved simply with a yes/no decision. It is also a question of choosing an aspect that then determines whether it is a system with two objects or an object with a corresponding internal differentiation.

Sartre, for example, distinguishes between the pre-reflective and the reflective consciousness. In purely conceptual terms, there are therefore two types of consciousness. Existentially, however, according to Sartre, there is only one consciousness with a corresponding internal differentiation. Counting therefore requires a prior clarification of the perspective.

In addition, it should be borne in mind that Sartre's consciousness is not a fixed identity, but a lack of identity. The lack of consideration for this fact is one reason for Tepley's incomprehension of Sartre's philosophy. Because it must always be taken into account that man is a being that can question itself, that is, a being that can suspend its own essence. I do not believe that this problem should be addressed by confirming or rejecting numerical identities.

The deeper reason for this "talking past each other" is that Tepley assumes a completely different view of the world than Sartre. Since in his essay he does not engage in Sartre's ontological prerequisites, but instead tries to force Sartre's approach into the corset of analytical philosophy on the basis of his world view by means of concept analyses, he creates a caricature of Sartre. This dialogue also seems to have failed.

### Trivialisation

Formulations on Sartre's theory of consciousness, which are acceptable within analytical philosophy, are often inadequate in Sartre's world of thought. If, on the other hand, they are formulations that are adequate in the sense of Sartre, then they often seem unacceptable to the analytical philosopher. The reason for this is that both mindsets are based on different world views.

In some essays of the book to be discussed there is an attempt to trivialize this profound difference. One gives the impression that it is only a matter of finding the right formulation in one's own language world. Once this formulation has been found, it is hoped that Sartre can be judged. Perhaps the real problem, however, is that the world views are so different that mere reformulations are not enough. Maybe you have to be able to change your point of view.

The existentialist believes that this is an important problem that stands in the way of a deeper dialogue. Sartre's metaphysical and ontological approaches are difficult to integrate into analytical philosophy. His thinking is perhaps more abysmal than some followers of the analytical direction can imagine.

The basic concepts at Sartre are the 'en-soi' and the 'pour-soi'. The principle of the 'en-soi' is the identity and the principle of the 'pour-soi' is the lack of identity. That's why Sartre says consciousness
suffers from a lack of coincidence with itself. Analytical philosophy can hardly accept this approach because of its logical self-image. Instead, one tries to grasp Sartre's concept of consciousness without this principle by choosing formulations that seem less absurd. But as much as one turns and turns, one will always come across Sartre's absurd formulation.

An example can be found in Daniel R. Rodriguez Navas' essay. He distinguishes between a 'standard reading' of Sartre's theory of consciousness and his own interpretation. The standard reading claims:

\[
\text{[...]} \text{that consciousness necessarily involves at least some form of self-awareness.}
\]

(Navas, Does consciousness necessitate self-awareness?)

Navas continues to write:

\[
\text{In this chapter I will present my reasons for thinking that the standard reading is wrong and explain why this should matter to us. (Navas, ebenda)}
\]

His arguments lead to the conclusion:

\[
\text{Sartre's point, to insist, is not that consciousness necessarily involves some form of self-awareness.” (Navas, ebenda)}
\]

Navas sharpens Sartre's theory of consciousness by reducing it to the following alternative:

- Consciousness necessarily includes a kind of self-awareness (standard reading).
- Consciousness does not necessarily include a kind of self-awareness (reading according to Navas)

Nava's arguments for the second reading are convincing. However, the existentialist suspects that defenders of the standard reading can also offer convincing arguments. The reason for this is again that Sartre is not clear about this. The problem here is the same as with Tepely: once again, for reasons of clarity, a philosopher of the analytical direction tries to ascribe to Sartre a statement that cannot be found in this unambiguousness in Sartre. Let's take a typical formulation of Sartre:

\[
\text{But the ego is by no means the personalizing pole of consciousness, but on the contrary, consciousness in its fundamental selfhood makes possible under certain conditions the appearance of the ego as the transcendent phenomenon of this selfhood. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 212)}
\]

Sartre speaks here of the 'fundamental selfhood' of consciousness and distinguishes it from the ego. The question now is what one would like to understand by the word 'self-awareness'. If this means 'fundamental selfhood', then there is obviously a need for 'self-awareness' in consciousness. If, on the other hand, by 'self-awareness' one means the ego, then it is not necessary, but only appears on occasion.

The unambiguous statements in the sense of Navas' seem somehow inappropriate. It would perhaps be more appropriate, in the sense of hermeneutic competence, to find out what Sartre could have meant by the 'fundamental selfhood' of consciousness and then decide whether it would be appropriate to interpret this fundamental selfhood in the sense of 'self-awareness' or not.

Sartre uses the word 'fundamental selfhood' and he clearly says that this fundamental selfhood belongs to every form of consciousness. However, Navas problematizes the word 'self-awareness' and tries to sharpen Sartre's concept of consciousness to the dichotomy of an affirmation or a negation of the necessity of such 'self-awareness'. So in a way, the problem is self-inflicted. Similar to
Tepley, who focuses on the word 'subject', Navas tries to capture Sartre's philosophy through the word 'self-awareness'. That's not Sartre's fault, it's the responsibility of Navas.

The crucial problem, however, is that the central concept of Sartre's theory of consciousness is the lack of identity. This means that any form of 'self-awareness' is contaminated with vagueness and is therefore open to question. This problem seems to be ignored by Navas in his clear formulations.

Sartre's position in the history of philosophy

The existentialist believes that these problems cannot be solved by common sense and logical concept analysis. An answer can probably only be found in the history of philosophy. You have to know the historical context in which Sartre argues. Only then will the meaning of his arguments be revealed. This identifies another fundamental problem in the relationship between analytical philosophy and existentialism: Sartre argues in the context of the history of philosophy. Analytical philosophy tries to detach itself from this context and to deal with the problems at hand with the means of its own tools. Understanding problems are inevitable.

Sartre's concern is to mediate between Descartes' and Husserl's philosophy of consciousness on the one hand and Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's philosophy of existence on the other. His thinking thus resembles a commute between the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of existence, without it being clearly assigned to one direction. This is probably an important reason for the interpretation difficulties mentioned.

Sartre supports the functional aspect of the Cogito that Descartes and Husserl have developed. By means of radical doubt, phenomenological reduction and epoché, the researcher is able to free himself from anything doubtful until the epistemological fundamentum inconcussum is reached: the Cogito. The problem in the 'I think' is the 'I'. Descartes interprets it substantially and emphasizes that this substantial ego cannot produce itself. That is why God becomes the Creator and Sustainer of this Ego. Husserl and Sartre equally reject this theistic interpretation.

Husserl's great discovery is the intentionality of consciousness, the fact that every consciousness is consciousness of something. Husserl first defines consciousness through intentionality. Sartre adopts this term with great enthusiasm. However, there remains a problem: the Ego. Already Descartes has failed to solve this problem, as Sartre says.

During the course of his existence as a researcher, Husserl became uncertain about the intentionality of consciousness. For it cannot be denied that this consciousness, whatever it is directed at, contains a selfhood. According to Sartre, Husserl chooses the wrong solution and betrays his principle of intentionality: he introduces the transcendental ego as a source of consciousness.

Sartre's concern is now to preserve Husserl's intentionality and at the same time to eliminate the transcendental ego. The reason for this lies in the influence that the existential philosophers Heidegger and Kierkegaard had exerted on him in the meantime. Because one must bear in mind that Heidegger totally rejected the concept of consciousness of Descartes and Husserl and introduced the concept of existence, which means an immediate being-in-the world without consciousness. Existence is a being of distance, which gives itself meaning from the things of the world. The 'identity' of existence therefore lies in the things and facts of the world and not in some source of consciousness.
Sartre now tries to mediate between Husserl's theory of consciousness and Heidegger's theory of existence. While Heidegger claims that existence is 'to be in the world', Sartre says that human reality corresponds to 'having consciousness of being in the world.'

Husserl's concept of intentionality fits perfectly with Heidegger's existence, while the transcendental ego contradicts it. For if there were a transcendental ego, it would be difficult to understand how existence could be a being of distance. For then the identity of consciousness would lie in this transcendental ego. The core of consciousness would then be an opaque entity, which would be the source of consciousness, but itself something other than this consciousness.

For this reason Sartre eliminates the transcendental ego to clear the way for a connection between Husserl's consciousness and Heidegger's existence. For Sartre, therefore, consciousness is an ego-less entity that witnesses the things of the world. It derives its own identity from this testimony to the things of the world. However, it finds its identity by establishing that it is not these things. So it is a question of a diminished identity, of an identity in diversity. Consciousness exists as a lack of identity.

An essential structural feature of Sartre's consciousness is therefore the lack of identity. It corresponds to Heidegger's existence, but is an intentional consciousness as with Husserl. If you want, you can see a contradiction in Sartre's approach right from the start. But one can also assume a fruitful tension between Husserl and Heidegger within Sartre's philosophy.

From this approach it follows that the fundamental selfhood of consciousness lies in being consciousness of things by witnessing these things in the way not being these things. Consciousness therefore corresponds to an internal negation of being. Fundamental selfhood is the unity ground of consciousness, but this unity ground is not in consciousness or at the source of consciousness, but in the distance, in the connection between the testimony of the world and the not-being this world. Without the world consciousness would be pure Nothingness.

Sartre repeatedly refers to this identity-forming force of the 'en-soi' within human reality, both in TE and in BN:

Consciousness is defined by intentionality. Through intentionality it transcends itself, unites itself by escaping itself. (Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 44)

Consciousness unites itself by escaping itself, Sartre writes. Consciousness is outside with things and by being outside with things and thus fleeing from itself, it unites itself. This is Sartre's paradoxical train of thought. For example, if you add two and two, many acts of consciousness are involved. However, the unit reason of these operations is the transcendent object "two and two is four":

Without the permanence of this eternal truth it would be impossible to grasp a real unity, and there would be as often irreducible operations as operative consciousness. (Sartre, ibd., p. 44)

Here lies the deep meaning of the identity of the 'en-soi' for the unity of consciousness. The reason for this unity of consciousness is the identity of the 'en-soi', which plays into human reality and which prevents the lack of identity, which fundamentally characterizes consciousness, from transforming into a mere nothing. The consciousness, suffering from a lack of identity, clings to the transcendent world so that it does not fall into the abyss of nothing.

The being of consciousness corresponds to a participation in the being of the 'en-soi' and consciousness unites itself by lending a meaning to itself through this participation. So even the consciousness of something is connected with a fundamental selfhood, which in turn is intimately connected with world consciousness.
It is now a question of language usage whether one wants to call this fundamental selfhood a 'self-awareness' or not. Sartre illustrates the facts of the case with the example of thirst:

Thirst can therefore be transcended onto the glass of which it is consciousness, and as a correlate of this possible non-thetical consciousness, the drank glass haunts the full glass as its possible and constitutes it as a glass to be drunk. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 214)

This text reveals essential structures of Sartre's theory of consciousness. First of all, the consciousness of something is an experience consciousness, that is, it is primarily suffered and enjoyed before it is recognized. The experience of thirst is directly interwoven with world consciousness; for thirst transcends to the full glass, as Sartre expresses himself. Moreover, the thirst consciousness interwoven with world consciousness is a temporal consciousness, for the full glass is haunted by the emptied glass as its possibility. This visitation constitutes the full glass as a glass to be emptied.

