EXISTENTIALISM

KIERKEGAARD
HEIDEGGER
AND SARTRE

A MATERIALIST INTERPRETATION

ASOKE BHATTACHARYA

1

DENMARK
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

SOEREN Kierkegaard's existentialist philosophy cannot be understood in the right perspective without a reference to its unique Danish background. So nineteenth century Denmark—particularly her socio-economic condition, has to be presently our subject of study. As we know, philosophical, economic, political or aesthetic thoughts emanate either directly or indirectly from the prevailing social conditions as reflected in the mind of the thinker. Various undercurrents in the different strata of the society leave their imprints on the thoughts that emerge during a particular age. Societies, particularly those in the process of transition, can give rise to thinkers who may lament over the past, regret the present and despise the future. Some may even despise the past, embrace the present and welcome the future. But thoughts do not emerge out of the blue; they are rather concrete expressions of the thinker's class-consciousness. A fair idea, therefore, of the class-relations of a particular society in a particular age is immensely helpful for understanding the works of a thinker. But a mechanistic adherence to this system may also land one in serious trouble. A philosopher may have serious differences with the past social system but he may be equally reluctant to accept the changes in the transitional phase. He may denounce the deterioration of the old values but may be unwilling to accept the new ones. He may be caught in a crosscurrent of conflicting value-systems and stand confused at the juncture of past, present and future. It then requires a lot of labour in terms of methodology of analysis and usage of appropriate tools as well as insight to understand correctly where the philosopher stands in relation to the various social forces.

What was Denmark like then in the nineteenth century? What was her relation with the countries of Western Europe? What were her communication channels with these countries? What were the social, economic and political conditions of Denmark?

An attempt to answer these questions will reveal the total complexity of the situation that gave birth to Kierkegaard's philosophical thoughts. In the following pages we will try to recreate Denmark of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

I

Denmark, the land of Hamlet, Soeren Kierkegaard and Hans Christian Andersen, resembles a disjointed wrench protruding from the mainland of North-Western Europe out into the sea. Hemmed in between the North Sea on the west and the Baltic Sea on the east, it belongs to a geographical and climatological community that is known as Scandinavia. Its history in Soeren Kierkegaard's time is basically the history of a successful bourgeois revolution that emancipated the bulk of peasantry from the oppressive yoke of feudalism. The beginning of this socio-economic transformation started in the 1780's and came to a major culmination in the ferment of 1840's. Denmark during this period also witnessed military defeat and political and economic decline. At the same time there was also a period of economic stagnation and commercial ruin of its merchant fleet.

The rise of Denmark as a major maritime nation and its decline and fall roughly coincide with the establishment of an absolutist regime in 1660. After a period of internal division and disastrous military defeat Denmark was deprived of its possession of the

provinces on the east side of the Sound. The power then passed from the hands of the nobility to the crown. The nobility from then onwards ceased to be a political factor of any significance. There remained no representative institution in Denmark worth mentioning. In this power vacuum, the monarch enjoyed the active support of the urban merchant patriciate. The crown ruled, with the help of a relatively enlightened bureaucracy, for almost two hundred years till 1848 when it was replaced by a constitutional monarchy. Throughout the entire absolutist period Denmark remained an overwhelmingly rural and agrarian society

From 1720 to 1830 Danish industry, trade and finance were dominated by mercantilist ideals, the existence of which, indicated a desire to advance from a relatively primitive, to a more modern economy. It was, so far as the eighteenth century was concerned, a period of stability and prosperity. Its neutrality in the numerous petty wars of the century enabled the commercial patriciate to bring home the enormous returns of the shipping trade in which Danish ships carried goods to and from various belligerents.

A practical attitude dominated the age. Science was in the process of being accepted as the key to the mysteries of all nature. Political arithmetic, or mercantilism, was honoured as the definitive science of economics. As mercantilism fetched rich dividends, private capital preferred profitable commerce to unprofitable industry. Hence Denmark was slow in developing industrial technology. Protectionism and a lack of proper commercial regulation impeded the growth of mercantilism in the beginning. But from 1731 when the monopoly of Copenhagen merchants was scrapped Danish shipping could take advantage of its neutrality in the numerous petty wars. From the time of the War of Austrian Succession, mercantilism made considerable headway without any interruption until 1807.

The period of 1801-7 was actually the time of Copenhagen's greatest commercial success. Napoleon had by this time closed up most of the other continental ports. But the good time was short-lived. Danish neutrality was something like an anathema to England. Neither the Danish foreign ministry nor the business community wished to recognize the new situation after 1800 and Denmark continued to reap enormous profit from the war without, however, keeping any option open for meeting an emergency situation. Late in 1806 Napoleon blocked all trade of conquered areas with England, and the latter retaliated by banning all neutral trade with enemy ports. The Danes were reluctant to recognize the new situation and continued to suffer from short-sightedness. In March 1807 Canning became the British foreign minister and in July 1807 the Russians switched from war against France to alliance with her. This terrified Canning who believed incorrect rumors that Denmark was about to close its harbours to the English, and turn its Navy to the French. On August 8, 1807 the British fleet was in the Sound and demanded that the Danish fleet be turned over to them. On August 16 the British bombardment started and they landed a large force which encircled and took the city of Copenhagen after bombarding and burning much of it during the first days of September. On September 6 an agreement was signed, as a result of which the entire Danish fleet was turned over to the English.

Thus ended abruptly the halcyon days of the Copenhagen merchant patriciate. War with England, Continental blockade, military defeat, political dismemberment and state bankruptcy followed during the next seven years. This culminated in the loss of Norway in 1814.

The war years began the ruin of Danish industry and commerce and the peace crisis completed it. The sharp distress upon conclusion of peace was attended by the usual concomitants: criminal defaults, bankruptcies, suicides and psychological aberrations.

Copenhagen alone registered 250 bankruptcies from 1816 to 1820. The paralysing effects of the economic crisis weighed heavily upon all social classes. The great commercial houses disappeared from the scene. The small, thrifty merchant with few commitments survived and was able, here and there, by shrewd management to lay the basis of a large business. So far as the bourgeoisie were concerned, this period was one of 'catch as catch can' so that when towards the middle of the nineteenth century there emerged a strong capitalist class, few of the old names remained. What was true for commerce was also true for industry. Those who survived the crisis most easily were the peasants. With very few debts to pay and very little of the inflated currency in their hands, they escaped the worst effects of a genuinely capitalist depression.

The Danish provincial towns, however, thrived better than the rural districts, and considerably better than Copenhagen. This would be evident from the increase in the amount of tonnage entering them between 1798 and 1834. Whereas the population of the country districts grew from 1801 to 1840 by 39 percent and that of Copenhagen by 20 percent, the population of provincial towns was augmented by 54 percent. Far from indicating stagnation, these figures prove that the provincial towns became prosperous during this period. The truth, of course, is that Danish commerce was in the process of decentralisation and that Copenhagen no longer remained the fountainhead of Danish commerce and industry.

The almost complete collapse of Danish industry and commerce after 1807 might at first suggest that the whole development since 1720 had been unsound and futile. Nevertheless, Denmark retained as an enduring legacy of these decades the remnants of a genuine bourgeoisie and their characteristic ideology. There had been bourgeois groups in Denmark right from the middle of the seventeenth century, and they used to exercise considerable political power when absolutism was established in 1660. But they were never, until the late eighteenth century, able to dominate politics, thought, the sciences and the arts. The princely fortunes that were accumulated then in the great shipping centres enabled them to vie with the aristocracy in magnificence, and encroach upon the office-holding prerogatives. As the barriers between themselves and the class above broke down, their separation from the class below widened. It was capitalism which now was the dominant ideology though restrained somewhat by absolutism. Individual members of the bourgeoisie might have been ruined, the whole class might indeed have been watered down but its essential elements remained and with them its view of life. Therein lay the significance of the industrial and commercial history of Denmark in the eighteenth century.

II

Danish agriculture till 1720 remained static due to the unchanging social structure and agricultural technique. The only purpose of this system was to ensure survival of the peasant with the barest essentials of life. The profit motive, soon to become the mainspring of economic and social revolution, was 'terra incognita' to agriculture and when it came, was viewed as the townsfolk's encroachment. Even on the estates of the feudal lords, there was almost no thought of accumulating a surplus to form capital for new and larger enterprises. The known exceptions merely proved the rule. But it was a rudimentary agriculture that was so stabilized. As surplus was unknown, there was the barest possible margin of safety. There was no way to prevent the capriciousness of weather, and the long arms of winter too often reached over the shoulders of spring and autumn. There was no way to contain pests that caused illness to man, and destruction to his beasts and crops.

The king, being himself a landowner, enjoyed all the advantages of the nobility. The peasants ploughed the lands of the crown and the nobles and the amount of land possessed by them varied from time to time. There was a constant tussle between the crown and the nobles as to who would encroach upon the other's land. Beside the crown and the nobles, there were also free holders. Another group of landed proprietors, namely the bourgeoisie, became increasingly important from about the middle of the seventeenth century. As industry was backward, there were limits to the possibility of reinvestment in trade, and possession of land was the surest way to social recognition. It is for this reason that the bourgeoisie bought estates in the rural areas.

The condition of common peasants who lived on the estates varied considerably, from place to place and time to time. As early as 1702 the crown abolished serfdom in the Islands. But the century-long militia system continued to bind the peasant to the place of his birth. Therefore, the actual cultivators of the soil on the estates were tenants who occupied the plots under the most varied regulations. In almost all of Denmark, the position was but little better than that of German serfs, and with respect to tenure it was sometimes worse. In most of cases the peasants were given tenure for a few years, at the end of which the owner could renew the lease if he so pleased.

With each passing year the estates of the feudal lords encroached upon the property of the yeomanry until but a small fraction of the soil was freehold. The rural population was subjected to a variety of special burdens. They were subjected to a land tax from which the nobility was partly or wholly exempt. In addition to the burden of military service which rested on the rural youth, a levy of special taxes was imposed on the common peasants. The lords were outside this burden of taxation. Another special burden on the common peasants was the obligation to labour upon the estates of the feudal lords. The crown tenants, who usually performed little or no compulsory labour, were brought under the owners of estates together with their lands. To make matters worse, the Government virtually reestablished serfdom in 1733 when it decided that peasant youths between the age of 14 and 36 would not leave the place of their birth without permission from the landlord. The ostensible reason was to ensure resources for the army, but the fact was, that this law served the purpose of keeping the labour price low in the rural areas. The peasants bitterly resented adscription and the effect was visible in the highly inefficient agricultural system.

III

The agricultural scene thus far described, though in all essentials continued till the eighteenth century, it was, especially in the latter half, that the same came under attack. Nevertheless, the rising influence of the bourgeois ideology, expressed in the science of economics, was evident when it was accepted as a proper subject of study, alongwith theology, in the universities. Under this new trend agriculture was subjected to analysis. Since it was the bourgeoisie who analysed the system, they necessarily emphasized the importance of private property and enterprise, profit (or excess of return over investment) and technology as the means by which profits and property might be increased.

In 1784 a group of democratically-minded physiocratic reformers seized control of the person of young Prince Frederick, who was regent during the reign of his father, the insane Christian VII. Prince Frederick, (later Frederick VI) who escaped the clutches of a conservative court faction, happily embraced their plans for a series of thoroughgoing reforms which deeply affected the life of the peasantry. Between 1787 and 1807, along with the most profound peasant reforms, there was a rise in world grain prices and this

encouraged the peasants to take advantage of their new opportunities and which enabled the reforms to finance themselves for the first twenty years; thus putting momentum into the peasant movement which even subsequent price declines and a host of other unfavourable political and economic situations could not arrest.

The first and foremost important precondition for the success of land reforms was the already mentioned fifty percent rise of grain prices coupled with the demand for grain from England. Other important contributory factors included renovation in agricultural techniques, and modern ideas.

In 1787 the population of Danish-speaking areas was roughly 750,000, of whom seventy percent were directly engaged in agriculture. Three-fourths of all agricultural land was incorporated in about 800 estates which, in turn, were owned by a few estate owners. Crown and church land made up of most of the remainder, with only a small percentage of the land owned directly by the peasants who worked it. However, eighty seven percent of the land on the great estates was in peasant copyholdings, and the remaining thirteen percent was demesne cultivated by peasant labour dues. There were approximately 60,000 copyholder families whose holding averaged five 'tender hartkorn' (1 tdr = 7/5 acre) and there was an equal, or almost equal, number of cottagers and dependent families who were landless peasants with only a few acres of land and a kitchen garden.

In 1785 a Commission to reform the agricultural system on the extensive crown holdings in Northern Zealand was established. A uniform and rather generous sort of copyhold was instituted. Many farms were reparceled in a more rational manner. Both labour dues and tithes were commuted to cash payments.

After this successful experiment at reform on crown lands, Prince Frederick's reforming government established the Great Commission on peasantry in 1787. From the very beginning the Commission was set to producing a document which would be a model, not only for Denmark but for all of Europe, and it was intended that its deliberations would be published.

In 1787 the first phase of this major reform came into force. It provided that the evaluation of the peasant estates, on the death of a copyholder, must be carried out by an impartial jurist, and not by the local sherriff who could be subjected to pressure from the landlord. Thus it became possible for a landlord to owe money to the copy holder's heirs instead of the reverse, which had almost invariably been the case previously. Frugality and industry now became practical virtues of peasants. In June 1788 the next major reform of the Commission gave equally profound impetus to peasant independence and industry; namely, the abolition of adscription which was to take place gradually over a twelve year period. In March 1790 another major law forbade landlords to rent farms on one-year contract. They were required to adhere to the ancient custom of life-tenancy where it had been abandoned. A landlord also could not absorb land into the demesne on the plea that tenants were not available to work on it.

Labour dues represented the greatest single political obstacle to reform. In 1799 a law was passed which required all labour dues to be limited to fixed periods. The State gradually compelled landowners to come to voluntary agreements with copyholders, to submit to binding government arbitration concerning the amount of labour dues and their commutation to cash payments. The eventual settlement exempted cottagers from these reforms, as they had been exempted from others; most notoriously those concerning cruel and arbitrary forms of landlord discipline.

Inspite of all these reforms, the cottagers' condition remained unaltered. Their continuing existence as a labour force was vital to the continuing existence of the big

demesnes. They were also a valuable source of cheap labour for the new class of 'self-owners'. The price of the reform which created a peasant farmer middle-class was the relative impoverishment and social isolation of the large group of landless cottagers.

Fuelled by the prosperity arising from high and rising grain prices during the first twenty years of reform, the transition from copyhold to self-ownership was astonishingly rapid. By 1807, about sixty percent of peasant farms had passed over to self-ownership. Seventy five percent of the farms on Islands and over fifty percent of those in Jutland had been reparcelled. After only fifteen years of reform, in 1802, about 40% of Zealand's thickly populated peasant villages, and about 20 percent of the villages of the whole country, had been decentralised. The impact of this social revolution could be felt well within the nineteenth century. As economic and political crisis deepened after 1807, the first wave of the peasant movement slackened and ebbed slightly, but a second wave of reforms started in the late 1820's with the return of better times.

The government offered many prizes, cash incentives, educational programmes, etc. in order to encourage the peasants to use new agricultural techniques, plant new sorts of crops, improve their woodlots, and so forth. Along with this better fencing, more compact holdings, rational crop rotation, use of green manures, home consumption of potatoes, and the desire to become self-reliant and independent, all led to the enormous jump in productivity.

In 1789 the Danish programme of reform was well-advanced. The country actually seemed to be achieving, without turmoil, those essential benefits for which the French were upsetting their political system. The reforms were furthermore carried out by the king himself. Hence a very unusual thing happened: when the French revolution began the country was more devoted to Crown Prince Frederick VI than to any of the previous rulers.

IV

The essence of the social struggle for political power during the years 1815 to 1865 was between the common people, mainly peasants, demanding economic, social and political equality with the upper classes, and the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy on the other, equally determined to end all hereditary political privelege by the establishment of a democracy that protected their priveleges from the assault of common man. However, the period from 1815 to 1830 was one of reaction after the Napoleonic wars. The great agricultural reforms had stopped. The economic crisis wreaked havoc with the Copenhagen merchants and put a definite brake on the prosperity of the peasants. People were talking about representative democracy, but very few suggested that anything like this would be forthcoming from Frederick VI. In 1820 a Students' Association was formed in Copenhagen, with the Government's permission, which was to play a significant role later, but in the 1820's it was harmlessly academic. Later it cooperated with the mature bourgeois Wholesale Association to develop the Danish constitutional movement. However between 1815 and 1830 there was practically no political commotion in Denmark.

From 1830 onwards winds of liberalism were blowing in Denmark. The nobility experienced an inexorable decline. Another group which was undergoing progressive decay was that of the clergy. They had always been a dominant, masterful group, close to the ruling power. They were also, as a group, more hated than respected because of their equations with the landed interest groups.

A group which all economic, social and cultural forces combined to favour in this period was the peasantry. Decentralisation of the village created a large section of independent owners of moderately-sized farms, who, with the expansion of the market for agricultural products that now occurred, became small capitalist traders. In addition to all these, the peasants now took an active part in politics. The primary reason was that in addition to their new-found freedom and prosperity, they were now taking the advantage of being culturally enlightened through the public or folk schools; it was thus no coincidence that several of their ablest leaders were former school masters. As hard realists the peasants wanted local self-government and adequate national parliaments, not for any academic interest in democracy, but to defend their own interests.

However, it was the bourgeoisie who prospered during this period. The increasing momentum of economic development naturally benefitted them more at first than the rural population. They had, furthermore, the tactical advantage of being at the outset nearer to the seat of power. The period 1830 to 1865 in Western Europe witnessed the final triumph of the bourgeoisie in their achieving political power. They raised this banner of individual freedom, equality of opportunity, political democracy, etc. to cloak their self-interest. Under the garb of a high and visionary ideal, they expressed their profit motive and appealed to the people with their slogans. The conquests of the bourgeoisie abroad were so impressive that the local bourgeoisie could speak at home with all the assurance inspired by consanguinity.

It was the force of an international compulsion (fulfilling the commitments of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815) rather than in response to popular pressure in Denmark that Frederick VI in December 1830 began preparations for the consultative assemblies of the Estates. However there were covert political pressure groups who wanted more political and economic freedom—academic circles converted to economic liberalism, commercial aristocracy of the wholesale merchants, importers and exporters, etc. Meanwhile the Copenhagen bourgeoisie were slowly recovering the lost ground along with their provincial counterparts. Agriculture was witnessing a slow but steady transformation towards capitalism. Hence there was general jubilation and support when the ‘general provisions’ for a system of consultative Estates were issued on May 28, 1831.

Thus four assemblies were created: one for the Danish islands to meet at Roskilde, one for Northern Jutland at Viborg, one for Schleswig at the city of Schleswig and one for Holstein at Itzehoe. Three groups of voters were created: owners of city property, owners of rural estates and owners of smaller rural properties. The king insisted that tenants of seven acres (5 tender hartkorn) also be admitted to the third group. The Estates were to enjoy no legislative power. Absolute monarchy was to continue, but the king promised that he would consult the Estates on all projects for ordinary laws, and granted the estates extensive powers to suggest changes in existing law. The king was aware that by exposing his policies to the criticism of popularly chosen representatives he might be endangering the principle of absolutism.

Freedom of the press became the first national issue upon which the liberals united. On July 8, 1834 the king banned the Norwegian newspaper ‘Morgenbladet’, because it inclined in favour to the radicals and peasants. In the course of the elections to the first assemblies, held late in 1834, the liberal press of Copenhagen aroused the king’s anger. In the meantime dissention between the liberals and the king came to a head, and in a reply to a memorandum submitted by the liberals, the king declared, in a counter-statement known as ‘We alone know that the phase of tolerance was over. This infuriated the liberals who formed a Society for the Proper Use of Freedom of the Press which quickly became an instrument of education in political liberalism. Partly stimulated by this

controversy about a free press, voting for the first Estates was very heavy, especially among the smaller rural elements who had practically no leader from their ranks and who had to depend upon others to champion their demands. The bourgeois liberals, in contrast, emerged fully competent to speak on their own demands. At the meeting of the Roskilde and Viborg assemblies during the remainder of the reign of Frederick VI, the debates very clearly indicated the trend of the social forces.

In 1837 when Frederick VI became critically ill, the liberals began vigorous preparations to demand a constitution from his successor. Frederick recovered but in 1838 the Estates of Roskilde and Viborg requested that they be united in a national assembly lest the heart of Denmark be divided. However their request was ignored.

On December 3, 1839 when the old monarch finally died, Christian VIII was immediately deluged with petitioners to give Denmark a constitution. The students, followed by Wholesale Merchants Association and organisations from the provinces, sent the petitions.

The election to the Estates in 1841 took an 'almost English character' in the urban centres where the constitutional question was uppermost. The peasantry had not previously been roused to constitutional reform. In 1841 and 1842 the so-called 'peasant movement' began; first on the basis of rural local self-government act of 1841 and during the following decade by a growing sentiment for democratic government which swept through the rural population. The peasant movement was essentially the struggle of the middle-class peasants against the great proprietors.

This peasant awakening in the political sphere was due to economic recovery and eventual prosperity achieved by the smaller agricultural enterprises. The establishment of the system of Estate in 1834 and then the law providing for peasant participation in local government, provided legitimate media for political self-expression. The system of public education implemented in 1814 bore fruit in considerable cultural advancement. Indeed, the rural school masters were often leaders of peasant politics. Existing at the lowest rung of the social hierarchy, they had to bear the brunt of the taxation imposed by the state, but when it came to bestowing honors, these went to great landlords and bureaucracy. Meanwhile the popular religious revival, confined so largely to the rural population, deepened the gap between them and the upper classes. All this brought the peasants into the fold of 'Farmers' Leagues' which became forums for discussions of their special interests. The simmering discontent in the German-speaking population in Holstein and Schleswig took a radical new turn in 1842 when a representative at the Schleswig estate was not allowed to speak in Danish. This event left a chain reaction in its wake and struck a blow at the reform by splitting the liberal movement.

The protection of the Danish minority in Schleswig against overweening Germanism now loomed as the foremost duty of the Danish people. Liberals began to write articles in favour of the Danish language in the German press. A national association of Danish peasants in Schleswig was formed in 1843. Several other measures were also taken by the Danish liberals. There was an attempt to evoke pan-Scandinavianism against the emerging pan-Germanism. The peasants were more interested in democratic reforms than anything else. The movement gained momentum and in 1845 public gatherings in the rural districts were banned. A tidal wave of protests washed up to the throne. Once more, along with strong public protests, the Roskilde Estate demanded a national democratic constitution. In May 1846 the circular was withdrawn. Against the back drop of these developments the Liberals won the election in 1847 and the work of preparing the first draft of the constitution was delegated to P. G. Bang, a moderate liberal, newly inducted in the ministry. However, the constitution prepared by the ministry was so disappointing

that there was a complete out-cry against the ministry itself and dismissal of the ministry was demanded. On March 21, 1848 the king Frederick VII declared that he was dissolving the ministry. Within the next twenty-four hours, a ministry of all parties was created and when it was introduced to the king he declared that henceforth he would regard himself as a constitutional monarch and would hold the ministry responsible for the formulation of policy.

Absolutism was at an end but trouble loomed for the advocates of reform. War started on March 23, 1848 in the defence of Schleswig-Holstein. The Danish constitution had to be prepared and adopted to the circumstances which the war brought in its train. Great enthusiasm prevailed at first and the Ministry's plan for the election of a national constituent assembly bore its impress; nearly one-fourth of the members were to be appointed by the king (ministry) but for the remainder every male citizen thirty years old might vote. Whereas the events of the 'March days' had lacked all semblance of social conflict, the elections to the constituent assembly were conducted much more in that spirit. Hardly had the National Liberals been admitted to the ministry when they revealed their identity of class and culture with the landlords and high officials whose power they insisted upon sharing. The peasants, on the other hand, stirred to their depths by the necessity of defending their homes in the war, were quick to charge the landed aristocrats with treasonable sympathy for the landlords of Schleswig-Holstein. The bourgeoisie and their newfound friends, including the clergy, advised against the danger of a plebeian peasant regime and began to shrink away from unlimited suffrage. The peasants jealously trusted only men of their own class and stoutly demanded complete democracy. As a result of the elections almost one-third of the popularly elected representatives were peasants.

Frederick VII signed the constitution on June 15, 1849. It provided for two chambers, the 'Landsting' to be elected indirectly and the 'Folketing' to be elected directly, both to be elected by male householders of thirty years of age. Only persons who paid 200 rigsbankdaler (1 rbd = 54c) in taxes or, who had an annual income of 1200 rbd and who had passed their fortieth year were eligible to the 'Landsting'. Members of the upper house were furthermore given terms of eight and a half years, the membership made renewable every four years. The 'Folketing' was to be elected every three years. Freedom of meeting, speech and press was guaranteed. Reform of the courts and jury system were promised; also promised were freedom of occupation, universal military service and local self-government; and all hereditary priveleges were abolished.

V

The period of 1813-1835 saw the blossoming of the intellectual, artistic and ecclesiastical life of Denmark in general, and Copenhagen in particular was dominated by brilliant writers, artists and clerics. Thus began what is now known as Denmark's 'Golden Age'. All but a handful of these Golden Age luminaries were native-born members of the upper bourgeoisie of Copenhagen. Generally they stemmed from the families whose fortunes were rooted in the professions or in the gradually collapsing merchant patriciate. It has been argued that the Golden Age was the collective product of the scions and servants of an elite which was a very narrow and highly urban social stratum, It was quite of historical fate that when the economic and social base of this elite was sharply eroding, and a new society was beginning to bourgeon forth, the thin shell of cosmopolitan urban aristocracy, built upon absolutism and maritime commerce, gave birth to a resurgence of cultural activities that temporally suited the situation of one hundred years earlier.

Political, cultural and ecclesiastical transformation followed in the wake of these social and economic changes. The remarkable cultural creations of the Golden Age were suspended in a political void. Most of these Golden Age luminaries were supporters of absolutism in politics and thoroughly conservative in their social-economic-cultural outlook. The fascinating thing about Denmark in the first half of the nineteenth century was that there was an increasingly evident contradiction between the changing social and economic realities on the one hand, and the brilliant, but blithely conservative cultural productions on the other. It is no accident that the middle of the nineteenth century was a great watershed in both the cultural and political life of Denmark. When the tension between economy and ideology, between act and word, was finally released in the mid-century, the Golden Age fairly burst like a bubble or rather faded like a dream.

VI

The first quarter of the nineteenth-century could be viewed from two different angles—each depicting the truth in its own way. Denmark was passing through a period of apparent stagnation. The great flourishing overseas trade was on the decline. There was little scope of industrialization in the urban sector. As there was little scope for investment of capital, most of the profit was spent in the pursuit of earthly pleasure. Fabulous sums were spent this way. The Church had sizable landholding and along with the other powers that be maintained a standard of living that was unchristian to say the least. The old set of values compatible with the feudal system was on the wane and the new values had not yet gained ground. A far-reaching change was in the offing in the Danish socio-economic structure. There were rumblings underneath and those who wanted could hear the footsteps of change.

Those who could clearly hear the footsteps of change eyed the whole thing from a different angle. They saw that an old social system based on serfdom was rapidly disintegrating. The landed aristocracy and the church were slowly but decisively receding into the background. A new social system ushered in by land reform and incursion of capital were making its way to the fore. The silent, meek and obedient peasants were slowly becoming conscious participants in a great social movement. Although the change was not violent, it was a change nonetheless — a change in the value system of society. Improvement in the standard of education also called for a general improvement in the knowledge about the neighbouring countries. Hence not only was merchandise exported to Germany, France and England, but information also poured in from these countries through various channels. The great and violent social changes taking place in Germany and France touched the minds of the Danes and that facilitated further inroads upon the bourgeois ethos.

Against this background of nineteenth century Denmark what was its principal city like where Kierkegaard flourished? According to contemporary description, it was a small town with narrow alleys and few vehicles. The streets were ideal for afternoon strolls which were also the occasions for socializing. Almost everyone of any importance was known to all the others and they would probably meet quite frequently. Free from metropolitan noise and crowd, Copenhagen looked like a modern provincial town. But this was just an overview and the wide-ranging social transformation could be felt by those who could read the pulse of the town. As SK once lamented that he was a poet in the market place, Copenhagen was being transformed into a capital metropolitan city by the third decade of the nineteenth century. The abolition of adscription created an exodus of peasants, mainly cottagers to the capital which was then a major port in Northern Europe. The Danish trade and industry needed labourers with freedom of movement.

Increased transactions necessitated more manpower in the auction trade, retail trade, transport sector, and export-import agencies as well as in the industries. All (his attracted people from the countryside. The influx of village-folk into the capital and the change of values that collided with the existing world of ethics and morality pervaded every nook and corner of small Copenhagen. The peasants and agricultural labourers had just been freed from their bondage; those of them who came to join various trade and industries including shipbuilding industry and export-import trade were soon involved in the process of undergoing a fundamental change in attitudes and values from those of their parents. That there was a sort of awakening among the people was more than apparent as the contemporary social events showed. Every Copenhagener felt this change. Some welcomed it, some opposed. But, nevertheless, everyone admitted that Copenhagen was changing.

At the other end of the social fabric were the bourgeoisie. At the end of the eighteenth century these men were very powerful in the Copenhagen citizenry. The upper-class society of Copenhagen was thus principally divided into two groups — the traders and the feudal lords. A clash of values between the old and the new was not unlikely in such a set-up. The bourgeoisie viewed the aristocrats as potential enemies because they stood in the way of their expansion. As soon as the period of boom was over, they felt restless. They had nowhere to invest their money gained from trade transactions as their British contemporaries had. And, therefore, they disagreed with the existing system. They wanted change in the existing pattern and demanded investment opportunities. Peasants tied to the land was a situation unacceptable to them. They favoured a change in the daily life-pattern where the day would not begin so late and end so quickly. The overall laziness in the atmosphere bred by aristocracy was a bar to their advancement. So, there was confrontation on every side and no single aspect of the social value system was left untouched by it. Previously the concept of ethics, morality etc. were absolute but now the bourgeoisie had different meaning for them and viewed them differently. Vis-a-vis the peasants and landless labourers also, the attitudes differed.

The aristocrats, the churchmen included, showed a degeneration comparable to that of the eighteenth century French aristocracy. The church, basking in the divine glory, showed off most markedly. Kierkegaard's crusade against the church was the result of his frustration with the existing life-pattern of the religious leaders. Economically, the church, as an organised institution and owner of one-eighth of all arable land, was one of the fiercest exploiters of the peasantry. This apart, they enjoyed the privelege of the king's patronage. But they would speak during the congregation about the utter poverty of Jesus and his followers, read out from the Holy Book how God incarnate had to suffer on earth and advise their listeners to follow Jesus. This total dichotomy was so prominent in the Danish society that when SK attacked the church with all his venom, he found many people supporting his contention — particularly the young people. The established church and the aristocracy showed all the signs of degeneration and they were at loggerheads with the changing values of the Novo Riches.

The intellectuals of Copenhagen were thus divided among themselves — some supporting the newly emerging trends and the others opposing them. Here one important detail is to be noted. Because of Denmark's proximity to Germany, the intellectual life of Denmark always continued to be influenced by the high standard of German art, literature, culture, and philosophy. The Danish intellectuals would often visit Berlin to get themselves acquainted with what was the latest in Germany and then storm the Danish capital with the newly acquired knowledge. All Danish intellectuals knew exactly what was happening in the German speaking world. As Copenhagen was a major port of North

Europe and Germany its next door neighbour, communication with Western Europe was very close. The educated Dane could read, write and speak German. When Hegel commanded the German philosophy with his system approach, he also found admirers and adversaries in Denmark. The Danish intellectuals were thus sharply divided between pro- and anti-Hegelians. This in turn would explain, of course only to some extent, their liking for the aristocrats or the bourgeoisie within the Danish society. There were many churchmen in Denmark who in fact were in favour of Hege-lianism. A section of the church was also interested in agrarian reform that would pave the way for capitalism. In fact Grundtvig, an important churchman and social reformer, was instrumental in transforming Denmark from a feudal to a bourgeois state.

About Copenhagen, SK once spoke through the mouth of one of his characters as follows: Some of my countrymen think that Copenhagen is a boring little town. I think just the opposite. Freshened by the seas on which it lies, unable even in winter to forget the beach woods, I think it the most felicitous place to live in I could wish for. Big enough to be a larger-sized town, yet small enough to have no market price set upon men, the tabulated comfort the Parisians may have from knowing exactly how many suicides take place, and the tabulated joy which the Parisians may feel from knowing exactly how many persons of distinction there are, does not press it upon Copenhagen and disturb it, whirling the individual about with such a rush that life acquires no meaning, comfort no day of rest, joy no sabbath, because everybody is dashing around after what is meaning-less or all too meaningful. Some of my countrymen find the people who live in this town not vivacious enough, not sufficiently swift-moving. This does not seem to me to matter. The speed with which, in Paris, thousands form a crowd round one man, may indeed be flattering to the one around whom they collect, but I wonder if that compensates for the loss of the more tranquil mind, which allows the individual to feel that he too has some meaning. Just because the individuals are not altogether fallen in price, as if it took so many dozens to make one person; just because the people are (fortunately) too slow witted to grasp that cheap doctrine which flatters only the desperate and the blind; just for this reason life in this capital is so entertaining for him who knows how to find delight in people—a thing which endures better and gives richer award, than getting a thousand people to acclaim one person for half an hour."

As it often happens, the intellectuals can see penetratingly the depth of social transition which only others seize upon. In Denmark, too, this was happening. In 1841 Heiberg published a play 'A Soul after Death 'which exposed the respectable townsman's lack of sensitiveness to the spiritual condition of the age. In the same year Paludan-Muller, a famous Danish poet wrote a great satirical epic 'Adam Homo' which denounced the typical Copenhagener. Hegel or the System was the new name for philosophy. Even Kierkegaard, who later became a vociferous critic of the Hegelian System, was swayed by it initially. Science, poetry, philosophy and religion, all of which seemed to branch out from the same divine substance, were rapidly taking specific shapes. Oersted whose discovery of electro-magnetism changed the entire field of the application of electricity, though he considered himself a natural philosopher, was already a physicist. The newly emerging field of natural science and the wide interest in political questions contributed to the breaking up of the closed circle which had hitherto dominated the intellectual life of the country.