The fundamental selfhood is experienced here as an intimate pre-reflective giving of meaning in relation to the things of the world with regard to one's own existence. This intimate connection between world consciousness and self-consciousness is direct, immediate. It does not have to be produced first. It belongs to the "being-in-the-world" of man:

So the world is mine by nature, insofar as it is a correlate en-soi of nothing, that is, the necessary obstacle behind which I find myself as what I am in the form of 'having it to be'. (Sartre, ibid., p. 214)

The world thus appears in the light of selfhood; it appears as a correlate of what I have to be. It is the necessary obstacle that I have to overcome in order to realize myself. World and selfhood are therefore not independent entities, but they form a unit of reference:

Without the world no selfhood, no person; without the selfhood, without the person, no world. (Sartre, ibid., p. 214)

These formulations of Sartre describe his statement that intentional consciousness is at the same time consciousness (of) itself. The thirst is consciousness of thirst and the thirst consciousness is at the same time world consciousness, because the full glass is interpreted as a glass to be drunk out and the thirst consciousness is thus reflected in the world, so that one can say that the conscious man finds himself in the world, and that he finds himself in the form of a future draft of himself, which is at the same time a future draft of the world. World consciousness is therefore also self-consciousness; if you want: 'self-awareness'.

Sartre also speaks of the 'circle of selfhood', which means that world consciousness and self consciousness form a unit of reference. This fact speaks for the standard reading and against Navas, if one wants to interpret the described fact of the entanglement of world consciousness and self consciousness as 'self-awareness'.

Here lies a decisive point of Sartre's theory of consciousness: his proximity to Heidegger's philosophy of existence demands that an intimate relationship be assumed between self-conscious and world consciousness, so that these two types of consciousness must be regarded as an identity in diversity. This fact is also expressed in the following quotation:

[...] consciousness is a being which is concerned in his being about his being, insofar as this being implies something different than it itself. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 37)
This formulation reveals Sartre's attempt to interweave existential philosophy and philosophy of consciousness. From the philosophy of consciousness he adopts the idea of intentionality; for the being of consciousness implies another thing. At the same time, consciousness is about being of itself. In other words, consciousness testifies to the otherness of the world in order to gain identity for itself. In short: According to Sartre, the testimony of the objective world is always connected with a subjective self-expression. Self-consciousness, however, is pre-reflective. It is primarily experienced, suffered and enjoyed, but not recognized. The reflective awareness of knowledge is retrospective.

The intimate relationship between world consciousness and self-consciousness can also be illustrated by the concept of meaning. The 'en-soi' is without sense. The meaning comes only through man to the 'en-soi'. The world is the 'en-soi' equipped with sense. This sense always involves the subjectivity of consciousness.

The full glass in itself has no sense. Only through man's thirst does it become a glass to be emptied. Only through man does it receive an "in-order-to". The basic statement of existentialism is that the world always has a pre-reflective "in-order-to". Self-consciousness and world-consciousness are therefore inextricably intertwined, because the world always appears as meaningful.

In the pre-reflective consciousness of natural attitudes, subjectivity and objectivity are neither clearly distinguished from each other nor are they identical. There is a fundamental ambiguity here: it is an identity in diversity. There is a self-awareness of consciousness that allows the realization that it is my consciousness. This selfhood is not based on the existence of a substantial being at the source of consciousness, but on the individuality of the perspective on the world, whereby the world appears in a certain light. This light corresponds to an illumination of being, which Heidegger calls unveiling.

Thus it is clear that there is a distinct difference between the world perspective of existentialism and the scientific world outlook of analytical philosophy. The scientific world view implies the point of view of an objective world vision, i.e. an inhuman point of view, which could also be called the point of view of God.

According to Sartre, this aspect can be simulated, but not realized. In reality, the scientist is also a human being and his point of view remains a human one. There is an "in-order-to" with every perspective and this "in-order-to" prevents the 'view from nowhere'.

For example, physics is not the result of an objective view of the world, but the result of an attempt to achieve technologically useful knowledge. The 'in-order-to' is here the desire to promote the well-being of mankind through technical progress. But it may also be that behind physics is the political desire to achieve military and economic power over other societies. The 'in-order-to' of a human activity is therefore quite variable.

But this does not mean that Navas is completely wrong with his arguments. It is only to say that the facts of the case are not as clear and unambiguous as he would like to suggest. One can argue, for example, in favour of Navas's reading that he refers to transcendental consciousness, to the transcendental field that emerges after the phenomenological reduction, i.e. after the suspension of worldliness. After the bracketing of the world, selfhood would also have to disappear, so that one would have a consciousness without "self-awareness". This argument is certainly correct, because Sartre himself writes:

So we can formulate our thesis: transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It is destined to exist at any moment, without one being able to...
imagine anything in front of it. Thus every moment of our conscious life reveals to us a creatio ex nihilo. (Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 86)

Sartre characterizes transcendental consciousness as follows:

- It's an impersonal spontaneity
- It is destined to exist at any moment
- It has no other basis
- It's a creatio ex nihilo

It is indeed difficult to reconcile 'impersonal spontaneity' or 'creatio ex nihilo' with 'self-awareness'. In this respect, it is understandable for Navas to claim that Sartre by no means states the need for 'self-awareness'.

Nor can it be said that this transcendental consciousness is a mere abstraction that is meaningless for real life. For Sartre, this original impersonal consciousness is a fact and not a theoretical construction. Because he says himself:

This monstrous spontaneity seems to us to be the origin of numerous psychasthenias. (Sartre, ibid., p. 87)

In psychiatry, 'psychasthenia' is a personality disorder that is expressed in fear, disturbed self-esteem, inferiority complex, self-doubt, ego-weakness and depersonalization. If Sartre is right, then the origin of these disorders can be seen in the fact of monstrous spontaneity, which is both the origin of man's creative self-invention and the origin of the socially mediated ego constructs. But it is also the source of the threat of creative freedom to this Ego.

It is evident that Sartre's philosophy seems to be contradictory at this level of discussion. There are arguments in favour of Nava's reading and there are arguments in favour of the standard reading. Furthermore, it is clear that this 'contradiction' results from the entanglement of Heidegger's philosophy of existence and Husserl's philosophy of consciousness. It is also clear that this 'contradiction' has something to do with the difference between the natural attitude and the learned operation, which is called 'phenomenological reduction' by Husserl or 'hyperbolic doubt' following Descartes. The question is only how to deal with this 'contradiction' at Sartre. For this 'contradiction' exists because Sartre sought a balance between Husserl and Heidegger. Instead of compensation, however, he initially produced a conflict.

There are now several possibilities. You can make Sartre clearer than he is by choosing a version and claiming that this version is the right one and the other version is based on the fact that Sartre sometimes expresses himself unclearly and clumsily. One simply makes a cut and transforms the real Sartre, whose arguments are sometimes very intricate, into a splendid specimen of analytical philosophy with an easy theory of consciousness. That seems to be Navas' goal.

But one can also proceed differently, which the existentialist would like to plead for, by arguing as follows: If Sartre is contradictory here, it is because of the contradiction of human existence, which can only be elucidated if one argues intricately. For it is not to be expected from the outset that the philosophical description of human existence could be simple. The following is more likely: If the description is simple, then it is inadequate, and if it is adequate, then it is not simple. In short: one has to leave the present level of description and try to descend deeper into the abysses of Sartre's philosophy of consciousness.
As has already been stated, Sartre is of the opinion that only a modification of Heidegger’s philosophy of existence is able to adequately describe human reality. For Husserl’s theory of consciousness in itself resembles a phenomenism, that is, it is incapable of transcending itself towards the world. It lacks the en-soi-dimension of human existence. Husserl’s phenomenism may be the basis of a scientific philosophy, but one misses the concrete human reality. In contrast, Heidegger’s philosophy of existence lacks the pour-soi-dimension. With him, there is a danger that existence freezes to the en-soi.

One may now recognize the actual reason for the contradiction stated by Navas: the standard interpretation emphasizes the philosophy of existence with its close connection of world consciousness and self-consciousness, and Navas underlines the philosophy of consciousness with its emphasis on the transcendental field as an impersonal spontaneity. In the sense of Sartre, however, a combination of these two approaches is correct. How is this entanglement to be understood more precisely?

Sartre first notes that a reinterpretation of the phenomenological reduction is necessary. For Husserl’s phenomenological reduction corresponds to the attitude of a scholar, which must be clearly separated from the natural attitude. It pursues the goal of freeing itself from all that is doubtful in order to achieve the undoubted. It is about suspending world consciousness in order to attain the fundamentum inconcussum of knowledge.

Sartre confirms the possibility of such a learned operation and he also confirms the result of this process: the Cogito. As long as one confines oneself to epistemology, Sartre agrees with Descartes and Husserl: Consciousness is able to tear itself away from the world in order to confirm itself through pure reflection and an instantaneous experience of evidence and in this way one actually achieves something like an unquestionable knowledge. This insight serves above all as a bastion against senseless scepticism.

But this is only the functional aspect of phenomenological reduction. There is also an existential aspect. The great difference between Husserl and Sartre is that Husserl limits himself to the functional aspect and ignores the existential aspect. The basic statement of existentialism is that this procedure is insufficient and that it is important to consider the functional and the existential aspect together. In other words: Pure transcendental reduction is possible in the sense of abstraction, but it must be supplemented by an existential analysis if one wants to achieve concrete human reality.

Descartes already recognized this when in the Sixth Meditation he described the initial hyperbolic doubt as ‘worthy of laughter’. In the context of the abstraction of a purely epistemological point of view, the ‘cogito’ is a fundamentum inconcussum, but in consideration of the existential point of view, God cannot be rejected as ‘asylum ignorantiae’.

The question now is how this entanglement of the functional and the existential point of view is to be understood. The natural attitude and the learned operation are both possible, but they only give a limited picture of human reality. They both have to be seen together if you want to reach the fullness of human reality. Their separation is possible, but it has to be paid with the price of one-sidedness.

The existential philosophers Kierkegaard and Heidegger have already done the preparatory work for such a concretization of the approach. Kierkegaard also has a suspension of world consciousness, called suspension of ethics in his work, and he interprets this suspension of ethics as the prerequisite for the leap into the religious stage of existence. The point about Kierkegaard is that this suspension of ethics always starts from a concrete situation and is accompanied by a collateral existential phenomenon: anguish.
Heidegger also knows this suspension of the secular in the form of a sudden insight into the senselessness of the worldly and the resulting call of conscience for a resolute decision on actuality.

For Kierkegaard and Heidegger, however, it is not about the fundamentum inconcussum of knowledge, but about a new design of their own existence. In this phase of indeterminacy, which follows the suspension of worldliness, anguish emerges. The anguish of himself.