In short, Copenhagen was, by the early nineteenth century, the theatre of battle between the old and new. The adherents of the old referred to the past when morality was at its peak, Norway was a vassal state, there was less apparent discontent and life was smooth. To be precise, they desired the restoration of the past. The supporters of the new

era pointed to the utter sluggishness of the Danish society under the aristocrats, deterioration of values as also to the perspective of change in France and England—their democracy, equal rights, industrial supremacy and world-wide sway. They compared western Europe with Denmark which was economically a cripple, militarily broken and politically orthodox. The businessmen of the export-import trade daily added fuel to the fire by invoking a rosy picture of what Denmark could be under their leadership. Last but not the least, to help the Danish society out of the medieval feudal background, there was enough intellectual agitation as is clearly evinced by the Folk-school movement of the period. In short, this was the socio-economic background that formed part of SK's childhood and early youth.

2

AN ENQUIRY

INTO THE LIFE OF SOEREN KIERKEGAARD

MICHEAL Pedersen Kierkegaard was a shepherd boy in the desolate heath country of West Jutland where he was born into a family with nine children. He came to Copenhagen along with his maternal uncle Niels Andersen Seding who had his own business in the capital. Michael Kierkegaard soon showed an unusual acumen in business and beginning his career as a hosier, he expanded business in other fields like cloth etc. In 1780, when he was only twenty-four years of age, he obtained a license to deal in foodstuffs and, in 1788, he was given license by Royal Patent to deal also in Chinese and East Indian goods as well as in merchandise from the Danish West Indies. At the age of thirty, he was a wholesale dealer on a big scale.

This family background seen in the overall perspective of the growth in Danish mercantile capitalism could have provided our principal character a different upbringing. But this was not to be so because of SK's father Michael Pedersen. Working for another ten years, he retired from his business at the age of forty—just two months after the death of his first wife. In spite of being himself a businessman connected with the export-import trade for more than a decade, he did not develop a progressive outlook. He remained a devout Christian of the orthodox pietistic background with all the superstitious characteristics of his native village. Also, he had done something that violated the existing social ethics and this implanted in him a deep sense of guilt from which he could not recover all his life. This also inculcated in his children an uncanny feeling that left a permanent mark in their lives and made them mentally ill and physically crippled. While studying SK this background of the household has to be constantly kept in mind.

On April 26, 1797, before the year of mourning caused due to the sudden death of his first wife was over, Michael Pederson got married to Ane Sorensdatter Lund, a distant relation from the country who stayed with the family as the maid. The first child Maren Kristen was born on September 7, 1797—four and a half months after the marriage. We will discuss about this marriage later in order to understand the psychological state of Kierkegaard and its relation to solve many enigmas of his writings. However, after fifteen and a half years from the birth of the first child, Soeren Kierkegaard was born on May 5, 1813 when the mother had reached the forty-fifth year of her life and the father fifty-six. After Maren Kristen were born daughters Nicoline Christine and Petrea Severine, sons Peter Christian, Soeren Michael and Niels Andreas. This bounty from the second wife of Pederson Kierkegaard had a very ignoble beginning. Another important point may be noted here. Within two months from the death of his first wife, the childless widower, instead of investing more time in business, gave it up to a nephew and withdrew himself

into his shell. He also underwent a peculiar transformation. He gave up his business in order to live the rest of his life without any fixed occupation. He kept himself busy reading and brooding over philosophical and religious questions. Michael Pederson who was in the thick of business for almost thirty years of his life—one might well imagine that a businessman of his calibre had many close friends with whom he used to share public life—totally isolated himself after his remarriage and except for daily shopping seldom went out of the house. One might well suppose that he was suffering from a complex. Copenhagen in particular and Denmark in general was then predominantly a feudal place with landed aristocracy as the guardian of social values. Though himself of modest peasant origin, he had already risen up the social ladder whereby the social elites were his friends. When he married the maid-servant of the house, it must have raised many an eyebrow and set not quite a few tongues wagging. To avoid the queries of his all too inquisitive friends and acquaintances he must have taken refuge within the four walls of his house. Anyway, this did not help matters. One can well imagine the awkwardness of the situation when a respectable gentleman, a man nearing forty and owner of a great fortune suddenly creates a scandal by marrying his own maidservant. The gossips in the locality and the circle of friends and acquaintances must have alarmed him, and he preferred to sever all connections.

As if this was not all, the whole family lived in a very gloomy environment. The children could not invite their friends to the house. There was a constant gloom cast over the face of Michael Pederson. On the one hand he became a devout Christian, on the other he used to stay at home all day long keeping the family under his constant surveillance. Not only the social reason that we have just outlined but a deep personal reason was also the cause of his melancholy.

Soeren was admitted to school at the age of six. Although come of a peasant stock of West Jutland, he was a frail child and, unlike other boys in the school, he used to dress very oddly like the poor choir boys of the church. His clothes were so odd that he was subjected to all sorts of ridicule from his classmates. They used to call him ‘Soeren Sock’ and ‘choirboy’ much to his displeasure, of course. His features were also a bit peculiar in that his face was thin with a portruding snoutlike mouth and receding chin. In childhood he fell from a tree which hurt him in the spine and caused him to stoop a little. Being frail, he could not give his classmates a lesson when teased and he had to calmly endure it all because the father would just not brook any variation in clothing. Usually the boys who are not allowed to go out of the house find plenty of pleasure at school where they enjoy freedom to their hearts’ content. But it appears that Soeren never liked the atmosphere at school.

His home was not an ideal place for intimate association with other children. He never took any of his playmates or classmates to his house nor did he go to theirs. Through one of his pseudonyms Johannes Climacus he has given a vivid description of this period: “His home did not offer many diversions and as he very rarely went out, he early became accustomed to occupying himself alone and with his own thoughts. His father was a very stern man, apparently dry and prosaic but under his rough coat he concealed a glowing imagina-lion which even old age could not quench. When Johannes occasionally asked permission to go out, he was generally refused. But, now and then, the father, by way of compensation, proposed taking the boy’s hand and walking with him backwards and forwards in the room. Al first sight this may seem a poor substitute for a walk, and yet, as with a rough coat, there was something concealed behind it which made all the difference. The proposal accepted, it was left entirely (o Johannes to decide where they should go. So they went out of door lo a nearby summer castle, or out to the sea-shore, or about the

streets, wherever Johannes wished to go; for the father was capable of anything. While they went backwards and forwards in the room, the father described all they saw. They greeted passers-by, carriages rattled past them and drowned the father's voice; the cake woman's goods were more enticing than ever. He described so accurately, so vividly, so really—even down to the last details—everything that was known to Johannes and so forthrightly and perspicuously what was unknown to him, that after half an hour of such a walk with his father, Johannes was as much overwhelmed as fatigued as if he had been out of doors for a whole day. Johannes soon learnt from his father how he too could exercise this magic power. Then what had hitherto been an epic now became a play. They conversed as they walked. If they went along well-known ways, they watched each other sharply to see that nothing was overlooked. If the way was strange to Johannes, he joined his wit with his father's, for the latter's almighty imagination was capable of creating anything using every •childish fancy as an ingredient in the drama that was being enacted. To Johannes it seemed as if the father were the Lord, and he himself his favourite, who was allowed to interpose his childish conceits as merrily as he would. For he was never repulsed and the father was never non-plussed. Everything was included and always to Johannes' satisfaction."

But however much lovingly he might have described the indoor walks, one thing was certain; he grew up as a brooding child always immersed in the depth of his thought. Unlike other children who were allowed to go out and play with their companions outdoors, SK was forced to enjoy the imaginative walks with his father. This solitary imprisonment and the gloom that always prevailed at home isolated him both mentally and physically from the external world. Physical frailty and complete lack of communication with the outside world inculcated in him a sense of inferiority. He grew up alone and then had to face the world outside. Unprepared and frightened, he developed his defence mechanism—his wit and imagination. In time these became his swords with which he confronted the world. For others, the world at large was but a natural companion. For SK, it was a world up against him with a variety of problems—a world to confront but not to live with.

The child was also introduced to religion at a very tender age. The shaky and superstitious father used to tell him the stories of the Christ and his crucifixion as also other stories from the Old Testament. It was in this early childhood that he felt that he was destined to suffer in this world, that he was a 'sacrifice' who could not expect to lead a normal and happy life. It may be guessed that the father knowingly or unknowingly hammered this point into the child's mind. Some family tragedies also accentuated this feeling. It appears that it was the father's belief that like the story of Abraham and Isaac of the Bible, he was also destined to sacrifice his most beloved son to atone for the sin that he had committed. We have not yet explained what this sin was. At appropriate time and place we will deal with it.

The above fact is corroborated by SK's recollection of his childhood. In a Journal entry he described his plight as follows: "I was already an old man when I was born. Delicate, slender and weak, deprived of almost every condition for holding my own with other boys, or even for passing as a complete human being in comparison with others; melancholy, sick in soul, in many ways profoundly unfortunate, one thing I had: an eminently shrewd wit given me presumably in order that I might not be defenceless. Even as a boy I was aware of my power of wit, and knew that it was my strength with far stronger comrades." In his book, Point of View, he also described this in another way: "In the two ages of immediacy (childhood and youth), with the dexterity reflection always possesses, I helped myself out, as I was compelled to do, with some sort of counterfeit,

and not being quite clear about myself and the talents bestowed opon me, I suffered the pain of not being like the others—which naturally at that period I would have given everything to be able to be, if only for a short time. A spirit can very well put up with not being like the others— indeed that is precisely the negative definition of spirit. But childhood and youth stand in close relation to the generic qualification expressed in the species, the race and just for this reason it is the greatest torment of that period not to be like the others, or as in my case, to be so strangely topsy-turvy as to begin at the point where a few n every generation end, whereas the majority who live merely in the factors of the soulish-bodily synthesis never reach it—that is the qualification of spirit.. ... But when one is a child—and the other children play or jest or whatever else they do —and then in spite of the fact that one is a child or a youth, then to be spirit! Frightful torture! Even more frightful if by the help of imagination one knows how to perform the trick of appearing to be the youngest of all."

From the above two quotations one can easily see the deep sense of inferiority that SK suffered from for not being like others and the defence mechanism that he put up — a superiority complex of being above the other human beings in spirit. Here in passing it may be pointed out that the deviation from normal human behaviour that characterised SK's later life had their origin in his childhood and youth.

Kierkegaard also reflected later on his religious upbringing at the hands of his father. That he became mentally ill he himself admitted: "As a child I was strictly and austerely brought up in Christianity; humanly speaking, crazily brought up. A child crazily travestied as a melancholy old man. Terrible! What wonder then that there were times when Christianity appeared to me the most inhuman cruelty." On another occasion he wrote, "To cram Christianity into a child is a thing that cannot be done; for it is a general rule that everyone comprehends only what he has use for and the child has no decisive use for Christianity. . . ."

These observations point singularly to one fact—the superstitious father, reeling under his own sense of guilt, had tried, as a form of atonement, to inculcate forcibly in the children a sort of religiosity. The gloom of the household, the sense of guilt, and finally a religiosity bordering on the worst superstition hung over the house. This not only frightened the children but also made them mentally and physically handicapped. The melancholia that developed in SK was therefore not an isolated phenomenon. His brother Peter Christian was also a patient of melancholia. It became so acute that he was compelled to resign his office as bishop. It is said that he had all through opposed his father's delusion that the latter had committed an unforgivable sin. But at last he too fell a victim to this craziness. His son was so insane that he had to be confined in an asylum and yet he was witty enough to quip: "My uncle was Either/Or, my father is Both-And, and I am Neither/Nor." Another of SK's nephews had several attacks of insanity and, in one of them, he committed suicide.

Added to all this SK had a belief that he was a sacrifice at the altar of God. In fact the story of crucifixion of Jesus had left an overwhelming impact on him. The story of Abraham sacrificing Isaac also moved both the father and son. This story has been taken as a motif in 'Fear and Trembling'. From his childhood he thought of himself as an exception, a sacrifice to God, and, later in his life this thought of being chosen as a sacrifice deterred him from taking all vital decisions.

The University

Soeren Kierkegaard's childhood as traced in the preceding pages portrays a little boy who is studious, intelligent yet gloomy, at home within the four walls of the house but

uneasy in social gatherings or in the company of friends. The mind of this type of boy, as soon as he enters the University where the students are at liberty to skip classes, where there is no one to monitor their conduct, where a young mind is allowed to take part in anything he wishes to, where knowledge is easily accessible and anyone can acquire it to one's heart's content, literally takes on wings. He satiates himself with the taste of liberty and unlike others who have known in their childhood what freedom is—at least tasted its charm at one time or another— stretches the boundary of freedom a bit too far. As his own recollections suggest (as well as documents from other sources) the first four years of the University were a new dose of life for him. He learnt to accommodate himself to the world, started defying his father whom he had looked upon with awe all his childhood, acquired the courage to know the Arts—music, drama and literature, grasped the intricacies of modern philosophical thought although his main subject was theology; in short, he showed signs of all-round maturity. Art and aesthetics attracted him greatly during this period. From the very first year he became an avid listener of European classical music, feelings about which he later jotted down in several chapters of the first volume of Either/Or. He had also a taste for the dramatic that led him to be a regular theatre-goer. These tastes he had never known during his schooldays but at the University he was a great enthusiast of opera and theatre. Besides, he engaged himself in a wide variety of literary studies, especially German fiction. He led a free and easy life at the University, read whatever he wanted to and whenever, attended lectures only if the topic and the speaker interested him. He also took an active interest in student activities—lecturing in seminars or arguing with his comrades on the burning topics of the day, gossiping at the student cafeterias and coming homeward only to take food.

At this period it seemed that he was gradually getting rid of the melancholia that seized him during his childhood and school days. There was little time to get 'immersed in thoughts'. Life was quite busy now and demanded most of his time and attention. It was rather his elder brother Peter who at that time exhibited symptoms of depression. He often vacillated as to whether he should join the party of Grundtvig which was much in royal disfavour during this period. Of course later when the cause of Grundtvig held sway he became an open disciple.

During the last years of his school days, SK got acquainted with a latter-day renowned naturalist Peter Wilhelm Lund, elder brother of his sister Petrea's husband. Wilhelm was then studying the Brazilian paleontology. True to the spirit of the nineteenth century, though not a non-believer, Wilhelm did not agree with the theologists that natural science was but a part of theology. As SK was on intimate terms with this scientist, they used to communicate and correspond with each other on their views on various subjects. In one such letter, we find SK's early views on science and arts and also the choice of profession that he would take up later. He wrote that he was bent on finding out the secrets of life rather than the secrets of matter. It also seems that he was not very clear about the role of science. He thought that the sole objective of science was merely the collection of facts. That science is in the ultimate analysis a philosophical outlook where facts strengthen an existing philosophical hypothesis or give rise to another was terra incognita to him. What transpires from the letter is that SK from his very childhood was not interested in methodological and scientific study.

The secrets of life that he was interested in now began to urge him to start the career of a writer. To begin with he was interested in writing poetry and, for this reason, he made a serious study of Faust, Don Juan and the Wandering Jew. The first two themes occur in Either/Or. He would be occupied with these two themes for a few more years to come.

Another theme which caught his imagination during this period was that of a master thief like Robin Hood. His idea about the qualities of a master thief confirms the belief that he was suffering from a complex. Thus he wrote in his Journal, "We must be careful to remember that it is not only wickedness or thieving or the like, which has generally been regarded as the root idea of the master thief. On the contrary, the master thief has always been pictured as good-natured, lovable, and charitable whose conduct indeed was extraordinary and who moreover was endowed with an outstanding cunning and sagacity; but who did not steal really for stealing's sake, ie. Merely in order to appropriate the possessions of others. He stole for another reason. We must picture him as being often discontented with the established order of things, and as expressing his discontent by infringing upon the right of others; and in doing so, seeking an opportunity to encounter the law and play with the authorities. Apropos this, it is noteworthy that he is pictured (this is related for example about Peter Mikkelsen) as stealing from the rich to help the poor—which shows his magnanimity; he does not steal things for his own use. We can also think of him as having a warm affection towards the other sex; a thing which on the one hand indicates a bright spot in his character, and on the other hand, gives him and his life just that touch of romance which is required to distinguish him from ordinary thieves—whether he thieves for the sake of winning, if possible, a better time in his beloved's arms, or whether he is conscious, in his activities as a thief, of being an opponent of the establishment, or whether he is taking revenge against authority for an injustice it has perhaps inflicted on him. Then his girl appears by his side like a guardian angel, and offers him solace in his difficulties; and when the authorities pursue him and try to take him, the multitude on the other hand look suspiciously upon him as one who is certainly a thief, although a voice in their midst sometimes perhaps speaks up in his defence. Meantime, he can find no comfort or encouragement among other thieves since they stand far beneath him, and baseness is their prevailing characteristics. The only association lie may have with them can only be for the purpose of using them for the attainment of his aims, otherwise he must disdain them. . . . Such a master thief will also advancingly and frankly confess his crime, and suffer punishment for it as a man who is conscious having lived for an idea; and precisely because of this, he recognises the reality of the state and does not repudiate it—as perhaps one may put it —by his life. It is only abuses that he opposes. We may well think of him as one who would initiate a court of justice, but in this we can only see a kind of ridiculing of everything, and a declaration in action of a certain vanity which goes with his idea. He will never forget to be frank, and he will come out with his own confession when once he knows how he may play with the court.... Of course, he may be imagined as equipped with a high degree of humour (as much indeed as can be reconciled with his discontent) and this will make him satirical—even if he is not always to be thought of as discontented—can easily be reconciled with his coming from the simpler classes of the people and from the nation's roots.'

From the above entry it can be guessed that several ideas were taking shape in his mind at this time: firstly, the idea of anti-establishment; secondly, the idea of being an exception and thirdly, recognition of the moral supremacy of the erring man. These three important motifs not only give an idea of how SK was thinking these days but also what his future course of action could be. The idea of an extraordinary thief—criminal in the eye of law but revered in the public mind—would preoccupy his thought for a long time to come.

It was about this time that a series of tragedy overtook the family. Already in 1819 Soeren Michael had died at the age of twelve. In 1822, the eldest daughter Maren Kiristine died at the age of twenty-five. In 1832, the second eldest daughter, Nicoline,

died aged thirty-three. One year after in 1833 Niels Andreas, who had gone to America, died there. In July 1834, the mother died and the same year in December Petrea died at the age of thirty-three. The shock was terrible. It aroused uncanny and superstitious beliefs about the limit set by divinity to their stay on earth. It was at this time that the sense of guilt that overwhelmed the father pervaded the sons too. They began to nurture a lurking belief that they would never live to be thirty-four, the maximum age-limit granted to them, and the gloom that SK was slowly overcoming in the first few years at the University, again seized him. As ill luck would have it, he discovered some secrets of his father—terrible secrets that confirmed his belief that they were born only to die at an early age as punishment to the father for his sin. What did Soeren discover?

Between his twenty-second and twenty-fifth birthdays, SK came to know the terrible secrets and, as soon as he learnt about it, the whole history of the family and the predicament that befell them appeared to him in a different light. Everything seemed predestined, occurring according to God's will. He reflected upon the broodiness of his father, the gloom that hung over the house, his own melancholia and that of his brother and all this accounted for the singular conclusion that the father must outlive all his children who would die one after another before him. He now realized that his father's over-religiosity was not due to his reverence for God but the dread that had crept into his heart after committing great sins against the God Almighty. He bore a profound impact of this discovery all his life.

SK has nowhere written down what this guilt of his father was. But from a study of the entries in the Journals and an analysis of his views about some of the Greek and Biblical characters he often alluded to it has been possible to make a reasonably fair conjecture as to what this 'Great Earthquake', as SK termed it, was. In one of the Journal entries he wrote: 'If something becomes thoroughly depressing, there must first develop in the midst of the most favourable circumstances a suspicion whether things are all right, one is not clearly conscious of anything so very wrong, it must lie in the family relations, there the consuming power of original sin shows itself, which may rise to the point of despair and affect one more terribly than does the fact which confirms the truth of (he presentiment.

A sort of presentiment commonly precedes everything that is to happen (c.f. a scrap of paper); but just as this may have a tempting effect, for the fact that it awakens in a person the thought that he is predestinated as it were, he sees himself carried on through a chain of consequences, but consequences over which he has no control. Hence one must be so cautious with children, never believe the worst, never by an untimely suspicious or chance remark (a firebrand from hell which kindles the tinder there is in every soul) to arouse an alarmed consciousness whereby souls innocent but not strong, are easily tempted to believe themselves guilty, fall into despair and thereby take the first step towards the goal which the alarming presentiment foreboded—an utterance which gives occasion for the kingdom of evil with its shaky benumbing eye to reduce them to a sort of spiritual impotence. To this case also the saying applies: Woe unto him through whom the offence cometh.'

'Here it is in point to observe the effect often produced by reading about the symptoms of sickness.... There is a certain susceptibility which is so strong that it is almost productive.... All sins begin with fear.

'It made most horrible impression upon me the first time I heard that indulgences contained the statement that they compensate for all sins, etiam se matrem virginem violasset. I still remember the impression it made on me when several years ago in youthful romantic enthusiasm for a master thief I let fall the remark that it was after all only a misuse of powers, that such a man might well be able to reform and father then

said in great seriousness, “There are crimes which one can contend against only by God’s constant help.” I hastened down to my room and looked at myself in the mirror. Or when father often remarked that it would be a good thing if one had such a venerable old man as a confessor to whom one could open oneself.’

The first paragraph evidently points to the gloomy atmosphere of the house which had the effect of forcing one into utter despair. The second paragraph suggests that his predestination of events should not have been disclosed to the children who since lived under the spectre of the forthcoming catastrophe. The fourth paragraph is in fact the most significant one. Here there is a reference to the sin of violating virginity. This has been widely discussed by the scholars and some of them have come to the conclusion that SK had found some indication which confirmed his belief that it was by an act of rape on the part of the father that the relation with the second wife began. As already mentioned, the first wife died without leaving any children. Then the marriage took place between the owner of the house and his maid-servant and the first child was born within four months of their marriage. This conclusively proves that the father had come into sexual relationship with his would-be wife much before the marriage and only a few months after the death of the first wife. The maidservant who was a distant relation of the senior Kierkegaard stayed in the house under the protection of the former who had violated her virginity and only later, finding no other alternative, married her. This explains the constant gloom cast over the father, his severing of all connections with the society and his consequent behaviour. All this vitiated the atmosphere of the house.

Revelation of this secret led SK to write the following in his diary: ‘Then it was that the great earthquake occurred, the frightful upheaval which suddenly forced upon me a new infallible rule for interpreting the phenomena one and all. Then I surmised that my father’s great age was not a divine blessing, but rather a curse; that the distinguished talents of our family existed only to create mutual frictions, then I felt the silence of death increasing around me, when in my lather I beheld an unfortunate man who must outlive us all, a sepulchral cross upon the grave of all his own hopes. Guilt must rest upon the whole family, a divine punishment must be impending over it, it must disappear, be driven out by God’s mighty hand, be wiped out as an unsuccessful experiment. And only now and then did I find a little relief in the thought that my father had the heavy duty of consoling us with the comfort of religion, of preparing us all, so that a better world would be open to us if we were to lose all in this, even if there were to fall upon us that punishment which the Jews devoutly wished for their foes, that our remembrance would be cut off from the earth and our name blotted out.’

After this great earthquake there appeared several changes in SK’s life and attitude. Firstly, he openly revolted against his father. The patriarch, his emperor now stood before him without his clothes. He was at this time intently working on the themes of Don Juan and the Wandering Jew. Besides, he began to take active interest in the activities of the students’ union. But, owing to his peculiar upbringing he did not move along with the political thoughts of his time—that of transforming the highly feudal Danish society into a modern one. Although he was for the time being striving to rid himself of his father’s influence, the melancholia from which he was suffering never quite left him. This mental illness as also the various delusions generated by it were also instrumental for his conservative views. However, in participating in student activities, he showed great zeal and enthusiasm. He delivered a lecture on November 28, 1835 on ‘Our journalistic literature’. In it he showed, by tracing the course of thought expressed in the daily papers over the previous years, that the liberal reforms, which had led to the summoning of the Consultative Provincial Councils, had not, as was commonly believed and as was

maintained by the daily press, proceeded from the efforts of the press, but were in fact due to the initiative of the government. The subject under discussion was extremely controversial. Of course, the question whether the daily press was instrumental or not could be answered with the help of statistics. There is no doubt that the bourgeoisie and a section of the peasantry had voiced the demand. But SK, due to his conservatism, was reluctant to concede the credit to anyone other than the government itself. On another he went still further. He was presiding over a plenary assembly of the students' union and a political occurrence of immediate interest was hotly debated. At one point it seemed that the decision of the house would go against the conservatives and the government. Staunch conservative as he was, he defied the advice of his other advisers including his brother and proclaimed pre-emptorily that the meeting was adjourned. Years later on a visit to king Christian VIII he was surprised to learn that the king was informed about this meeting and the part he had played in it.

It was also about this time that he wrote three political articles in the Copenhagen Flying Post where he attacked the liberals for their lack of integrity. These incidents show his conservative leanings which would deepen with the coming years.

He was also contemplating suicide at this stage. On the one hand, he was always fleeing from himself and trying to forget his wounds by plunging into the company of his friends and comrades, poets and idlers. On the other, whenever he came to himself, he found it totally futile to stay alive because, after all, he would not be able to lead a peaceful life. In the company of his friends, he showed himself to be a witty and reckless young man who would drink in the evening, frequent the brothels and come back home in the early hours of the day only to repeat the routine. He wrote in his Journal about this time thus: 'Inwardly rent asunder as I was, without any prospect of leading a happy earthly life (that it might go well with me and I should live long in the land), without any hope of a happy and snug future—which most naturally issues from and consists in the historical continuity of family life in the home—what wonder that in hopeless despair I grasped solely at the intellectual side of man's nature and clung to it, so that the thought of my not inconsiderable gifts of mind was my only consolation, the idea of my only joy and that men were to be indifferent.'

One evening, back home from a party at Poul Moller, the poet's house, he wrote in his diary—'I have just come home from a party where I was the moving spirit. Witticisms streamed from my mouth, everybody laughed and admired me — but I went out and—yes, the dash should be as long as the radius of the earth's orbit—wanted to shoot myself.' The inferiority complex used to haunt him. We have seen how in his childhood he had become, due to his peculiar upbringing, a sort of out of place character. When he was a fresher at the University, he was gradually getting rid of these complexes. But, with the repetition of the tragedy of death in his family, the old delusions came back afresh and with them the superstitious belief that there hung a curse that would take away all the scions to his father's blood. The Great Earthquake occurred during this phase and everything appeared to him to take shape according to a grand plan. The father's guilt had to be atoned by the father himself and he would be punished as mortally as possible by outliving his children. The maximum stretch of' life granted to the children would be thirty-four years; so why not shorten it by committing suicide? This was how SK was thinking these days. But the next moment, in a bid to live life more forcefully then ever, he would visit his friends, eat, drink and be merry and try to enjoy himself as much as he could. That he was a misfit in this society, that guilt surrounded him and his family, that there was no other way but to give in—these disquieting thoughts he tried to drown in the streams of wit and jest while in the company of his friends. Inside himself, lie was always

conscious of the peculiarity of his birth and the sin of his father that would eventually blot him out. That he was a sacrifice was a feeling that haunted him. This mental condition would account for the conduct of our subject in the forthcoming events.

Added to all this was his melancholia—a deep persistent feeling which gave birth to ideas of superiority and of being an exception, a sacrifice at the altar of God. We will observe various metamorphoses of" Ihese concepts of 'sacrifice' and 'exception' overwhelming the life of our principal character.

Engagement

The stage was now set for SK to be compared with an Antigone or a I Hamlet. He has known a secret of his father as Hamlet had known about his mother. The hand of God had already taken away his brothers and sisters. The 'exception' that he was in his childhood had now been transformed into a 'sacrifice'. All this cast a dark spell over his love affair.

Soeren used to visit the house of a deceased parish priest named Thomas Skat Rordam whose daughter Bolette he was a little fond of. She was then engaged to a student of theology but Soeren was sure that he could easily dislodge his competitor. However, at Rordam's place, he one day met a young girl named Regine Olsen, daughter of a highly placed government official. She was then only fourteen years of age and Soeren twenty-four. For Soeren it was love at first sight— a feeling which accompanied him all his life. From now on he would visit Regine quite frequently, lend her books and by this pretext would seek to develop a closer relationship.

What followed would subsequently fill his Journals and books. Everyday from now, recollections of every scrap of conversation, every twist and turn of small incidents, every dilemma and vacillation— in short, every small detail would fill his mind. So many characters from history would be beckoned to this end, so many episodes having only remote resemblance to SK and Regine's life from contemporary German literature or ancient Greek would be brought into the making and breaking of this relationship; so many arguments, in favour and against, would be adduced to justify his various actions that this love story can become an epic in its own right.

Even before this affair took place, SK had his own misgivings about his future love life. He wrote: 'My misfortune on the whole is that during the time I was pregnant with ideas, I got a shock from the Ideal; and so I gave birth to deformities and therefore Actuality does not correspond to my burning longings. May God grant that that should not be the case with love; for I am seized with a secret dread of mistaking an Ideal for an Actuality. God forbid! As yet this is not so. But this dread makes me long to know the future beforehand, and yet I fear it.' This substitution of Ideality for Actuality and vice-versa would be the most disturbing factor in the years to come.

From the middle of 1838 till August 1840, SK used to visit the Olsens regularly. Gradually acquaintance grew into intimacy between the two young hearts. On September 8, 1840, SK went to Regine's house with the purpose of telling her what he had wanted to tell her all these months ever since they met. He met Regine on the street outside the house. She informed him that there was no one in the house and requested him to come in. Soeren accepted the invitation. Regine sat at the piano but he interrupted her and asked her to stop playing. He then said with emotion: 'Oh, what do I care about music! It is you I want and have wanted these two years.' Straight from there Soeren came to Regine's father's office and proposed the hand of his daughter. He had no objection and asked Soeren to come over to their place in two days time.

Immediately after this Soeren began to vacillate. He started brooding over all the pros and cons of this relationship. He was then desperately retelling against himself because he felt that he had unnecessarily let himself in for a dangerous venture. He felt that 'he was under 70,000 fathoms of water', not only alone but along with an innocent girl. This complete reversal of mood, total volte-face— asking for something he was determined to ask for and repenting for asking it after the same had been granted, this to and fro movement of thought exhausted him to such an extent that within a week he looked tired and worried.

As if to set aside these misgivings, SK paid the kind of attention that convention demanded of him as a suitor. He got himself introduced to Regine's brothers and sisters. After the engagement was announced the Olsens gave a party to which SK's nephews and nieces were invited. In short, a cordial family relationship was established between the Kierkegaards and the Olsens. With Regine he was all gay and joyful. But no sooner had he arrived home than he was again downcast with worries. The idea that his was not a normal and peaceful life still haunted him.

What was the reason for all these vacillations? If he was not pre-pared to advance further why did he not say so to Regine? If he was sure that he would not be able to lead a happy and peaceful married life, why did he organise and participate in the family get-togethers? Answers to these questions are to be found in the psychological build-up of our subject and that is why we have decided to study SK's psychology in the light of his life-story. For the present, let us follow SK's own reasoning. SK said about this, 'A penitent as I was … my vita ante acta ... my broodiness.' Let us examine this statement carefully. Firstly, this refers to his fall, i.e., his moral 'slip'. But there is no doubt that if SK had confessed about this to Regine, she would have readily forgiven him. The later events that showed that she was deeply in love with SK. amply confirm our belief. But, then, this 'sin' that he was forced to commit after the Great Earthquake was a sequel to his father's 'sin' and therefore doubts rose in his mind whether he could divulge a secret which was not his own. This was a secret about his father who was till recently regarded by him as the supreme moral personality. There was another problem—the gravest of sorts—the problem of the curse that hung over the family. If she were admitted into it, she would also have to share with others of the family the fate that it was destined to suffer. In short, Soeren might have argued that he had no right to endanger the life of an innocent outsider. Lastly, the profession that he could choose for his livelihood was that of a priest because he had a University degree in theology. But confessing this slip might mar his chances in this line. His diary shows deep concern about all these problems. He was deeply worried about the aftermath of the marriage and apprehended a gloomy future waiting for him. These thoughts came to his mind one after the other only when he had taken the decisive step of asking for the hand of a young lady. His mind was now a battle-ground of opposing pulls and forces.

However, after a while when Soeren and Regine came still closer, their relations became more normal. He would weep sitting beside her and she would know that he was aggrieved over the loss of his beloved father. She then began to take interest in his studies and he initiated her to the intricacies of theology. 'She was light as a bird' wrote SK, 'I let her mount higher and higher, I stretched out my hand and she alighted upon it and flapped her wings. She called down to me, "it is glorious here". She forgot, indeed she did not know, that it was I who made her so light, I who gave her boldness of thought. It was her belief in me that made her walk upon the water. And I paid homage to her, while she accepted my homage." It was this sort of relationship that existed between them. She

knew about his unhappiness - and his habit of brooding and was prepared to share it with him. And he, still vacillating, did whatever was needed to keep the relationship going.