Sartre now states that only a synthesis of these two approaches can do justice to human reality:

*In the Cartesian meditations, Husserl himself makes a very vague allusion to certain psychological motives that would lead to the execution of the reduction. However, these motives seem hardly sufficient; and above all, the reduction seems to be possible only at the end of a long investigation; it thus appears as a learned operation, which gives it a kind of gratuité. (Sartre, transcendence of the ego, p. 89f)*

From an existential point of view, according to Sartre there is a certain groundlessness with regard to reduction. One wonders: 'What is this?' What's the point of this learned operation? Descartes 'laugher' from the Sixth Meditation becomes visible again. As a 'learned operation' it may still pass through, but what is the existential meaning of this operation? Husserl's allusions are not really convincing. This is where the philosophy of existence comes into play:

*If, on the other hand, the 'natural attitude' appears entirely as an effort of consciousness to escape itself by projecting itself into and merging into the I, and if this effort is never fully rewarded, if an act of simple reflection is enough for the conscious spontaneity to suddenly break away from the I and prove itself independent, then the epoché [in Sartre with Greek letters] is no longer a miracle, an intellectual method, a learned procedure: It is a fear that imposes itself and that we cannot avoid; it is at the same time a pure event of transcendental origin and an event that is always possible in our everyday life. (Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 89f)*

This text contains Sartre's reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. This reinterpretation is necessary for Sartre because the reduction seems unmotivated from an existential point of view. If everything is in order with the natural attitude, why is there such a reduction at all? Can't we just leave it at the natural setting? Sartre calls reduction in this sense a miracle, an intellectual method or a learned procedure. In any case, there is an enigma attached to it.

Sartre's answer is that the natural attitude is not all right. The natural attitude is contaminated with the unfortunate consciousness and therefore tends to question itself. In the view of Sartre, man strives to escape his own indeterminacy, to replace it with an image of himself, that is, to construct his own Ego, and to enjoy this Ego. However, this effort of man's natural attitude is not fully rewarded; disappointments and despair remain. Kierkegaard describes this process with his 'Stadien-Lehre', Heidegger with his theory of conversion from 'Uneigentlichkeit zu Eigentlichkeit'.

The point is that these forms of suspension of worldliness in the sense of the philosophy of existence reflect the real motivation for the phenomenological reduction. Sartre claims, therefore, that the real cause of the phenomenological reduction is the unfortunate consciousness in the context of natural attitudes. Doubting the truth of the insights within the framework of natural attitude is only a special variant of this unfortunate consciousness. In short: the phenomenological reduction must be seen in the context of unhappy consciousness.
For Sartre, therefore, phenomenological reduction is primarily not a learned operation, as with Husserl, but rather a reflection within the natural attitude. It involves a tearing off of the original consciousness from its own projections, from its Ego. It is the emergence of a monstrous spontaneity in the midst of the self-constructions of the Ego. In short, it is the emergence of freedom.

This freedom appears in the face of anguish. The anguish of oneself reflects the possibility of the suspension of worldliness and the associated previous presuppositions of selfhood. The point is that here too it is a kind of 'self-awareness' that consists of an intuition that the worldliness of the world can be abolished, and that this calls into question one's own previous ego.

The conclusion is that only the concept of freedom corresponds to Sartre’s theory of consciousness. Without the concept of freedom, Sartre’s theory of consciousness is meaningless. The decisive factor here is that freedom and facticity form a unit of reference. There is no freedom without facticity, at least not in the context of human reality. Man in the sense of Sartre is an ambiguous being, he is a facticity-transcendence. Freedom means the possibility of breaking away from facticity. In order to break away from facticity, there must be a facticity.

Sartre also calls this ambiguity of human reality existence. That is where the name existentialism comes from. He writes:

\[
\text{The study of non-thetic consciousness reveals a certain type of being that we want to call existence. Existence is distance to itself, distance [décalage].}
\]

\[
\text{The existing is what he is not, and is not what he is. He negates himself. He's not coincident with himself, he's pour-soi. (Sartre, Consciousness and Self-Knowledge, p.7)}
\]

The concepts of freedom and existence reveal the problematic nature of Nava’s attempt to capture Sartre’s theory of consciousness with a simple dichotomy. Can one grasp the self with such a dichotomy, if this self is in question, if there is such a self, but one is just about to distance oneself from this self? How is this dichotomy to be understood when the phenomenon of this 'self-awareness' is anguish, the anguish of radically breaking with this self?

You can see: Navas’ alternative is inadequate. The decision for or against the standard interpretation does not provide any insight into Sartre’s theory of consciousness. Such a decision simply runs into nothing. The question is not whether consciousness is personal or impersonal, but how the relationship of the impersonal aspect to the personal aspect of consciousness is to be understood. The answer is that the impersonal aspect must be understood as the freedom of consciousness also towards one’s own personality traits.

The reason is that both – the standard-interpretation and Navas’ point of view – are right and wrong at the same time. There is always a ‘self-awareness’, but this ‘self-awareness’ is questionable, it is always a ‘self-awareness’ which is illuminated by the monstrous spontaneity, it is a ‘self-awareness’ which exists in distance to itself, a ‘self-awareness’ which does not coincide with itself.

The central concepts of Sartre’s theory of consciousness are therefore: Lack of identity, presence-in-itself, freedom, anguish, existence, distance to oneself, temporality. It is unlikely to succeed to capture this delicate way of being with a simple yes-no-decision.

In the form of pure reflection, the phenomenological reduction reveals the freedom of consciousness, i.e. the independence of consciousness from the given. It is a reflective intuition of pre-reflective consciousness in relation to itself for the purpose of one’s own objectification and internalization. Pure reflection reveals a truth that is immediate and without shading, i.e. without
profiling. It reveals in a flash the pre-reflective consciousness as a monstrous, impersonal spontaneity, as a freedom from the given.

The phenomenal sign of this freedom is anguish. Anguish reveals that this event is not only a pure transcendental reflection, but a transcendental reflection intertwined with empirical existence. It is, as Sartre says, a pure transcendental event in the midst of an everyday event. It is a kind of empirical-transcendental duplicate.

Freedom, anguish and conversion

The standard example of this anguish is Kierkegaard’s Abraham. Of course, Abraham has a fundamental selfhood, a circle of selfhood that connects his self-awareness with his world-consciousness. This includes in a special way the love for his son Isaac; his life struggle is connected with this love. Nothing seems more solid than this fundamental selfhood, this Ego of Abraham. At this moment Abraham hears the voice of God commanding him to sacrifice his son. This is the monstrous spontaneity Sartre speaks of. Is there anything more foolish than this order? God wants him to kill his beloved son? Abraham rejects this senseless request resolutely.

But Abraham also senses something else: the possibility of phenomenological reduction, the possibility of tearing oneself away from the past. In front of him the transcendental field of pure reflection opens up. A question arises: ‘Is this really God speaking to me?’ And with this question appears the challenge to his entire existence. Abraham is feeling the anguish, the fear of himself, the anguish about the emergence of a new self, the creatio ex nihilo. He is feeling the possibility of the suspension of the ethical:

Abraham’s action is, ethically speaking: he wanted to murder Isaac; religiously speaking, he wanted to sacrifice Isaac. But in this contradiction lies the very fear that may rob a person of sleep; and yet, without this fear, Abraham is not who he is. (Kierkegaard, fear and trembling)

Here Kierkegaard addresses the fundamental meaning of anguish. Anguish is the counterpart of conversion and conversion is the foundation of the individual. Man only becomes an individual through the initial draft and this initial design corresponds to the creatio ex nihilo of a new self. The space of this event is the transcendental field, the impersonal spontaneity that threatens the existing selfhood and creates a new selfhood. Thus, in humans, Anguish and individuality are intertwined. Without that anguish, Abraham wouldn’t be who he is.

Such an event, a murder at God’s command, is of course only possible in a special religious atmosphere. It should be borne in mind that human sacrifice, including the sacrifice of one’s own child, is part of humanity’s wealth of experience. Iphigenia is another example. But one can also translate these experiences into the scientific way of thinking of our time and interpret them as ‘Ego disorders in psychosis’. Clinicians report so-called ‘thought insertions’ in psychotic patients. They tell us that strangers would force thoughts on them. (Andreas Heinz, Ego disorders in psychosis, p. 440)

Of course, the choice of this example is completely arbitrary. One could also mention Paul and ask how Saul became Paul. How did the relentless persecutor of Christians, the zealot for the law, in the blink of an eye become a follower of Christ? How can the Damascus experience be interpreted philosophically?

How did Augustine, the bon vivant of Hippo, become an important church father? How did the utilitarian murderer Raskolnikov become a repentant sinner? How did the Catholic Martin Luther
become the Reformer? If Sartre is right, there are no adequate explanations; it is always a 'creatio ex nihilo'.

The literature also offers many examples of radical conversion. Think of Shakespeare's Macbeth, for whom the witches prophesy he would become king of Scotland. Macbeth is sceptical at first, but then the process of reflection begins. The freedom to convert appears before his mind and with it the anguish. Macbeth is going to murder King Duncan.

Possibility of total conversion

How is the total conversion of a person possible? The historical and literary examples show sufficiently that it is possible. But how it is possible remains an open question. Sartre's answer is that a total conversion is possible at any time, because the phenomenological reduction can appear at all times as pure reflection in the course of the natural attitude of man. Man in his fundamental selfhood is always threatened by his own freedom.

Here one recognizes the advantage of Sartre's complex theory of consciousness over Heidegger's theory of existence. Heidegger also knows the entanglement of man and world. He calls this phenomenon 'inauthenticity'. For him, too, there is the conversion to 'authenticity' on the basis of a suspension of worldliness. Heidegger describes this suspension as follows:

The complete insignificance, which manifests itself in nothingness and nowhere, does not mean absence from the world, but states that what exists within the world is so completely insignificant in itself that at the bottom of this insignificance 'des Innerweltlichen', the world in its secularity only imposes itself. (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1986, page 187)

Suspension of the worldly means here, suspension of every given sense of this world, the emergence of the bare and senseless existence of things. For Heidegger, this type of suspension is the prerequisite for conversion from non-authenticity to the authentic. He interprets the tendency towards such conversion as a call of conscience for oneself.

But where this call comes from remains a mystery to Heidegger. The situation of the inauthentic man in his worldliness as a copy of the others does not actually offer any room for such a conversion. He is what he is: a copy of the others. So where does this call of conscience come from? Where does intuition for the senselessness of the world come from?

Sartre is more explicit here. For him, consciousness is freedom, lack of coincidence with himself, decompression of being. As such, consciousness in its natural attitude tends to escape itself, that is, to gain identity through projection into the 'en-soi'. However, it is always possible to break away from this constructed identity and return to its origin through pure reflection: the impersonal transcendental field of consciousness.

This shows that there is no contradiction between the two statements on the subject of 'self-awareness'. Freedom means being able to tear oneself away from the world. For there to be freedom, a world consciousness is necessary. In order to break away from my self-awareness, I need to have a self-awareness. In short: The facticity of the given is not a contradiction to the freedom from the given, but its correspondence.

One sees that the alternative established by Navas is inadequate, if one interprets it as a contradiction. In the sense of hermeneutic competence it rather leads to the core of Sartre's
philosophy. For even if one admits that there is always 'self-awareness', this does not speak against the assumption that there is no 'self-awareness' at the source of consciousness, but rather a monstrous, impersonal spontaneity. Freedom is another word for this monstrous, impersonal spontaneity and it leads to being able to break away from this 'self-awareness'.

Nava's mistake is to try to force a clear decision. One wants straightforward, simple theses and thus blocks the way for an adequate understanding of Sartre's philosophy. The reason for this lack of hermeneutic competence lies in the refusal to take Sartre's basic statement seriously: Consciousness is lack of identity; it is what it is not and it is not what it is.

The basis of consciousness is freedom. Freedom is lack of identity. Lack of identity is lack of 'self-awareness'. Lack of 'self-awareness' means having a self-awareness that is under observation and in doubt. Can one grasp such a situation with Navas' dichotomy? I don't think so!

**Simplification**

If Sartre is right, then the structure of human reality is extremely delicate. At the source of consciousness one finds an impersonal spontaneity, called freedom. Human life consists above all in gaining identity, in other words in fleeing one's own impersonal spontaneity. Sartre calls this the 'natural attitude'. Personalization is the attempt to transform the lack of identity into personal identity. This attempt is always threatened with dishonesty, because the structure of an Ego corresponds to the escape from freedom.

Sartre claims, however, that it is possible in principle for man to escape this insincerity. He calls this process 'radical conversion' and the corresponding standard of living 'authenticity'. Authenticity therefore means recognizing the structures of human reality. In this sense, insincerity would be the non-recognition of this human reality.

Sartre believes that human history to this day has been a history of insincerity, and he sees the ethical task in transforming the insincere existence of man into an authentic one. The problem, however, is how to imagine this transformation in more detail. Pierre-Jean Renaudie addresses this question in his essay 'Sartre and Cavell: opacity of self-knowledge', which answers that the meaning of Sartre's differentiation between dishonesty and authenticity is doubtful:

Sartre’s approach to self-knowledge relies on the idea that a true knowledge of oneself requires the overcoming of consciousness’ predisposition to conceal and ‘absorb’ itself in a transcendent ego. Yet, this claim seems quite counter-intuitive if we distance ourselves a little bit from Sartre’s analysis. If intentional consciousness is by nature involved in a self-concealing process through which it ‘hypnotics itself before this ego which it has constituted’, it seems that this self-concealment is part of ourselves; it defines ourselves at least as much as, and maybe more intimately than, any other character that we could ascribe to ourselves. Should we not consider that self-concealment is precisely that which makes us the kind of person we are, rather than something that would characterize our existence as inauthentic? Coming back to Sartre’s analysis of bad faith, it seems to me that the many so-called ‘inauthentic’ roles we play all throughout our life [...] disclose us to ourselves, precisely because we cannot be but actively engaged in this self-concealing process. (Pierre-Jean Renaudie, Sartre and Cavell: opacity of self-knowledge, S. 221)
Renaudie wants to make precisely the process, that Sartre describes as dishonest, the essential characteristic of human existence: the escape from freedom into the self-constructions of the ego and the concealment of this escape from itself. For Renaudie, self-knowledge and self-concealment are inextricably linked. Self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of one's own Ego, is only possible on the basis of self-concealment of one's own freedom.

In Renaudie's view, it would make more sense to describe precisely this double process of self-knowledge and self-concealment as 'authentic'. He thus asserts a decidedly anti-sartrean position. He doubts the meaning of Sartre's concept of authenticity. In doing so, he also calls into question the meaningfulness of the concept of insincerity.

Renaudie points to a problem that actually arises in the context of Sartre's philosophy. This makes him pleasantly different from some other authors of this book, whose problems with Sartre's philosophy are often based on misunderstandings or mere inventions. The relationship between insincerity and authenticity, on the other hand, is a real problem of Sartre's philosophy.

Nevertheless, the existentialist has to realize that Renaudie's solution proposal is unacceptable. This proposal is tantamount to the destruction of existentialism. For he ennobles an attitude that Sartre calls in a pejorative sense the 'spirit of seriousness'. So the question is: what attitude should we call authentic, the spirit of seriousness that Renaudie proposes, or the attitude of authenticity in the sense of Sartre?

One can agree with Renaudie to the extent that the efforts of consciousness to escape itself correspond to the 'nature' of man. One can also agree with the assertion that to a certain extent the self-concealment of freedom meets the person's self-knowledge. For self-knowledge is in a way a confirmation of one's own identity, while the recognition of freedom would be a questioning of one's own identity. Renaudie therefore argues for a consolidation of his own identity, while Sartre advocates a weakening of this identity. One has to admit that Renaudie's view comes closer to the common notion of 'authenticity'.

In this respect, Renaudie pleads for the natural attitude of consciousness to be declared authentic. This view seems plausible at first. What could be more authentic than acknowledging one's 'nature'? Sartre's point, however, is that this attitude is not true, and Sartre continues to believe that one should not escape the truth in reality. This is also a moral problem.

The natural attitude will also lead to psychological and moral problems, and Sartre believes it is beneficial to address these problems by facing the truth. These problems can relate both to the personal way of life and to the history of mankind. Moreover, it is very problematic for Sartre to ignore or marginalize a truth once it has been recognized, because that would be a kind of cynicism.

Imagine, for example, a person whose ego is dominated by an inferiority complex and who suffers greatly from this complex. At the same time, this person hides from himself that his inferiority has been chosen by himself, that is, that he is responsible for his freedom. What is authentic now: the adherence to his self-constructed complex or the attempt to discover the truth, namely to come to the insight that the inferiority complex corresponds to a self-choice?

One can also think of a historical phenomenon such as Anti-Semitism. Sartre describes in detail how Anti-Semitism solidifies in a person in search of his identity over time, because he experiences this definition as a relief from his own freedom. Is the one who stands by his anti-Semitism like a fixed characteristic authentic, or is the one who puts a question mark behind his own choice authentic? Renaudie tries to replace a big problem of human reality with a simple solution. He says, if man has the natural inclination to construct an ego, why not stand by that inclination? Sartre's answer is: It is
better to recognize the origin of this inclination by means of catharsis and to arrive at a purified attitude towards his self-constructed nature on this basis.

The natural attitude has a tendency to dishonesty, because it understands one’s own person in a spirit of seriousness, i.e. suffers from the self-concealment of one’s own freedom. Sartre understands authenticity as a purified attitude that puts a question mark over one’s own person from the point of view of freedom, without wanting to deny the importance of personalizing the individual. Sartre’s authenticity is a kind of ambiguity in relation to his own identity. As Kierkegaard states: Human being is a relationship that relates to itself.

It is about gaining a purified attitude towards oneself. This gives people room to relate to themselves. Sartre says one should use this room and avoid the spirit of seriousness that disregards this scope.

Renaudie, on the other hand, clearly relies on the power of natural attitude. He’s simplifying human reality, because he neglects the possibility of phenomenological reduction. He thus marginalizes important insights of consciousness theory, such as the transcendental field in Husserl and the monstrous spontaneity in Sartre. He denies the phenomenon of fear, which is of great importance in the context of existential philosophy. Renaudie’s 'suggestions for improvement' are therefore a trivialisation of Sartre’s philosophy.

Pour-soi-pour-autrui

Sometimes the simplification consists of describing Sartre’s philosophy correctly on the one hand, but trivializing it with a suggestion for improvement on the other. The advantage of such a trivialisation is obvious. A concept that is difficult to analyse, such as Sartre’s authenticity, is transformed into a clear and simple programme. This can be easily represented, while Sartre’s concept appears vague. The existentialist can only oppose such trivializations with the view that they may be clear, but that they are inadequate.

Another way of simplification is to impute a simplified position to Sartre and then contradict it. This type of simplification can be found in Anna Ciaunica’s essay 'A developmental perspective'. The topic here is the clarification of the concept of the 'Pre-reflective Consciousness'.

Ciaunica points out that empirical research in recent years confirms the phenomenological theory of consciousness, especially the concept of intentional consciousness. She also points out that the perspective on the development of children is particularly well suited to elucidating structures of consciousness.

In this respect, it can be said that Anna Ciaunicas has made a very interesting and enlightening contribution. However, their reference to Sartre is problematic because it assumes positions that Sartre does not take in this simplified form. Here, too, one must - unfortunately - express the suspicion that a caricature was created only for the purpose of being able to contradict it in the end. To clarify this criticism of Ciaunica's essay, the following quote is intended:

I have summoned recent developmental findings on the primacy of social versus visual perspective taking to support the idea that, at the basic level, pre-reflective self-awareness is experienced first and foremost as other-relatedness rather than self-centered or first-person „for-me-ness.“ [...] This suggest, against Sartre (1943), that my-being-for-others is not primarily experienced as an external dimension of being or as an existential “alienation” or as an experience in which I
am pre-reflectively aware that I am a visible object for another. Rather than two distinct objects of each other’s visual awareness, my-being-for-others is primarily experienced as co-awareness, i.e., an essentially shared dimension of being (Rochat 2004). (Anna Ciaunica, A developmental perspective, S. 433)

Ciaunica distinguishes here between two types of 'for-me-ness': the first position, which includes a relationship to the other, and the second position, which is egocentric. Ciaunica emphasizes that in toddlers the reference to the other dominates. With these children, there is above all a social co-consciousness that precedes the visual perception of the object-other. She concludes that this empirical result contradicts Sartre's 'being for the other' because this 'being for the other' means an external alienation of the subject from itself.

The existentialist must point out that this interpretation of Sartre's theory of the other, in this exaggerated simplicity, is wrong. Rather, the empirical results reported by Ciaunica agree very well with Sartre's theory of the other.

Ciaunica differentiates between a social co-perception and a visual object perception. She notes that empirical findings prove the priority of social co-perception. With regard to Sartre, she seems to suggest that Sartre, on the other hand, gives priority to visual object perception. She supports this interpretation of Sartre's theory of the other by referring to his description of a shame experience from 'Being and Nothingness'.

This shame experience is actually based on being seen visually. It is also true that the examples chosen by Sartre are mainly visual. Nevertheless, the conclusion that Sartre's theory of the other is based on being seen visually is wrong. Rather, it is a theory of general social interaction.

First of all, it is obvious that Sartre's 'becoming seen' is not bound to the visual realm. It can be any experience that reveals being an object, for example a crackling in the background or a rustling in the bushes, thus an acoustic experience. Another sensual experience, for example the stroking of the body by the other, would have the same effect: the perception of being an object.

But even these examples do not reflect the depth of Sartre's analyses. For Sartre, the other is an aspect of my own consciousness. For him, the other is part of the Cogito, which sets him apart from both Descartes and Heidegger. Sartre's cogito concept is characterized, among other things, by the fact that it includes the other. These sensual experiences are only occasions to evoke this aspect.

According to Sartre, self-consciousness contains an internal structure that encompasses the existence of foreign consciousness. In other words, being in the world contains an aspect that implies being in the middle of the world. It is therefore an ambiguous concept.