Then, as if to shake off his broodiness once and for all and take up the responsibility befitting an engaged man, he registered himself for the Pastoral Seminarium at the very last hour. The idea obviously was to reserve for himself the possibility of taking up priesthood as profession for which the practical training of the Seminarium was required. The first sermon delivered by him there was 'To me to live is Christ, to die is gain'. The crux of the sermon was that death was only gain for those in whom the eternal and hidden life had dawned and grown into the fullness of the manhood of Christ. This was to deprive a great number of people of the comfort they had at death because for them the hidden life had not thus 'dawned'. One should note the violent contradiction in SK's thought-process. He entered his name at the Seminarium to have a priest's job and yet at the delivery of his very first sermon he was extolling death as the only 'gain'. Metaphorically speaking, he was keeping one foot in the thick of life and another in the grave. Both he wanted to keep. This height of vacillation explains his utter psychological imbalance.

Meanwhile he was working on his postgraduate dissertation entitled 'On the Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates'. Here again is visible his urge to find himself a decent occupation. He hoped that on completion of the thesis he might be offered the professorship in moral philosophy which remained vacant since the death of Poul Moller. But, unfortunately for SK, the post was offered to Rasmus Nielsen who later collaborated with SK in philosophical writings. The shock this appointment gave SK was quite deep. But he saw God's hand in it.

As a result of his inner conflicts, he sent the engagement ring back to Regine on August 11, 1841 along with a note that read: 'In order not to have to try out any more what is bound to happen, and what, when it has happened, will give strength as strength is needed, so let it now happen. Forget above all else him who writes this; forgive a person, who, whatever else he could do, could not make a girl happy.' But the letter had a totally different effect on the receiver. Regine rushed to his house and not finding him there, left a note pleading him not to cut off relations with her 'for the sake of Jesus Christ and by the memory of your dead father'. Obviously, this made an impact on SK. Regine's mentioning of these two names could not prevent SK from breaking off the engagement but deferred the final day. SK now took a round-about course of action to arrive at the decisive result. The method was to make her tired of the engagement; to root out all feelings of inferiority from her and to induce in her the conviction that it was not he who had discovered that she was not worthy of him, rather it was she who had made a mistake in choosing him. And this method depended on the ability of flawless acting on the part of SK to prove himself worthless in the eyes of Regine. That in so doing he would be jeopardising his family reputation, that everyone would look down upon him as the one who could break his word of honour, that he could be portrayed as a scoundrel in the eyes of his contemporaries—these thoughts had occurred to him; but even then he decided to go ahead with the plan because she would only then disengage herself and settle down with someone else. Though later he contradicted this in some of the aesthetic works, at that period he actually wanted her to break with him and marry some other person.

He tried his best to play the role of a worthless fellow. Some day he would appear nonsensical and stupid, the other day cynical and frustrated. He would advise her to reconsider her decision to get married to a philosopher who was good for nothing and this would lead to hot exchanges between them. All this was part of a foolproof strategy. He would act in the same way towards her other family members only to convince them that

he was really a stupid fellow. Tired and dejected, she finally broke off the engagement on October 11, 1841.

The small town of Copenhagen buzzed with gossip. In the clubs, restaurants and theatres the same story was discussed over and over again. To get away from all this, SK set sail for Berlin. There during his stay of four and a half months he worked on his first book 'Either/ Or' which soon became the most talked about piece of Danish literature. The next four years saw a spate of writings from SK's pen. 'Fear and Trembling' and 'Repetition' were published in 1843. Other books folio wed as well: 'Stages on Life's Way', 'The Concept of Dread'^ etc. All these books had but one central theme, i.e., SK's self-justification in annulling the engagement.

While in Berlin, he gave specific instruction to his friend Emil Boesen to see to it that she (Regine) got the impression that even in Berlin he was leading a very dubious life. The intention was, as SK would have others believe, that he did not want her to keep even an iota of faith in him and to pave the way for her to lead an uninhibited married life. But that he was not so sincere in his purpose was evident from the shock that he received months later when he heard the news of Regine's engagement to Schlegel, her private tutor. Now he began to argue that since Regine had by the name of his dead father implored him not to break off, she was morally married to him. He was so outraged at this development that he changed the latter part of his hook 'Repetition' to give vent to his feeling.

From now on, he showed a pronounced inclination towards Christianity. He saw the hand of God in all that had happened and began to explain them in terms of Biblical parables. In 'Fear and Trembling' In- argued that he had sacrificed his most beloved one in the world to God. The theme of sacrifice that dominated his thoughts right from his childhood would continue to be given different meanings and undergo several metamorphoses. He was a sacrifice of his father in his atonement for guilt. Now he is sacrificing all his earthly pleasures to atone for his own and his father's guilt. Later it would be his sacrifice for Christianity. Moreover, this was the period when he was decisively turning towards Christianity. It was at this time that he propounded His famous theory of leap. He divided the whole life span into three distinct phases: Aesthetic, Ethical and Religious. At the 'aesthetic' period, one is concerned with beauty, love, earthly pleasures, etc. Beyond the 'aesthetic', an individual might reach the 'ethical' stage. At this stage, he is concerned with morality, ethics, etc. Here his concern is: 'how ethical it is !' Life at this stage has one solitary goal, i.e. to promote oneself to the next higher stage—the 'religious' stage. At this stage, an individual reaches godliness. This is the highest stage that one can reach in this earthly life.

Beginning of Literary Activities

Although the first literary piece that SK composed was a review of a novel written by Hans Christian Andersen, real literary activities in right earnest began after the engagement with Regine was broken off. And, all of SK's aesthetic works deal in one way or another with his love affair with this innocent girl. Either/Or, a book of some eight hundred pages with several articles on Mozart, Goethe, contemporary Danish literature and theatre, a long diary and an analysis of the aesthetic validity of marriage was published on February 20, 1843. SK himself said that it took only eleven months to write this book. He started planning the book during the last phase of his relationship with Regine and when he went to Berlin after the annulment of his engagement to her, he wrote the greater part of the book there. He came back to Copenhagen in March 1842 and

worked on it continuously until he finished it within another five months. Either/Or was SK's first major work and due to the variety of its subject matter, it got an immediate appreciation in the literary circles. It will be seen that more than anything else this book was a long post-script to the letter of annulment of engagement that he wrote to Regine.

While Either/Or was in its last stage of completion, two other works were undertaken simultaneously—'Fear and Trembling' and 'Repetition'. 'Fear and Trembling' dealt with the concept of sacrifice contained in the Bible, i.e., that of Isaac by his father Abraham. It bore resemblance both to his own idea of sacrifice and that of his father. 'Repetition' is a sort of split-personality analysis describing various moods of relationship between a youngman and his beloved and their subsequent break-up.

In 'Philosophical Fragments' he argued that by annulling the engagement he, an exception, performed his duty by protesting and also as a Christian philosopher he was performing his duty by opposing Hegelianism. In fact, from 'Fear and Trembling' onwards, these concepts, though bearing no apparent resemblance to each other, would run simultaneously. On the one hand, he would defend himself as an exception and on the other, try to refute the Hegelian system where the role of an exception is denied.

Another book which deserves special mention is 'Stages on Life's Way'. This is a sequel to Either/Or. It also deals with arguments for and against marriage and is autobiographical in nature. The style and language speak amply of his literary ability.

'The Present Age' is a small book that will enlighten us about his sociological views. In addition, he had written numerous sermons, articles on Christianity and a number of books on Christian theology.

It may not be an exaggeration to say that his relationship with Regine—its inception, various phases of intensity and the final termination—was instrumental in opening the sluice gate of his self-expression, and the spate of literary productions from the fountain-head of despair and agony have enriched Danish literature beyond all proportions. The deep mental crises during and after the affair sought to find an outlet to relieve the self and what else could be of more lasting help than giving expressions to his agonies and torments in the form of literary productions! In the beginning, all his literary endeavours were meant to satisfy only one purpose, that is, to tell her that he was 'not guilty', he was not a rogue, no betrayer but a religious character devoted to the service of God. But, whatever might be his intention, it may be asserted that because of Regine Olsen, Denmark can boast of the works of Soeren Kierkegaard. SK said time and again that it was Regine who made him a poet. All his books with the only exception of 'The Concept of Dread' were dedicated to Regine. How deeply he loved her could be understood from a perusal of his diaries. There he once wrote: 'Charming indeed she was the first time I saw her and truly lovable in her simplicity; moving, in a noble sense, moving in her sorrow; not without grandeur at the last moment of parting; childlike, first and last. And inspite of her shrewd little head, one thing which would be enough for me to praise her for ever: I mean her silence and inwardness. And one power had she: an adoring look when she was pleading, which could move a stone. How blissful it was to enthral her! How blissful to see her indescribable bliss. A most atrocious injustice was committed against her when I tore her into relationship with me, into frightful scenes, as though calculated to ruin the good impression people had of her. God forgive me! I had to mortify and forsake her. I had to be cruel to her for the last two months so as to help her if I could. And I have had to continue this cruelty, though truly with the most upright intent. She for her part has certainly suffered indescribably. She would wish to forgive me. My beloved she was indeed. My life most certainly accentuate her life; my authorship can indeed be regarded as a monument to her honour and glory. I shall take her with me into history. And I, who

with all my broodiness had only one wish, namely to enchant her, know that there at any rate, my wish has not been denied. There I walk by her side. Like a master of ceremonies I introduce her in triumph and say, “Pray be good enough to make a little room for her, for our own dear little Regine”.

If one wants to delve into the works of SK the philosopher, one may not be amply rewarded. But from a literary point of view, the pieces are superb creations—not so much for the content as for the expression, novelty of presentation, wit and humour. Even his religious writings which do not purport to be fruitful for a non-religious reader are cases in point. His philosophical writings that were designed to blow up the Hegelian system can be read, if for nothing else then for their presentation. He wanted to blow up the Hegelian system with the help of wit and jest. The system of course did not crack up but people enjoyed his arguments (or the lack of it) thoroughly. That philosophical arguments could be spiced with such humour and wit and that too against the inanimate, all-powerful, robot-like philosophy of the Hegelian system was unthinkable.

SK was a perfectionist. We have his letters, notes and Journals to give us an idea as to how much trouble he used to take over one little sentence or how many times he used to polish his essays until he was fully satisfied with his words and expressions.

His primary allegiance (beside to God), however, was to his mother tongue. Here is an example of how deeply did he rejoice in the use of his mother tongue: ‘Some of my countrymen are of the opinion that their mother tongue is hardly capable of expressing difficult thoughts. This seems to me a strange and ungrateful thought, as it also seems to me strange and exaggerated to be so zealous for one’s language that one almost forgets to rejoice in it, to assert so zealously its independence that the zeal almost seems to indicate that one already feels one’s dependence and that in the end excitement is derived from the strife of words rather than refreshment from the joy of the language. I feel myself fortunate in being bound to my mother tongue, bound perhaps as few are, bound as Adam was to Eve because there was no other woman, bound because it has been impossible for me to learn any other language, and hence impossible to look down proudly and haughtily upon the tongue to which I was born. But I am also glad to be bound to a mother tongue which is rich in original idioms, which expands the soul and delights the ear with its softer sounds; a mother tongue which does not puff and groan when it is held in the toils of a difficult thought (for which reason some think it is incapable of expressing it), for it makes the difficult easy by uttering it; a mother tongue, which does not sound strained and panting when it is confronted with the unutterable, but employs itself with it in jest and earnest until it manages to utter it; a language which does not find at a remote distance what is near, nor seek in profound abyss what is close at hand, because it is on such good terms with the subject that it passes in and out like a fairy and like a child comes out with the happiest expression without quite knowing it; a language which is vehement and emotional when the right lover knows how to incite manfully the feminine passion of language, is self-confident and victorious in the strife of thought when the right ruler knows how to lead it, is supple as a wrestler when the right thinker will not let go of it, and will not let go of thought; a language which if it seems poor in a single instance, is nevertheless not so but is disdained as a false lover disdains an unassuming maiden who possess in reality the greatest worth and above all is not sophisticated; a language which is not lacking in expressions for the great, the decisive, the conspicuous, yet has a charming, a winning, a genial preference for the nuances of thought, for the qualifying term and the small talk of humor and the thrill of transition and the subtlety of inflection and the concealed luxury of modest affluence; a language which understands jest as well

as earnest—a mother tongue which binds its children with a chain "easy to bear—yes—hard to break".

Crusade against Christendom

On May 5, 1847, SK completed his thirty-fourth year and found to his utter surprise that he was still alive. The belief that he would never cross thirty-four was so strong in him that he suspected that his date of birth might have been wrongly registered. That he had already survived his father who was supposed to outlive him could not induce him to shake off his foreboding. However, when he at last realized that he had lived beyond thirty-four, he greatly celebrated the occasion. But still he thought that he was not to enjoy a long life.

The next decade found Kierkegaard turning out one book after another. This was the period marked by desperately hard work and intense reflection upon religious problems. Finally, he reached a point when he could no longer help denouncing the established Church which according to him had degenerated into false Christianity. Now he drew a parallel between his sufferings and the sufferings of Jesus and his immediate followers. Gradually, he intensified his attack against the Church of Denmark and soon it became a veritable crusade.

Shortly before this he had been engaged in a violent quarrel with a very widely known Danish satirical paper named The Corsair. He thought that the paper was intellectually and spiritually demoralizing the people of Copenhagen. He felt it his duty to denounce it publicly, the consequently published several articles in another paper called The Fatherland in protest. These articles shattered Corsair to pieces but Corsair also retaliated by hitting him below the belt. It published a series of cartoons that made Kierkegaard a laughing stock to the public, especially to the street urchins.

Interestingly enough, the Corsair affair reinforced his theory of the individual. According to SK's own logic, a religious author must even take care to be an object of persecution by the masses, to be ridiculed and hated by the mob. Hence, he denounced the public, the masses, democracy, anything that is a collection of human individuals. He raised his flag high in the air in favour of the individual, an exception, a sacrifice, a target of attack by the masses. His theory of the individual directly emanated from his own suffering at the hands of the Copenhagen commonalty.

During this period a conviction was growing in him that true Christian religion did not exist in Denmark. And he was all set to denounce ecclesiastical Christianity. 'That Christendom certainly needs a jolt of this kind', he wrote, 'I do not doubt for a moment, or rather, I am absolutely sure. That I shall succeed in administering it, I am also convinced. That this is the greatest thing humanly speaking, which can come of my life, I well understand.' In this crusade against Christendom lies a deep psychological reason which we will point out later.

The real opportunity for initiating this crusade came with the death of Mynster, the Bishop Primate of Denmark, in January 1854. Hans Martensen who succeeded to the bishopric later in that year said in the funeral oration that Mynster 'was a witness to the truth'. Kierkegaard made a public protest against this remark saying that Mynster was just like any other public servant adorning the office of Bishop Primate. How could one see in this Bishop 'a witness to the truth'? 'A witness to the truth', Kierkegaard wrote, 'is a man whose life has brought him profound knowledge of inner conflicts, fear and trembling, temptations, spiritual distress, moral suffering. A witness to the truth is a man who bears

witness to the truth in poverty. humiliation and contempt, misunderstood, hated, mocked at, despised, ridiculed. A witness to the truth is a martyr.'

How exactly does this fit into the image he had of himself—was he pointing towards himself that he was a witness to the truth? It may also be pointed out in passing that it was a vengeful reaction that he expressed against Mynster who was a friend of his father but later did not show the warmth that SK expected of him. This Mynster, 'epitome of a whole generation', writes SK, 'was in reality only human wisdom, worldly intelligence, weakness, ambition, pleasure, with no greatness beyond oratory; and the misfortune of my life, my misfortune, is that having been brought up by father on Mynster's sermons, I too, from filial piety towards the dead, endorsed this false bill, instead of protesting.'

Before he became bishop Mynster used to visit SK's father who had the greatest regard for him. He was also highly respected by SK himself. During his engagement with Regine when SK found that she lacked religious education, he used to read her Mynster's sermons every week. After his father's death, this relationship lost its warmth. Though it did not immediately break down, it showed signs of stress. Kierkegaard noted in his diary that Mynster at times wanted to avoid him. During the Corsair affair, SK expected Mynster's support against degradation of public morality, but he did not oblige. A little later when Kierkegaard published 'Training in Christianity', Mynster had made it known to him that he did not approve of SK's theme. Besides, on several occasions, when SK had asked for a lecturership at the Pastoral Seminary, Mynster ridiculed the whole idea and asked him id found his own seminary in line with his idea about Christianity.

SK then trained his fire on the official Church of Denmark. He published a broadsheet called 'The Instant' in which he serialised his attack, in the nine numbers that appeared from May to September 1855. He attacked the conformism of the Church, conduct of individual churchman, his way of life, ambition, etc. He said that contemporary Christendom was a caricature of Christianity or a monstrous amount of misunderstanding and illusion, etc. mixed with a sparingly little dose of true Christianity.

Throughout the course of his polemics with the established Church Kierkegaard was conscious of the extreme difficulty of his situation. He was defending Christianity against the established Church, preaching without any official sanction and advocating absolute austere Christianity. All alone against the powerful enemy, he continued his crusade until finally, sick in body and soul, he was admitted to the Frederik Hospital where he died after a few weeks' illness. With his death, he could convince his fellowmen that he had 'sacrificed' his life.

3

SOEREN KIERKEGAARD'S PSYCHOLOGY

Reason for applying Psychoanalytic Tool

Soeren Aabye Kierkegaard, known the world over as the father of existentialism, composed no less than twenty volumes of literary, philosophical and religious works and Journals (diaries) running to several thousand pages. This immense body of creative work, many assume, propounded a philosophy that is more relevant today. They argue that the human essence, so easily mutilated in the contemporary societies, can be restored to its proper stature if only the philosophical thoughts of Kierkegaard are duly taken cognizance of. Some insist that the category of 'individual' that SK initiates in philosophy certainly contain the embryo of the modern concept of freedom of the individual man.

The present study is the outcome of an effort to understand Kierkegaard's works and his contribution to the philosophy of man. During the course of this study, it has been observed that Kierkegaard's works are a unique admixture of philosophical propositions, religious thoughts and autobiographical episodes. He has blended the story of his life and its various interpretations with his arguments on philosophy and religion in such a manner that it is well-nigh impossible to separate them. And hence what appears as philosophical work to one may seem to be literature to another. There are also areas in his work where philosophy and theology overlap. Above all, neither his works on philosophy nor those on religion are free from autobiographical allusions.

There are two kinds of creative work—subjective and objective. Painting and poetry, music and dance, etc. belong to the former while science and philosophy, sociology and history, etc. fall into the latter category. But, if by a flight of imagination, these two are made to intermingle, the line of demarcation goes hazy and ultimately becomes invisible. This then becomes a queer admixture. And if, over and above, reason is bidden good-bye and unreason and faith overcast the writings, they no longer retain the semblance of objective work. Finally, if the person who is presenting this body of thought is psychologically unbalanced, then even the usual objectivity of a subjective analysis becomes a far cry. Here objectivity loses all grip over the subject-matter. Hence the only way to salvage the objective truth is to make use of such an analytical method that would clearly draw the line of demarcation, separate the objective truth and analyse it in the light of science.

Our enquiry has started with an analysis of the forces of interplay in the society that gave birth to Kierkegaard's thoughts. It was felt that in the society itself would be found the ingredients that can explain the works of SK. Hence contemporary Danish society, its economic and social structure, rise and decline of the dominant classes have been studied. But this could only partially help us understand Kierkegaard. The reasons are not far to seek. The works are so personal in nature that without understanding the riddles of his life it is well-nigh impossible to understand his works. We have studied his biography. Now we will go on to study his mind.

Although we have applied the method of socio-economic analysis for understanding SK's works, it in itself is not enough to answer the various queries that are raised regarding the personal and religious stands that SK had so often taken in life. Our psychoanalysis is not a substitute for the socio-economic analysis. It has only been used as a supplementary to the method of socio-economic analysis. Socio-economic analysis is the broader area that accommodates a man's thought-process; psychoanalysis can in its turn illuminate some obscure aspects of his thought and actions that could not be included in the broader spectrum of socio-economic analysis.

In the following pages we have tried to analyse the psychoanalytic methods of Freud, Jung and Adler. This critique will provide us with the basis for formulating a method of scientific psychoanalysis. With the help of this critique we will try to uncover his mental make-up.

Psychoanalysis -a critique

SIGMUND FREUD

This critique on psychoanalysis that we are presently engaged in, though not wholly linked with our primary aim, i.e., to understand the mental condition of Soeren Kierkegaard, has still been resorted to for various reasons. As we proceed, we shall find

striking similarity between the theories of psychoanalysis and that of existential philosophy. This will come to us handy while analysing existentialism.

Further, this critique will trace the development of various psychoanalytic schools and will try to subject each school to a scrutiny from the scientific-materialistic angle. The sources and origins of the mystic and pseudo-scientific views will also be searched for and examined critically. And finally, the reader will be acquainted with the tools of psychoanalysis which will help him understand better the analysis conducted on Soeren Kierkegaard. These would also enable our reader to understand the theories of Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. The latter two will be examined differently because their works are impersonal in nature and abound in theoretical postulates. However, we will find a striking resemblance between the theories of psychoanalysis and existentialism, especially between those of Jung and Heidegger.

Psychoanalysis is a school of thought which owes its origin to Sigmund Freud, the little-known Viennese doctor who later shot into world eminence and like Einstein, influenced the various realms of human knowledge of his time with the far-reaching effects of his theories. But he began in a small way and quite empirically.

Freud entered the University in 1873 as a medical student. During his third year he worked in the physiological laboratory of the famous Ernst Brucke. Here he worked chiefly on the anatomy of the central nervous system. In 1881, he decided to take his medical degree and joined Vienna General Hospital. However, as a physician also he was extremely interested in nervous diseases and decided to pursue his study under the great Charcot in Paris.

Freud was in Paris from October 13, 1885 to February 28, 1886. During these seventeen weeks he used to visit Charcot's clinic regularly, listened to his lectures, accompanied him on his ward visits, engaged himself in translating his writings into German, and worked in the laboratory on the anatomy of the human brain. But it was the treatment of hysteria by Charcot that attracted him most.

From Charcot, Freud learnt to reject the traditional belief of the medical practitioners that hysteria was due to 'imagination' or an irritation of the womb or uterus. He learnt from Charcot that it was a nervous disorder. The second thing that he learnt from Charcot was regarding traumatic hysterias, ie., hysterias developed after an accident. Charcot had discovered that in traumatic hysterias, symptoms are delimited not in accordance with the anatomy of the nervous system but by reference to our ordinary concept of the body. For instance, an hysteric patient will have a paralysis of the leg in the sense that only that portion which is not covered by the clothing will be affected, It did not tally with the neuro-physiological grouping. Freud remarked that hysteria behaved as though anatomy did not exist, or as though it had no knowledge of it. Thirdly, Charcot revealed to Freud that there was a close link between hysteria and hypnotism. Hysterical symptoms could be removed by hypnotic suggestions. And again, symptions of traumatic hysterias could be removed or modified by hypnotic suggestion.

The second and third lessons of Charcot had a far-reaching significance for Freud. He must have argued within himself that if symptoms that develop in hysteric patients did not obey rules for neuro-physio-logy, then the origin of these diseases could not be physiological but mental. The third lesson was still more pregnant with meaning. If by hypnotic suggestions a normal person could be made hysteric, or a hysteric patient could be made normal, then the origin of the disease was not physiological but mental, that is, the diseases were ideogenic. These two lessons that Freud learnt from Charcot paved the path of his development.

But when Freud returned to Vienna with these ideas and thought of putting this sort of treatment into practice, he faced violent opposition. It was the age of physical therapy and the physicians, ignorant of the psychic- factors, were blind adherents to the maxim-mens sana incorpore sano (a healthy mind in a healthy body). That a healthy body could carry a diseased mind was beyond their comprehension. At that time, any symptom was explained on the basis of some organic lesion. If nothing physical could be found, the physicians then diagnosed some disturbance in the brain (that too physiologically). The treatment was also based on the same understanding-drugs, hydro-therapy and electrotherapy. When the patient was excited, he was given some sedatives; if he was depressed, he was given some tonic. And when drugs failed, hydro therapy and electrotherapy were recommended.

For more than a year, Freud could not put his newly-learnt techniques into practice. But after that he started private practice where he relied mostly on hypnotism and electrotherapy. He soon realized that electrotherapy was not quite effective and found hypnotism to be giving good results. But treatment with the help of hypnotism posed a great problem; all patients could not be hypnotised. He, however, continued to experiment with hypnotism for a few more years.

For sometime Freud felt that his failures were due to his individual inability to apply the technique properly. He, therefore, resolved to visit Nancy where Bernheim and Liebault—the then doyens of hypnotic therapy—had their clinics. He also took a recalcitrant patient along with him for treatment. Bernheim tried his best but at last gave up. This incident as well as his own experience with hypnotism drew him away from it. And then the novel method of psycho-analysis was evolved.

The story of non-hypnotic treatment can be traced to Freud's student days when he was working in the physiological laboratory. There he made acquaintance with Dr Joseph Breuer, a well-known general practitioner. They used to exchange views though Breuer was fourteen years' senior to Freud. During this period of friendship—in November 1882—Breuer described the case history of Anna 0—one of his patients—and the novel treatment he had used in her case with positive results.

The patient Anna O was aged twenty one, intellectually gifted, gay, imaginative and possessing a highly critical faculty. She was sexually and emotionally very immature and because of the highly puritanical nature of the family circle, she used to resort to systematic day-dreaming which she referred to as her private theatre.

In July 1880, her father fell ill of an abscess. Anna devoted herself to nursing him until she also fell ill and it was at this point, in December 1880, that Breuer undertook her treatment. She had symptoms of rigid paralysis of the right side sometimes extending to the left, a severe nervous cough, an aversion to nourishment and disturbances of sight and speech. In addition to all this, she sometimes fell victim to systematic hallucinations when she behaved in an unruly and violent manner. The hallucinatory periods were followed by deep sleep from which she would wake up in an auto-hypnotic state that she called 'clouds'. Then she would mutter words as if they were parts of some dialogues.-

On one occasion, between Breuer's visits, someone, overhearing some of the words Anna O was muttering to herself, repeated them to her. Anna then joined immediately in the discussion and told the story in which these words appeared. After this she woke up—calm and quiet. The next attack was with a different idea and Breuer used the same technique. Breuer termed it 'talking cure'; Anna O thereafter had to be constantly treated in this manner. Otherwise, she would wake up still more disturbed and so many stories would occur to her—untold.

A year after her father's death, Anna O's hallucinations began to be dominated by memories of that year which she began to re-live, down to the specific visual experiences, day by day. In addition, the events that occurred between her father's illness and her own collapse-Incubation period' as termed by Breuer—began to make themselves heard. And then something quite remarkable and quite unexpected occurred. Anna O recited an event from this period and then a symptom disappeared. The symptom was her inability to drink and the event was her going into her lady companion's room and seeing to her disgust her little dog drinking out of a glass. The second step in the evolution of the therapy was taken when Breuer, observing what had happened set out to exploit it. Taking each symptom he would ask Anna during her auto-hypnotic state, when did it previously occur and with the answer the symptom would disappear. Later Breuer, finding this method quite time-consuming pushed the therapy a stage further when he would himself hypnotise the patient.

Gradually all the symptoms were traced back to determining causes during the early stage of her nursing her father. And in each case the symptom bore the traces of, or had a conceptual link with, the event which was its cause. So on the last day of her treatment, the paralysis of her right side and her occasional loss of command over the German language were traced back to a hallucination she had experienced one night. She was at her father's bedside and waiting for the arrival of a surgeon from Vienna. In her waking dream she had seen a snake approaching her father. Her right arm which was on the back of the chair had gone to sleep and she could not move it. And when she tried to pray she could think of nothing until some English children's verse came to her mind.

This case history brought several important points to the forefront:

(1) That a symptom could be removed by talking about it; that this therapy could be effective if the patient remembered the incident that caused the symptom like the dog's drinking from the glass and the subsequent aversion of the girl to milk.

(2) Until the cure is achieved, the stimulus of the symptom lies in the 'unconscious'. Only when the stimulus is removed from the unconscious the symptom disappears.

Breuer told this case history to Freud in 1882. While working with Charcot, Freud saw similar phenomena and described the incidents to Charcot. Charcot apparently showed no interest in the case. But after his return from Paris, Freud began to ponder over the case and try this method in his private practice. After his return from Nancy in 1889, Freud was disillusioned with the hypnotic method and since then for a number of years he utilised this method of the talking cure with good results. He called this method cathartic because it was dependent on mental and emotional purging, catharsis, which the patient went through during treatment. The other conclusion drawn in this respect was that hysteria is a disease of the past and the symptom was a movement to the disagreeable and forgotten episode from the patient's life called repression.

This was the origin of modern psychoanalysis. The cathartic method, which discarded hypnosis and utilised free association as the key to penetrate the unconscious was the first important discovery of Freud. The doctor, by this method, simply engages the patient in a dialogue and this helps open up as though by a magic key the unconscious both to the doctor and the patient. As the unconscious is laid bare, the origin of the disease is easily diagnosed. This method had another edge over the hypnotic one; it ensured a permanent cure. Once cure was achieved, seldom would the disease repeat itself.

From small beginnings greater success were achieved. What started as a therapy began to evolve as a theory. Freud during his lifetime propounded and rejected various theories on the origin of neuroses. Gradually Freud began to lay more and more emphasis on sex

as the root cause of repression particularly in hysteria, and obsessional and anxiety neuroses. His theories too had an ever-increasing share of sex. In the beginning it was Seduction Theory, then came the Oedipus Complex and later the Theory of Libidinal Discharge. Eventually, the term Libido got a wider connotation. He also moved from the treatment of neurosis to normal human behaviour which he considered as the basis for studying neurosis. And this led to his outstanding discovery -the interpretation of dreams. He found the similarity between neurosis and dream and concluded that what normal persons experience in sleeping state, a neurotic does in the waking state. The various characteristics of the neurotic hallucinations—condensation and displacement, transference and symbolism—are present in the dream patterns, he asserted. These are outstanding discoveries and paved the- path for further development of psychoanalysis.

It was discovered one day, wrote Freud, that the pathological symptoms of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was founded. It happened, continued Freud, in the course of this treatment that patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms brought their dreams. A suspicion thus arose that the dreams too had a sense. Thus Freud traced the development of his dream theory.

We have already touched on the treatment of Anna O that has relevance to the first assertion mentioned above. We have also noted that there are similarities between a dream and a neurotic hallucination. And now we will discuss the dream theory of Freud. The reason why we have decided to discuss this topic will be disclosed later. When we will have gone through Freud's conception of dream and its interpretation, we will observe a peculiar phenomenon about him. On the one hand we will find a scientific mind at work and, on the other, we will see in Freud a person who would prefer to do away with logic and invite mysticism instead wherever that suited his purpose. This contradiction—which is present in all his theories—could be visible with glaring subjectivity in his theory on interpretation of dreams. Freud's work is at once a brilliant piece of original discovery and a storehouse of mysticism.

According to Freud, a dream is a disguised fulfilment of a wish. Of course, there are explicit dreams of wish-fulfilment. These are mainly children's dreams. Freud has described a few examples in his works. As for instance, the following dream; A girl of 314 years was taken across the lake for the first time. At the landing stage, she did not want to leave the boat and wept bitterly. The crossing had been too short for her. Next morning she announced, "Last night I went to the lake'. We may, Freud says, safely add that this time the crossing had lasted longer. Another dream; Freud's daughter Anna, then nineteen months old was kept without food for a whole day after an attack of vomiting. In her sleep she was heard muttering the following; 'Anna Fweud, stwawbewwies, wild stwawbewwies, omblet, puden.' She was definitely dreaming of eating those prohibited fruits and dishes. There are also dreams that grown-ups see under terrible exhaustion and privation, for example, the prisoner's dream of becoming an angel and slipping through the window, as in the painting of Moritz Von Schwind. Here, of course, the dream was also acting as the guardian of sleep. The sunrays fell on the face of the prisoner. The dream was to guard the sleep that the rays were disturbing and again was that of a wish-fulfilment. But, then, how do we account for such disguised fulfilment of a wish? Why should it be at all disguised? Here we come to Freud's theory of dream and how he strikes upon the question of censor. According to Freud, there are two persons amalgamated into one in the dreamer. Now according to the theory of wish-fulfilment, a dreamer would like to dream anything that satisfies him or his instincts. And in the course of this satisfaction, he may see such things as he would never like to see in the normal waking state. Hence the concept of censor. The censor will distort the content, make it unfamiliar and thus

relieve the dreamer of the guilt of an unethical experience. This 'unethical' thought will come to him in dream but apparently he will not understand the meaning. At least, the dream-pattern will endeavour to make the dreamer not understand the content. But how is this achieved? Here we come to the threshold of the Freudian dream theory proper.

Freud says that every dream of grown-up individuals has two distinct contents. He termed them manifest content and latent content. The manifest content is composed of our experiences or reminiscences— usually incidents occurring the day before. The latent content gives the dreamer the essence or meaning of the dream. But it may so happen that the manifest and latent contents coincide.

From this it follows that the dream-pattern is a process or a piece of mental activity by which the dream thoughts are converted or transcribed into the dream contents. According to the Freudian hypothesis the latent content of dream goes piecemeal, element by element, into the manifest content, inside which only a half-hearted attempt is made to mould it into a unity.

There are four activities that the dream-pattern accommodates— all of them together or separately or in any combination; condensation, displacement, representation and secondary revision. Condensation is exemplified in the fact that the whole manifest and latent contents are squeezed into the dream, various elements of the thoughts being present only by a compression of their material. Only some word or picture or image appears to point to the latent content. According to Freud, what is meant by condensation is that the manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent one and is thus an abbreviated translation of it. Condensation can on occasion be absent, as a rule it is present and very often it is substantial. It is never changed into the reverse; that is to say, it is never found that the manifest dream is greater in extent or content than the latent one. Condensation is brought about by total omission of certain latent elements, by only a fragment of some complexes in the latent dream passing into the manifest one and by latent elements which have something in common being combined and fused into a single unity in the manifest dream. A composite picture may look like A, be dressed like B, may do something like C and may appear like D. This composite structure is emphasising something which these four people have in common. The outcome of this superimposing of the separate elements that have been combined together may be a little blurred pictorially.

The second characteristic of the dream-pattern is displacement. It is, according to Freud, entirely due to dream-censorship. It manifests itself in two ways; in the first, a latent element is replaced not by a component part of itself but by something more remote—that is by an allusion and, in the second, the psychical content is shifted from an important element to another which is unimportant, so that the dream appears differently centred and strange.

Representation, the third characteristic of the dream-pattern is according to Freud the most interesting psychologically. It consists in transforming thoughts into visual images. As to secondary revision, this is the attempt by the mind to order, to revise, to supplement the contents of the dream so as to make it an acceptable or intelligible whole. It makes no new contribution to the dream but only structural changes are undertaken by it. This then is the mechanism of the dream-pattern.

Besides these four activities of the dream-pattern there is another component which according to Freud is the most remarkable element of it known as dream symbolism. Unconscious mental processes, besides undergoing the transformation by dream-pattern, are also subjected to distortion (transformation) when apparently to a novice the imagery

will have no meaning at all; but once the symbolic relationships are known, they will throw fresh light on the interpretation of dreams. According to Freud, the essence of this symbolic relation is that it is a comparison, though not a comparison of any sort. Special limitations are to be attached to the comparison. Not everything with which we can compare an object or a process appears in dreams as a symbol of it. And on the other hand, according to Freud, a dream does not symbolise every possible element of the latent dream-thoughts but only certain definite ones. So there are restrictions here in both directions. The concept of symbolism is also not hard and fast but borders, sometimes, on what we know as replacement or representation, or even an allusion. With a number of symbols, the comparison which underlies them becomes obvious. But there are symbols in regard to which we may not arrive at any definite conclusion. Moreover, it might appear strange that if a symbol is a comparison it should not be brought to light by an association, and that the dreamer should not be acquainted with it but should make use of it without knowing about it; furthermore, the dreamer feels no inclination to acknowledge the comparison even after it has been pointed out to him. Hence, according to Freud, the symbolic relation is of a special kind.

The range of things which are given symbolic representation in dreams is not very wide; the human body as a whole, parents, children, brothers and sisters, birth, death, nakedness, etc. House represents, as a rule the human figure. It may happen in a dream, Freud says, that one finds oneself climbing down the facade of a house, enjoying it at one moment and frightened at another. The house with smooth walls are men, the one with projections and balconies are women. One’s parents appear in dreams as the emperor or empress, the king and queen, or other honoured personages. Birth is almost invariably represented by something which has a connection with water. Dying is replaced by departure in dreams, by train journey etc. Nakedness by clothes and uniforms.

Now, according to Freud, it is a striking fact that there is another field, that of sexuality, which has extraordinarily rich symbolism—the genitals, sexual process and sexual intercourse.

The male genitals are represented in dreams in a number of ways. According to Freud, male genitals as a whole finds a symbolic representation in the sacred number 3. The male organ finds symbolic substitutes in things that resemble it in shape—things that are long and upstanding, such as, sticks, umbrellas, posts, trees and so on; in objects that share with the thing the characteristic of penetrating within the body and injuring—sharp weapons of every kind, knives, daggers, spears, sabres, but also fire-arms and rifles, pistols and revolvers (particularly suitable owing to their shape). In anxiety dreams of girls being followed by a man with a knife or a fire-arm such symbols play a large part. Objects from which water flows—water taps, watering cans, or fountains represent male organ. Objects that are capable of being lengthened—hanging lamps, extensible pencils, are also examples of male organ symbolism. Pencils, pen-holders, nail files, hammers, etc. are male sexual symbols.

The remarkable characteristic of the male organ which enables it to rise up in defiance of the laws of gravity, the phenomenon of erection, according to Freud, leads to its being represented symbolically by balloons, flying machines and most recently (1916 : author) by Zeppelin Airships. Dreams can symbolise erection in a more expressive manner. They can treat the sexual organ as the essence of dreamer’s own person and make him feel as if he is flying.

Among the less easily understandable male sexual symbols are certain reptiles and fish and above all the famous symbol of snake. Hats, overcoats or cloaks are also elements of male symbolism.

The female genital organs are symbolically represented by all such objects as share their characteristic of enclosing a hollow space which can take something into itself: pits, cavities, hollows, vessels and bottles, receptacles, boxes, trunks, cases, chests, pockets and so on. Ships, too, fall into this category. Some symbols have more intimate connections with the uterus than with female genitals; thus, cupboards, stoves and more especially rooms. Here room-symbolism touches on house-symbolism. Doors and gates are symbols of genital orifice. Materials, too, are symbols of women; wood, paper and objects made of them, like tables and books. Among animals, snails and mussels are undeniably female symbols; among parts of the body, the mouth (as a substitute of genital orifice); among buildings churches and chapels. The breasts must be reckoned with the genitals and these like larger hemispheres of the female body, are represented by apples, peaches, and fruit in general.

The pubic hair in both the sexes is depicted in dreams as woods and bushes. The complicated topography of the female genital parts are often represented by landscape with rocks, woods and water. The imposing mechanism of the male sexual apparatus is symbolically expressed by all kinds of complicated machinery.

Another symbol of the female genitals which deserves special mention is a jewel case. Jewel and treasure are used in dream as well as in waking state to describe someone who is loved. Sweets frequently represent sexual enjoyment. Satisfaction obtained from one's own genitals is indicated by piano-playing. Symbolic representation par excellence of masturbation are gliding or sliding and pulling off a branch. The falling of a tooth or the pulling out of a tooth is a particularly notable dream symbol. Its first meaning, according to Freud, is undoubtedly castration as a punishment for masturbating, special representations of sexual intercourse may be dancing, riding and climbing as well as violent experiences, such as, being run over; so is certain manual crafts and threats with weapons.

Underclothing and linen in general are female symbols. Ladder, steps and staircase or more precisely walking on them are clear symbols of sexual intercourse. Hills and rocks are symbols of the male organs, Gardens are common symbols of the female genitals. Wild animals mean people in an excited state and evil instincts or passions. Blossoms and flowers indicate women's genitals or in particular virginity.

The domain of sexual symbols through which we escorted our readers and with as little change as possible from Freud's original was not intended to make the reader acquainted with dream symbolism alone. In fact our main objection to Freud is that he has not followed a scientific logic in formulating his theory. He has not utilised his raw data as a scientist. Here, as on many occasions, we find him more in the guise of a soothsayer than a psychoanalyst. As we see, symbols found in dreams have been mostly those that we encounter in day to day experience. It is true that dreams because of their very nature do not always follow the logic of real life. It is also true that peculiar associations between words and their distortion might create apparent in-explicability. And, in this connection, we want to discuss the dream of Alexander the Great and its interpretation by his official soothsayer. Freud has described this dream and agreed with its interpretation. This dream has been reported with slight variations by Plutarch and Artremidonus of Daldis. The story goes that when the king was laying scige to the obstinately defended city of Tyre (322 B.C.) he at one point thought of raising the seige and withdrawing. Then one night he had a dream. He saw a dancing satyr. Aristander, the dream interpreter who was present with the army, interpreted the dream by dividing the word 'Satyros' into 'sa Turos' (thine is Tyre) and therefore promised that he would triumph ultimately. Now, what did really happen in the dream? The phonetic similarity between Turos and Satyr

and the association between Sa Turos and Satyros found a peculiar combination. The phonetic similarity developed an image of the dancing Satyr; sa Turos was transformed into satyros and satyros can only be represented by a dancing satyr. Hence he saw in his dream the image of a dancing satyr. This peculiarity of the association of words and thence the transformation of the combination into an image is not peculiar to dreams. Furthermore, as a dream is primarily a visual expression, it has the possibility of transforming any thought into visual representations. We have specifically selected this dream to emphasise also that there is a definite relation between a dreamer's life experience and the dream content. Almost all the dream symbols that Freud has described have this unique connection with the time and place at which the dreamer finds himself. Archaic phenomena which we will shortly discuss have nothing in common with the experience of the dreamer. A thorough scrutiny into the dream symbols will also justify our contention that dream symbols are local symbols and cannot be something independent of the dreamer's experience, conscious or unconscious. An overcoat or a hat cannot be a male organ symbol to an Indian girl. A zeppeline cannot be a dream symbol today. Similarly, there are other symbols like the table which will never occur to a tribal who has never seen one in his life. Dream symbols are very concentrated forms of association. And an association cannot be made if the symbol itself has never been experienced by the dreamer. A dreamer cannot dream anything that is beyond the purview of his associations. A dreamer may not understand the symbols but the constituent parts of the symbol or the symbol as a whole must on some occasion or the other have been experienced by the dreamer himself.

Freud has given explanations for some symbols. And this will again justify our views. The human body is often represented in dreams by the symbol of a house. Carrying this representation further we have found that windows, doors and gates stand for openings of the body and that facades of houses are either smooth or provided with balconies or projections to hold on to. But the same symbolism, Freud asserts, is found in the German linguistic usage—when we greet, Freud continues, an acquaintance familiarly as an 'altes Haus' (old house), when we speak of giving someone 'eins aufs Dachl' (a knock on the head literally, 'one on the roof) or when we say of someone else that 'he is not quite right in the upper storey'. In anatomy the orifices of the body are in so many words termed 'Leibespforten' (literally meaning 'portals of the body'). Now this explanation and the dream of a German connecting a house with a human body is extremely probable given the peculiar transformation that the dream imageries receive—the relationship that we saw between Sa Turos and satyros and the image of a dancing satyr. This sort of association is very probable given the peculiar transformation the dream imageries undergo. But one thing should be borne in mind. The dreamer must have stored in his memory something relating to the symbol appearing in his dream. He may not be aware of it in a conscious state. He may even deny that he ever had heard or seen anything to that effect. But it cannot be a phylo-genetic inheritance as Freud would assert later. Another example; Freud says: it is hard to understand how wood came to represent what is maternal or female. Our German word 'Hote' seemes to come from the same root as the Greek 'hule' meaning stuff, 'raw material'. This seems to be an instance of the not uncommon event of the general name of a material eventually coming to be reserved for some particular material. Now there is an island in the Atlantic named 'Madeira'. 'This name was given to it by the Portuguese when they discovered it because at that time it was covered all over with woods. For, in the Portuguese language 'madeira' means 'wood'. The reader will notice, however, 'madeira' is only a slightly modified form of the Latin word 'materia', which once more means 'material' in general. But 'materia' is derived from 'mater', 'Mother'; out of which anything is made is, as it were, a mother of

it. This ancient view of the thing survives, therefore, in the symbolic use of 'wood' for woman or mother.

If we scrutinise this explanation there seem to be some plausible associations between madeira, materia and mater (mother). It may be supposed that the dreamer who had had this symbol must have heard these words and known the etymological roots of these words at least vaguely. For a non-European it would not evoke any symbol or image; if it does evoke any, that may be quite a different one because of the different linguistic usage and etymology.

Again, Freud seems to forget that the same symbol might have different meanings in different contexts. If we take the example of a revolver or for that matter any sharp weapon, we shall see that in the context of a war the revolver will have a very different meaning from what Freud attributes to it. Adler has interpreted many dreams of this nature. That Freud's patients—most of whom he could cure, had predominantly sexual reasons for their neuroses is apparent from the generalisation of the problems he had made and, in his interpretation of the dreams, he stressed solely on the sexual associations of the symbols.

In fact, dream symbols are very subtle and roundabout forms of associations and depend on the experiences of the people concerned. These symbols are generally collective and the same symbols might occur to many people sharing the same experiences. Here we can compare it with symbols of poetry. In poetry two or more words, each having the characteristic of qualifying the others are used to evoke a sort of image. This image will be restricted to a large extent among the same linguistic/regional group of people. When different people have similar experiences the same words will evoke similar images. In fact our contention is that there is no need to mythologise dream symbolism as Freud has done later. We may also try to understand dream from a physiological angle.

We have dealt with in connection with our discussion on consciousness with the origin and development of memory. Memories are experiences stored in the brain. Whatever we do, speak or achieve, whatever we think or see, whatever experiences we gather, arc all stored in the brain. The memory bank of one's brain may be compared with an infinitely long tape with audio-visual and other sense-perforations or magnetizing capabilities. In waking state we may suppose that it is a cassette in a video-recorder recording everything in it. Take for example the following incident; you went to a house live years ago. Today again you alight at the same bus-stop. The views around have changed a little, you call up from your memory the previous trip, take a right turn, walk a few more steps and fumble before the bells you could possibly push and then depending on your memory press the bell of a particular house. This is a very common experience. If the place has changed beyond recognition, the memory cannot help the caller much. This is a case when the memory is almost intact but the place has changed. It may be the other way round. Your memory may have faded and the place may remain unchanged. In that case too you will have to fumble. It also happens that a new place seems quite familiar. It is nothing but an old memory of a similar place haunting the caller.

Now we can imagine that all the sense-perforations of the tape are equally effective. Here is an incident which occurred to the author himself. Once he was travelling in a very crowded bus. The people inside were huddled like cattle and he could not even lift his head and look up. Suddenly he heard a conversation between two persons. He could not see the persons but could easily guess that one of them had been his playmate twenty years ago. When the bus stopped near his house and he alighted he found that the other two persons were also getting down. His memory had not betrayed him. The explanation

may be given in this way that as soon as he heard the voice of the childhood friend it struck the memory system. The tape began to unwind itself and within a fraction of a second a resonance took place between the two voices; the face of the person was called up immediately in the visual screen, it was lit up and the screen was full with the bright face of the child with the voice. And by the law of association, the whole series of childhood memories came into his mind, one in association with the other. Like a film a section of childhood got unreeled though the pictures were a little blurred.

Dream is activisation of memory in sleep. Besides wish-fulfilment and other matters discussed by Freud, Schemer and others, we would like to discuss some basic concepts related to dream. As we have said, a memory bank can be compared to an infinitely long tape that stores each and every experience in our life to its minutest detail. And whether we know it or not, auditory, visual and other sense-impressions of all sorts that we come across in our everyday life make their impact on the tape. When we are sleeping, this tape unwinds itself by being activated by the innervations that disturb us. For simple wish-fulfilment dreams of children—like that of the child who wanted a longer trip in the lake—this particular association of the memory is called up and the child gets a longer trip. With some complicated dreams, we may assume that the innervations and the memory tape behave like a computer. For a definite innervation caused by a definite wish, various associations of the memory tape are called up one after another and each undergoes the same treatment of dream-mechanism and symbolism, of course in varying degrees of intensity. From this it follows that dream is a sort of illusion. But as illusions are products of reality, so is dream a product of memory. But by memory we should not understand only the memory we are conscious of. It also contains mnemonic impressions of which we are not conscious. Freud in his interpretation of dreams, had often deviated from this simple truth. And he extended the unconscious to a realm where it bordered on mysticism. In his enthusiasm on certain occasions—and this is one of the important drawbacks of Freud for which he had to pay dearly—he laid great stress on the archaic features of the dream-mechanism. This is the Marling point of Jung and that is the reason why we have taken the trouble of discussing Freud and his theory of dream. Freud says, "Let us start once more from the conclusion we arrived at that the dream work, under the influence of the dream censorship, transposes the latent dream thoughts into a different mode of expression. The latent thoughts do not differ from our familiar conscious thoughts of waking, life. The new mode of expression is incomprehensible to us owing to many of its features. We have said that harks back to states of our intellectual development which have long since been superseded to picture language, to symbolic connections, to conditions, perhaps, which existed before our thought language had developed. We have on that account described the mode of expression of the dream-work as archaic or regressive.

You may conclude from this that if we study dream-work further, we must succeed in gaining a valuable light into the little-known beginnings of our intellectual development. I hope it will be so; but this work has not so far been started upon. The prehistory into which the dream-work leads us back is of two kinds—on the one hand, into the individual's prehistory, his childhood, and on the other, in so far as each individual somehow recapitulates in an abbreviated form the entire development of the human race, into phylogenetic prehistory too. Shall we succeed in distinguishing which portion of the latent mental processes is derived from the individual prehistoric period and which portion from the phylogenetic one? It is not, I believe, impossible that we shall. It seems to me, for instance, that symbolic connections, which the individual has never acquired by learning, may justly claim to be regarded as a phylogenetic heritage."

In our opinion, this concept of phylogenetic heritage present in an abbreviated form in the unconscious and making its appearance in dream-symbolism is nothing but stretching a scientific theory into the realm of pseudo-science. We have discussed this aspect in the chapter on consciousness where we have considered the phylogenetic and morphological inheritance of species. In fact, unscientific views passing for science gave Jung the opportunity and authority to preach every kind of nonsense as science. We will shortly discuss Jung and his concepts in a later sub-chapter.

It was the phenomenon of unconscious that Freud brought to our knowledge. The role of unconscious in our waking and sleeping states was also revealed by him. That even dreams could be scientifically interpreted was also his discovery. In short, Freud was the man who uncovered an area that we were not aware of—the area of human consciousness.

But in spite of this Freud had to take his place as an empiricist who, ignorant as he was of the dynamics of social change, borrowed terminologies both from ancient and modern times to account for the raw data that he collected from his patients.

If we deeply consider his theories of neurosis—which we cannot do here because of our limitation of space and the area of investigation-it would be apparent that he was groping in the dark to account for certain phenomena of our psychic life. And in so doing he arrived at such fantastic conclusions that neither the experts nor the common public could agree to. In fact, for this very reason, some of his disciples who later became famous themselves broke away from him. Some went for still wilder propositions and some, following his love for reason developed further in that direction. Jung took that part of Freudian psychology as was characterised by his ‘archaic’ and prehistoric/genetic concepts. Adler developed his theory of ‘individual psychology’ by following the scientist in Freud.

His preoccupation with sexuality as the only cause of neurosis is another instance of his faulty generalisation. He saw the neurotic outside his social and historical background. True, he was successful in curing many patients; but, it is one thing to consider sexuality as one of the principal reasons for neurosis and it is another to reject all other conclusions/diagnoses except the sexual one. All neuroses, as we know, are caused by tensions—and these tensions are mainly social, Of course, the term social has wider connotations. We have touched on these points later while discussing Adler. Sexual relationship is also a social relationship with a strong biological bias; just as speech or verbal communication is a socio-biological phenomenon. But, for Freud, all other factors were relegated to the background and only sexuality - outside all social contexts—remained to account for all sorts of problems.

His conception about infantile sexuality is similarly fallacious. It is true that all children show a certain amount of curiosity in sexual mailers. But this again is a social phenomenon and not a biological one. The society in which Freud worked and for that matter many societies even now, are guided by feudal and semi-feudal rules of morality, and therefore the reaction to the question of morality is distorted. This arouses an intense curiosity in the child which in normal state of affairs would seldom occur. To take this curiosity as the sexual instinct in children would be as erroneous as to see in a single tree the shadow of a wood. Barring abnormal sexuality, normal human beings develop their sexuality at a certain period of their life. As Caudwell has rightly pointed out, it would be unscientific to find the roots of sexuality in children when the biological basis of sexuality is existent only in the embryo. It would be ridiculous to consider a child as a grown-up little man as it is equally ridiculous to consider a man as an aged child. As the vital biological functions and the processes necessary for its fulfilment vary with age and as in

nature nothing occurs according to our theory but by the laws of nature, this Freudian assertion of infantile sexuality is a distorted view of sexuality and growth.

Even the causes of neurosis or psychosis found out by Freud need radical revision even in those cases where, according to him, excellent results were obtained. The same assertion about results is to be found in jung. Adler also in his preface to the book on individual psychology claimed that if a theory could be proved by results, he had considerable success with his theory on life-plan. Hence it is not enough to cure a few patients and then claim that his theory stands the test of science.

Lastly, we come to Freud's theory on energy discharge. According to Freud, a psychical case—be it hysteria, obsessional neurosis or anything else—is nothing but alternative energy utilisation, known as libido. A hysterical patient is utilising that libidinal energy which a normal person uses for sexual satisfaction. The same reason, Freud asserts, lies behind the symptom formation in hysteria, and the routine of obsessional activities in obsessional neurosis etc. Now this point needs closer examination. According to Freud perversions are due to fixation of libido to a certain point in the life of a patient in early childhood when he had enjoyed sexual satisfaction. This is known as regression. Similarly, in obsessional neurosis the libido is fixated to certain routine functions. In anxiety-hysteria, the release of libidinal energy is utilised for the development of anxiety. And, this idea reached the fantastic point of culmination in Freud's theory of sublimation of sexual desires.

But if we consider libido or the sexual urge from a socio-biological stand-point, we might have a clearer picture about the various issues involved.

Let us consider a similar biological function, say hunger. A hungry man, at the very outset, wants to eat. But if he does not get food, he gets irritated. If this man goes on living in a very critical condition with minimum diet, he will become anaemic, fall victim to many diseases, lose weight and become thin. He will, in short, become an irritated person. Any lower middle class family in the underdeveloped world may have more than one member who will tally with our description. Our novels and short stories also abound in such characters. If this state of affairs continue, the hungry man might become a lunatic. Or he may, at one point of time, commit suicide which is another outcome of malfunctioning of the brain. But then do we say, following Freud, that the ego-libido was transformed into psychoses as to show conservation of energy? No. Because the energy is not stored either in the brain or in the sexual act. The energy is generated from the vital organic functions, i.e., production of calories from the assimilation of vegetable and protein food. This energy gets spent up in performing the acts of living which at a certain point of time and growth also include the function of procreation.

Now, procreation is a biological act. The need is to continue the life of the species. But as satisfaction of hunger was transformed through ages of civilisation into food habits, tastes, etc. and with satisfaction of hunger to eating to assimilate organic objects for survival was transformed into an art that modern cuisine is through the civilising influences of the society, so also sexual intercourse which was originally necessary only for procreation was socialised and developed into a part of social intercourse with associated changes. Just as human society from its primitive form developed into class society, thus developing a whole realm of culture to meet hunger, it also developed the principle of exploitation of one class by another. Availability of food for satisfying hunger was once the right of every member of the society but the division of the society into classes resulted in denying this right to a large section of the people. Sexual relationship also underwent a transformation. The development of economic units (families) necessitated that sexual relations be restricted to do justice to heredity,

appropriation and inheritance of property. Thus developed a whole multitude of ethics and morality necessary for each economic period and super-seding the former with the transformation and change in social system. This guardianship of the society over the cumulative sexual relationships within the society created its own superstructure. Civilisation also taught men not to think of sexual intercourse only in terms of procreation but as an independent source of pleasure with or without procreation. Hence, on the one hand, throughout the course of civilisation, sexual pleasure became more and more independent of procreation, on the other hand society created its taboos, ethics and morality in sexual matters. Thus because of social restriction dependent on economic and other factors normal sexual experience as available to the primitive people became more and more restricted, the diversion from procreation to pleasure found its outlet in masturbation, homosexuality and unruly and distorted sexual behaviour. It is not fixation or regression that makes a man a homosexual or masochist or sadist. The environment in the guise of the society makes him so. Just as a hungry man cannot choose whether he will become a lunatic or commit suicide, so it is uncertain if sexual privation will make a man neurotic, psychotic or pervert. It is not a question of libidinal discharge but the condition of the society—whether it allows normal biological function or not. Our mental process is a function of the society we live in. Psychology is a part of sociology. Psychic processes can only be understood in the context of the society.

When Freud attributed to psychoanalysis the origin of the two following assertions it caused a tumultuous uproar in the entire world. On the one hand there were conservatives, feudal elements and outright reactionaries who found in the Freudian hypotheses the seeds of moral degradation and anarchism. The culmination of this wave of revulsation was the burning of his books in the streets of Berlin in 1933. On the other hand, there were others who, though they welcomed his methodology, shirked from giving to his theoretical postulates any recognition as a system although these postulates began to be used for medical treatment. An elaborate study of the discussion on neurosis would have given us the opportunity to point out the areas of disagreement. However, a short note that we have just submitted may serve the purpose, even if partially.

Two of the hypotheses of psychoanalysis, Freud says, are an insult to the entire world and have earned its dislike. One of them offends against an intellectual prejudice, the other against the aesthetic and moral ones. We must not be, he continues, too contemptuous of these prejudices; they are powerful things, precipitates of human developments that were useful and indeed essential. They are kept in existence by emotional forces and the struggle against these prejudices is very difficult.

The first of these unpopular assertions made by psychoanalysis declares that the mental processes are in themselves unconscious and that of the entire complex of mental activities it is only certain particular acts and portions that are conscious . We are in the habit of identifying what is psychic with what is conscious. We look upon the conscious, he continues, as nothing more nor less than the defining characteristics of the psychical and psychology as the study of the contents of consciousness. In fact, it seems to us, says Freud, so much a matter of course to equate them in this way that any contradiction of the idea strikes us as obvious nonsense. Yet the theory of psychoanalysis cannot avoid raising this contradiction; it cannot accept the identity of the conscious and the mental. It defines what is mental as processes such as feeling, thinking and willing and it is obliged to maintain that there are such processes as unconscious thinking and unapprehended willing. In saying this, Freud says, it has from the very beginning frivolously forfeited the sympathy of every friend of sober scientific thought and laid itself open to the suspicion

of being a fantastic esoteric doctrine eager to make mysteries and fish in the troubled water.

The second hypothesis, Freud says, which psychoanalysis puts forward as one of its findings, is an assertion that instinctual impulses which can only be described as sexual, both in the narrower and wider sense of the term, plays an extremely large and never hitherto appreciated part in causing nervous and mental diseases. It asserts further, continues Freud, that these same sexual impulses also make contributions that must not be underestimated to the highest cultural, artistic and social creations of the human spirit.

In my experience, says Freud, antipathy to this outcome of psychoanalytic research is the most important source of resistance which it has met with. We believe, continues Freud, that civilisation has been created under the pressure of the exigencies of life at the cost of satisfying the instincts; and we believe that civilisation is to a large extent being constantly created anew, since each individual who makes a fresh entry into human society repeats this sacrifice of instinctual satisfaction for the benefit of the whole community. Among the instinctual forces which are put to this use the sexual impulses play an important part; in this process they are sublimated—that is to say, they are diverted from their sexual aims and directed to others that are socially higher and no longer sexual. But this arrangement is unstable; the sexual instincts are imperfectly tamed, and, in the case of every individual who is supposed to join the march of civilisation, there is a risk that his sexual instincts may refuse to be put to that use. Society believes that no greater threat to its civilisation could arise than if sexual instincts were to be liberated and returned to their original aims for this reason, society does not wish to be deprived of this vital portion of its foundation. It has no interest in acknowledging the strength of sexual instincts or in demonstrating the importance of sexual life to the individual. On the contrary, with an educational aim in view, it has set about diverting attention from the whole field of ideas. That is why, it docs not tolerate this outcome of psychoanalytic research and far prefers to stamp ‘t as something aesthetically repulsive and morally reprehensible or even as something dangerous. But objections of this sort, Freud says, arc ineffective against what claims to be an objective result of scientific research; if the contradiction is to come into the open it must be restated in intellectual terms. Now it is inherent in human nature to have an inclination to consider a thing untrue if one does not like it, and after that it is easy to find arguments against it. Thus society sees what is disagreeable as untrue. It disputes the truth of psychoanalysis with logical and factual arguments; but these arise from emotional sources and these objections are maintained as prejudices against every attempt to counter them.

It is exactly this aspect of Freud that we had been warning our readers about. The first assertion, that of unconscious mental processes can be considered as one of the most brilliant discoveries of Freud. It not only satisfies the materialistic conception about the history and nature of evolution of the psyche, it opens up new vistas for exploring the mental processes. The whole range of mental diseases, the psyche of normal human beings and prevention of mental imbalance—all these have their basis in the unconscious. Contrary to outdated views, mental processes can only be understood as a combination of conscious and unconscious, each supplementing the other.

Besides the theory on psychoanalysis, we have a Freudian theory on our civilisation in which he asserts that sublimation of sexual impulses is what is instrumental for the development of civilisation. By a single stroke he nullifies the whole struggle from prehistory to the present age; as historical materialists we know that economics is the driving force of history and it is class struggle that brings about the progressive changes of the society. But Freud nullifies all these scientific reasonings. And by his attempt to

interpret the history of civilisation with his psychoanalytic theory, he has turned himself into a mystic of the highest order. He has refused to acknowledge the age-old contradiction between productive forces and production relations that at each movement of the historical process has given rise to class struggle and pushed forward the wheels of our civilisation.

Freud has not enlightened us much about the causes of melancholia. He has himself admitted his inability to understand the disease and cure patients suffering from it. Of course, he has furnished some theoretical approximations about the nature and origin of this psychic aberration. But these are so wide off the mark in relation to Kierkegaard that we have not considered them worth noting in our study.

At one point in his lecture on psychoanalysis, he writes, "There are, however, other forms of illness in which, in spite of the conditions being the same, our therapeutic procedure is never successful. In them too, it had been a question of an original conflict between the ego and the libido which led to repression—though this may call for a different topographical description; in them, too, it is possible to trace the points in the patient's life at which the repressions occurred; we make use of the same procedure, are ready to make the same promises and give the same help by the offer of anticipatory ideas; and once again, the lapse of time between the repressions and the present day favours a different outcome of the conflict. And yet we do not succeed in lifting a single resistance or getting rid of a simple repression. These patients, paranoiacs, melancholies, suffer from dementia praecox, remain on the whole unaffected and proof against psychoanalytic therapy. What can be the reason for this? Not any lack of intelligence. A certain amount of intellectual capacity is naturally required in our patients, but certainly there is no lack of it in, for instance, the extremely shrewd combinatory paranoiacs. Nor do any of the other motives seem to be absent. Thus the melancholies have a high degree of consciousness, absent in paranoiacs, that they are ill and that is why they suffer so much; but this does not make them more accessible. We are faced here by a fact which we do not understand and which therefore leads us to doubt whether we have really understood all the determinants of our possible success with other neuroses."

CARL GUSTAV JUNG

In Freud two trends are discernible—one is his passion for objectivity and another his submissiveness to subjectivity; one is his urge for scientific discovery and another his search into artistic creativity. He was at the same time a psychoanalyst and an adventurer in the realms of the complex human psyche and ultimately vacillated between reason and disorderly hypotheses. He unravelled the mysteries of the hitherto unknown world of the unconscious and discovered the reasons for neurosis and its relation to the unconscious. But he extended his empiricism too far and asserted that the great human civilisation is an outcome of sexual sublimation. He discovered the hitherto unknown psychic areas of dream and concluded that dreams contain phylogenetic characteristics. In cases of neurosis he found sex played an important part and concluded that all kinds of neuroses have sexual origins. Thus he developed his theory of infantile sexuality which contradicts scientific discoveries in physiology. He equates ego with the censor which is nothing but a reflection of the then Austro-Hungarian political terminology. His love for myths and mythical explanations contaminated his scientific proposition so much that at times one wonders if one is reading science or just science fiction. Another factor too has polluted his scientific thought. This is his passion for philosophizing. He wanted to explain the world through his psychological findings. He failed to understand that psychology is a part of sociology and psychological propositions are subject to sociological foundations.

But he overturned this pyramid. His psychology has become the basis of his sociology. He explains the society in terms of the individual psyche, not the latter in terms of the former. Thus we find a brilliant discoverer of the workings of human psyche groping in the dark and explaining his scientific observations in terms of myths and parables five thousand years old. And the result has been ridiculous instead of becoming sublime. It is like explaining atomic physics in terms of alchemy of the middle ages. Psychology is one of the most modern areas of science—it is a new branch of science in need of a theory that can sustain its complexity. But this science finds its explanation in myths and folk-lores, in Grecian anecdotes and Egyptian tales of antiquity. The result is that Freud, a brilliant discoverer, has been lost under the debris of thousand years' old manuscripts.

These two opposing trends of the master have also split the disciples into adherents of two opposing camps. On the one side, we find Adler, a man differing with Freud on the question of scientific objectivity. On the other, we find Jung, a man who found Freud too timid in his attempts to explain the human psyche in terms of archaic phenomena. Both have accused Freud but for two different reasons. And Freud who was midway between the two found all his labour lost as his other disciples for example Otto Rank, Ferencizi, Brill, Ernest Jones, etc. were not brilliant enough to carry forward his banner. Hence Freud remains a lone traveller.

But we have digressed too much about Freud's contradiction instead of discussing Jung. Before we discuss Jung's psychological theories, we want to find out some of his antecedents that would throw light on his psychological theories. Here we will discuss a bit of Jung's biography that would allow us to penetrate into his theories of psychology.

Carl Gustav Jung was born on July 26,1875 in Kesswil, Switzerland. it is no l known for sure what inspired him to join the medical profession but we know why he chose psychiatry over surgery and medicine. According to Joseph Cambell, one of his biographers, during his college years Jung was an avid reader of Kant, Goethe, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. One day he had a strange experience. He was in his room, studying with the door half-open to the dining-room where his mother sat knitting beside a window. Suddenly there occurred a loud sound like a pistol shot. Rushing to the spot he found that a circular table had cracked half way down. Two weeks later, having relumed home in the evening, he found his mother and sister quite agitated over a deafening sound caused by a crack in a heavy nineteenth century sideboard. Nearby, in the cupboard containing the breakfast, Jung discovered the breadknife with its steel blade broken into pieces. These two apparently incredible incidents left a lasting impression on the clergyman's son. What actually brought him to psychiatry was his urge to understand the "disease of personality" which as the author Kraft-Ebing said in his book ''Lehrbuch der psychiatrie" about psychosis.

In December 1900, Jung joined the Burgholzli Psychiatric Clinic in Zurich as the first Assistant Physician under Eugen Bleuler. Bleuler at that time was deeply impressed by Freud's work and had himself used some of his techniques for treatment. However, under Bleuler in 1902, Jung completed his doctoral dissertation on 'the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomenon', analysing the mediums he had met and the seances he had attended during his two-year-long adventure of his into the realm of occult, with a review of his earlier published studies of somnambulism, hystero-epilepsy, amnesia and other related twilight states. And what is remarkable, says Cambell, is that already in this earliest work there appear at least five major themes that were to recur as leitmotifs through all of Jung's later thinking.

Jung's first acquaintance with the writings of Freud took place in 1900, the year of publication of 'The Interpretation of Dreams', which he perused at Bleuler's suggestions.