There are many passages in 'Being and Nothingness' which prove this interpretation:

*But on the other hand, Hegel's failure has shown us that the only possible starting point is Cartesian cogito. Only this, by the way, places us on the ground of that factual necessity which is the existence of the other. So what we, in the absence of a better one, call the cogito of the existence of the other, merges with my own cogito. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 454/455)*

Sartre studied Hegel and diagnosed the failure of Hegel's philosophy of spirit. This philosophy of spirit postulates the existence of a super-consciousness, which in turn allegedly cancels the difference between self-consciousness and foreign-consciousness. Sartre denies the existence of such a super-consciousness, called spirit, and demands the Cogito as the starting point of a correct philosophy.
A correct understanding of Sartre's Cogito philosophy requires consideration of his criticism of Hegel and Heidegger, for it is this criticism that leads him back to the Cogito. Hegel is to be criticized, because with the postulate of a super-consciousness he cancels the difference between self-consciousness and foreign-consciousness. Heidegger is to be criticised because he marginalises such a difference from the outset with the concept of 'being with others'. Sartre returns to the Cogito because he confirms the difference between self-consciousness and foreign consciousness and considers it insurmountable. Sartre's position is: There is a difference between self-consciousness and consciousness of the other and this difference is insurmountable, but self-consciousness and awareness of others are intertwined.

As a result of this criticism, Sartre starts from the Cartesian Cogito, but he sees the necessity to transcend the boundaries of the Cartesian Cogito. He seeks a way to find the means within the immanence of Cogito to achieve absolute transcendence:

\[\ldots\] within myself I must find reasons not to believe in the other, but the other as the one who is not me. (Sartre, ibid., p. 455)

Sartre thus suspects in the interior of the Cogito an 'I-Not-I-structure', which neither refers to a dialectical unity in Hegel's sense, nor disintegrates into a mere dichotomy of two incoherent entities.

If Sartre is right, then one finds the other inside the Cogito. So there is a Cogito of the 'Existence of the Other', as Sartre puts it for lack of a better expression. This aspect of the Cogito fuses with the original Cartesian Cogito to a more complex and concrete structure. Besides the intuition of the fact of the indisputability of selfhood, there is a second intuition within the pre-reflective cogito: the fact of the indisputability of the existence of the other. The fact of self-consciousness and the fact of foreign consciousness refer to each other within the unity of Cogito.

**Complementarity**

It should also be emphasized that for Sartre the 'pour-soi' and the 'pour-autrui' are complementary structures of consciousness. In other words, they cannot be reduced to each other, they are somewhat contradictory and they complement each other. They neither form a causal internal structure of consciousness, nor are they moments of a dialectical unity. Just as the "I-think" is a de-facto-necessity, the existence of the other is a de-facto-necessity either. The existence of the other cannot be proven, but one's own existence cannot be proven either. In both cases it is an evidence experience. The intuitive certainty provided by these experiences is so convincing that no proof in the world could surpass this evidence. These Cogito species are axioms based on evidence experiences.

Sartre calls this complementary structure of consciousness the 'For-oneself-for-others'. The analogy to quantum physics may be helpful. One can think of the wave structure separately from the particle structure, but in reality a quantum physical object, for example an electron, has both aspects that emerge depending on the situational context. In quantum physics, 'wave' and 'particles' are only abstractions that can be thought of separately, but which must be put together in a complementary way with regard to reality. So it would be appropriate to speak of a 'wave-particle' with an electron. The situation is similar with Sartre's 'For-oneself-for-others'. The 'For-oneself' can be thought separately in the sense of abstraction, but in reality it forms a complementary structure with the 'For-other'.

A consideration which will help us in our task and which arises from the previous remarks is that being-for-other is not an ontological structure of being-for-oneself: in fact we cannot think of deriving being-for-other like the consequence of a principle of being-for-oneself or vice versa. [...] It might not be impossible to think for ourselves, totally free from everyone else, that existed without even suspecting the possibility of being an object. But this for-oneself would just not be 'man'. (Sartre, ibid., p. 505f)

This passage proves that Sartre has to make an important distinction between human reality and certain abstractions intended to describe that human reality. The for-itself is an abstraction, it does not correspond to human reality in its full complexity. Sartre writes:

The concrete can only be the synthetic totality of which both the consciousness and the phenomenon only form moments. The concrete thing is man in the world with that specific union of man with the world which Heidegger calls 'being in the world', for example. (Sartre, ibid., p. 50)

For Sartre, this 'being in the world' also includes the other. Consciousness in the sense of 'for oneself' is only a moment of the concrete; the 'for oneself for others' is a more concrete being that corresponds more to human reality than the pure 'for oneself'.

The reference to the concept of complementarity in quantum physics helps to better understand Sartre's theory of the other. The other is an aspect of consciousness, just as the wave is an aspect of the electron. Ignoring the wave aspect gives a false idea of the electron. Ignoring the other within consciousness gives you a false idea of consciousness. The revelation of the other on the occasion of a certain experience therefore does not only correspond to the revelation of an object of the world, but also to the revelation of the structure of consciousness:

Shame is the revelation of the other, but not in the way that a consciousness reveals an object, but in the way that a moment of consciousness laterally implies a different moment as its motivation. If we had reached pure consciousness through the cogito and if this consciousness were only consciousness of being ashamed, the consciousness of the other would again haunt it as an incomprehensible presence and thus escape any reduction. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 490)

Sartre wants to say the following: In different situations, different types of consciousness emerge. For example, there is the situation of phenomenological reduction in the sense of a learned operation. In this situation, the worldliness of the world is suspended and the result is the Cogito: Descartes 'I-think'. This achieves the fundamentum inconcussum of epistemology. In another situation, for example the keyhole situation, another consciousness emerges: the shame consciousness. This sense of shame is an experience within the framework of the natural attitude, and yet a structure of this consciousness is revealed, namely the complementary double structure: on the one hand the for-me-ness of Cogito, on the other the existence of the other.

Even if one has achieved the pure cogito through a learned operation, if this pure cogito is a shame consciousness, it is afflicted by the existence of the other, as the inner structure of this consciousness. This sense of shame is an experience within the framework of the natural attitude, and yet a structure of this consciousness is revealed, namely the complementary double structure: on the one hand the for-me-ness of Cogito, on the other the existence of the other. Sartre concludes:
This shows us sufficiently that one does not first have to seek the other in the world, but on the side of consciousness, in which and through which consciousness makes itself what it is. Just as my consciousness, grasped by the Cogito, undoubtedly testifies to itself and its own existence, certain special consciousnesses, for example the 'shame consciousness', bear witness to the Cogito undoubtedly both to itself and to the existence of the Other". (Sartre, ibid., p. 490)

In the consciousness of shame the indissoluble reference unit of these two moments becomes visible, because the strengthening of my being is linked to the existence of the other. I experience myself as a "prisoner" in an intensified way. Within this double structure I discover myself as an object in reinforced form. I internalize my "being in the middle of the world" as a certain aspect of my "being in the world".

Sartre goes beyond Descartes and Husserl with his Cogito concept, allowing both, experiences within the framework of natural attitudes and transcendental reduction as a learned operation. The learned operation is possible, but it is not always purely feasible. The shame consciousness is an example of this transcendental-empirical duplicate.

In this way Sartre shows how one can escape the solipsism that always threatens Descartes and Husserl. One should bear in mind that the refutation of solipsism is one of Sartre's main concerns in 'Being and Nothingness'. Sartre fulfils this concern by proving the double structure of shame consciousness. This double structure revealed by Sartre fits very well with the empirical results reported by Ciaunica. Ciaunica's claim that the empirical results refute Sartre's theory of the other is completely misleading. Sartre was about to refute solipsism with his theory of the other. Accordingly, his theory anticipated these empirical results.

It is also clear that the natural attitude dominates in infants, as they are not expected to perform the learned operation. The empirical results mentioned therefore all refer to types of consciousness that arise within the framework of natural attitudes. From the viewpoint of Sartre's philosophy, it is therefore no wonder that the dual structure of consciousness is revealed in the sense of co-awareness.

From the point of view of philosophy, however, it must be pointed out that it does not follow that the learned operation would not be possible. But it is a kind of consciousness that requires a certain level of development of the person. It is certainly not one of the primary stages mentioned in the empirical studies.

Philosophy of ambiguity

One can now identify another fundamental problem of the dialogue between analytical philosophy and existentialism. Analytical philosophers often try to formulate simple and unambiguous theses and believe they can identify them as Sartre's position. A good example is the above-mentioned essay on the subject of 'self-awareness'.

One reading says that 'self-awareness' belongs to every consciousness, the other says the opposite. Sartre's position, however, is that anguish is a fear of oneself, that it is a fear of one's own indeterminacy. That is, there is a selfhood, but this selfhood is not identical to itself, it suffers from a lack of identity; it is always threatened by being replaced by a new selfhood. The 'self-awareness' here consists of having a self that lacks sufficient identity.
This ambiguity can be expressed in various ways. Sartre says, for example, that the ego appears only on the side of mankind. Man in his everyday natural attitude experiences himself as an ego and he interprets his behaviour and his feelings as aspects of this ego. This is the dimension of the human.

But there is another dimension: that of monstrous spontaneity. This is the dimension of the inhuman in the human! The dimension of impersonal consciousness.

When these two dimensions intertwine, which is rare in natural attitudes but can happen, then man experiences this as a fear of himself. This fear shows the ambiguity mentioned, on the one hand to be a person and on the other hand to be a monstrous spontaneity.

Therefore the ego does not completely fill the consciousness and it can be that the ego is flooded by the monstrous consciousness. There is therefore an impersonal creativity of consciousness.

There are other aspects to this ambiguity. Husserl tries to limit himself to the learned operation. He wants to carry out the pure transcendental reduction, but as a scientist, not as an existing human being. That is, he tries to avoid existential analysis. He is limited to the point of view of the theoretical subject. This procedure is necessary for Husserl because he wants to establish philosophy as an exact science. The theoretical subject, the transcendental ego, becomes for him the guarantor of the possibility of scientific thinking. It is, so to speak, the first person form of pure theoretical reason.

Sartre is quite prepared to follow him to a certain point. But only up to a certain point. The insufficiency of Husserl’s learned operation becomes apparent in the end when it becomes evident that he can not free himself from his phenomenological prison. He’s lost contact with human reality. His procedure may be scientifically justified, but his philosophy becomes existentially irrelevant.

Husserl has advanced to the transcendental field, but he cannot free himself from it. Instead of linking his science with human reality, he endows the transcendental field with a transcendental ego, thereby saying goodbye to the human. For Husserl, the transcendental ego has become a substitute for God’s omniscience. He tries to achieve scientific clarity and overlooks the fact that science is permeated by a fundamental ambiguity: by the ambiguous relationship between knowledge and existence.

Sartre’s concern is to describe the concrete human reality. For Sartre, the failure of the quest to be God is part of the concrete human reality. And so he considers the entanglement of the transcendental and the empirical point of view to be the existentially correct procedure. This procedure also reveals a result: anguish as a sign of the entanglement of impersonal consciousness with the person.