But he could not penetrate well into the subject at that time. Three years later he perused the book once again and found it offering the best explanation of the mechanism of repression. Already at that time he had set up a laboratory for experimental psychopathology, where with Dr Franz Riklin as collaborator he had undertaken to investigate psychic reactions by means of association test. Jung opened an exchange with Freud by sending him in 1906 a collection of his early papers entitled 'Studies in Word Association'. Jung was invited to Vienna. They met at one in the afternoon and discussed for thirteen hours at a stretch. Next year Jung sent Freud his monograph on "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox" and was again invited to Vienna. The following year in 1908 Jung attended in Vienna the first International Congress on Psychoanalysis and it was there that he got introduced to the learned circle of psychoanalysts who helped in making the subject gain ground.

The next year 1909 saw Jung once again in Vienna. On this occasion an incident occurred which was to have a lasting impact on the Freud-Jung relationship. Freud, elder to Jung by nineteen years confided to this young man that he was adopting as the eldest son and "anointing him as the successor and crown-prince" to the psychoanalytic kingdom. Then Jung asked Freud what he thought about precognition and para-psychology. Freud replied "Sheer nonsense." At this, Jung said later, he had a curious sensation, as if his diaphragm was made of iron and was becoming red-hot—a glowing vault. "At that moment" describes Jung, "there was such a loud report in the book-case, which stood right next to us, that we started up in alarm, fearing that the thing was going to topple over on us. I said to Freud, "there, that is an example of a so-called catalytic exteriorization phenomenon'. 'Oh come', he exclaimed, 'that is sheer bosh'. 'It is not', I replied. 'You are mistaken Herr Professor. And to prove my point I predict that in a moment there will be another such loud report'. Sure enough, no sooner had I said the words than the same detonation went off in the bookcase. . . . Freud only stared aghast at me. I do not know what was in his mind or what his look meant. In any case, this incident aroused his mistrust of me, and I had the feeling that I had done something against him."

On Jung's departure, Freud wrote a letter to him. He wrote, "It is remarkable that on the same evening that I formally adopted you as an eldest son, anointing you as my successor and crown prince—in partibus infidelium —that then and there you should have divested me of my paternal dignity, and that the divesting seems to have given you as much pleasure as investing your person gave me. Now I am afraid that I must fall back again in the role of father towards you in giving you my views of poltergeist phenomena. I must do this because these things arc different from what you would like to think.

I do not deny that your comments and your experiment made a powerful impression upon me. After your departure I determined to make some observations, and here are the results. In my front room there are continual cracking noises, from where the two heavy Egyptian sides rest on the oak boards of the book case, so that's obvious. In the second room where we heard the crash, such noises are very rare. At First I was inclined to ascribe some meaning to it if the noise we heard so frequently when you were here were never heard again after your departure. But since then it has happened over and over again, yet never in connection with my thoughts and never when I was considering you or your special problem (not now, either, I add by way of challenge). The phenomenon was soon deprived of all significance for me by some-thing else. My credulity, or at least my readiness to believe, vanished along with the spell of your personal presence; once again, for various inner reasons, it seems to me wholly implausible that anything of the sort should occur. The furniture stands before me spiritless and dead, like nature silent and godless before the poet after the passing of the gods to Greece."

In 1909, Freud and Jung were invited by the Clark University, U.S.A. to lecture on psychoanalysis. They met at Bremen to embark on the voyage. At Bremen Jung read of the peat-bog corpses brought to light in Denmark; bodies from the Iron Age, perfectly preserved, which he had hoped to see while in the North. And when he started talking of this, there was something about Jung's persistence that began to get on Freud's nerves. Several times Freud asked why he was so concerned about the corpses; and when at the dinner Jung went on, Friend suddenly fainted, having conceived the idea, which he later explained, that .lung had death wishes against him.

The break finally came in 1914. Some thought that it came about after .lung published his book "Symbols of Transformation". However, this was not quite .lung's own view, although the book certainly played a part. "The only thing he saw in my work", Jung said to Dr. Billinsky in 1959 "was 'resistance to father' —my wish to destroy the father. When I tried to point out to him my reasoning about the libido, his attitude towards me was one of bitterness and rejection." More deeply, however, as Jung went on to explain: "It was my knowledge of Freud's triangle that became a very important factor in my break with Freud. And then, I could not accept Freud's placing authority over truth." (Freud was in love with his own sister-in-law).

There are many more interesting incidents that could possibly explain the gradual deterioration of relationship between these two. However, we are not going to describe them here. We have touched on the Freud-Jung relationship only to drive home the point we made at the beginning of this subchapter. Both Freud and Jung suffered from a lack of confidence in science and materialism. And it is obvious that both of them had peculiar and fixed ideas. Neither of them could rise above it.

Analytical Psychology: Unconscious—Individual and Collective:

According to Jung, the concept of unconscious was at first limited to denote the state of repressed or forgotten contents. With Freud, who metaphorically made the unconscious take the stage as the acting subject, it was the gathering place of forgotten or repressed contents. For Freud, the unconscious was an individual possession although, Jung claims, he (Freud) was aware of its archaic and mythological thought-forms.

A more or less superficial layer of the unconscious is undoubtedly personal, Jung says. He calls it the personal unconscious, but this personal unconscious, continues Jung, rests on a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition bat is inborn. According to Jung, this deeper layer is the Collective Unconscious. He terms it 'collective' because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal. In contrast to the personal psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals. It is identical in all men and thus constitutes a common psychic substratum of a suprapersonal nature.

Psychic existence can be recognised only by the presence of contents that can be approached through consciousness. We can therefore speak of the unconscious only in so far as we are able to demonstrate its contents. The contents of the personal unconscious are chiefly the feeling-toned complexes; they constitute the personal and private side of psychic life. The contents of the Collective Unconscious, on the other hand, are termed by Jung as archetype.

Medical psychology, according to Jung, growing as it did out of professional practice, insists on the personal nature of the psyche. By this, Jung says, he means the views of Freud and Adler. It is psychology of the person and its aetiological or causal factors are regarded almost wholly as personal in nature. Nevertheless, Jung argues, even this

psychology is based on biological factors, for instance, on the sexual instinct or on the urge for self-assertion which are by no means merely personal peculiarities. Neither of these views, continues Jung, would deny the a priori existence of instincts common to man and animals alike. Yet instincts are impersonal, universally distributed, hereditary factors of a dynamic or motivating character, which very often fail so completely to reach the level of consciousness that modern psychotherapy is faced with the task of helping the patient to become conscious of them. Moreover, the instincts are not vague or indefinite by nature but are specifically formed motive forces which, long before there is any consciousness and in spite of any degree of consciousness Inter on, pursue their inherent goals. Consequently, they form very close analogies to the archetypes, so close, in fact that the archetypes may be called the unconscious images of the instincts themselves or in other words, they are the patterns of instinctual behaviour.

The hypothesis of the collective unconscious is, therefore, no more during, asserts Jung, than to assume that there are instincts. One admits readily that human activity is influenced to a high degree by instincts, quite apart from the rational motivations of the conscious mind. So, if the assertion is made, says Jung, that our imagination, perception and thinking are likewise influenced by inborn and universally present formal elements, one can discover in this idea just as much or just as little mysticism as in the theory of the instincts. The concept of the Collective Unconscious, according to Jung, is neither speculative nor philosophical but an empirical one. The question is simply this — are there or arc there not unconscious, universal forms of this kind? If they exist, there is then a region in the psyche which one can call the collective unconscious.

Archetype

For the purpose of explaining the Jungian psychological system, the term archetype (according to the originator) is helpful and apposite, because it tells us that so far as the contents of the collective unconscious are concerned, it is dealing with archaic or primordial types, that is, with universal images that have existed since the remote times. The term ‘Representations Collectives’ used by Levi Bruhl to denote the symbolic figures in the primitive view of the world, could easily be applied, according to Jung, to unconscious contents as well. Primitive tribal lore is concerned with archetypes that have been modified in a special way. According to Jung, they are no longer contents of the unconscious but have already been changed into conscious formulae taught according to traditiongenerally in the form of esoteric teachings. This last, according to Jung, is a typical means of expression for the transmission of collective contents originally derived from the unconscious.

What the word ‘archetype’ means in the normal sense is clear enough, Jung asserts, from its relations to myth, esoteric teaching and fairy tale. But if we try to establish what an archetype represents psychologically, Jung says, the matter becomes complicated. So far mythologists have always helped themselves out with solar, lunar meteorological, vegetal and other ideas of the kind. The fact that myths are first and foremost psychic phenomena, that reveal the nature of the soul, they have absolutely refused to see until now. Primitive man, continues Jung, is not interested in objective explanations of the obvious, but he has an imperative need, or rather, his unconscious psyche has an irresistible urge to assimilate all other sense-experiences to inner psychic events. It is not enough for the primitive, says Jung, to see the sun rise and set; the sun in its course must represent the fate of a god or a hero who, in the last analysis, dwells nowhere except in the soul of man. All the mythological processes of nature, such as summer or winter, phases of the moon, the rainy season and so forth, are in a sense allegories of these

objective occurrences; rather they are the symbolic expressions of the inner unconscious drama of the psyche which becomes accessible to man's consciousness by way of projection — that is mirrored in the events of nature. Projection is so fundamental that, says Jung, it has taken several thousand years of civilisation to detach it in some measure from its outer object.

It is true, says Jung, that the diagnosis of the Collective Unconscious is not an easy task. It is not sufficient to point out the often obviously archetypal nature of unconscious products; Cryptomnesia should also be ruled out in certain cases. In spite of all these difficulties there remain enough individual instances, asserts Jung, showing the autocthonous revival of mythological motifs to put the matter beyond any reasonable doubt. Hut if such an unconscious exists at all, psychological explanation must, take account of it. A certain picture of Leonardo da Vinci shows this myhological motif present in the archetypal images of the psyche. The picture is about St. Anne with virgin Mary and the Christ Child. According to Freudian interpretation, Leonardo himself had two mothers—and hence the representation of his psychic image in the picture. Jung argues that it is an inaccurate statement not only because St. Anne is Christ's grandmother and not mother as would be necessary for the Freudian explanation, but because there is an Impersonal motif well-known to us from other fields. This is the motif of the dual mother, an archetype to be found in many variants in the fields of mythology and comparative religion and forming the basis of numerous "representationes collectives".

Now transposing Leonardo's case to the field of neurosis, and assuming that a patient with a mother complex is suffering from the delusion that the cause of his neurosis lies in his having really had two mothers, Jung says that the personal interpretation would have to admit that he was right and yet it would be quite wrong. For in reality, Jung explains, the cause of his neurosis would lie in the reactivation of the dual-mother archetype, quite regardless of whether he had one mother or two, because here the archetype functions individually and historically without any reference to the relatively rare occurrence of dual motherhood.

In numerous cases of neurosis, the cause of the disturbance lies in the very fact that the psychic life of the patients lacks the cooperation of the motive forces. Nevertheless, argues Jung, a purely personalistic psychology, by reducing everything to personal causes, tries its level best to deny the existence of archetypal motifs, and even, Jung accuses, seeks to destroy them by personal analysis.

There are as many archetypes, says Jung, as there are typical situations in life. Endless repetition has engraved these experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form of images filled with content but at first only as forms without content, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action. When a situation occurs, corresponding to a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears which, like an instinctual drive, gains its way against all reason and will or else produces a conflict of pathological dimension, that is to say, a neurosis.

The Source of Archetypes

Since archetypes are supposed to produce certain archaic forms, says Jung, we must discuss how and where one can get hold of the material demonstrating these forms. The main source of archetypes, asserts Jung, is the dream which has the advantage of being an involuntary, spontaneous product of the unconscious psyche and therefore, a pure product of nature, not falsified by any conscious purpose.

Another source of the material is to be found in' 'active imagination". This is a sequence of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration. It has been found that the existence of unrealized, unconscious fantasies increases the frequency and intensity of dreams, and that when these fantasies are made conscious, the dreams change their character and become weaker and less frequent. From this Jung concluded that dreams often contain fantasies which ''want" to become conscious. The sources of dreams are often repressed instincts which have a natural tendency to influence the conscious mind.

Finally, very interesting sources of archetypal material are to be found in the delusions of paranoiacs, the fantasies observed in trance-states and the dreams of early childhood from the third to the fifth year.

Unconscious and the Ego

The term 'individuation', Jung says, denotes the process by which a person becomes psychologically 'in-dividual', that is, a separate indivisible unity or 'whole'. It is generally assumed that, says Jung, consciousness is the whole of the psychological individual. But knowledge of the phenomena that can only be explained by the hypothesis of unconscious psychic processes, makes it doubtful, says Jung, whether ego and its contents are in fact identical with the 'whole'. If unconscious processes exist at all, they must surely belong to the totality of the individual, even though they are not components of the conscious ego.

If they were part of the ego, they would necessarily be conscious because everything that is directly related to the ego is conscious. Consciousness can even be equated with the relation between the ego and the psychic contents. But unconscious phenomena, explains Jung, are so little related to the ego that most people do not hesitate to deny their existence outright. Nevertheless, they manifest themselves in an individual's behaviour. An attentive observer can detect them without difficulty while the observed person remains quite unaware of the fact that he is betraying his most secret thoughts or even things he has never thought consciously. It is, however, a great prejudice, says Jung, to suppose that something we have never thought consciously does not exist in the psyche. There is plenty of evidence, Jung asserts, that show that consciousness is very far from covering the psyche in its totality. Many things occur semi-consciously and a great many more remain entirely unconscious. Thorough investigation of the phenomenon of dual and multiple personalities has brought to light a mass of materials with observations to prove the point.

There is in fact no field directly known to us, says Jung, from which one could derive certain pathological ideas. It is not a question of more or less normal contents that became unconscious just by accident. They differ in every respect from neurotic materials which cannot be said to be at all bizarre. The material of a neurosis is understandable in human terms, but that of psychosis is not.

The peculiar images we call psychotic material cannot be derived from the conscious mind because the latter lacks the premises which would help to explain the strangeness of the ideas. Neurotic contents can be integrated without appreciable injury to the ego but psychotic ideas cannot. They remain inaccessible and ego-consciousness is more or less swamped by them. They even show a distinct tendency to draw the ego into the 'system', says Jung.

Such cases indicate that under certain conditions the unconscious is capable of taking over the role of the ego. The consequence of this exchange is insanity and confusion because the unconscious is not a second personality with organised and centralised

functions but in all probability a decentralised congeries of the psychic process. Moreover, asserts Jung, nothing produced by the human mind lies outside the psychic realm. Even the craziest idea must correspond to something in the psyche. We cannot suppose that certain minds contain elements that do not exist at all in other minds. Nor can we assume that the unconscious is capable of becoming autonomous only in certain people, namely in those predisposed to insanity. It is very much more likely that the tendency to autonomy is more or less a general characteristic of the unconscious. Mental disorder is, in a sense, only one outstanding example of a hidden but nonetheless general condition. The tendency to autonomy reveals itself above all in affective states including those of normal people when in a state of violent affect one says or does things which exceed the ordinary. Not much is needed; love and hate, joy and grief are often enough to make the ego and the unconscious change places.

The autonomy of the unconscious begins where emotions are generated. Emotions are instinctive, involuntary reactions which upset the rational order of consciousness by their elemental outbursts. Affects are not made or wilfully produced; they simply happen. In a state of affect a trait of character sometimes appears which is strange even to the persons concerned or a hidden content can irrupt involuntarily. The more violent an affect, the closer it comes to the psychological, to a condition in which ego consciousness is thrust aside by autonomous contents that were unconscious before.

Unconscious and the Individual

Jung says that we generally call unconscious ‘nothing’ and yet it is a reality in potential. The thought we shall think, the deed we shall do, even the fate we shall lament over tomorrow, all lie unconscious in our today. The unknown in us which the affect uncovers was always there and sooner or later would have presented itself to consciousness. The unconscious has a Janus-face; on one side its contents point back ‘ to a preconscious, prehistoric world of instincts while on the other side it potentially anticipates the future precisely because of the instinctive readiness for action of the factors that determine man’s fate. If we had complete knowledge of the groundplan lying dormant in an individual from the beginning, his fate would be in large measure predictable.

Today we can judge better, says Jung, than one could twenty years ago the nature of the forces involved. Can we not see how a whole nation is reviving an archaic symbol, yes even archaic religious forms, and how this mass emotion is influencing and revolutionizing the life of the individual in a catastrophic manner? The man of the past is alive in us today undreamt of before the War and in the last analysis what is the fate of the great nations but a summation of the psychic changes in individuals?

So far as a neurosis is really only a private affair, having its roots exclusively in personal causes, archetypes play no role at all. But if it is a question of general incompatibility or an otherwise injurious condition productive of neurosis in a relatively large number of individuals, then we must assume the presence of constellated archetypes. Since neurosis in most cases is not just private concern, but a social phenomenon, we must assume that archetypes are constellated in most such cases too. The archetypes corresponding to the situation is activated and as a result those explosive and dangerous forces hidden in the archetype spring to action, frequently with unpredictable consequences. There is no lunacy people under the domination of the archetype will not fall a prey to. If thirty years ago anyone had dared to predict that our psychological development was tending towards a revival of the medieval persecution of

the Jews, that Europe would again tremble before the Roman faces and the tramp of religious, that people would once more give Roman salute as two thousand years ago, and that instead of a Christian Cross, an archaic Swastika would lure onwards millions of warriors ready for death — why, that man would have been hooted at as a mythical fool. And today? Surprising as it may seem, all this is a horrible reality. Private life, private actiologies, and private neuroses have become almost a fiction in the world today. The man of the past who lived in the world of archaic 'representationes collectives' has risen again into very visible and painfully real life and this not only in a few unbalanced individuals but in many millions of people.

In the preceding pages, we have endeavoured to present the principal themes of Jungian Analytical Psychology. As far as possible, we have tried to reproduce his thoughts in his own words. We now want to discuss these views in the light of scientific materialism. As will be apparent from the preceding pages, Jung has swayed between psychology and parapsychology, between psychology and metaphysics and ultimately between psychology and astrology. The admixture of science and imagination in the garb of scientific psychology seems to us very confusing and dangerous. As we have already noted and where we intentionally took leave of Freud after discussing his concepts about archaic remnants in dreams, Jung has accepted this as his starting point. The readers will now be in a better position to appreciate our intention of discussing the Freudian dream theory. As was pointed out, because of his inclination to mysticism and the occult, Jung has caught hold of that weak spot in Freud that has greatly jeopardized his own development.

However, in the context of our present times, it is all the more necessary to discuss Jung because a number of progressive thinkers have been misled by some of Jung's theses. A case in point is Ritwik Kumar Ghatak, the noted Indian film-maker. It is sad that because of Jungian influence many aspects of his creative genius were mystified by mythological allegories like the Great Mother Image, etc.

Jung says that unlike Freud he wants to add another deeper layer existing under the personal unconscious. This layer of the psyche is existent in all individuals and everywhere and its content is all similar. This he terms as the Collective Unconscious. This deeper layer is inborn and a hereditary possession while the personal unconscious is a personal acquisition. As against feeling-toned complexes which are regarded as the personal unconscious content, that of collective unconscious is archetype. Jung argues that even the psychology of Freud and Adler is based on biological factors — for instance, Freud's theory of sexuality. And hence neither of these views would deny the existence of instincts common to man and animal. Yet instincts are impersonal, universally distributed, hereditary factors of a dynamic character…. Moreover, the instincts are not vague or indefinite by nature but are specifically formed motive forces, which long before there is any consciousness later on, pursue their inherent goal. Consequently they form very close analogies to the archetypes, so close, in fact, that the archetypes are the unconscious images of the instincts themselves or in other words they are patterns of instinctual behaviour. Once again we have reproduced Jung's own theory about the archetype. To discuss archetype, then, it is necessary to discuss what are instincts and what relation instincts have to consciousness or the psyche. In fact, later in the book dealing with Sartre we have discussed the genesis of the psyche. But though we would expect our readers to go through that chapter on consciousness, here we would like to present our argument in brief.

We know that the development of the instincts themselves culminated in the development of the psyche or in other words the instincts are the psyche in embryo. The

instincts themselves did not appear from the blue. In fact during the evolution of life itself the instincts developed—one after the other—to take care of biological metabolism and defence. The principal instincts present in human beings may be considered the origin of the development of the psyche. In the human brain one finds five distinct divisions. We have analysed each part in detail in the chapter already referred to. It would suffice to say that the other parts of the brain excepting the cerebral cortex take care of the instinctive drives. In a highly complex division of labour the cerebral cortex takes the vital decisions — it analyses the situation and on the basis of past experience — which is memory — judiciously motivates the motor functions of the body. The instinctive impulses thus generally get socialized by cortical supervision. The instincts that are raw and undifferentiated make the animals what they are. They are all instincts. And that is why an animal is not born free, it is dominated by instincts. On the other hand, man dominates the instincts and socializes them. That is why man is free. But even this freedom is not unlimited. It is subject to understanding nature and mastering it. According to Jung, archetypes are the patterns of instinctual behaviour. What he means by it is not clear. Instinctual behaviour is animal-like. It cognizes only those aspects of nature that are necessary for the survival of the species and the subject. We do not have any quarrel with Jung on the point of existence of the instincts; nor do we have any doubt about its universal, non-personal origin that is the basis of human psyche. But we have serious differences with him when he extends this thesis further. In fact, in a flight of imagination, he has seen archetypal patterns in all myths and folk-lores. Further, Jung says that the term archetype is helpful and apposite because it tells that so far as collective unconscious contents are concerned, it is dealing with archaic or primordial types, that is, with universal images that have existed since remote times. It then presupposes that the instincts have some form of images or patterns in the memory. But that is utterly impossible because memory is younger than instinct in biological evolution. The development of memory takes place at a much later stage and only in higher animals. But instincts are present in all living beings. It is on the basis, i.e., the structure of instincts that the superstructure of consciousness — memory included — rests. Hence biologically speaking, instincts cannot have images in the memory. That is why they are instincts; they operate without any prior knowledge. An insect is not taught how to swallow another insect. It is instinctive behaviour. But as soon as the question of images come, we come to a later stage of evolutionary process.

The term ‘representationes collectives’ used by Levi Bruhl, says Jung, to denote the symbolic figures of the primitive view of the world, could easily be applied to unconscious contents as well. Primitive tribal lore is concerned with archetypes that have been modified in a special way. They are no longer contents of the unconscious but have already been changed into conscious formulae taught according to tradition, generally in the form of esoteric teaching. The last is the typical means of expression for the transmission of the collective contents originally derived from the unconscious.

Now, all primitive societies — even societies with some form of development — had as a rule wanted to unravel the mysteries of nature. But the success depended on the material development of the society itself; because, the more sophisticated are the methods of penetrating into the mystery of nature, the better the chances for knowing it. As the awareness of the people is relative to the development of the society, all primitive societies retain certain common features. The concept about gods in the Maya or Inca civilization have striking resemblance to that of African tribes although they never met. But these have nothing to do with the collective unconscious; and Jung wants to equate this collective unconscious with instincts. It is a great error on his part to be oblivious of

the chronological factors involved. Instincts are as old as the evolution of life on earth itself. But myths can at best be as old as the oldest tribal society. Hence, what he terms as archetypes can at most be the mythical representations. But mythical images cannot transmit phylogenetically. If that were possible, then the human psyche — particularly that of the unconscious in the memory— would have been stuffed with the whole history of human civilisation and that is absurd.

Now, Jung says that myths are first and foremost psychic phenomena. He also says that primitive man is not interested in the objective explanation of the obvious. We have reproduced these Jungian concepts earlier (pi. refer to Jung's concept about archetype). What comment can one make on these unscientific and subjective propositions! It seems that though civilisation has come a long way from the primitive stage, people like Jung have not been able to rise above the ignorance of primitive man. A primitive man cannot be accused for believing the changes in nature to be a projection of his psychic process. One can understand his limitation. But when a medical man uses these data to forward a fantastic thesis, he should outright be criticised. These concepts show in glaring detail the unsoundness of the Jungian idea of the archetype. A scientific analysis of the myths of various peoples will prove beyond doubt that myths are an attempt by the primitive societies and people inhabiting them to explain nature and life. They contain in a primitive form an urge to unravel the mysteries of the world. There is very little 'psychic' about it.

There are as many archetypes, says Jung, as there are typical situations in life. Endless repetitions have engraved these experiences into our psychic constitution, not in the form of images filled with content but at first only as forms without content, representing merely the possibility of a certain type of perception and action. When a situation occurs corresponding to a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears which, like an instinctual drive, gains its way against all reason or will or else produces a conflict of pathological dimension, that is to say, a neurosis.

Our observation is that if archetypes are patterns of instinctive behaviour, then the number of archetypes cannot be more than the number of instincts. Secondly, it would be naive to say that due to activisation of an archetype corresponding to a situation that a person lakes his decision. The process of decision-making is much more complicated. Archetypes are rather figments of imagination, a theory having no scientific basis.

The main source of archetype, according to Jung, is the dream. But we have already observed that this cannot be the case because dreams originate from memory. Instincts are much older in the process of evolution than memory and hence memory cannot have images of the instincts; it is a chronological impossibility.

The second source of the material is to be found in 'active imagination' claims Jung. Now, while discussing it we will ask the reader to kindly refer to the process of 'active imagination' described by Jung in his works. There a Mrs. X, who is an American by birth and whose ancestors had migrated from Scandinavia, has drawn some pictures by invoking her 'collective unconscious'. The result has been very doubtful. The first picture, that of a woman trying hard to come out of a region strewn with boulders, seems to us a very conscious reflection of her mind. If the collective unconscious is of a universal nature why should only her image or her plight be conspicuously present? Her Scandinavian ancestry, her forefathers' proximity to sea and the sea-voyages are reflected in the presence of the sea-shore. Further, what universal content did that picture show except that the human race passed through the stone-age? In all her pictures only the stone-age has been depicted. But if the human race has passed through various other stages, why have they not been reflected in the pictures? Is it because she was conscious

that she was invoking the ‘collective unconscious’? Thirdly, the two other boulders that show her affinity to other women, her anima complex, as explained by Jung, reveal rather plainly that the picture has very definite associations. Various explanations from alchemy to Indian occultism, black magic and Tibetan Buddhism given in connection with the ‘mandalas’ drawn by Mrs. X only reinforce this doubt. These symbols of stars and planets, metals and numbers are but the result of the development of the society through various ages. Equating these very recent acquisitions of our civilisation with unconscious mental processes which are supposed to be as old as the human psyche itself is nothing but sheer mysticism. (C. G. Jung, Collected Works, Vol. 9 and 10)

Other sources of archetypes, Jung says, are in the delusions of the paranoiacs, the fantasies observed in trance states and in the dreams of children from the third to fifth years. It is obvious now that the medical man is becoming too gullible. He is accepting the versions of his subjects in toto and is readily stamping them as reflections of the collective unconscious. What is a trance-state to one who does not believe in the super-natural? To a medical man trance-state is nothing but a neurotic fixation.

Further, Jung says that the unconscious is a reality in potentia. The thought we shall think, the deed we shall do, even the fate we will lament over tomorrow, all lie dormant in our unconscious today. ... If we had complete knowledge of the groundplan lying dormant in an individual from the beginning, our fate could be in large measure predicted, assures Jung.

It is sad that Jung’s analytical psychology has finally been transformed into astrology. Everything is to be found in the unconscious — one only needs to know the groundplan! And we have an active imagination which will reveal it. At this stage, I believe, the readers will have had enough to judge Jung and his pseudo-scientific postulates.

But this is not all. We have already mentioned Jung’s reasoning about the rise of Fascism. He said that the activation of a certain archetype was the root cause of this shameful episode. ‘Since neuroses in most cases are not just private concerns but social phenomena, we must assume that archetypes are constellated in these cases too. The archetype corresponding to the situation is activated and as a result those explosive and dangerous forces hidden in the archetype come into action frequently with unpredictable consequences. There is no lunacy people under the domination of archetype will not fall a prey to.’

As already observed, the problem with Freud and his disciples is that all of them have taken it upon themselves to explain the world through psychoanalysis. For Freud it was due to the sublimation of instincts that the whole edifice of civilisation came into being. Now Jung comes to provide psychological explanation for the rise of Fascism. It is not the unique economic and political situation of Germany of late 1920’s and early 30’s but the irruption of archetype that was the root cause of Fascism as Jung would have us believe. With this explanation Hitler or Mussollini could be considered a neurotic. By the same standards, the persecution of Jews could be explained away as the ‘death wish’ of certain individuals against others. Jung’s collective unconscious is nothing but Freud’s personal unconscious on a mass scale. When psychology, refusing to become a part of sociology, goes forward to explain the social forces in terms of its own alone, the result is such psychoanalysis.

Questions might be raised as to why knowing the contents of Analytical Psychology as they are, we have discussed it while we knew that it would not help us much to understand Kierkegaard. We have one important point in our defence; this knowledge of

Analytical Psychology will make it all the more easy for us to understand the existentialism of Martin Heidegger.

If one follows Jung rightly, one would find that according to his system of psychology there is a realm of the psyche — deep inside — which is the real self of man. And he who can reach it will gain insight into his past life as well as into the present and the future. From this it follows that a man should strive to reach the depths of the realm of the collective unconscious and find out the mysteries hidden therein. The soul of every human individual is there — in the psyche. The better one knows it, the wiser one becomes. We will find a striking resemblance between this school of thought and that of Heidegger's existentialism.

ALFRED ADLER

Adler was born in Vienna in 1870. In 1902 when Freud started a seminar to discuss various issues in psychoanalysis, Adler joined the group. His first work 'A Study of Organic Inferiority and its Psychical Compensation' was well-received by Freud and his other colleagues. All along he had theoretical differences with Freud which culminated in his break with him in 1910. Adler was a Socialist in his political inclination and also an active propagandist. He gave many lectures to social workers, physicians and the general public throughout Europe and the United States. In the U.S.A. his theories were highly valued in the 1920's and 30's. He died suddenly during a lecture-tour in Scotland in 1937.

Adler's Individual Psychology is based on a more solid foundation than that of Freudian or Jungian Analytical Psychology. In fact, amongst these three, Jung's is the most mystic and religious. Freud sways between materialism and mysticism. But Adler roots his psychological analysis in the very society he lives in. But this does not imply that he had a scientific view about society. Yet he was more down-to-earth in his theories. Unlike Freud and contrary to Jung, he wanted to find out the reason for the development of neurosis from a social angle. As already noted, he carried forward that tradition of Freud that made him one of the greatest experimentalists in psychoanalysis. In the pages to follow, we will present an outline of Adler's Individual Psychology. The following is a general outline of the causes of neurosis according to Adler's theory of Individual Psychology:

I. Every neurosis can be understood as an attempt to free oneself from a feeling of inferiority in order to gain a feeling of superiority.

II. The course of the neurosis does not lead in the direction of social functioning, nor does it aim at solving given life-problems but finds an outlet for itself in the small family circle, thus achieving the isolation of the patient.

III. The larger unit of the social group is either completely or very extensively pushed aside by a mechanism consisting of hyper-sensitiveness and intolerance. Only a small group is left over for the manoeuvres aiming at the various types of inferiority to expend themselves upon. At the same time protection and withdrawal from the demands of the community and the decision of life are made possible.

IV. Thus estranged from reality, the neurotic man lives a life of imagination and phantasy and employs a number of devices which enable him to side-step the demands of reality and to reach out towards an ideal situation which would free him from any service for the community and absolve him from responsibility.

V. These exemptions and privileges of illness and suffering give him a substitute for his original hazardous goal of superiority.

VI. Thus the neurosis and the psyche represent an attempt to free oneself from all the constraints of the community by establishing a counter-compulsion. The latter is so constituted that it effectively faces the peculiar nature of the surroundings and their demands. Both of these convincing inferences can be drawn from the manner in which this counter-compulsion manifests itself and from the neurosis selected.

VII. The counter-compulsion takes the nature of a revolt, gathers its material either from favourable affective experiences or from observations. It permits thoughts and affects to be preoccupied either with the above-mentioned strivings or with unimportant details, as long as they at least serve the purpose of directing the eye and the attention of the patient away from the life-problems.

In this manner, depending upon the needs of the situation, he prepares anxiety and compulsion situations, sleeplessness, swooning, perversions, hallucinations, slightly pathological affects, neurasthenic and hypochondrial complexes and psychotic pictures of his actual condition, all of which are to serve him as excuses.

VIII. Even logic fails under the domination of counter-compulsion. As in psychosis, this process may go as far as the actual nullification of logic.

IX. Logic, the will to live, love, human sympathy, cooperation and language, all arise out of the needs of human communal life. Against the latter are directed automatically all the plans of the neurotic individual striving for isolation and lusting for power.

X. All the volition and all the strivings of the neurotic are directed by his prestige-seeking tendency, which is continually looking for excuses which will enable him to leave the problems of life unsolved. He consequently turns automatically against allowing any community feeling to develop.

XI. To cure a neurosis or a psychosis, it is necessary to change the whole surroundings of the patient and turn him definitely and unconditionally back upon human society.

XII. If, therefore, we may regard the demand for a complete and unified understanding of man and a comprehension of his (undivided) individuality as justified — a view to which we are forced both by the nature of reason and the individual psychological knowledge of the urge toward an integration of the personality — then the method of comparison, the main tool of this method, enables one to arrive at some conception of the power lines along which an individual strives to attain superiority.

The above is in general the conception of the Adlerian school. At the very outset, one point may be noted here: unlike Freud or Jung, Adler endeavoured to understand and explain neurosis on the basis of the individual's relation to society. There is no doubt that the reasons put forth as the causes of neurosis — isolation from the society, inferiority complex, etc. — demand serious attention and can even convincingly explain a whole lot of neurotic behaviour. Of course, there are various other cases in which other methods of analysis and treatment may be helpful — as for instance Freudian method when the neurosis is caused by sexual factors.