Insufficiency of Analytical Philosophy

Why is analytical philosophy partly incapable of expressing such facts appropriately? There are several reasons. One lies in the already mentioned unhistorical way of thinking. That is, these philosophers sometimes lack sufficient awareness of the problem. The second reason for this is the often exaggerated quest for clarity. One looks for simple theses and formulations, but one overlooks the fact that clarity and pseudo-clarity are often difficult to distinguish. Above all, one neglects the fact that clarity is a value that competes with other values. One such other value is adequacy. The aim must not be clarity at all costs, but a balanced relationship between clarity and adequacy.

Nava’s theses are clear, but they are not adequate. One does not do justice to Sartre by establishing the alternative of whether or not consciousness is always associated with self-awareness. Rather, it is
about the complicated coexistence of world consciousness and self-awareness, about the historically
depening constitution of self-consciousness, about fear of oneself in the face of the entanglement
of a monstrous spontaneity with a human person. So it's about the complicated interplay of the
different aspects of consciousness. It is about determining more precisely what Sartre means by
consciousness as a lack of identity.

Historical versus ahistorical approach

It has been shown that a historical approach is particularly suitable for elucidating Sartre's thinking.
Perhaps we should be more specific and say that combining historical and systematic thinking
promises the greatest success. A purely ahistorical, systematic and analytical philosophy is certainly
not suitable. Now, however, the Anglo-American variant of philosophy places particular emphasis on
the separation between the systematic and the historical view. In the book to be discussed here, for
example, there is a separate chapter for texts with a "Historical philosophical background". It seems
reasonable to assume that the other chapters attempt to get along without this historical
background. And so it is no coincidence to find an essay in this historical section that comes quite
close to Sartre's real philosophy. This is Raoul Moati's contribution 'On Sartre's concept of 'pure
reflection'".

If you compare Moati's essay with that of Tepley, the qualitative abyss is striking. Moati's essay is
basically adequate, Tepley's essay is completely inadequate. The reason is Tepley's ahistorical
method. By means of his linguistic-analytical considerations he succeeds in identifying the elements
of Sartre's philosophy, but unfortunately the spiritual bond that could connect these elements to a
comprehensible philosophy is missing. The result is that Tepley turns Sartre into a nonsense-
philosopher who himself does not seem to know what he wants to say.

In the following quote, Tepley tries to show that a theory of subjectless consciousness would render
phenomena such as anguish, guilt and remorse meaningless, because, Tepley argues, why should a
subjectless consciousness feel fear or guilt? Tepley writes:

"Third, a subject-less theory of consciousness makes no sense of certain kinds of
consciousness, such as fear, guilt, and regret. These kinds of consciousness take as
their objects things that have already happened or will (possibly) happen to other
consciousnesses. Fearing consciousness, for example, may be directed at a harm
that is expected to befall some future consciousness. If there is a subject of
consciousness, then this makes sense: the subject is afraid of what might happen
to it in the future. But if there is no subject of consciousness, then why should this
be. Why should there be a fearing consciousness directed at something that will
(or might) happen to some future consciousness. The fearing consciousness and
the future consciousness are numerically distinct, so whatever happens to the
latter does not happen to the former. One might point out that these two
consciousnesses belong to the same ego, but unless the ego is the subject of these
consciousness I do not see how this is going to help. (Tepley, Sartre's non-
egological theory, S. 309)"

We are dealing here with the extreme case of a caricature that has only been drawn for the purpose
of being able to refute it. What Tepley represents here is not Sartre's philosophy, but an absurd
distortion that originated in his analytical philosopher's brain.
In doing so, he relies on the concept of 'numerical difference' and seems to assume that two entities that are numerically different cannot have an intimate relationship. But that's all wrong. The heart and lungs are two numerically different organs and yet there is an intimate relationship between them in the physiology of the body.

In Sartre, too, there is a unity of being for oneself, to which above all temporality must be counted. The different consciousnesses, for example the present and the future, stand in the unity of being of temporality. In Sartre, selfhood and temporality are synonyms. For Sartre there is only one consciousness, so that the numerically different consciousnesses are to be interpreted as internal differentiations of this one consciousness. Likewise, the fundamental selfhood of consciousness, that is, the unity ground of consciousness, and the ego maintain an intimate relationship, which is expressed in the natural attitude, for example, by the human being returning his actions to the qualities of the ego. In this sense, the ego is of course the subject of human reality, as Sartre himself expresses in the following text, for example:

As ego we are subjects de facto and de jure, active and passive, willingly acting, possible objects of a judgement of value or responsibility. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 307)

Sartre does not want to deny the existence of the person, but he wants to say that this person is the result of a personalization process in which many factors are involved. If this person, in a sense the subject, is only formed in the course of life, if there is personalization, then this person cannot sit at the source of consciousness. If this person is the result of the initial design and its historical development, then he cannot be the origin of this initial design. Sartre therefore means that the person is not the source of consciousness, but the result of the creativity of an originally impersonal consciousness.

On the other hand, the idea that Sartre wants to claim that man is an incoherent collection of numerically different consciousnesses is so absurd that one can only wonder.

Obviously, Tepley cannot or does not want to understand Sartre's concept of anguish. Anguish arises because the monstrous spontaneity of impersonal consciousness threatens the precarious identity of the human person, because this person has or may have an intuition that his life plan is in question and because there is the possibility of replacing the present life plan with another one. Sartre means that freedom, the fact of impersonality of consciousness, can bring about a conversion of the person at any time, because freedom is the possibility of tearing oneself away from the existing.

Sartre does not want to claim that there is no subject, but he wants to say that this subject is not the source of consciousness. That is precisely why the subject feels anguish, precisely because it feels that it is not immune to conversion. If the subject were the source of consciousness and if that subject had a stable identity beyond that, then anguish could not arise, because why should a subject with a solid identity be afraid of himself? Anguish emerges because there is a subject, but a subject whose identity is in question. And the reason for this lies precisely in the impersonality of the transcendental field.

The Fundamental Selfhood

The existentialist must admit that good contributions can be found in the book with results that show a proximity to Sartre's philosophy. These include Tomis Kapitan's essay 'Is subjectivity first-personal?' This article deals with the question of what Sartre might have meant by the expression 'fundamental selfhood'.

[71x761]
Starting from the well-known dichotomy of Analytical Philosophy, which distinguishes between the perspective of the First Person and that of the Third Person, one could quickly answer and claim that Sartre's 'fundamental selfhood' is nothing other than the known 'perspective of the First Person'. Captain contradicts that. In the existentialist's view, he rightly shows that this selfhood is more the perspective revelation of objective facts. The selfhood corresponds to the perspective taken. Only the reflective attitude leads to an explicit reference of this perspective to the first person.

The point about selfhood, as has already been noted, is that this self-consciousness forms a unit of reference with the corresponding world-consciousness. Sartre calls this reference unit the 'circle of selfhood'. Subjectivity and objectivity exist at this level, but are not clearly differentiated. Kapitan writes at the end of his essay:

> At the personal level, it is mine, to be sure, and this is why my consciousness of it is reflexive, but in order to be mine I need not conceive it as mine. (Tomis Kapitan, Is subjectivity first-person?, S. 62)

The subjectivity thus corresponds to a certain perspective. This perspective is mine. But it is not necessary for me to see it as my perspective. Subjectivity and objectivity are not clearly separated here, but are in a state of indefinite entanglement. It is the function of reflective consciousness to bring about this separation, i.e. to create a subject-object duality. Sartre means to say, that every objective world consciousness starts from a certain subjective perspective, without the subjectivity of this perspective somehow affecting the objectivity of world consciousness.

The dichotomy 'subjectivity-objectivity' is inappropriate at this level. Rather, everything is given in one blow and inseparably: world consciousness and self-consciousness. But while world consciousness is direct and explicit, self-consciousness is indirect and implicit. It requires a reflective concentration of consciousness in order to make this self-consciousness explicit. It is clear that Kapitan is right with this approach to perceive selfhood as a certain perspective on the objective world.

**Necessary conditions for an appropriate interpretation**

In this paper three necessary conditions for an appropriate interpretation of Sartre have been worked out so far: Hermeneutic competence, historical approach, adequate clarity. If there is a lack of hermeneutic competence, then there is a lack of good will, and without good will one cannot do justice to the author. The historical approach is necessary to provide an adequate awareness of the problem. It is not impossible to achieve this problem awareness purely analytically, but it would be an enormous intellectual achievement if the interpreter could come to terms with the history of philosophy by pure analytical thinking. The term 'adequate clarity' refers to a balanced relationship between adequacy and clarity of interpretation. Analytical philosophers often tend to prefer clarity at the expense of adequacy. So you have a tendency to caricature the real problems and then analyse this distortion.

The interaction or absence of these conditions will now be demonstrated using Mark Rowland's contribution 'Sartre on pre-reflective consciousness: the adverbial interpretation' as an example. Rowland's essay meets two conditions: He has sufficient hermeneutic competence and he succeeds in producing a presentation that is characterised by adequate clarity. The result is a surprisingly good representation of Sartre's philosophy. What is missing is the historical approach. In this case, however, this does not lead to a lack of awareness of the problem, but to inappropriate criticism of Sartre's way of arguing.
Since Sartre presupposes knowledge of the historical problem situation, he sometimes argues very briefly what Rowland interprets as incomprehensibility. He calls this incomprehensibility 'argumenta ad lapides' and assumes Sartre has an affinity with this kind of 'arguments'.

It has already been pointed out here that Sartre seeks a balance between the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of existence. This includes the adoption of the concept of 'being in the world' at Heidegger. In Sartre's interpretation this means above all the 'circle of selfhood', i.e. the reference unit of self-consciousness and world-consciousness. By witnessing the things of the world, man witnesses to himself, because he always takes a perspective that includes his own existence.

This inclusion of one's own self is given with the mere world consciousness. It is not produced afterwards. The purely objective world consciousness, i.e. the scientific world consciousness, which starts from the perspective of an objective world eye, is a subsequent construction based on abstraction, on an abstraction that turns the real person into a theoretical subject.

Sartre expresses this fact of an always given selfhood as follows:

\[
[... \text{ consciousness is a being to which its being is concerned about its being, } \\
\text{insofar as this being implies something different than it itself. (Sartre, Being and } \\
\text{Nothingness, p. 37)}
\]

It is clear that this is a reformulation of Heidegger's concept of existence in the sense of Sartre. So this is the existentialist interpretation of the fact that consciousness is always endowed with a sense of the 'my-ness' of world consciousness. This 'Meinigkeit' needs no explanation; it is, so to speak, an axiom of existential philosophy.

This explains the scarcity with which Sartre deals with such questions. Rowland calls this way of thinking 'argumenta ad lapides'. But why should Sartre paraphrase Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'? He simply presupposes Heidegger's concept of existence and adds the changes he considers necessary. Sartre's argument is therefore not an 'appeal to the stone' but an 'appeal to history'.