Simultaneously, a great lacuna is also visible here. Adler has diagnosed the reason for the development of the neurosis as inferiority complex. But he has not ventured to give any reason for the generation of this complex. The feeling of inferiority which gives rise to neurosis in order to gain superiority is in itself the result of a system which is guided by the animal law of survival of the fittest. In a class-divided society any slip from the ladder may land the victim in utter ruin. At every moment in a person's life the possibility remains that he may be overtaken in a perpetual rat-race. At every stage of life's struggle one has to jostle and push forward in a madding crowd. This is the system which breeds

neurosis. Just as a stagnant pool of water is the breeding place for mosquitos, a class-divided society is the perennial source of neurosis. The patient's distaste for community life arises here. It is this society, this community which is striving at every moment to shove him off his feet and pin him down. This society is definitely opposed to him and he in turn is also up against this society. And hence, at times, he flees from this suffocating race for survival. At least a sick person is better cared for. Sickness bestows up on the patient more importance and a right to sympathy and kindly feeling. As Adler has rightly pointed out, to cure a neurosis/psychosis, it is necessary to change completely the whole surroundings of the patient and turn him back definitely and completely upon the society. The remedy is good; only by being integrated and associated with human society can the patient turn into a normal human being again.

But the point is — who will bell the cat? Can a psychoanalyst change the whole surroundings of the patient? Can a psychoanalyst integrate the patient with society? It is really too much to expect it from a psychoanalyst. What is really possible only by a revolutionary change of society is being prescribed here as the task of the psychoanalyst. It is, to borrow a metaphor from Christopher Caudwell, to tumble down London bridge with a shout. Adler has diagnosed the cause of neurosis and rightly prescribed the medicine. But a class-divided society is incapable of administering the medicine because the germ of the disease lies in its very nature.

According to Adler, an individual's neurotic behaviour can be traced back to the years of his childhood. The future neurotic had germs of the disease in childhood itself. This is known as life-plan in the Adlerian terminology. A case in point is the 'mechanism of masculine protest' in early childhood.

The mechanism of 'masculine protest' Adler says, can of course be studied in early childhood. It manifests itself with special clarity among girls. The direction taken by the expansionist tendency is found in many variations and we soon discover, says Adler, to what a white heat the actual expectations and tensions of the child in relation to its environment are aroused.

From the feeling of curtailment, there develops regularly the fanaticism of weakness, thus opening a door to the understanding of the child's from of hyperirritability, negativism and neurotic artifices. An otherwise healthy girl of three years showed the following manifestations: continuous trial of strength with the mother, frightful sensitive-ness to every form of compulsion and relegation, stubbornness and defiance. Refusal to take food, constipation and other revolts against the ordinary household arrangements took place continually. Negativism developed to a degree that it became almost unbearable. Thus one day when her mother suggested to her gently that she should take her afternoon tea, the following monologue occurred; "If she says milk then I will drink coffee and if she says coffee, I will drink milk." Her longing to be like a man was frequently exhibited. One day she stood in front of the mirror and asked her mother: "Did you always want to be a man also?" As the impossibility of any change in sex became clear to her, she suggested to her mother that she would like to have another sister but under no condition a brother; that when she was grown up, however, she would only have boys. Later on, she still betrayed an unquestionably high estimation of men.

The case detail of another three-year old girl were as follows: Her favourite occupation consisted in dressing herself in the clothes of an elder brother and never in those of her sister, at least not in the beginning. One day when on a walk with her father, she stopped in front of a boy's clothing shop and tried to persuade him to buy her some boys' clothes. When he pointed out to her that a boy did not wear girl's clothes, she pointed to a little cloak, that might, at a pinch, be made suitable for a girl and asked that she be allowed at

least that. In this instance we have, says Adler, what is not an infrequent change in the form assumed by the main path (of character), one at the same time dependent upon the masculine terminal goal and one which insists that even the semblance of being a man suffices.

From the above two examples Adler poses some questions. The reader will find that in both the questions posed and the solutions recommended, Adler has made a great error.

What method has heretofore been offered for reconciling one-half of mankind to an unalterable condition which it dislikes, asks Adler. For one thing is clear — that if such a reconciliation is not successful, we shall at all times have before us the condition which I have just discussed in detail, a permanent feeling of inferiority will continually give occasion for dissatisfaction and lead to various attempts and contrivances for proving one's own superiority in the face of all obstacles. In this fashion arise those weapons in part connected with reality, in part of an imaginary kind, that form the external picture of the neurosis. That this condition has advantages, that it enables a person to live in a more intensive and subtle manner is not to be pleaded when our task is that of pondering over some means to be adopted for cancelling the far greater disadvantages. This mood with its feeling of insecurity at one pole and its longing for quasi-masculine recognition at the other, is still further intensified when the girl is relegated to the background by the boy, when she sees her possibility of development curtailed and when the female molimina... menses, child-bearing and climacteric with their disadvantages, appear. It is well-known that these periods arc decisive in neurotic revolts and we may consequently predict these revolts beforehand. Although one of the roots of neurotic troubles has thus been laid bare, we must unfortunately admit that neither in our pedagogic nor in our therapeutic equipments has any method been found of preventing the consequences of this natural situation and that imposed by society. From our point of view, we may provisionally draw the following conclusions: the necessity of impressing upon the child early, both prophylactically and therapeutically, the unchangeableness of the organic sexual character; that the disadvantages are not to be regarded as unconquerable but be looked upon as difficulties inherent in life which others know both to appreciate and if need be, to battle against. With that I think the uncertainty and resignation present in today's woman's work will disappear and with it that exaggerated desire for recognition that so frequently makes her appear as inferior.

We are thankful to Adler for observing that neurosis is a social phenomenon. Regarding women the psychologist has rightly pointed out their desire to be men — even the semblance of appearing as a man would suffice for them. But the preventive method that he has prescribed is unacceptable to us. In any society it is the economic relation that determines the social position. The only solution for removing the sense of inferiority in women is to provide them with equal opportunities in all spheres of life. And that is exactly what is denied in a bourgeois society. The treatment of the elders differ in relation to male and female children. A male child is allowed to grow up with as little control as possible. A female child is taught at every stage what she ought and ought not to do. From her very childhood—from her birth itself— she considers herself as a burden to the family and the society. What Adler prescribes is to tell them that they can overcome their 'natural difficulties'. But we feel that there is absolutely no natural difficulty. It is their social position due to their economic dependence that is being wrongly interpreted as natural difficulty. The only suggestion that one could give is to change this social system itself.

Similarly, regarding juvenile delinquency, his observations are commendable. How brilliantly he could identify the problem is evident from his observations. But there again, in pointing out a solution, he has come to a wrong conclusion.

I am quite at sea, Adler says, as to what can be done in an age of intensified demoralization like ours. The correct and proper thing is to act immediately. Even in times of complete peace, our civilization was not able to gain effective control over demoralization and crime; she could merely punish, avenge herself, frighten people but never solve the problem. She kept the demoralized at an arm's length. Visualize, if you can, the frightful fate of these people, whose loneliness must in itself drive them to crime; people who are criminals only because they have lost contact. From that they develop into habitual criminals. It is a piece of utter stupidity, for instance to herd together during examination, demoralized individuals with their own kind or with criminals. . . . Evils are also noticeable in the type of attitude taken by the society. Both court and police work to no purpose because they always centre their attention upon questions other than the really radical and determining ones. To improve the situation the first requirement is to have a different and more human personnel. Institutions ought to be erected for taking care of these demoralized children, for bringing them back to life; not shutting them off from society but on the contrary making them more adapted to it. That can only happen if we have a full understanding of their peculiarities. Nothing can be accomplished if any kind of person whatsoever (e.g. a retired officer or subaltern) can be appointed Director of an institution of this kind merely because he enjoys political protection. Only such people are to be considered for such posts as have a strongly developed community sense and a full understanding of the people entrusted to their care. The essential point of my argument is this, that in a civilization one man is an enemy of the other — for this is what our whole industrial system means — demoralization is ineradicable, for struggle and crime are by-products of the struggle for existence as known to our industrialized civilisation. The shadow of this struggle falls very early across" the soul of the child, destroys its poise, facilitates its cravings for greatness and renders it craven and incapable of cooperation.

To limit and to do away with demoralisation a chair of curative pedagogy should be established. It is indeed hard to understand why Midi a chair does not already exist. Today a true understanding of the problem is extremely rare. All persons in any way connected with this problem should be compelled to take an active part. The institution itself should be in the nature of a central exchange bureau which would give information on all matters relating to the prevention and control of this demoralisation.

Adler has rightly pointed out the enormity of the problem. He has pointed his finger towards the industrial civilisation in which one man is an enemy of another. This is the breeding ground of juvenile delinquents who would later grow up into hardened criminals. But in spite of this clear-cut and penetrating approach he again confuses the solution of the problem. He says that the only solution lies in bringing back these isolated, demoralized people into the fold of society. Is this not a contradiction in terms? Is it not the same society which has alienated the individual and forced him to become a criminal? Yet he prescribes that the criminals should be brought back into community life. Does this society generate the eradication of the causes that were instrumental in alienating them? Again, Adler was not fully satisfied with this solution. He questioned the appropriate selection of personnel of the corrective institutions. He wanted properly qualified directors In be appointed there, as though by choosing appropriately qualified directors the criminals could be brought back to the society. What a delusion? Finally, he prescribes a chair of curative pedagogy as the ultimate solution. What an enormous

problem and how easy a solution! While the appropriate solution calls for a radical change of society itself where one man will no longer turn into an enemy of another, where cut-throat competition will not be the order of the day, where each man will be a working partner of another in a harmonious communal relationship, Adler has prescribed a cheap and unsatisfactory solution. According to Adler, the neurotic tendency of the patient exists in an embryonic form in childhood itself. And during this period the patient develops his life-plan which only becomes manifest at a later stage. Hence Adler wants to find the cause of neurosis in the childhood experiences of the patients.

This view, to say the least of it, is exceedingly immature. Neurosis is developed as a result of a tension due to the strain that builds up in a class-ridden society. When a man is unable to succeed in the worldly competition with flying colours, he falls victim to neurosis. Usually, as a child one does not experience those tensions which one is forced to confront during adolescence, youth and later on in life. Only in certain cases neurosis may develop from the patient's early childhood experience, say when a child loses his parents or when due to unusual circumstances the child is subjected to mental exhaustion or tension. And there are instances when the development of the child is stunted in the early years of his life. Like Freud's in his search for libido, Adler also insisted on searching for the life-plan which in a good number of cases he would not find. An interesting similarity with Freud is also apparent in his theorisation. Lately Freud tried to find the answer to all sorts of neuroses in the patient's childhood sex experiences; in other words Freud believed that a child's sex experience ultimately forms the grownup's attitude towards sex.

The basic causes of neurosis can be sexual, social, economic, political, racial, religious or anything else that creates tension in the patient. The task of the psychoanalyst should be to find the appropriate cause that gives rise to tension in a particular individual. Adler is prone to simplify the issue.

As regards child-psychology, we are all grateful to Adler for his contribution. How demoralized children grow up to become perfect criminals, he has shown in vivid detail. And in doing so, he has pointed his accusing finger at the social system within which children grow up. But here again, due to his lack of knowledge about the social system or his lack of willingness to see penetratingly what the system is like in a class-ridden society, he has prescribed a chair in Pedagogy at the University level. And he wants his readers to believe that this lofty chair would remove the ills that the whole system of a class-ridden society is afflicted with. He has himself compared the struggle for existence of children from proletarian and non-proletarian backgrounds. But he seems to have overlooked the fact that the remedy to this lies in (he transformation of this tension-ridden society into a one free from such tensions.

Similarly in female neurotics he finds the basic cause of their illness in their desire to 'be a man'. He has shown this with the help of a number of case-studies. While prescribing the remedy, he wanted to impress upon the patient the argument about the inevitability of the law of creation. After all his socially conscious analyses, he arrived with utmost ease at these rotten bourgeois solutions. Every socially conscious individual in the twentieth century knows that the relative strength and weakness of men and women do not at all depend on their physical structure but on the economic position. A psychoanalyst of Adler's stature cannot be pardoned for forgetting this commonplace truth.

These lacunae which are of a fundamental nature are to be found all over the contents of Individual Psychology. Even his left-of-centre attitude towards the analysis of psychological problems could not hide his limitations. The human psyche which is a

product of human society cannot be unearthed if one is ignorant of the malady of a particular society and its real remedy.

In his preface to the English translation of the book 'Individual Psychology' Adler said: "Our contention that all forms of neurosis and developmental failure are expressions of inferiority and disappointment rests on a firm basis. And if success in treating these maladies — even in their greatest form — is a criterion, then its practical application has shown that Individual Psychology comes well out of the test. To encourage the student I would further add that we Individual Psychologists are in a position, if a proper procedure is observed, to get a clear conception of the fundamental psychic error of the patient at the first consultation. And the way to a cure is thus opened." In fact the problem with psychoanalysis lies here. Everyone demands that his theory is the most appropriate. The same assertion Freud has made in his 'Lectures on Psychoanalysis'. And he was not ready to listen to any objection from any quarters. Jung has claimed success in therapy. Freud would explain anything with his theory of libido, Jung with his unconscious and Adler with his inferiority complex. Each would claim his method to be the only correct one and challenge those who dared to oppose it.

This is the limitation of the bourgeois psychologists. These psychologists easily forget that an individual's psychology is part and parcel of the social psychology of a particular society because one lives and grows up in a particular society and that his psychic process is intimately related to the particular society with its form, class-relations and cultural make-up.

There is another problem of philosophising and universalising the psychoanalytic results. Where perhaps the philosophers would fare better, the psychologists have intruded. And hence Freud has his own explanation about the development of human civilisation, art, creativity, etc. and Jung has his explanation about the unconscious which he claims was at the root of the irruption of Fascism. Only Adler stops short of such far-fetched conjectures. And that, we believe, is what has made his theory the most rational among these three giants.

Kierkegaard's Neurosis: An Adlerian Explanation

The preceding section on psycho-analysis will come in handy and useful to us for the purpose of analysing the neurotic behaviour of Kierkegaard. We have already hinted at the various ingredients of our analysis while discussing the life of our philosopher. Now will be discussed in further detail the points that might help us in reaching a concrete conclusion. Once we have come to understand the eccentricities of our principal character, we will be suitably placed to discuss his works. This will also allow us to dispense with some other observations of the author about himself and those of many of his biographers.

(1) INFERIORITY COMPLEX:

As a child, Kierkegaard developed a deep sense of inferiority. The cause was rooted in the gloomy atmosphere of the household. As we know, little Soeren was seldom allowed to move about freely in the neighbourhood in company of his friends or to invite them to his house. He was forced into a sort of isolation which is unbearable to any child. The aged father — then well beyond sixty — was his only companion for conversation which mostly concerned religion. The father with his sin complex used to inculcate in the little child a sort of religiosity which was beyond his area of comprehension. This also served

to accentuate his feeling of isolation. Little Soeren must have discussed the religious teaching that he used to receive at home with his classmates and discovered to his surprise that not all parents preached the way his father did. And he sensed something unusual in the father and his all-too-frequent references to God.

It is clear that it was his father who inculcated in him the idea of sacrifice. The father had a strong belief that he would not be spared for his misdeeds, and that he would be punished by God in the severest manner. This motif of sacrifice that little Soeren inherited from his father underwent various transformations. The father might have used this concept of sacrifice in the sense that he might have to live an incredibly long life and see the extermination of his own children before his very eyes, i.e., his children were to be sacrificed to atone for his sin.

In school SK did not have many friends. We know how even in the very first years he was ridiculed by his classmates as 'Soeren Sock' for his peculiar choir-boy like attire. The old father was stubborn enough not to give in to his son's wish. Secondly, Soeren was a little hunch-hacked. Thirdly, he was also thin and frail. But all these difficulties could be easily overcome. What was insurmountable for him was his gloomy household. He could never forget the damp vapid atmosphere that pervaded the house, the uncanny darkness that filled the rooms and gave shape to the image of his strict father. Haunted by this gloomy atmosphere but used to it all the same, he felt peculiarly out of place in the clean and free air of the school and he detasted the very idea of going there everyday.

Thus physically and mentally unprepared to have a comradely relationship with his classmates, he developed an acute sense of isolation. The only defence that the unhappy little boy had was his wit. Against the sharper claws and stronger fists of his classmates he had his wits to fight them with. This was a very significant defence mechanism. The advantage of it was that he could guard himself against physical torture. But a complex of inferiority got ingrained in him. Wit could not defend him against an attack of sense of inferiority, nor could it make him feel equal to his classmates.

As reality was to him a dreaded aspect of life, it was the flight of imagination that gave him complete peace of mind and satisfaction. Hence reality in life became secondary to him. He set up for himself an imaginary world, and there he would defeat anyone who dared to compete. We know about his imaginary strolls with his father. What a great pleasure it was to trot anywhere he liked in imagination! There was a total lack of communication between his imaginary world and the real people of the real world. In a journal entry on December 30. 1837 he writes, "strange to say, my imagination works best when I am sitting by myself in a big gathering where chatter and noise provide a substratum for my will to cling to its object; without such a surrounding it bleeds to death in the unnerving embrace of a vague idea." This satisfaction in imagination was also born of inferiority complex because he could not cope with the real world properly; it was full of obstacles for him.

From his earliest childhood the only consistent companion the small boy had was his father. Within the four walls of the house his father brought him up in the severest discipline; he used to talk down to him and at times listened. The situation thus developed was a sort of love-hate relationship. But hate, not love, was the dominant feeling. SK has betrayed this feeling both when speaking about him lovingly or in an outrage.

As we will see, he made his father responsible for his melancholia. In a Journal entry in 1844 he wrote: "There was a father and a son. Both very gifted, both witty, especially the father. Probably everyone who knew their home and frequented it found them very entertaining. Mostly they debated with each other and entertained each other like two

clever fellows, not like father and son. Once in a long while the father would look at his son and would see that he was troubled; then he would stand before him and say: Poor boy, you are going about in quiet despair; (but he never questioned him more closely; alas he could not, for he too went about in quiet despair.)Beyond that no word was ever breathed about the matter. But within the memory of man, this father and son may have been two of the most melancholy beings that ever lived. . . . And the father thought the son's melancholy was his fault, and the son believed, the father's melancholy was his fault, and so they never spoke of it to each other. And that explanation which the father made was an outbreak of his own melancholy, so that in saying what he did he was talking to himself rather than to his son." Although here in this quotation, the share is evenly portioned out, at heart he squarely blamed his father. For in the folio wing passage from the Journal, we find an unrestrained flow of venom against the father; "The great benefaction of bestowing life upon another human being! Yes, most certainly! A debilitated lecher, a senile oldster, with hardly enough sexual potency — the truth is they cannot bridle their lustful heat, but this hypocritically expressed to the effect that they intend to make the great benediction : bestow life on another human being. Well, thank you! And what a life! a wretched, miserable, tormented existence usually becomes the lot of such progeny. Now, isn't that fine!" It is apparent that the responsibility for everything is squarely placed on the father — right from the moment of his birth. Now, at the age of twenty two/twenty five there took place the 'great earthquake'. He then discovered the scandal that his father had created: "Everything my father has told me conies true, yes. 'There are sins from which a human being can be saved only by extraordinary divine succour.' From a human viewpoint I owe my father everything. He has made me as unhappy as possible in every way, made my youth a torment without peer, caused me, inwardly, not to be far from feeling scandalized by Christianity, or rather I was scandalized, but out of reverence for it I decided never to breathe a word about it to anyone, and of love for my father represent Christianity as being as true as possible in contrast to the senseless nonsense which in Christiandom passes to be Christianity; and yet my father was the most affectionate lather and I always had and will always have a deep yearning for him whom, morning and evening, I have never once failed to remember."

We can very well understand the meaning of "there are sins from which a human being can be saved only by extraordinary divine succour". This has reference to the disclosure of unusual relationship that the father had with his maid-servant who later became his wife. There was an uncanny gloom in the atmosphere of the house. From his very childhood, he was brought up in it. But only at a certain age did he discover that the gloom in his father's face was but the expression of a guilt. He revolted; not against the gloom, but against his father. II was as if he found the reasons for everything that befell him in his father. We will explain this psychologically thus: Now that he found a reason for this melancholia, he made it a permanent garb around him.

From the above discussion the following inferences can be drawn:

(1) There was a deep sense of inferiority in the child from early childhood.

(2) As a defence mechanism against isolation and taunts from his classmates, the child developed sharp wit and imagination.

(3) Melancholia was both the cause and effect of this inferiority.

(4) Religious superstition coupled with an unusual revelation about the relationship between his parents helped ingrain this psychological mood.

(2) UNCERTAINTY AND VACILLATION :

The beginning of youth brought unimaginable suffering for Kierkegaard although it was mainly psychological. We have already discussed the episode that caused the great earthquake for the youngman. The events that followed have also been discussed elsewhere. There is only one point that we would like to stress here. It is at this juncture that SK took to drinking and frequenting the brothels. It was a sort of revenge against the father as well as an emotional outburst. It was about this time that he was realizing the need of a lady companion. This was a very natural desire for a youngman of twenty four. But later, in his writings, Kierkegaard has given a religious undertone to everything. And gullible as some of his biographers are, they have taken SK's explanation as the most plausible one. We, however, feel that SK has later retouched some of his youthful adventures to appear prophetic and religious. The truth is that the youngman of Copenhagen was as flippant as any other youngman of his age and left no stone unturned to strike up a friendship with a girl. We will find that even the choice was limited.

Before he fell in love with Regine, he used to visit the family of a deceased parish priest Thomas Skat Rordam whose daughter Bolette he was a little fond of. She lived with her mother and was engaged to a theological student named Peter Koebke. But this could not deter SK from making an attempt to dissociate her from Peter. Even the fact that she was engaged was ignored. This piece of information, though of little significance, is worth taking note of. Here we find little religiosity or ethics in young SK. Perhaps, there were many youngmen in Denmark at that time whose ethics would have prevented them from this adventure, because engagement was nothing but a sort of agreement before formal marriage.

One day during this period (May 1837) when he felt specially upset and disturbed, he decided to go and talk to Bolette, but, we are told that he was 'overtaken by God' and had to turn back. Now this God was none other than his conscience. But a few days later he repealed his visit, this time successfully, so to speak. But on this later visit, something happened which changed the course of events.

But one thing should be noted here. Regarding Bolette he was a little concerned because of her engagement. Had she not been engaged and if he succeeded in wooing her, he would have followed the same course of action as he did with Regine with perhaps some minor change in details, because the incidents that followed were of his own making or rather the symptoms of his disease. He had put forward various explanations in his defence. But the course of events only show that he was suffering from that psychological disease that overestimates hindrances, real or imaginary, and induces the patient to shirk his responsibility.

However, on this visit he met Regine Olsen at the house of the Rordams and instantly fell in love with her. The choice was obvious. With Bolette he had qualms of conscience, that is, her engagement and the very real obstacle represented by Peter. With Regine he had no such obstacle to reckon with — she was a young maid of fourteen years and the safest object for a teen-age romance. At the very first meeting SK was successful in drawing the attention of his would-be beloved.

Though we are told that the experience of that day was overwhelming, on that very night he wrote in the Journal such remarks that would predict the later events. His thought ran through the whole situation. He was at that time thinking that he was to 'realize the universal', he had to place all his cards on the table — meaning thereby that he had to confess the excesses he had gone to in the preceding months. He was thinking that the sin his father had committed, the sins he too had committed and his excesses — all would be

counted at the day of judgement. As already remarked, this vacillation is the symptom of the disease. And in the intervening days, his fading religiosity showed signs of revival; because he was to take shelter under the garb of religiosity or rather use his religious scruple to ward off a demand of life.

From that day in the month of May 1837, until the middle of the year of 1839, SK used to go to the Olsen family on the pretext of lending and borrowing books. But at this time he was preoccupied with the theological examination which he sat after the death of his father. After he had written his papers, his thoughts of Regine got the better of him. During this period he had written in his Journal: 'My misfortune on the whole is that during the time I was pregnant with ideas, I got a shock from the Ideal, and so I gave birth to deformities, and therefore actuality does not correspond to my burning longings — may God grant that that should not be the case in love; for I am seized with a secret dread of mistaking an Ideal for an Actuality. God forbid! As yet this is not so. But this dread makes me long to know the future beforehand and yet I fear it." On August 9, 1840, SK finally spoke to Regine of his love for her. Simultaneously he went to her father and asked for the hand of his daughter.

Thereupon started the story of his notorious indecision. He began to sway between getting prepared for his marriage and at the same time thinking of breaking the relationship. Within a few days of his proposing to her Regine met him on the street and got the impression that he was extremely disturbed and careworn. But SK also set himself the task of fulfilling the role of a would-be son-in-law. He took care to make friends with all the brothers and sisters of Regine, and also introduced his own family members to them. He was swinging between joy and despair all the same as his diaries would show. Several reasons he concocted in favour of his desire to break off — "A penitent as I was, my vita ante acta, my broodiness". Here he argued with himself that he would have to tell her everything about himself— his fall and sin; then about the sin of his father and lastly about his melancholia. He knew well enough that his own 'fall' would be readily forgiven. He also knew that his 'broodiness' as he called it would be accepted without much ado. But then he had to get married. This he could not do. So he argued about the secret of his father which he had no right to divulge and denigrate him to an outsider. These are nothing but the symptoms of the disease — melancholia from which he was suffering, for he exaggerated out of all proportion his arguments against taking a decision.

But he had not arrived at a concrete decision of a 'no' at this stage. He was then worried about his future profession as well. His father's savings that he had inherited were not enough to keep two people going. So he enrolled himself at the Pastoral Seminarium after having put it off until the last moment. Meanwhile, he defended his M.A. thesis at the University. He hoped that this might pave the way for him to the professorship in moral philosophy. But instead the post was offered to Rasmus Nielsen. Now, the dilemma was that to get the position of a priest, he had to confess and he was afraid that the confession might disqualify him for priesthood. He also brooded over the curse that befell the family — in short he was weighing each and every piece of his fantastic reasoning to justify that he would not be able to make a girl happy with his numerous problems. Ultimately, as a result of all these vacillations, he sent the engagement ring back to her on August 11, 1841.

SK's conduct caused a great scandal at Copenhagen. The whole town was up against him for his irresponsible conduct of a sensitive affair. He behaved himself like an undignified person whose words carry little value. And in his bid to take revenge against the society, he ignored all social norms. He wrote that the unanimous judgement which the town had passed against him was the proof that he had acted rightly. He also wrote

that the fortnight he spent in Copenhagen after the breaking of his engagement he used to undo himself in impudence. And interestingly, it was during this period that he started writing Part II of 'Either / Or' where he extolled the 'Aesthetic Validity of Marriage'.

This dichotomy — this contradiction of extreme polarity — will be apparent in all his later actions and deeds: on the one hand not to realise the universal and on the other a passion for it. After a fortnight he went to Berlin, apparently to flee unfriendly Copenhagen. But on reaching there, he wrote a series of letters to Boesen, his dearest friend, whereby one might suspect that he was not too eager to forget that episode. It also purported to create an impression in her that he was an outright scoundrel, ostensibly to separate her more from him. Hut looking from a psychological angle, it was meant to torment her still more cruelly, to subject her to his whims and create further pressure. He wrote in a letter during this period "is it not enough to make one mad that I go through the world and conceal in my breast healthy and strong feelings, so many that I think ten persons could do with them respectably and honestly. And yet… I am a scoundrel! But I laugh at people as I have always done. I take a fearful revenge on them, for it is always the worst revenge to have the right on one's side." However, lately, as he came to know (from a letter of Boesen) that Regine was unwell, he planned to return to Copenhagen immediately. He was surely thinking of repairing his damaged relationship with her as his Journals and letters would suggest. Some months later 'Either/Or' was published.

Not quite two months after the publication of the book there occurred an incident which needs to be mentioned. He wrote in his Journal that on Easter Saturday (which that year fell on April 16) during the evening prayer at the 'Church of Our Lady' Regine saw him and nodded. This small incident was enough to cause him great anxiety. He interpreted it thus that she still had some soft corner for him, that she still considered him to be a good soul. He wrote, "Now the sufferings of a year and a half are wasted, all my prodigious efforts — she still does not think that I was a deceiver, she believes in me. What trials now await her! The next will be the notion that I am a hypocrite. The higher up we get, the more terrible it is — to suppose that a man with my sincerity, my religiousness could behave in that way." How deeply he was moved could be understood from the impact the incident made on him. He fled to Berlin again to think over the whole situation. In Berlin, he wrote two books 'Fear and Trembling' and 'Repetition'. About two months later he returned to Copenhagen. There he learnt that she was engaged to Fritz Schlegel. He wrote in his Journal, "The most dreadful thing that can happen to a man is to become ridiculous in his own eyes with regard to a matter of essential importance, to discover for example, that the sum and substance of his sentiment is bosh. A person easily incurs this danger in his relation to another person — by believing for example in cries and screams. Here is a case where one needs to be stoutly built." One can well imagine from the episodes above how far a melancholic person might go to inflict injury on his close friends and associates.

(3) REVERSAL OF INFERIORITY INTO SUPERIORITY COMPLEX:

Christianity became the last resort in which SK could take refuge from the terrible vacillations that he suffered in his contemplation to annul the engagement. Now he began to interpret everything in terms of Christianity, in terms of martyrdom and sacrifice. Previously his theme was that he had sacrificed his lady-love. Now, in his later writings, the theme is transformed: he sacrifices himself at the altar of Christianity. And now he began to take the liberty of interpreting the events of his life in the light of his newly-acquired religiosity and urged self-immolation. All his vacillations, his uncertainty, his

broodiness were now looked upon as attributes to becoming a true Christian. Even the most cruel up-bringing during childhood appeared to him in a new light.

This phase can roughly be called, psychologically, as turning of the inferiority complex into a superiority complex. Previously, he was a cursed son of a cursed father. Now he was becoming a 'chosen' one of Christ. "My task", says SK in a Journal entry in 1854 "is new in this that in the 1800th year of Christianity there is literally no one from whom I can learn how to go about it. For hitherto all who were above the ordinary have been active in the direction of spreading Christianity, but my task lies in the direction of halting this mendacious spreading and also, I suppose, in the direction of making Christianity shake off a lot of Christians who are so in the name only. Therefore, none of the men above the ordinary has been as solitary as I — let alone realized, that one of their tasks was to defend their solitude and guard it —for if a halt must be called, it is easy to see that the less personnel used for it, the better for the solution of the task."

In another entry in 1854 he wrote, "Not until a man has become so utterly unhappy or has grasped the woefulness of life so deeply that he is moved to say and mean it — life for me has no value — and not till then is he able to make a bid for Christianity. And then his life may acquire the very highest value." A peculiar resemblance with the life of Christ was also another thing that helped him to form his arguments. He writes, "Christianity expresses something entirely different; the closer you get with Him, the worse for you. It is almost as if God said to men : You better go over to Tivoli (an amusement park in Copenhagen) and have a good time with the rest — but whatever you do, don't get yourself involved with me, for that will only bring yon misery, humanly speaking.

And not only that; in the end God also abandons the Christian, as shown by the example of the model (Christ).

For in strict sense, being a Christian means: to die for the world — and then to be sacrificed; first a sword pierces the heart (to die from the world) and then to be hated, cursed by men and abandoned by God (sacrificed). In other words, Christianity is super-human. And yet the New Testament bids the Christian take up the imitation of Christ.

I am not able to do that. I can only get so far as to use the 'model' for humiliation, not for imitation, and once again for humiliation, for it is humiliating that I cannot use the model for any other way."

We can give many more quotations from his Journals and works but we do not want to do so here. We hope that the point has been made quite clear that in a bid to reverse the whole nature of the complex, a cursed man that he considered himself to be has been transformed into a 'chosen' one of Christianity.

Melancholia: Adlerian analysis

In the preceding sub-chapter we have analysed various symptoms of SK and have codified them in terms of complexes. Here we will discuss the symptoms of Melancholia in general with the help of Adlerian methods of investigation. SK would have us believe that he had to forego so many desires of life because of his melancholic nature. But our analysis will show that a patient of melancholia suffers from these very symptoms and shows a tendency to shirk the responsibilities of life. Melancholia is the very disease the symptoms of which are expressed in so many episodes of SK's life.

According to the Adlerian theory, Melancholia develops among individuals whose methods of living have from early childhood been dependent upon the acts and deeds of others. Defective activity and manifestations of a non-masculine type are predominant in

them. Such people are generally found to limit themselves to the company of either their own family or a small persistent circle of friends. That their tremendous egoism occasionally brings them external success does not contradict the above statement, Adler says.

The fundamental questions in their own lives, like those pertaining to their own progress and development, even adherence to their own spheres of activity, are either evaded or approached only hesitatingly, especially if difficulties arise somewhere along the way.

The whole life-conduct of the melancholy type presupposes a fictive but all penetrating outlook, a melancholic perspective rooted in the infantile psychic life, a perspective according to which life resembles a difficult and frightening game of chance in a world full of obstacles and in which the majority of men are hostile. In this antagonism to community-feeling there exists an intensified sense of inferiority, one of the qualities that lie at the basis of the neurotic character. When protected by their special aggressive tendencies which are transformed into traits of character, affects, preparations and acts (crying!) these people feel that they are able to cope with the reality of life and they try when ‘sane and healthy’ to achieve a reputation among a small number of friends.

From the incessant attempts made from early childhood to gain prestige, Adler infers that the neurotic’s life is ridden with a sense of low sell-assessment. They betray in their maniacal melancholic ideas the ineradicable assumption of super-human, even divine powers. it is on such an assumption that are based the complaints in which the sick individual bewails, in what really represents a disguised idea of greatness.

There is also found references to heredity, to parents’ errors in bringing them up properly and wilful lack of considerations on the part of relations and superiors. References like the above, to melanchola, physical deformities, etc. serve also to establish the fact that according to the patient, we are here dealing with an unalterable and incurable disease. This, of course, enormously increases its importance. Their sensitive ambition which spurs them on persistently, although with secret trembling, to seek superiority, forces them likewise to retreat or waver before the more important social task.