Since Rowland does not take these historical connections into account, he sets out his own complicated interpretation of Sartre's philosophy, which, it must be emphasized positively, is correct and reflects Sartre's philosophy very well. Here is an excerpt from Rowland's contribution, which can be considered a good paraphrasing of Sartre's interpretation of Heidegger's concept of existence:

\[
[... \text{ there is however, another way of explaining this sense of ownership, one that } \\
\text{does not appeal to introspective grasp of a peculiar sort of property. The same } \\
\text{phenomenon can also be explained in adverbial terms. When I have experiences, I } \\
\text{have them minely. Their mine-ness is an adverbial modification of the act rather } \\
\text{than an introspectively grasped property of an object of that act. This adverbial } \\
\text{modification is not a brute, unexplainable feature of the experiential act. Rather it } \\
\text{stems from the nature of positional consciousness itself and, in particular, the way } \\
\text{this sort of consciousness presents its objects. The adverbial modification results } \\
\text{from the fact that the objects of my experiences [...] are presented, precisely, as } \\
\text{things that are for-me [...] (Rowlands, Sartre on pre-reflective consciousness, S. } \\
\text{117)}
\]

Rowland continues his explanations, but in the end his concern can be reduced to Sartre's formulation above: Consciousness is concerned in its being with its own being, insofar as this being implies something else than itself. This means that man only becomes aware of himself by turning to the world and, in Heidegger's sense of the things of the world, giving meaning to himself. In other
words: Every world consciousness is connected with an 'in-order-to' and this 'in-order-to' always involves one's own self.

For the existentialist this is a self-evident fact, but he is pleased that it is also possible for an analytical philosopher to arrive at these insights with his means. However, the existentialist has to remark restrictively that Rowland's theory of adverbial modification may facilitate the understanding for philosophers of the analytical direction, but beyond that it is no enrichment in content.

Critique or paraphrase
The contributions discussed so far can be divided into two groups: The first group contains critical essays ranging from factual contradictions to biting remarks, the second group deals with paraphrases of Sartre's formulations. In the contributions of the first group, Sartre is given a negative testimony. Here one can distinguish between texts that first create caricatures or simplifications of Sartre's philosophy, in order to destroy them afterwards in a scathing criticism. Gerhard Seel's essay and that of Joshua Teply are examples of this. In the other part of this group there are essays that Sartre initially judges positively, but then criticizes him in decisive points (Williford, Levine).

The criticism is consistently unfounded and is based on personal expressions of opinion, for example that one hopes for scientific progress in the future (Williford) or that one simply dislikes Sartre's concept of freedom, although one at least partially accepts the arguments for this concept of freedom. (Levine)

The second group is largely positive towards Sartre and defends his philosophy against the majority of the analytical direction. But it is striking that in these contributions one actually only finds paraphrases of existentialist positions. From the point of view of the existentialist, these are commonplace positions, which are often explained in the language of analytical philosophy, without there being any gain in knowledge in terms of content.

These include Mark Rowland's article and also 'The zero point and I', for which the authors Terry Horgan and Shaun Nichols stand. The expression 'zero point' refers to Husserl and aims at two facts: Firstly, the 'phenomenal subjectivity' corresponds to a certain perspective on the world and secondly, this perspective is permeated by multi-modal blind spots. After Husserl, the authors call such a blind spot a 'zero point'. It is clear that this 'zero point theory' reflects an essential aspect of Heidegger's 'being in the world' and can also be found in Sartre's concept of 'committed cognition'. Heidegger says, for example, that every revelation of being is based on a preliminary understanding of being and that this preliminary understanding of being makes revelation possible, but cannot itself be the direct object of this revelation. In this context Sartre writes:

\[\text{The point of view of pure knowledge is contradictory: there is only the point of view of committed knowledge. This means that knowledge and action are only two abstract sides of an original and concrete relationship...A pure knowledge would be knowledge without point of view, thus a knowledge fundamentally outside the world. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 347)}\]

Sartre does not use the expression 'zero point' here, but the expression 'point of view'. However, it is clear that both concepts refer to a 'blind spot', which is the basis of the phenomenon but is not part of the phenomenon itself.

Dorothée Legrand's contribution 'The body is structured like a language' is one of the good paraphrases worth reading. There she analyses Sartre's 'Being for Others' in terms of body, language
and desire. It is a good and correct representation of Sartre's philosophy, but not a dialogue between analytical philosophy and existentialism.

All in all, on the basis of these articles, it must be noted that this is actually less a dialogue between analytical philosophy and existentialism than a process of self-understanding among the analytical philosophers with regard to existentialism. Depending on the type of contribution, a supporter of Sartre's philosophy can only adopt a negative attitude, because it is not Sartre who is currently being criticized, but a caricature, or he can only agree cautiously, because it is a more or less successful paraphrase of existentialist positions.

In this respect, this book is not a conversation between two parties, but the presentation of a dialogue between philosophers of the Anglo-American direction regarding the possibility of integrating insights of existentialism. This dialogue takes place with two types of participants: the uncomprehending and the understanding person. The understanding participant tries to explain the facts to the uncomprehending one. The existentialist sits in the auditorium and always follows the piece with interest, but sometimes a little irritated.

The Dialogue

A good example of the dialogue, which is monologue that analytical philosophy carries with itself, is Matthew C. Eshleman's article 'Sartre's error theory of introspection'. Eshleman is one of the understanding participants. What's more, he wrote an excellent article on Sartre's philosophy. This contribution is only a paraphrase of Sartre's thinking, but it is also a representation from the perspective of a very original point of view: Sartre's philosophy of consciousness as 'error theory of introspection'. Eshleman lists the following errors:

- the projection error
- The objectification error
- The Illusion of Immanence
- false analogies
- The Illusion of the Primacy of Knowledge
- the mistake of the point of view

The idea of portraying Sartre's thinking in this way is convincing and illuminating. But the article also shows that there is no dialogue between Anglo-American philosophy and existentialism. Instead, it is a dialogue within Analytical Philosophy, for example between the understanding Eshleman and a less understanding author named Kathleen Wider. The existentialist can only agree with Eshleman; for it is again a transcription of Sartre's philosophy, albeit from an original point of view.

Wider criticizes - in Eshleman's presentation - Sartre's concept of pure reflection. According to Sartre, pure reflection should capture the pre-reflective consciousness in a lightning intuition. Wider now argues that pure reflection must be identical either with pre-reflective consciousness or with impure reflection. For either pure reflection grasps pre-reflective consciousness as an object, then it is identical with impure reflection. Or it does not grasp it as an object, then it is identical with the pre-reflective consciousness. So there is no distinction criterion for pure reflection in relation to impure reflection and pre-reflective consciousness.

Eshleman gives the right answer to this 'problem' by pointing out that pure reflection does not capture pre-reflective consciousness in the kind of cognition, not under the category of subject-object duality, but in the kind of an immediate self-directed evidence experience. It is a kind of self-
illumination of the pre-reflective consciousness. In this respect, Sartre also speaks less of discerning an object, but rather of recognizing oneself. Pre-reflective consciousness grasps itself by means of a lightning intuition in relation to itself.

This self-illumination can be called reflection because it is directed at itself. It is more than the original pre-reflexive consciousness, because it means objectification and internalization. It is less than a cognition of a different object, because subject-object duality is not yet fully developed here. It is not impure reflection, because here no experiences are transformed into timeless states.

Here one must now acknowledge that one can either understand such an intuition for oneself or not. If you cannot understand it, then arguing and logical reasoning will not help. For example, if one cannot understand the evidence of the indisputability of the Cogito, which Descartes obviously had, then Descartes cannot help one either, because it is not the construction of a logical proof, but the determination of a fact.

It is just that at the end of the learned operation Descartes is undoubtedly aware of himself. If one thinks one has to deny the fact of this self-illumination, then it will hardly be possible to resolve this disagreement argumentatively. The only help that can be offered are further examples. Eshleman quotes an example of shame:

 [...] encloses within it an implicit and non-thematized comprehension of being-able-to-be-an-object on the part of the subject for whom I am an object. This implicit comprehension is nothing other than the consciousness (of) my “being-myself”; that is, of my selfness reinforced. (Eshleman, Sartre’s error theory of introspection, S. 193)

This example clearly shows the difference between pure reflection on the one hand and pre-reflective consciousness on the other. I look through the keyhole and am fascinated by what is happening in the room. My consciousness is entirely focused on this event, and yet I have an implicit consciousness of myself, because it is I who am fascinated by what is happening. Suddenly I hear a noise behind me and I realize in a flash that I was caught in a delicate situation. I experience myself as an object seen.

The difference between the two situations before and after the noise is the distinctness of self-consciousness. Before I had an implicit and indistinct consciousness of myself, now I have a more distinct consciousness of my own experience; a consciousness full of shame. Blushing, I assure myself that I was caught as a voyeur.

It must be admitted, however, that there is a difficulty here that complicates the situation, because reflection is characterised by the fact that it is directed towards one’s own consciousness. The shame consciousness, however, is characterized by a double structure, which was not present in the original reflected consciousness. Shame consciousness includes both self-consciousness and foreign consciousness. It is therefore a new pre-reflective consciousness. Only through the mediation of the other in this experience can I come to a self-illumination of the reflected consciousness by means of pure reflection. So it is the other within the shame experience that mediates me with myself.

The difference to impure reflection can also be clearly marked. For example, when I am traumatized by this shame experience and walk around wringing my hands and moaning about myself saying 'I am a voyeur', then I suffer from the dishonesty of impure reflection, because this attribution is exaggerated. It cannot be justified by the phenomena. I have acted like a voyeur, but it does not follow that I am a voyeur.
Now the interesting question is why philosophers like Kathleen Wider obviously find it so difficult to understand these facts. The existentialist suspects that an excessive striving for logical clarity is an obstacle on the way to understanding Sartre's philosophy. One would like simple, clearly formulated logical dichotomies. Either something is an object for consciousness or it is not an object for consciousness. Tertium non datur!

It is denied that there can also be modifications of the consciousness without this modification either leading to a clear subject-object duality on the one hand or collapsing into a mere identity with itself on the other. That there can also be a lightening of the consciousness in the form of a sudden self-illumination, which, while increasing objectification and internalization, does not imply subject-object duality, is of course no problem for those who have experienced something like this before. This also applies in the event that it is not easy to explain to other people what this is all about. It is simply difficult to grasp human reality logically and linguistically. In this sense, the educational work of the understanding philosophers of the Analytical Direction is commendable.

The game is over.

Jeremy Ekberg's work with the title 'Invisible ghosts' is problematic. Using the example of the protagonists of Sartre's 'The game is over', he explains the difference between the reflective and the pre-reflective consciousness. In Ekberg's depiction, the pre-reflective consciousness is bound to the living body, while he links the reflective consciousness with the ghostly existence of the dead.

This interpretation is questionable; for Sartre there is only one consciousness, which contradicts the attribution of the pre-reflective consciousness to the world of the living and the reflective consciousness to the world of the dead. If one nevertheless conceptually separates the two types of consciousness and symbolizes this separation alive/dead as a dichotomy, then the unity of consciousness would also have to become somehow clear, so that no false picture of Sartre's theory of consciousness emerges.