The most important offensive weapon of the melancholia type which he uses for improving his position and which he has employed from childhood on, consists in complaints, tears and depression.

It is characteristic of melancholia that with the object of a more powerful attack, and because of a more extensive feeling of inferiority, the realization of inferiority disappears and all criticism of the maniacal ideas is excluded, by means of a marked anticipation of an inevitable tragedy and a determined absorption in the imminent danger. The categorical imperative of melancholia is to ‘act, think, feel in such a way as if the horrible fate that you have conjured up had already befallen you and was inevitable’. The main presupposition of melancholia-mania is to possess a prophetic insight, to be like God.

In the psychosis as in the neurosis, the intensified reference to the unchangeability of the weakness and sad destiny awaiting us, prove to he necessary in new and apparently difficult situations, professional decisions and tests of all kinds devised with the object of developing hesitation or abandoning a certain course.

What guides the man in melancholia is his fears, what makes his maniacal ideas ‘incurable’ is not the lack of intelligence or logic but the lack of desire, the methodical unwillingness to apply this logic. The patient will feel and even act illogically if he can

only in this way, and only by means of mania approach nearer to his goal and heighten his personality consciousness.

Helpless situations, an unusual degree of lack of interest in life evinced from early childhood, provocations, and an ostentatious lack of respect in the judgement of the world may lead to attempts at suicide as an extreme act of revenge for activity continually directed against one's own person.

Fear of lack of success, anxiety, competition or expectation of not being able to cope any longer with family relationships force this type in case of subjectively-felt trouble to resort to anticipating their ruin.

The melancholic viewpoint growing out of this self-absorption, which by reason of its purportive achievement in waking life and dreams always become more and more deeply rooted, and in its influences upon the whole organism, is the continual motive for a poorer functioning of the organs.

The early acquired deficiency of the social activity conditions that peculiar attitude of attack which, resembling suicide, proceeds from an injury inflicted upon one's self to threatening the environment or to acts of revenge.

The presupposition of all activity, the concealed reference to the importance of one's own person, expressed in the demand for the subordination, in the claim upon the services of others, is never absent. Since the insistence upon the guilt of others is likewise always present, the melancholic attitude thus establishes the fictive superiority and irresponsibility of the sick man.

The attitude of persons who are likely to succumb to melancholia is one of distrust and criticism of society from childhood on. in this attitude likewise we can recognise as one of the primary assumptions a feeling of inferiority with its compensation and a cautious search for superiority in spite of all statements to the contrary.

4

PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF SOEREN KIERKEGAARD

Soeren Aabye Kierkegaard cannot be considered as one who has left a consistent and cohesive body of thought. His career as a writer is so chequered that with each successive period his views underwent some changes until finally he had undergone a religious transformation. His emergence as a writer originated from a desire to explain his conduct to the particular individual whom he termed his reader. This reader was none other than the lady with whom he fell in love but did not bring that relationship to its logical conclusion. Hence his first literary Writing to which he also gave a philosophical undertone was a sort of apology but not of the run-of-the-mill type. He explained his conduct in a philosophical language.

We have already attempted to give a psychological explanation to the philosophy of SK. The symptoms of melancholia were expressed in so many of his works that perhaps it would not be an exaggeration or an affront to say that the writings of Soeren Kierkegaard, especially his 'aesthetic' writings are nothing but a person explaining his own conduct. But we are aware of the problem of such an assumption. All the Kierkegaardians the world over will immediately unite and brand our point of view as an affront to the philosopher. This will probably be a very narrow outlook also. The reason is that although SK composed these works as an apology, as an explanation to himself, to Regine and to

the people at large, these works have not remained a mere apology. In his role of a litterateur, he has also expressed his opinions on the world and the society he lived in, his career in literature, his view about the philosophers of his time. These discussions and explanations, his attitude towards life and humanity in general, his point of view about the contemporary society — in short his opinion about the world— have found expression in all his writings, be they philosophical, aesthetic or religious. And here, the necessity of our analysis arises; it is the necessity to posit him in the context of social, political and economic coordinates.

Our analysis has one primary objective — to understand what were the socio-economic and psychological reasons that led SK to compose these works. We have also tried to understand the chronological development of Kierkegaard's mind. Hence we will start our discussion with the early writings of SK and discuss some of the principal works in a chronological order.

Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est—Translated by T. H. Croxall, London, Adam and Charles Black, 1958.

This is the earliest philosophical work by Soeren Kierkegaard. Anti-Hegelianism, which was the most favourite theme of SK, finds expression here in a mixture of humour and serious philosophical arguments. Here Kierkegaard attempts to refute the philosophical postulate that 'modern philosophy begins with doubt'. Written in a unique un-philosophical story-telling fashion, the author relates the experiences that Johannes faces when he tries to interpret the meaning of the proposition that philosophy and specifically modern philosophy begins with doubt. He finds to his utter dismay that he cannot proceed with the enquiry which begins with doubt. He asserts that as soon as he begins with doubt he becomes a victim of the same philosophical fallacy which the philosophers after him will face. A later philosopher will begin with doubt about the philosophy of his predecessor the way he is beginning with doubt about his predecessor. Then in the history of philosophy no philosopher will remain unscathed because those coming after in succession will begin with doubt about their predecessors. Thus he puts forth the fallacy of this statement in an extremely hilarious manner.

In the same way he pierces the statement that modern philosophy begins with doubt. Here he questions modernity in relation to time. What is modern today will not remain modern tomorrow and the concept of modernity thus becomes relative. Nothing remains modern for eternity. Then how could one distinguish among modern, medieval and ancient; how could one say decisively that only that philosophy which is modern begins with doubt while the term modernity changes its meaning continuously with time?

Another statement: "One must have doubted in order to philosophise" is also scrutinised critically and eventually the statement succumbs to a fallacy of logic.

But this exposition which has taken into consideration only the subjective nature of the statement is itself a fallacy. The fallacy lies in the fact that Johannes has never gone into questions about what is philosophy, how philosophy is related to the individual and the society at large and what is the function of philosophy. Neither has he inquired what is modern about modern philosophy, and how doubt about the previous philosophy establishes the modern philosophy etc. And since the author himself is in confusion about what he wants out of a question and is only interested in the superficial question-answer, because he is reluctant to get to the crux of the matter, the reader is not fed on any real argument but only with superficial fallacies of logic. Anyone genuinely interested in the statement attributed to Hegel would have asked what is philosophy and what one doubts in the philosophy of the predecessor; what is called modern philosophy and what is

modern about it compared to the philosophy that preceded it and about what modern philosophy raises its doubt. Instead of going into these details SK has only derived some pleasure out of his play on words and fallacies of logic.

One does not expect that Kierkegaard would approach the whole proposition from a materialistic standpoint. But when one wants to refute Hegel's philosophy, one has to lay bare the philosophy of Hegel and then positing the factor of doubt one should attempt to find out an answer. If one has to refute Hegel, one has to proceed by doubting the Hegelian philosophy itself. Finding a logical fallacy does not serve the purpose of refutation.

An observation may be made at this stage about Kierkegaard's philosophical writings. In his philosophical works one does not find the serious exercise that is required either to establish a particular philosophy or to refute another. What one finds in them is a sort of subjective statement. Reasoning, which is one of the most important weapons of a philosopher, is seldom present in SK. As we will see, SK's important works are filled with personal accounts. He has tried to philosophise the episodes of his life. Beyond that he has not attempted and succeeded either. However, this work is some kind of an exception. While the first part is narrative, the second part is an attempt to say something in a philosophical language. And an explanation of this part will go a long way towards understanding SK's attitude to various questions of contemporary philosophy. Here it is present in an embryonic form which has been elaborated in his later works — of course in a different form.

As SK describes, after the devastating experience in his attempt to understand the logic of the statements, Johannes bade good-bye to these philosophers. He followed now the method that had hitherto been his wont, i.e., to make everything as simple as possible. Now Johannes discovered that that which evoked doubt in a person could be very different — it could be doubt's opposite, faith. This and similar other revelations led Johannes to discover why ideally doubt is possible in the mind or consciousness.

With this we come to the threshold of SK's philosophical thinking. But one important point has to be noted here and that is how SK totally side-tracked the real issue and instead of finding other methods to pursue the enquiry, went to the discovery of how doubt was possible in the mind or consciousness. This is a remarkable volte-face against philosophical enquiry. But since we are interested in SK's philosophical concept, this deviation from the main question might actually help us to gain an insight into his thought-process.

As in other idealist philosophers, we will find in Kierkegaard an inverted picture of the subject-object relationship. The same kind of inversion applies to the possibility of doubt in mind or consciousness. SK says that the possibility of doubt remains the same, however different the phenomenon may be that gives rise to doubt; for the fact that mind can doubt cannot be explained by the phenomenon that causes doubt; but it does explain, says SK (or Johannes) why the phenomenon has the repercussion it does. That which evokes doubt in the mind may be anything for all we know; if there was no prior possibility of doubt in the individual, nothing would be able to evoke doubt in the mind. Since, moreover, the phenomenon causing doubt may be variegated (including doubt's very opposite, faith), the possibility of doubting may be all embracing and essential to the human mind or consciousness. Two conclusions might emerge from the preceding discussion.

(1) It is not the phenomenon that causes doubt.

(2) The possibility of doubting is essential to the human mind or consciousness.

The above two conclusions bear out the promise that SK had an inverted perspective of the subject-object relationship.

Now Johannes turns his attention to 'mind or consciousness as it is in itself, viz. an instrument which explains all individual minds without itself being explained. One should read this statement of SK with caution. It is another tendency of idealism to go into generalization without individual experimentation, more into the abstract without the concrete. And what is this mind or consciousness in itself? Before answering this question he goes onto another query — 'cannot con-sciousness remain in immediacy?' he asks and replies that it cannot. Man would be an animal or dumb being in that case. If man could not speak he would remain in immediacy. Johannes thinks that this might be expressed by saying that immediacy is reality and speech is ideality. For when I speak, explains Johannes, I introduce opposition. If, for example, I want to explain the actual world which I perceive with my senses, then there is opposition. For what I see is quite other than what I express. Reality I cannot express in speech, for to indicate it I use ideality, which is a contradiction. Johannes' dilemma is the age-old dilemma of non-materialist philosophy. What I see is not the thing-in-itself. What I express about the phenomenon is different from what I want to express (double distortion). What I express may not be understood by the other the way I see and express it (third distortion). All these are the arguments of logic and fallacy on which idealist philosophers thrive.

According to Johannes, immediacy is reality, speech is ideality. Consciousness is opposition or contradiction. The moment I express reality by speaking, the opposition between my speaking and the reality or actuality I am talking about becomes apparent. For what I say is ideality. Johannes asserts then that possibility of doubt then lies in Consciousness whose essence is in contradiction or opposition. It is produced and itself produces a sort of duality (i.e., real/ideal). Consciousness implies collision and then contradiction inevitably appears, continues Johannes. Reality is not consciousness any more than ideality is. Consciousness is not present without both and this opposition or contradiction between reality and ideality is the origin and essence of consciousness. (This is the first pain of becoming.)

We do not want to go into further detail nor are we prepared to elaborately discuss the absurdity of these propositions. It would suffice to state that consciousness is the reflection of the reality. The contradiction between ideality and reality, speech and the objective world — as propounded by SK, has no relation to objective truth.

Now about Reflection; Johannes asked whether what he termed as consciousness was in fact usually referred to as Reflection. In this context, he fixed his definition thus: "Reflection is the possibility of relationship, consciousness is the relationship." The basic form (or essence) of consciousness is contradiction or opposition. He soon noticed what followed from this, viz. that the classifications made by reflection are always dichotomic (i.e. divisible into two); e.g. ideality and reality, soul and body, to recognise/the truth, to will/the God, to love/the beautiful, God/the world, and so on... these are some classifications of reflection. In reflection these impinge on each other in such a way that relationships become possible. The classifications of consciousness on the other hand are trichotomic (i.e. divisible into three) as indeed language itself indicates. For, when I say "I was conscious of such and such a sense-impression", I mention a trinity (I, consciousness, impression). Consciousness is spirit and the remarkable thing is that when in the world of spirit one is divided, it always becomes three and never two. Consciousness therefore presupposes reflection. If this be not so, it is impossible to explain doubt. This is Johannes's i.e. SK's conception about reflection.

Enough of philosophy! We could easily conclude our discussion by commenting that the second part where SK wanted to deal with real hard philosophy, he gave a good account of himself by dishing out age-old stuff. But we did not want to do that. Instead we thought that we should give our reader a feel of the philosophy that is considered by the bourgeois world as a unique contribution to the world of knowledge. As you have observed, except adding a comment or two here and there, we have reproduced SK's expressions in his own words. But we may conclude by saying that this contribution cannot even knock a brick off the edifice of Hegelian philosophy.

Fear and Trembling: A dialectical lyric — Translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA, 1952.

Fear and Trembling is a queer admixture of personal experience and philosophical postulates. The abrupt super-imposition of his personal 'tragedy' on his aversion to the Hegelian system has been carried all through in this book. The introduction itself is extremely significant — not so much for understanding SK's thoughts and inclinations as for taking note of the extreme anarchy in contemporary philosophy. The limitations that Hegel and Descartes had with respect to reason and logic and their ultimate submission to the authority of the church and state establishments rather strengthened SK's hands. Thus he could rightly exploit the opportunity by quoting Descartes:

"Remembering, however, as I have already said, that the natural light is to be trusted only in so far as nothing to the contrary is revealed by God himself.. . . Moreover, it must be fixed in one's memory as the highest rule, that what has been revealed to us by God is to be believed as the most certain of all things; and even though the light of reason should seem most clearly to suggest something else, we must nevertheless give credence to the divine authority only, rather than to our own judgement." (p. 4)

One can well understand that with this submission of Descartes to the establishment, the Cartesians and other rationalists in Denmark were very much cornered and they hesitated to refute the arguments of the theologians because, after all, the omnipotent God was there to nullify all the rationalists' conclusions. The limitation of the idealists and their schools of thought and this ultimate submission to God and His omnipotence gave the theologians and philosophers like SK the opportunity to question the whole modern philosophy that was based on reason and doubt. Hence the philosophy of reason and doubt propounded by Descartes and Hegel could be attacked both by the theologians and materialists. When at last Hegel also took total and complete refuge in God, Christianity and the Emperor, the theologians could posit him with their category of faith. Faith and belief, the two important blunting implements of religion could well be used against Hegel because after all he himself had sought refuge in them. Another queer thing also arose: even bishops and parsons who could not theoretically support the Hegelian philosophy that started with doubt could sport themselves as Hegelians for the simple reason that Hegel also had succumbed to obscurantism in the end. Martensen, who later became the Bishop Primate of Denmark is an example. Hence SK criticised the Hegelian system and its followers in an extremely caustic manner:

'I prostrate myself with the profoundest deference before every systematic "bag-peerer" at the custom house, protesting, "This is not the system, it has nothing whatever to do with the system." I call down every blessing upon the system and upon the Danish shareholders in this omnibus — for a tower it is hardly likely to become. I wish them all and sundry good luck and all prosperity.' (pp. 7-8)

While discussing the contents of 'Fear and Trembling' we will therefore take three distinct paths. We will show the development of SK's philosophical outlook — the

various categories that he introduces here. After Kant, philosophers of all sorts and shades tried to introduce categories to specify various phenomena. SK, therefore, following his predecessors, tried to categorise various stages of development of the self. Simultaneously, he has thrown comments against Hegel throughout this book. These comments will give us clues to the cause of his aversion to Hegel — social, economic and political. And lastly we will show how he has introduced his life-experiences within the body of his theological and philosophical categories. To do this properly, we will have to conduct our enquiry in line with the course of development of this book.

The Prelude describes with a little variation in detail, a Biblical story — that of Abraham, the father, sacrificing Isaac, his son, at the instance of God's command. Abraham, who believed in God and had complete faith in Him, took Isaac on ass-back and went to Mount Moriah where he sacrificed his only son, that too of old age, because God wanted it that way. But as he believed in God and had complete and unswerving faith in Him, he was again rewarded with Isaac. Thus, 'faith' is the supreme stage of human existence which Abraham reached. But today, says Silentio (the pseudonym of SK), philosophy has not offered even a category called 'faith'. The author now ponders over the whole episode of Abraham sacrificing Isaac and finds parallel to his own love-affair.

The author sarcastically asserts that it is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel, but to understand Abraham is a trifle. To go beyond Hegel (here he alludes to the contemporary Hegelians in Denmark) is a miracle but to go beyond Abraham is the easiest thing of all. 'I, for my part, have devoted a good deal of time', says the author, 'to the understanding of Hegelian philosophy. I believe also that I understand it tolerably well, but when in spite of the trouble I have taken there are certain passages I cannot understand, I am foolhardy enough to think that he himself has not been quite clear.' 'All this', continues SK, 'I do easily and naturally; my head does not miller from it. But when on the other hand I have to think of Abraham, I am as though annihilated. I catch sight every moment of that enormous paradox which is the substance of Abraham's life, every moment I am repelled, and my thought in spite of all its passion cannot get a hair-breadth farther. I strain every muscle to get a view of it—that very instant I am paralysed.' (p. 42)

The reason for extolling Abraham will soon be clear because, as we have said, here he runs the story of his love-affair parallel to the 'great deed' performed by Abraham. In this modern age he alone had the courage to sacrifice his beloved. But readers, please wait and read SK's own remark. Remembering that Abraham had reached the highest stage, i.e., faith which he did not attain but only reached the stage of infinite resignation, SK says, 'so if (in the quality of a tragic hero, for I can get no higher) I had been summoned to undertake such a royal progress to Mount Moriah, I know what I would have done. I would not have been cowardly enough to stay at home, neither would have I laid down or sauntered along the way, nor have forgotten the knife, so that there might be a little delay — I am pretty well convinced that I would have been there on the stroke of the clock and would have had everything in order to get through with it sooner. But I also know what else I would have done. The very instance I mentioned the horse, I would have said to myself, "Now all is lost, God requires Isaac, I sacrifice him, and with him my joy — yet God is love and continues to be that for me; for in the temporal world God and I cannot talk together, we have no language in common." Perhaps oneor another in our age will be foolish enough, or envious enough of the great to want to make himself and me believe that if I really had done this, I would have done an even greater deed than Abraham; for my prodigious resignation was far more ideal and poetic than Abraham's narrow-mindedness. And yet this is the greatest falsehood, for my prodigious resignation was the

surrogate for faith, nor could I do more than make the infinite movement, in order to find myself and again repose in myself. In that case I would not have loved Isaac as Abraham loved. That I was resolute in making the movement might prove my courage, humanly speaking; that I loved him with all my soul is the presumption apart from which the whole thing becomes a crime, but yet I did not love like Abraham, for in that case I would have held back even at the last minute, though not for this would I have arrived too late at Mount Moriah. Besides by my behaviour I would have spoiled the whole story: for if I had got Isaac back again, I would have been in embarrassment. What Abraham found easiest, I would have found hard, namely to be joyful again with Isaac; for he who with all the infinity of his soul, proprio motu et propriis auspiciis, has performed the infinite movement (of resignation) and can do more, only retains Isaac with pain. (pp. 45-7)

The reader will observe how the two stories run parallel to each other. Even the dilemma of getting back Isaac, not in the other world, but in this one, is being spelt out. This also clearly shows that unlike Abraham, SK or Silentio was prepared from the very beginning not to take the affair to its logical conclusion. Philosophising on the greatness of Abraham has at last brought this aspect to the forefront. This corroborates our psychological hypothesis.

Now SK recounts still more directly what had happened. A young swain falls in love with a princess, (the whole content of his life consists in this love), and yet the situation is such that it is impossible for it to be realised, impossible for it to be translated from ideality into reality. The slaves of paltryness, the frogs in the life's swamp, will naturally cry out, "Such a love is foolishness. The rich brewer's widow is a match fully as good and respectable." Let them creak in the swamp undisturbed. It is not so with the knight of infinite resignation; he does not give up his love, not for all the glory of the world. He is no fool. First, he makes sure that this really is the content of his life and his soul is too healthy and too proud to squander the least thing upon an inebriation. He is not cowardly, he is not afraid of letting love creep into his most secret, his most hidden thoughts, to let it twine in innumerable coils about every ligament of his consciousness — if the love becomes the unhappy love he will never be able to tear himself loose from it. He feels a blissful rapture in letting love tingle through every nerve, and yet his soul is as solemn as that of the man who has drained the poisoned goblet and feels how the juice permeates every drop of blood — for this instant is life and death. So when he has thus sucked into himself the whole of love and absorbed himself in it, he does not lack courage to make trial of everything and to venture everything. He surveys the situation of his life, he convokes the swift thoughts, which like tame doves obey his every bidding, he waves his wand over them and they dart off in all directions. But when they all return, all as messengers of sorrow and declare to him that it is an Impossibility then he becomes quiet, he dismisses them, he remains alum: and then he performs the movements. If what I am saying is of any significance, it is requisite that the movement come about normally. So far the first thing, the knight will have power to concentrate the whole content of life and the whole significance of reality in lone single wish. If a man lacks this concentration, this intensity, if his soul from the beginning is dispersed in the multifarious, he never comes to the point of making the movement, he will deal shrewdly in life like the capitalists who invest their money in all sorts of securities, so us to gain, on the one what they lose on the other — in short he is not a knight." (pp. 57-60)

Now, we come to the most important of all revelations, the meaning of all of SK's philosophical categories, the essence of his religiosity — though expressed with some sort of pretension. Here we will discover his reasoning as to why he cancelled his engagement with Regine. But one point should be noted in this context.

As a symptom of melancholia, he has tried to give expression to his suffering. He says, "The deeper natures never forget themselves and never become anything else than what they were. So the knight remembers everything, but precisely this remembrance is pain, and yet by the infinite resignation he is reconciled with existence- Love for the princess became for him the expression for an eternal love, assumed a religious character, was transfigured into a love for the Eternal being, which did, to be sure, deny him the fulfilment of his love, yet reconciled him again by eternal consciousness of its validity in the form of eternity, which no reality can take from him. Fools and young-men prate about everything being possible for a man. That however is a great error. Spiritually speaking everything is possible, but in the world of the finite there is much which is not possible. This impossible, however, the knight makes possible by expressing it spiritually, but he expresses it spiritually by waiving his claim to it. The wish which would carry him out into reality, but wrecked upon the impossibility is now bent inward, but it is not therefore lost neither is it forgotten. At one moment it is the obscure emotion of the wish within him which awakens recollections, at another moment he awakens them himself; for he is too proud to be willing that what was the whole content of his life should be the thing of a fleeting moment. He keeps his love young and along with him it increases in years and in beauty." (pp. 61-2)

Now he alludes to Regine's engagement to Schlegel. He writes, "There was one who also believed that he had made the movement; but lo, time passes, the princess did something else, she married — a prince let us say — then his soul lost the elasticity of resignation. Thereby he knew that he had not made the movement rightly; for he who has made the act of resignation infinitely is sufficient unto himself." (p. 63)

From the above discussion it is apparent that the author wants to distinguish between his stage of development with that of Abraham. The stage of development of the author is that of infinite resignation. But the stage of development of Abraham is still higher — he belongs to the stage of faith. Explains SK, "The infinite resignation is the last stage prior to faith, so that one who has not made this movement has no faith; for only in infinite resignation do I become clear to myself with respect to my eternal validity and only then can there be any question of grasping existence by virtue of faith." (pp. 65-6)

For the same love-affair, the knight of faith performs further movements; "Now we will let the knight of faith appear in the role just described. He makes exactly the same movements as the other knight infinitely renounces claim to the love which is the content of his life, he is reconciled in pain; but then occurs the prodigy, he makes still another movement more wonderful than all, for he says, '1 believe nevertheless that I shall get her, in virtue, that is, of the absurd, in virtue of the fact that with God all things are possible! The absurd is not one of the factors which can be discriminated within the proper compass of understanding; it is not identical with the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen. At the moment when the knight made the act of resignation, he was convinced, humanly speaking, of the impossibility. That was the result reached by the understanding and he had sufficient energy to think it. On the other hand, in an infinite sense it is possible, namely by renouncing it; but this sort of possessing is at the same time a relinquishing and yet there is no absurdity in this for the understanding continued to be in the right in affirming that in the world of the infinite where it holds sway, this was and remained an impossibility. This is quite as clear to the knight of faith, so the only thing that can save him is the absurd and this he grasps by faith. So he recognises the impossibility and that very instant he believes the absurd, for, if without recognising the impossibility with all the passions of his soul and with all his heart, he should wish to

imagine that he has faith, he deceives himself and his testimony has no bearing, since he has not even reached the infinite resignation." (pp. 66-7)

Contrary to all sorts of explanations that biographers and writers on SK arc prone to give, the book under discussion with all its eategories is but an explanation to justify the actions of SK vis-a-vis Regine. In fact, all of SK's inventions of categories and stages, are primarily related to this affair and the explanation that he gives to Regine and the world is intended to show his innocence. All these works are tied as though by a common thread; that he was not guilty of breach of promise; what he did was in pursuance of higher goals, divine commandments. And to establish that he has brought forth the story of Abraham who was ready to sacrifice to God his only son of his old age. If he can elevate the stature of Abraham still higher, it makes the explanation of his conduct still easier. He therefore invents two stages of development — that of Infinite Resignation and of Faith. Faith is the higher category but Infinite Resignation is also quite high. He has reached this stage and is constantly trying to reach the higher category of faith. This serves two purposes. First, he can establish that what He did was not a breach of promise; he has done so at God's bidding. Second, that it was a religious transformation in him to reach the category of faith, that he has sacrificed his most precious possession in that process. He is hence in the process of religious development. On the other hand (and here he takes the opportunity to attack the girl), the beloved who also had promised that she would never get married, had broken her promise and got married, say to a prince. People at large would say that SK was guilty of breach of promise, but to God it is clear who had really broken the promise. Not SK in the least, although she moved the world with her tears and everyone who heard her side of the story of woe has sided with her. But this does not deter SK from placing the things in their right perspective, "But by my own strength I am not able to get the least of the things which belong to finiteness, for 1 am constantly using my strength to renounce everything. By my own strength I am able to give up my princess and I shall not become a grumbler, but shall find joy and repose in my pain; but by my own strength I am not able to get her again, for I am employing all my strength to be resigned. But by faith, says the marvellous knight, by faith I shall get her by virtue of the absurd." (p. 71)

Till now we have only covered one-half of the book. The pages that follow endeavour to draw out "from the story of Abraham the dialectical consequences inherent in it, expressing in the form of *Problemata*, in order to see what a tremendous paradox faith is, a paradox which is capable of transforming a murder into a holy act well-pleasing to God, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no thought can master, because faith begins precisely there where thinking leaves off." (p. 78)

How can one justify the deeds of Abraham and those of Soeren? If only this can be proved that both of them had a higher goal to achieve, anyone committing an injustice may involve those higher goals and justify the misdeeds. Any riffraff, any murderer could then take the advantage of this argument. Hence SK tried his best to console himself and convince the readers of his innocence. But if things could be prophesized, if other characters of Greek mythology could be brought to bear witness to or serve as parallels to what SK did, perhaps he could justify his own actions. Hence reader, please prepare yourself to plunge into SK's philosophy. But beware! All this philosophising has only one goal — that of self-justification.

SK writes, "Conceived immediately as physical and practical, the particular individual is the particular which has its telos in the universal and its task is to explain itself constantly in it, to abolish its particularity in order to become the universal. As soon as the individual would assert himself in his particularity over against the universal he sins,

and only by recognising this can he again reconcile himself with the universal. Whenever the individual after he has entered the universal feels an impulse to assert himself as the particular, he is in temptation and he can labour himself out of this only by abandoning himself as the particular in the universal" (p. 79). But if this is the case then both Abraham and SK are lost because both of them have flouted the norms of the universal. By universal standard Abraham would be a murderer and SK a deceiver. And then all would be lost. But did not the pseudonym Silentio refer to faith which led Abraham to sacrifice his own son? Did not Silentio deliberate about the Infinite Resignation of SK (the knight of Infinite Resignation)? So now we arrive at that philosophical proposition by which both Abraham and SK can be saved. This motif of the individual will later be amplified by SK as his unique contribution to philosophy. SK writes, "Faith is precisely this paradox that the individual as the particular is higher than the universal, is justified over against it, is not subordinate but superior yet in such a way be it observed that it is the particular individual who, after he has been subordinated as the particular to the universal, now through the universal becomes the individual who as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. This position cannot be mediated, for all mediation conies about precisely by virtue of the universal' it is and remains to all eternity a paradox, inaccessible to thought. And yet, faith is this paradox-—or else (these are the logical deductions which I would beg the reader to have in *mente* at every point, thought it would be too prolix for me to reiterate them on every occasion) there never has been faith ... precisely because it always has been. In other words Abraham is lost" (p. 82). This superiority of the individual over the universal is not a question of mediation, it is not dependent on the criticism by the universal of the individual. The individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. That is, no one can question the validity or justification of the deeds of the individual because the individual is only answerable to God. One can now understand the logic of this apparently incomprehensible statement. But SK has justified his action thus: he has done it out of his allegiance to divinity and the mortals of the universal have no right to question the justification of his faithfulness towards or betrayal of Regine. And this has been very succinctly expressed by SK thus: "Why Him did Abraham do it? For God's sake and (in complete identity with this) for his own sake. He did it for God's sake because God required this proof of his faith; for his own sake he did it in order that he might furnish the proof. The unity of these two points of view is perfectly expressed by the word which has always been used to characterise the situation: it is a trial, a temptation (Fristelse). A temptation — but what docs this mean? What ordinarily tempts a man is that which would keep him from doing his duty, but in this case the temptation is itself the ethical ... which would keep him from doing God's will" (p. 89).

While discussing the life of SK. and his distorted psyche we pointed out that one of the symptoms of melancholia was to elevate one's self to the stature of demi-god. We have already discussed that this is due to the complex of inferiority which makes victims shirk their responsibilities and hinders the pursuit of normal human relationships. We have also mentioned that SK's writings, especially the 'aesthetic' ones, abound in reference to his personal vacillations and justifications for it. 'Fear and Trembling' corroborates our observations.

SK asks himself a question which he answers in the affirmative — "Is there such a thing as an absolute relation to God?" — and he answers, "The paradox of faith is this that the individual is higher than the universal, that the individual (to recall a dogmatic distinction now rather seldom heard) determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, not his relation to the absolute by his relation to the universal.

The paradox can be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty toward God; for in this relationship of duty the individual as an individual stands related absolutely to the absolute. So when in this connection it is said that it is a duty to love God something different is said from that in the foregoing; for if this duty, is absolute, the ethical is reduced to a position of relativity. From this, however, it does not follow that the ethical is to be abolished, but it acquired an entirely different expression, the paradoxical expression — that, for example, love to God may cause the knight of faith to give his love to his neighbour — the opposite expression is that which ethically speaking is required by duty" (p. 105). Hence by paradox of faith, the individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute without the mediation of the universal. It is because of duty towards God that Abraham and SK performed the acts of sacrificing Isaac and Regine respectively. They could not realise the universal but what they did was ethically right. Here the individual stands higher than the universal. And this category of individual the bourgeois critics extoll as a unique category — the very human category. This is the sort of philosophical category presented by Kierkegaard.

Then SK undertakes to justify the theory of sacrifice. He writes, "The absolute duty may cause one to do what ethics would forbid, but by no means can it cause the knight of faith to cease to love. This is shown by Abraham. The instant he is ready to sacrifice Isaac, the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac. But if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not require this, for Cain and Abraham are not identical. Isaac he must love with his own soul; when God requires Isaac he must love him and if possible even more dearly and only on this condition can he sacrifice him; for in fact it is this love for Isaac which by its paradoxical opposition to his love for God, makes his act a sacrifice. But the distress and dread in this paradox is that, humanly speaking, he is entirely unable to make himself intelligible. Only at the moment when his act is in absolute contradiction to his feeling is his act a sacrifice, but the reality of this act is the factor by which he belongs to the universal and in that respect he is and remains a murderer" (pp.111-12). Reader, please substitute Regine for Isaac and you have the justification and torment in SK.

Was Abraham ethically defensible in keeping silent about his purpose before Sarah, before Eleazar, before Isaac? It is with this question that SK opens the issue. It is important to note that the pseudonym used by SK as the author of 'Fear and Trembling' is Johannes de Silentio, i.e., Johannes the Silent. To understand the reason why this question was asked, one would do well to refer to the whole episode of the love-affair with Regine. We have already noted how SK began to vacillate from the very beginning. At first he was obsessed that it was the curse from heaven that had befallen him and his family. Then he became obsessed by a sense of guilt and atonement. And finally he was obsessed with the notion of sacrifice. He himself was a sacrifice to God to atone for the guilt of his father; then his fiancee had to be sacrificed at the altar of God. We also noted while discussing SK's psychology that the symptoms of melancholia include evasion of responsibility. SK was constantly haunted by his own deed and sought to furnish a justification for it. As we have already observed, most of his works are written to justify himself before his own conscience and the public at large including the 'individual' who had suffered most due to his idiosyncrasies.

Thus by opening the issue he has sopken his mind out after, of course, traversing through the zig-zag of philosophy — individual and universal, ethics and aesthetics. He argues that whereas it would have been ethical to have expressed his intention to sacrifice, in the specific case as the individual is higher than the universal and there is an absolute relation with the absolute, it was equally ethical that Abraham did not express

his intention of sacrificing Isaac; it was God's wish I hat he was carrying out. Not content with the philosophical exposition, SK went ahead to explain his conduct by referring to a few more instances.

Take for example the story of the political disturbance at Delphi which was provoked by a question of marriage. When the augurs foretold the bridegroom that a misfortune would follow he suddenly changed his plan at the decisive moment when he was supposed to fetch his bride — he would not get married. This must have confused the bride and her relatives and friends. But did the bridegroom do anything wrong? No, for he was guided by a divine oracle and because of the absolute relation that he had with the absolute, mediation was unnecessary.