Plea for Prereflexive Consciousness

In the previous contributions one finds less a dialogue between Analytical Philosophy and Existentialism, but rather the representation of a process of communication between the members of Analytical Philosophy regarding the philosophy of Sartre. Manfred Frank's essay 'Why should we think that self-consciousness is non-reflective?', however, reveals a philosophical dispute between different schools.

Frank explains the history of the development of the concept of 'pre-reflexive consciousness', which includes Fichte and Sartre in particular, and describes the attempts of continental European philosophers, who regard this concept as central, to enter into dialogue with representatives of the analytical direction. Frank considers the types of theory developed within Analytical Philosophy to be insufficient. These are above all ideas for which the concept of 'representation' is central. Frank also describes how the philosophy of pre-reflexive consciousness has conquered an ever-increasing area in the Anglo-American region.

Frank's arguments in favour of 'pre-reflective consciousness' are, in principle, identical to those of Sartres, apart from the way they are expressed. Representation theories of consciousness are basically reflection theories of consciousness, and all the arguments Sartre puts forward against the reflection theories of consciousness also apply to representation theories. Two arguments are in the
foreground: the argument of 'infinite recourse' and the argument of 'Meinigkeit'. Frank formulates the problem of 'infinite recourse' as follows:

*Consciousness comes to be when an unconscious mental event becomes the object of a higher-order mental event. The higher-order mental event is itself unconscious and becomes conscious through the objectification by another mental event of yet higher order, which is itself unconscious. And so on.* (Frank, *Why should we think...*, S.30)

Frank, like Sartre, sees in this reflective model of consciousness the problem of infinite recourse and interprets this fact as a weakness of the model. The weakness lies above all in the fact that reflection is supposed to produce the being of consciousness. The theory of pre-reflective consciousness, on the other hand, claims that the being of consciousness is independent of whether it is reflected upon or not. The pre-reflective consciousness is direct consciousness of the things of the world and consciousness (of) itself in the unity of a consciousness. It's an experience-consciousness. The reflection is retrospective, but is intimate with the pre-reflective consciousness.

Furthermore, this model cannot interpret the phenomenon of 'Meinigkeit'. For the consciousness, in Frank's sense, not only the object of consciousness is important, but also the fact that it is my consciousness.

For this reason, consciousness must be understood in a fundamentally different way. Accordingly, consciousness is a direct consciousness of the outer object and an indirect consciousness (of) itself. It is a complementary reference structure without full formation of subject-object duality. If the object is not an outer object, but one's own consciousness, one speaks of a 'self-awareness'. Frank quotes Zahavi to illustrate the difference between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness:

*It is necessary to differentiate prereflective self-awareness, which is an immediate, implicit, irrelational, non-objectifying, non-conceptual and non-propositional self-acquaintance, from reflective self-awareness, which is an explicit, relational, mediated, conceptual, and objectifying thematization of consciousness.* (Frank, *Seite 39*)

As far as Sartre is concerned, it should be critically noted that Frank has a tendency to place Sartre close to German idealism, i.e. in the vicinity of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Names like Kierkegaard and Heidegger do not appear in his essay. The concept of freedom does not appear either. If this aspect of Frank's essay is overemphasized, there is a danger that Sartre will be wrongly positioned in terms of philosophical history.

**Plea against pre-reflective consciousness**

We now come to a contribution that comes to a completely different conclusion. It's about Eric Trémault's essay 'Do we need pre-reflective self-consciousness'. The author compares Brentano's concept of intentionality with that of Sartre's and, after a lengthy course of argumentation, which also includes Descartes and Husserl, but which was difficult for the reviewer to comprehend, arrives at the conclusion that for reasons of simplicity one should renounce the concept of pre-reflective consciousness, for this term, according to the author, only complicates the situation without offering any advantage.

With regard to Trémault, the problem is not so much to understand his arguments as to find out what he was trying to prove with his arguments, or whether what he was trying to prove has really
been proved with his arguments. As an example, an argument is presented here which, in Trémault’s view, should prove that the concept of pre-reflective consciousness is superfluous. He writes:

In addition, it now seems that non-thetical self-consciousness is no longer required for the perception of “self” either. If the consciousness which I am is made of absolute phenomena, then there is no question any more as to how this consciousness appears. The question of self-consciousness now only means the question of how certain phenomena among all others that fill myself as consciousness come to be selected as especially “me” – which is a very different question, namely the question of the appearance of an empirical self. (Trémault, S. 296)

Trémault seems to want to say this: The phenomena are decisive for consciousness, and among these phenomena in particular the appearance of the empirical self. This could be, for example, one's own body, in the sense of Sartre's 'body as for oneself', that is, as the perspective starting point of the phenomenon. Trémault now believes that with this empirical self the necessity of pre-reflexive consciousness would disappear. So it would not be necessary to accept such an awareness.

If this really should be Trémault's argument, then it must be said that this argument is completely unobjective. Obviously, Trémault has a very different concept of pre-reflective consciousness than Sartre. For Sartre, pre-reflective consciousness is the basis of any kind of consciousness, including empirical consciousness. So what Trémault could at most have shown with his argument is that the concept of Empirical Consciousness is sufficient and that the concept of Transcendental Consciousness could be dispensed with. But even if that were true, it would not lead to the renunciability of the concept of pre-reflective consciousness.

According to Sartre, there is no consciousness at all without a pre-reflective basis. Each consciousness is first an experience, before it is objectified and internalized in a process of reflection through clarification. And even then, according to Sartre, one must acknowledge that the pre-reflective consciousness and the reflective consciousness are the same consciousness. For this differentiation is not about two numerically different types of consciousness, but only about an internal differentiation within this one consciousness.

It must also be added that with Trémault's approach the concept of freedom is lost; for this concept of freedom states that man has the possibility of tearing himself away from this empirical self and of creating a new self by means of the transcendental field, i.e. monstrous spontaneity, in the sense of a 'creatio ex nihilo'. Consequently, Trémault's proposal would amount to a completely different philosophy.

It turns out again that it is not sufficient to analyse a detail problem if this analysis is not seen in the overall context of a particular philosophy. Once again, it is confirmed that the Analytical Philosophy procedure is insufficient overall.

Conclusion note
The reviewer has now discussed or at least mentioned all the contributions, although it was initially planned to deal only with a few treatises. Despite his critical attitude, the existentialist was unable to stop reading. In short: This book is recommendable. Although it does not provide the promised dialogue between Analytical Philosophy and Existentialism, it shows the current problems of such a dialogue, which is interesting enough to motivate an in-depth reading.

A deeper discussion between the Anglo-American variant of philosophy and existentialism would, however, require a concentration on basic questions of human existence. Topics such as 'human
freedom', 'the scope of science' and 'the relationship between freedom and science' would be suitable for initiating such a dialogue.

In the book such basic topics are rather embarrassingly avoided or only superficially touched upon. Instead, one prefers special topics such as 'The "pre-reflexive consciousness', without being able or willing to see that an adequate analysis of this concept would have to include Sartre's concept of freedom. In this sense, the existentialist sees this book more as a prelude to a research program on the relationship between science and human existence.

As far as Sartre is concerned, it would be necessary to elaborate more precisely on the foundations of his philosophy. One still finds too many inaccuracies, misunderstandings and pronounced misinterpretations in the contributions. A reader who relies on these treatises may be hindered in his understanding of Sartre's thinking as a result of these weaknesses. As long as these shortcomings persist, a fruitful dialogue will hardly be possible.

The introduction to the book, for which the authors Miguens, Preyer and Morando are responsible, should serve as an example for this problem. The introduction contains a short and in principle easy to understand introduction to the philosophy of Sartre. The only shortcoming of this text are occasional inaccurate formulations, which, however, depending on the interpretation, are likely to give the reader a completely false idea of Sartre's philosophy. This is partly because Sartre's philosophy is indeed extraordinarily complicated, partly because Sartre's didactic abilities are limited, but partly also because the interpreters obviously have not penetrated deeply enough into Sartre's philosophy. Here is an example of such a questionable formulation:

The pour-soi is conscious as such, because it is not dependent from the en-soi – rather, it is a negation (nihilation). (Miguens u.a., Introduction: back to pre-reflectivity, S. 4)

This formulation is likely to evoke a totally false idea of Sartre's philosophy. For the 'pour-soi' is not a negation of the 'en-soi', but an internal negation of it, which in turn implies the dependence of the 'pour-soi' on the 'en-soi'. The 'pour-soi' is a relation to the 'en-soi' and in this sense it is dependent.

The asymmetry of the relationship between the 'pour-soi' and the 'en-soi' is one of the basic statements of Sartre's existentialism. The 'en-soi' is independent of the 'pour-soi', but the 'pour-soi' itself is dependent on the 'en-soi'! That is why it is not right to speak of an ontological dualism at Sartre. There's a clear priority of the 'en soi'. There are many formulations at Sartre that prove this interpretation. Here's one of them:

The cogito is inextricably bound to the being in itself, not like thinking of its object - which would relativize the being in itself - but like a lack of what defines its lack.
(Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 190)

The same applies to the relationship between the for-itself and the for-others. The two types of being are connected by means of an internal negation. The difference to the ratio described above is that this dependency is symmetrical, that is, the for-itself is dependent on the for-others and the for-others is dependent on the for-itself. The relationship is reciprocal, as Sartre puts it. For this reason, Sartre says that human reality corresponds to a 'for-oneself-for-others'.

In this respect, too, the text contains formulations that may mislead the reader.

There is no direct connection between the pour-soi and others. [...] As such, there is no “other” nor “we” in the domain of pre-reflectivity. (Miguens u.a., ebenda, S. 6)
First of all, it does not seem appropriate to name the words 'other' and 'we' in the same sentence, because the relationship between 'other' and 'we' is a problem in itself for Sartre. In addition, there are many passages in Sartre’s text that make this formulation generally questionable. For instance:

> Just as my consciousness, captured by the Cogito, undoubtedly testifies to itself its own existence, certain special consciousnesses, for example the ‘shame consciousness’, reveal the Cogito undoubtedly both itself and the existence of the other. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 490)

So Sartre says that in shame consciousness there is a double structure that reveals both the existence of the self and the existence of the other. This shame consciousness is originally pre-reflexive, as Sartre himself points out:

> For example, let's look at shame. It is a mode of consciousness whose structure is identical to all those we have described so far. It is non-settling consciousness (of) itself as shame, and as such is an example of what the Germans call 'Erlebnis', it is accessible to reflection. (Sartre, ibid., p. 405)

Two insights follow from this: First, shame consciousness is pre-reflective, and second, this pre-reflective consciousness reveals the existence of the other. These two insights clearly contradict the above quotation from Miguens et al.

Since such questionable formulations appear again and again in the contributions of this book, there is obviously a fundamental problem here. This can only be accomplished through a reading of 'Being and Nothingness' based on sufficient hermeneutic competence and the unconditional will to penetrate Sartre’s thought processes. Too often one gets the impression that Sartre's thinking is analyzed from above and superficially by academic philosophy.