Then Johannes tells another story about Agnes and a merman. This story does not have a direct relevance to the central theme. It is rather a confession. The merman entices Agnes when she was bathing in the sea. It decides to abduct her with evil intention. But when the merman saw that Agnes had no inkling of its evil intentions and trusted it in all her innocence, its intention was defeated. The evil was subdued and she was back on the shore unscathed. It is apparent that SK alludes to his own intention vis-a-vis Regine.

The third story resembles the first. It is about Sarah and Tobias. Sarah was an unfortunate woman because she had lost seven husbands on the wedding nights for whoever came to marry her was killed by a demon who loved Sarah. Her eighth husband, Tobias, addressed Sarah as his sister on the wedding night and asked her to join him in a prayer to the Lord. This story can be understood if we consider that SK had the same misgiving regarding his own marriage and that is why he wanted to attain his goal by 'virtue of the absurd'.

The preceding observations must have given our readers a fairly good idea of the mind of Soeren Kierkegaard. 'Fear and Trembling' like 'Repetition' is also — from beginning till the end — an apology to Regine. But whereas in Repetition, the anger could not be contained, here it is pacified to a great extent. The critics on Kierkegaard, David F. Swenson and Walter Lowry, have isolated the contents from the general Kierkegaardian psychology and introduced the subject from a 'philosophical' angle. But any serious student of philosophy, who is not likely to be overwhelmed except by the merit of argument and exposition will admit that as philosophy this book does not merit any attention. But for psychological clues to SK's life the book is of great help because, we have already mentioned, a definite symptom of melancholia — to think of oneself as a demigod — has clearly emerged from this book.

Repetition Translated by Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, USA, 1946.

'Repetition' was written by Soeren Kierkegaard simultaneously with 'Fear and Trembling', during May-October 1843 and was published simultaneously on the same day, October 16,1843.1twas written under a pseudonym. The author termed this book as 'an essay in experimental psychology'. The content of this book consists of a story in which the pseudonymous author Constantin Constantius meets a young man and becomes his counsellor in an unhappy love-affair. When we have gone into the details of this work, we will find that the story is an autobiographical one. We will find also clues to the working of SK's mind when he fell in love with Regine and later broke off with her. This book was reviewed after its publication by J. L. Heiberg who praised it for its "pretty and telling" passages. As in 'Fear and Trembling' here also SK used some of the Biblical characters and referred to Greek philosophy to substantiate his views. A particular

passage quoted from his Journal will give the readers some idea about his position and frame of mind while writing this book:

"If I had faith I should have remained with Regine…. I have begun a story entitled 'Guilty/Not Guilty'. It naturally will contain things capable of astonishing the world. . . . But I cannot and will not. My relationship to her shall not be poetically volatilized, it has an entirely different reality. She has not become a theatre-princess, so if possible she shall become my wife. O Lord God, that indeed was my only wish and yet I had to renounce it. ... Faith hopes also for this life – but mark well, by virtue of the absurd, not by virtue of human wisdom" (Journal, May 17,1843).

Not content with Heiberg's review SK wrote a letter in the name of Constantin Constantius. There he gave something of a sort of philosophy which he claimed was behind the writing of the book. Needless to repeat that his argument was based on some queer 'philosophical' foundations. All said and done, the fact remains that he had written the book only as a consequence of his love affair. It was an expression of his anguish. It acted more as a safety valve than the expression of a new philosophy. True, there are philosophical statements. But they were brought forth to give a philosophical garb to his raw feeling and as a means to console himself. The passage quoted above is representative of his self-contradictory position. In the beginning he writes that he wants to get married to Regine; he expresses the belief that faith also hopes for her in this life and then again, as if to correct himself, he says that he wants to get her by 'virtue of the absurd'. We have discussed this self-contradiction, this duality, this uncertainty and the reason behind them. It should be emphasised here that like 'Fear and Trembling', 'Repetition' is also autobiographical in nature, with the only difference that the author has split himself into two personalities, one the counsellor Constantin Constantius and the other, the amorous young man. In fact, one does not need to delve very deep into the work to understand that it is a dialogue between two distinct parts of his own self.

"I have been engaged, at least occasionally, with the problem whether a repetition is possible and what significance it has, whether a thing gains or loses by being repeated" (p. 3) writes SK. It may seem strange to us how SK got hold of this particular term to give a philosophical tinge to his own problem of unhappy love. But before discussing his own problem, he philosophizes: "At home I had almost been brought to a standstill by the problem. Say what one will, it is sure to play a very important role in modern philosophy; for repetition is a decisive expression for what 'recollection' was for the Greeks. Just as they thought that all knowledge is recollection, so will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition…. Repetition and recollection are same movements only in opposite directions …"(p. 3). And then SK explains the meaning of repetition. How frantically he was searching for this philosophical movement only to translate it into his own life is apparent when he wrote, "the love of repetition is only happy love. Like that of repetition, it has not the disquietitude of hope, the anxious adventurousness of the discoverers, nor the sadness of recollection; it has the blessed certainty of the instant. Hope is a new garment, starched and stiff and glittering, yet one has never had it on and hence one does not know how it fits. Recollection is a discarded garment, which beautiful as it may be, does not fit, for one has outgrown it. Repetition is an imperishable garment, which fits snugly and comfortably, neither too light, nor too loose. Hope is a charming maiden that slips through the fingers, recollection is a beautiful old woman but of no use at the instant, repetition is a beloved wife of whom one never tires" (p. 4). Thus the direct relationship between repetition as a philosophical movement and SK's love-affair becomes apparent.

As to how repetition is viewed as a way of life SK describes: “When one has circumnavigated existence, it will appear whether one has courage to understand that life is a repetition and is inclined to delight in it. He who has not circumnavigated life before beginning to live will never come to the point of living; he who circumnavigated it but grew tired had a poor constitution; he who chose repetition really lives” (p.5). His whole psychological reaction against getting married is thus being philosophised so that by ‘repetition’ one can get what one has lost in real life

It may seem strange to our readers why we ought to take this trouble to lay bare SK’s philosophical attitude which is nothing but a peculiar admixture of distorted psychology and Greek and Biblical parables. In Repetition he has not at least portrayed himself as a martyr. Our intention is to present to the readers the essence of SK’s works, The reader might have heard so much about Kierkegaardian existentialism. He will discover that this philosophy of existentialism as contained in SK’s works is in fact a neurotic’s self-justification. One will also discover that SK always wants to find support in the Biblical parables and this has been done in several ways. While in Repetition this had been done by challenging God with the help of the anecdote of job, in ‘Fear and Trembling ‘this has been done by complete submission to Faith. The religiosity of SK and his psychological inhibitions against marriage led him to philosophise and explain his conduct through the same religious ethics which would have accused an ordinary man of being unfaithful and committing breach of promise.

Opposition to Hegel and his philosophy originally stems from his background. In Repetition he tried to contradict Hegel in a rather naive manner. SK. wrote, ‘Repetition is a new category which has to be brought to light. If one knows something of modern philosophy and is not entirely ignorant of the Greek, one will easily perceive that precisely this category explains the relation between the Eleatic school and Heraclitus and that properly it is repetition which by mistake has been called mediation” (p. 33). In the Hegelian philosophy mediation is achieved between thesis and synthesis by antithesis. SK does not accept Hegel’s position and thinks that he has wrongly understood the Greeks. There is no doubt that SK could not and did not understand the tremendous revolutionary potential of Hegel’s philosophy and because of his conservative views opposed him tooth and nail. Because of Denmark’s proximity to Germany some important and powerful Danish intellectuals and theologists sported themselves as Hegelians. Kierkegaard was also opposing them. Hegel, as we know, had supporters both in the extreme left and the extreme right. Those in the right accepted that part of Hegelian philosophy which preached infallibility of the state and the king. Those in the left accepted the Hegelian dialectics which considered nothing permanent and unchanging. In Denmark, SK was not even in favour of a status-quo. He wanted a backward move that would re-establish the Christian austerity. Against Hegel he states, “It is incredible how much fuss has been made about mediation in the Hegelian philosophy and how much foolish patter has under this caption enjoyed honour and repute. One would do better to subject mediation to a searching explanation and so render a little justice to the Greeks. Their treatment of the doctrine of ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’, their treatment of the ‘instant’ ‘non-being’ etc. trumps Hegel” (p. 33). Now we come to another aspect of Hegle’s logic that infuriated SK. He writes, “Mediation is a foreign word, repetition is a good Danish word and I congratulate the Danish language upon having a good philosophical term” (p. 33). This is not a mere elation for the richness of the Danish tongue but it also indicates a deep-rooted national feeling. His well-known position of being ‘Danish at heart’ explains two things: (1) that the excessive cultural influence of Germany presupposes an equally tormenting German superiority of might that led to war in 1848; and, (2) the feudal

Danish kingdom was being threatened by the bourgeoisie of both German and Danish descent. SK's remark implies that philosophically he was opposing Hegel and his concept of mediation and politically he was opposing the German and Danish capitalist interests that wanted to overthrow feudalism.

SK continues, "In our time no explanation is forthcoming as to how mediation comes about, whether it results from the movement of the two factors or in what sense it already is contained in them or whether it is something new which supervenes and if so, how. In this respect the Greek reflection upon the concept kinesis which corresponds to the modern category of transition deserves the utmost attention" (p.34). One can understand from the above that SK did not understand the essence of Hegelian philosophy. Otherwise he would not have been at a loss as to how 'mediation comes about'.

Regarding the dialectic of repetition (needless to mention that he has borrowed the term 'dialectic' from Hegel) he writes, "The dialectic of repetition is easy; for what is repeated has been, otherwise it could not be repeated, but precisely the fact that it has been, gives to repetition the character of novelty. When the Greeks said all knowledge is re-collection, they affirmed that all that is has been; when one says that life is repetition, one affirms that existence which has been now becomes. When one does not possess the categories of recollection or repetition, the whole of life is resolved into a void and empty noise. Recollection is the pagan life-view, repetition is the modern life-view; and at the same time the interest upon which metaphysics founders; repetition is the solution contained in every ethical view, repetition is a condition sine qua non of every dogmatic problem" (pp. 33-4). The Part I thus establishes repetition as the modern life-view.

In part II the author seeks to draw a bridge between modern philosophy (which according to him is repetition) with the Biblical anecdote of job. Now Job is significant. Job was the Biblical figure who revolted against God but at last won his love. SK writes, "The problem which baffles him is neither more nor less than repetition. He is quite justified in not seeking light upon the problem either from modern philosophy or from the Greek; for the Greeks perform the opposite movement and in this case a Greek would prefer to recollect, unless his conscience were to frighten him and modern philosophy makes no movement, generally it only makes a fuss and what movement it makes is always within immanence whereas repetition is always a transcendence" (p. 93-4). This is the view of Constantin Constantius who is giving lessons to the love-lorn young man. Constantin says, "It is fortunate then that my friend is not seeking enlightenment from any world-renowned philosopher or from any professor publicus ordinarias; he has recourse to an unofficial thinker, a private practitioner ... he takes refuge in Job who does not cut a figure in a university chair and with reassuring gestures vouch for the truth of his thesis but also sits among the ashes and scrapes himself with a potsherd and without interrupting this manual labour lets fall casual hints and remarks. Here he thinks he has found what he sought..." (p. 94). Thus we find a smooth transition from modern philosophy to theology a la Kierkegaard.

Previously, in continuation with his praise for Job, Constantin Constantius was expressing his inability to make a 'religious movement'. A religious movement is one by which one can transcend from the sphere of the ethical to a higher stage. The religious movement is, according to SK, the highest form of movement by which a person enters the ultimate category of human existence —i.e. with God. But Constantin declares that he is unable to make this movement. Job, however, protested against God but ultimately won him. How could he do that? "The explanation is that the whole thing is a trial of probation. This explanation, however, suggests new and unresolved difficulties which I have endeavoured to make clear to myself in the following way. Science does indeed deal with

and explain existence, including man's relation to God. But what science is there of such a sort that it has place for a relationship defined as probation which when conceived in the light of the infinite does not exist, but exists only for the individual? Such a science there is not and there possibly cannot be. Moreover, how does the individual get to know that it is a trial of probation? The individual who has any conception whatever of an existence in thought and a being of consciousness readily perceives that this is not so quickly done as said nor so quickly over as it is said, nor so quickly grasped as it is said. First the occurrence in question must be clarified by abstracting it from the cosmic connection and receive a religious baptism and .a religious name; then one hast to present oneself for inspection before the tribunal of ethics and then comes the expression 'trial'. Before this movement the individual did not exist by virtue of thought. Every explanation was then possible and the whirlpool of passion was let loose. Only the men who have no conception or an unworthy conception of living by virtue of spirit are in this respect quickly done with it; they have a half-hour's reading with which to console men, just as not a few philosophical apprentices have a hasty result to offer" (pp. 128-29). One can find the embryo of Kierkegaardian existentialism in the above quotation. First, the whole thing is a trial of probation — the trial which he believes he is undertaking. This 'category' is entirely innovated by him to give expression to the ordeal he is going through. Then he defines the category which when conceived in the light of the infinite does not exist but exists only for the individual. Here he is, in a subtle way, referring to the distinct Individual aspect of the trial. "The individual who has any conception whatever of an existence in thought and a being of consciousness readily perceives that this is not so quickly done as said … the occurrence in question must be clarified by abstracting it from the cosmic connection and receive a religious baptism and a religious name; then one has to present oneself for inspection before the tribunal of ethics and then comes the expression trial. Before this movement the individual did not exist by virtue of thought." SK or rather Constantin Constantius is aware that what is being prescribed can always be misused. Hence only one who is capable of letting oneself be tried takes the steps as mentioned above, only in that case can he consider himself to be worthy of being admitted for trial. The existence of the individual, as distinct from the universal, gets thus qualified. But even there the conception has not been made very clear. We will find that this is further developed in 'Fear and Trembling', where he establishes the Individual's distinction from the universal. But one thing needs to be emphasised at this stage. That is, for SK, the whole idea was to portray himself as an exception who can, even ethically, break the engagement only to gain the lost love through repetition. This is very Important.

"This category", writes SK, "trial of probation is neither aesthetic nor ethical, nor dogmatic, it is entirely transcendent. Not until it is known to be trial could a place be found for it in a dogmatic work. But so soon as this knowledge is at hand, the elasticity of trial is weakened and the category is really a different one. This category is absolutely transcendent and places man in a purely personal relationship of contradiction to God, in such a relationship that he cannot rest content with any explanation at second hand. The fact that a great many people have this category ready at once at every occasion, the gruel needing, only to be heated, merely proves that they have not comprehended it- The man who has a well-developed consciousness of the world has a very long detour to make before he reaches this category. Such was the case with Job who proves the breadth of his conception of the world by the firmness with which he is able to eschew all crafty ethical evasions and cunning wiles" (pp. 130-31). Any further information seems superfluous except for the one that this category places man in a purely personal relationship of contradiction to God. Undergoing this trial of probation, Job comes out with flying colours. "The tempest above raged themselves out — the thunderstorm is past — Job has

been reproved before the eyes of men — the Lord and Job understand one another" (p. 132). And as a consequence of it Job stands blessed and receives everything in double.

"Did Job lose his case? Yes, eternally; for he can appeal to no higher court than that which judged him. Did Job gain his case? Yes, eternally ... for the fact is that he lost his case before God" (p. 133). Thus the example of Job does not totally condone SK's guilt. This indicates his incessant prick of conscience. He now feels that he can be pardoned. The very next moment, he considers himself guilty. But at last he opts to round off the discussion. He writes, "So then there is such a thing as repetition. When does it come about? Well, that is not so easy to say in any human language. When did it come about for Job? When all conceivable human certitude and probability pronounced it impossible. Little by little he loses everything; therewith hope vanishes gradually in proportion as reality, far from being mollified, makes heavier claims upon him. In the sense of immediacy all is lost" (p. 133). This is not said only in the case of Job. It is an auto-biographical expression. SK's torment, anguish, inhibition against marriage, and above all the breach of trust that he has committed does not give him peace even if he has found justification by claiming himself to be an exception. After returning to the 'repetition' that the youngman experiences, we will point out SK's view on the 'exception' that he considered himself to be. The following quotation is from the young-man's letter to his adviser. He writes, "I am again myself. This self which another would not pick up from the road, I possess again. The discord in my nature is resolved. I am again unified. The terrors which found support and nourishment in my pride no longer enter in to distract and separate. Is there not then a repetition? Did I not get everything doubly resolved? Did I not get myself again precisely in such a way that I must doubly feel its significance? And what is a repetition of earthly goods which are of no consequence to the spirit — what are they in comparison to such a repetition. Only his children Job did not receive again double, because human life is not a thing that can be duplicated. In that case only spiritual duplication is possible, although in the temporal life it never is so perfect, as in eternity, which is true repetition" (p. 144).

By 'repetition' then the youngman gets back doubly in spirit what he has lost in real life. This is the consolation that SK derives. But in real life he was experiencing a heart-rending pain and subsequently when the girl got engaged to another person, the limits of his endurance were overrun. Condemned by friends and relatives, despised by Regine and criticised and ridiculed by everybody around, the lone man was now desperately in need of a theory, a theory of being an 'exception' who could not be judged by the temporal standard of the lesser mortals. Hence the philosophy of exception becomes one of the pet themes which he elaborates in this book. He writes '… it is expecting too much of an ordinary reviewer to suppose that he might have an interest in the dialectical struggle by which the exception breaks away from the universal, in the prolix and very complicated procedure by which the exception fights his way through and asserts himself as a justified exception - for the unjustified exception is recognised precisely by the fact that he wants to get around the universal... on the one side stands the exception, on the other the universal, and the strife itself is a strange conflict between the wrath and the impatience of the universal at the hubbub the exception causes…. If heaven loves one sinner more than ninety-nine just persons, the sinner doubtless does not know this from the beginning; on the contrary, he is sensible only of heaven's wrath until at last he, as it were, compels heaven to speak out." (pp. 151-3). The message is clear. He is not an unjustified exception who wants to get around the universal like a thief or a murderer. The exception has to be judged properly so that one must not think that because he is an exception, his misdeeds will also be pardoned. Not so: a justified exception does not get away from

something for which. the universal will be condemned. Rather only posterity absolves him. His behviour towards Regine should not be considered as a breach of trust. He should be judged in a special way for it is as painful to him as it is to the girl. Because he shirked his duty, should he be condemned? No. He should be judged the way an exception is to be judged from this idea of exception emerged his later thesis of the individual.

Such an exception is a poet. He represents the transition to the more properly aristocratic exceptions, namely, the religious exceptions. people generally rejoice over such a man and his productions. The allusion is more than clear. The youngman who is none but SK himself j is a poet and Constantin who is the counsellor for the youngman establishes the case in favour of the youngman. The youngman, i.e., I SK, is a poet, a poet is an exception and hence SK is an exception. J And as an exception he should not be judged in the usual way. He I should be specially treated.

"A poet's life begins in conflict with the whole of existence. The gist of it is to find an appeasement for a justification for in the first conflict he must always be defeated and if he is bent upon triumphing at once, he is an unjustified exception . . . poet finds justification precisely in the fact that existence absolves him at the instance when he •, would as it were annihilate himself. The soul now gains religious tone. This is what really supports him, although it never gets to the point of breaking through. ... He explains the universal as repetition and yet he himself understands repetition in a different sense; for while reality becomes repetition, yet for him his own consciousness raised to the second power is repetition.

"If he had a deeper religious background he wound not have become a poet. Then everything would have acquired for him religious significance." (pp. 155-7)

The above statement explains SK's justification of himself.

The Point of View: Translated by Walter Lowrie Oxford University Press, 1939

Critics of Kierkegaard have held in high esteem the philosophical category of the 'individual'. In the background of a devastated Europe at the end of the Second World War, bourgeois philosophers and thinkers were shocked at the loss of life and property and recalled those thinkers of the previous century who had defended the existence of the human individual. And the Kierkegaardian idea of the 'individual' found ready adherents in post-war Europe and America. These thinkers equated the war with the advent of science and technology and so welcomed Kierkegaard's concepts of faith and emotional autonomy. Quite suddenly, as it were, the unknown Dane became a very well-known personality in Germany and France, England and America. Of course, Kierkegaard's writings had been translated into German long before the First World War and his English translations had begun to appear at the beginning of the twentieth century. But while previously he used to be read in a small circle of academics and theologicians, in the post-war period his readers became more numerous and to them he stood as the founder of modern existentialism.

But the fame and glory bestowed upon him, particularly by philosophers like Heidegger and Sartre, were not so much for the concrete contribution that Kierkegaard made to the philosophy of existentialism but, we believe, as due to a misconception about the real nature of the Kierkegaardian categories. We have already analysed some of the aesthetic works of Kierkegaard and found the origin and development of many of the categories propounded by him. Here we will discuss his category of the 'Individual'.

Kierkegaard posits 'individual' and 'crowd' as the two opposite poles - the individual being the truth and the crowd, untruth. Says he, "crowd' is the untruth. In a godly sense it

is true, eternally, Christianly, as St. Paul says, that 'only one attains the goal' —which is not made in a comparative sense, for comparison takes others into account. It means that every man can be that one, God helping him therein - but only one attains the goal. And again this means that every man should be chary about having to do with 'the others', and essentially should talk only with God and with himself—for only one attains the goal. And this means that man, or to be a man is akin to deity" (p. 113). Now, this is SK's conception about the truth of the individual. One may recollect that in 'Fear and Trembling' he was preaching an absolute relation with the absolute where the individual stands higher than the universal. This is but an echo of the previous concept.

SK, understanding the absurdity of his position explains, "In a worldly and temporal sense, it will be said by the man of bustle, sociability and amicableness, 'How unreasonable that only one attains the goal : for it is far more likely that many, by the strength of united effort, should attain the goal; and when we are many success is more certain, and it is easier for each man severally'. True enough, it is more likely; and it is true also with respect to all earthly and material goods. If it is allowed to have its way, this becomes the only true point of view, for it does away with God and eternity and with man's kinship with deity. It does away with it or transforms it into a fable, and puts in its place the modern (or, we might say the old pagan) notion that to be a man is to belong to a race endowed with reason, to belong to it as a specimen, so that the race or species is higher than the individual, which is to say that there are no more individuals but only specimens" (p. 113).

He refutes the modern and hence the pagan view thus, "where there is multitude, a crowd, or where decisive significance is attached to the fact that there is multitude, there it is sure that no one is working, living, striving for the highest aim, but for only one or another earthly aim; since to work for the eternal decisive aim is possible only where there is one, and to be this one which all can be is to let God be the helper — the 'crowd' is the untruth" (pp. 113-4).

It may not immediately be possible for the reader to understand why SK wants to elevate the individual in opposition to the crowd or multitude. But we will soon see, apart from the reason that the individual is higher than the universal — his pet theme of 'aesthetic works' — there is a deep political reason which by invoking the name of God he wanted to conceal but could not do so quite successfully. He says, "The crowd is untruth. Hence none has more contempt for what is to be a man than they who make it their profession to lead the crowd. Let someone approach a person of this sort, some individual — that is an affair far too small for his attention and he proudly repels him. There must be hundreds at the least. And when there are thousands, he defers to the crowd, bowing and scraping to them. What untruth! No, when it is a question of single individual man, then is time to give expression to the truth by showing one's respect for what it is to be a man; and if perhaps it was, as it is cruelly said, a poor wretch of a man, then the thing to do is to invite him into the best room, and one who possesses several voices should use the kindest and most friendly. That is truth. If on the other hand, there were an assemblage of thousands and more, and the truth was to be decided by ballot, then this is what one should do (unless one were to prefer to utter silently the petition of the Lord's Prayer, 'Deliver us from evil'): one should in godly fear give expression to the fact that the crowd regarded as a judge over ethical and religious matters, is untruth, whereas it is eternally true that every man can be the one. This is truth" (pp. 115-6).

From the garb of religiosity, then, one can understand why SK is in favour of the individual as opposed to the crowd. It is because as a politically conservative person, he was deadly against all democratic principles. The 'crowd' in his terminology is nothing

but the majority in a democratic system. By invoking and extolling the greatness of the 'individual', he was giving his opinion in favour of monarchy and authoritarianism. As we have discussed earlier, the message of democracy was greatly influencing the minds of the Danish thinkers and most of them, a number of churchmen included, could not ignore the forces of logic and history. The newly-freed serfs demanded equality. The cottars and landless labourers as well as the workers of trade and commercial establishments did the same, and the bourgeoisie gave expression to their demands. This meant an end of monarchy in Den-mark, Politically opposed to democracy and equality, the descendant of a line jutland shepherds, now an intellectual of Copenhagen, SK weilded his pen with all his might against this ungodly ideology. In the preface to the work presently under discussion, he writes: "No politics ever has, no politics ever can, no worldliness ever has, no worldliness ever can, think through or realize to its last consequences the thought of human equality. To realize complete equality in the medium worldliness, i.e. to realize it in the medium the very nature of which implies differences and to realize it in the worldly way ie., by positing differences such a thing for ever is impossible, as it appears from the categories. For if complete equality were to be attained, worldliness would be at an end. But is it not a sort of obsession on the part of worldliness that it has got into its head the notion of wanting to enforce complete equality and to enforce it by worldly means — in a worldly medium? It is only religion that can, with the help of eternity, carry human equality to the utmost limit — the godly, the essential, the non-worldliness the true, the only possible human equality. And therefore (be it said to its honour and glory) religion is the true humanity" (Preface 109-10)

One could interpret these lines as an exaggerated expression of religiosity on the part of SK if we did not have other evidences which suggested to the contrary. He was definitely opposed to the concept of equality, fraternity and liberty — the great messages of the French Revolution. We will come to this point later on in this chapter after we have fully exhausted our analysis of the category of 'individual'.

Apart from the 'crowd' which is untruth SK has other categories of untruth of which the daily press stands at the top in terms of his abhorrence for various untruths. Says SK, "A crowd is untruth. And I could weep or at least I could learn to long for eternity, at thinking of the misery of our age, in comparison even with the greatest misery of bygone ages, owing to the fact that the daily press with its anonymity makes the situation madder still with the help of the public, this abstraction which claims to be the judge in matters of 'truth'. For in reality, assemblies which make this claim do not now take place. The fact that an anonymous author by the help of the press can day by day find occasion to say (even about intellectual, moral and religious matters), whatever he pleases to say, and what perhaps he would be very far from having the courage to say as an individual; that every time he opens his mouth (or, shall we say, his abysmal gullet?) he at once is addressing thousands and thousands; that he can get ten thousand times ten thousand to repeat after him what he has said — and with all these nobody has any responsibility, so that it is not as in ancient times the relatively unrepentant crowd which possesses omni-potence, but this absolutely unrepentant thing, a nobody, an anonymity, who is the producer and another anonymity, the public, sometimes even anonymous subscribers and with all this, nobody, nobody!" (p. 118)

Here, of course, there is a personal association for SK. The Corsair affair which suddenly made him an object of public ridicule must have contributed to this bitter criticism of the press. But apart from this, SK was always against any sort of scientific advancement. There are many instances which can throw light on this queer aspect. But one example may be cited here — the discovery of stethoscope. He wrote that this

scientific discovery would at last reach every barber of the town and they would know how to use it. Similarly, he was aghast with the discovery of the modern printing press. His argument was that the new machine would rob the select few of their privileges. The public — the man in the street, the barber, scavenger, worker, cottar — what right do they have to intrude into the intellectual, material as well as spiritual delicacies of the 'gentleman' and make it a mundane affair.

The only sensible passage regarding the category of crowd is the following: "The crowd, in fact, is composed of individuals; it must therefore be in everyman's power to become what he is, an individual. From becoming an individual, no one, no one at all, is excluded except he who excludes himself by becoming a crowd. To become a crowd, to collect a crowd about one, is on the contrary to affirm the distinctions of human life. The most well-meaning person who talks about the distinctions can easily offend an individual. But then it is not the crowd which possesses a power, influence, repute and mastery over man, but it is the individuous distinctions of human life which despotically ignore the single individual as the weak and impotent, which in a temporal and worldly interest, ignore the eternal truth — the single individual." (p. 121).

The extreme polarity that he attributes to man and mankind, single human individual and the human society will corroborate our proposition that his ex lolling of the individual does not stem from a progressive strand of logic but essentially from a conservative attitude towards newly emergent political thinking when age-old beliefs of monarchy, autocracy, benevolent dictatorship were being discarded by the people and a conscious democratic attitude was taking shape. Contrary to his argument that the crowd was brainless robot at the service of the leader, it was for the first time in recent history of mankind that people were participating in movements as conscious human individuals unified by the demand of a common goal. The dawn of capitalism saw a new awakening among the people which was unknown in the past. Isolating the individual from the masses, praising the individual and condemning human society, SK evinced his self-pride and arrogance.

While in a machine-dominated civilisation, an individual becomes a cog in the wheel, a part of a huge set-up and is reduced to an Orwellian number, the situation was quite different in the early periods of capitalism when even the term 'crowd' was progressive because it manifested a sort of awareness among the people who crowded together for a common goal. According to Kierkegaard, mass movements of all sorts were to be discarded. Majority rule in a democratic set-up was to be decried. The thinkers who welcomed the Kierkegaardian category of the individual did that at a developed stage of capitalism when it was necessary to salvage the individual from the masses at the service of capital. But when Kierkegaard was initiating this category of the individual, the concept of democracy was at its Infancy, there was practically no industrial development in Denmark, and capitalism was synonymous to mercantilism. As all philosophical thoughts should be judged in the context of time, in which they are produced, it can be said that Kierkegaard and his category stood against time, for reaction and for the values of the past.

In a 'supplement' to 'On my work as an author' Kierkegaard writes, "With regard to the 'established order', then, seeing that my special concern was 'The Individual' which was the point of my polemic against the numerical, the crowd etc., I have done the very opposite of attacking it; I have never been in or with the 'opposition' which wants to get rid of the 'government' nor have I been allied with it; but I have furnished what may be called a 'corrective', the intent of which was: for God's sake let us continue to be ruled by those who are appointed and called to this task, and that they should stand fast in the fear

of God, willing only one thing, the Good. And thereby, I have managed to fall out with the opposition and the public and have encountered once in a while the disapprobation of one or another (perhaps not well-informed) official of the bureaucracy. Insofar as the church establishment understands itself, it will in the same degree understand also the last book, namely, Training in Christianity, as an attempt to provide an idealist support for the establishment. In the first instance, I did not wish to speak out directly, as I do here (what as a matter of fact the Preface expresses directly by expressing how I understand the book) in order, in the interest of the truth, not to spare myself in the fact of a situation which probable or improbable, was always a possibility; in order not to evade the difficulties and dangers which might arise if the establishment were to undertake to convert my communication into opposition — which would have prompted serious misgivings about the state of the establishment's health. Thank God, this did not occur, however. Yet, it is quite possible that some well-informed office-bearer — to whom the fact that I have no official position was in itself reproach enough— might have perpetrated the ludicrous folly of rushing forward to defend and shield the establishment, so long as it understands itself.

"In '48 the strands of web of worldly wisdom broke. The shrill rasping note which announces chaos became audible! 'This was the year '48, it stood for progress.' Yes … if only a 'government' is consolidated. For that perhaps, not a single new official is necessary, nor the discharge of any old one, but perhaps an inward transformation which would consolidate the state in fear of God. The fault from above was clearly this, that throughout the government, taken as a whole from top to bottom, the strength relied upon was essentially worldly shrewdness, which essentially is nothing more than the lack of strength. The fault from below was that they wanted to get rid of government, that is to say punishment. But the punishment fits the crime, and the punishment now is that the want most bitterly felt at this time is simply the want of a government. Never as in our century was the race and the individual within it (the ruler and the ruled, the superior and the inferior, the teacher and the taught, etc.) so emancipated from all restraint (so to call it) due to the idea that there is something which unconditionally stands fast. Never has the race and the individual within it discovered so deeply that the race itself and every individual within it needs and craves to have something which unconditionally stands fast. Never have 'opinions' (the most heterogeneous, in the most various fields) felt themselves, under 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' so free, so unhampered, so fortunate, with the rule of go as you please which is expressed in the motto 'upto a certain point'." (pp.162-73)

Christian Concepts of Soeren Kierkegaard

The Christian concepts of Kierkegaard have marked parallels with the experiences of his own life. And here also lies the clue to his existential thoughts. Fortunately for SK, the peculiar and distorted view of life, or rather his complexes, developed throughout his life, his inability to take important decisions in life and his sufferings, pessimism, etc. arising out of these, had a resemblance with the sufferings and martyrdom of early Christianity starting with the life and death of Jesus Christ and carried through in the torture, persecution, and execution of the slaves under the Roman Imperial rule. And so SK could fight tooth and nail on the basis of New Testament with the Christian establishments of his time. All his Christian discourses including his famous attack against the established church may be explained in this light.

We have already discussed how SK detested the advent of science and technology which was hurling death blows at the last remnants of theological superstitions. We have

also described how SK detested the new industrial capitalism that was advancing at a great speed in England. France and Germany. And we have also noticed his marked preference for things ancient when faith reigned supreme. The new order of things where even those at high places in the clerical hierarchy were Hegelians themselves and carried out the task of introducing Hegelian concepts in Denmark shows that a section of the church was collaborating with the exponents of change because, like the missionaries of the early days of colonialism who used to accompany the conquistadores to convert the subdued into Christianity and also had an enormous share in the loot, they had a direct interest in the new capitalist order. And hence we find a marked difference between Christian concepts preached by the clerics — not in content but in emphasis — and SK's predominant theme of suffering for a cause, for sacrificing in this world to be doubly rewarded in the other, of leading an ascetic life.

The deep personal reasons to which he gave a religious appearance right from his very early writings, the escape sought in religion to justify his own activities, etc. slowly took a turn for the religious. In the beginning a sort of personal philosophy with inconsistent religious undertones took the better of him. But with the passage of time, this j personal philosophy was on the wane and a more religious attitude towards life became prevalent. But this religious attitude was in opposition to the merry-go-happy life of Christendom at his time and had j a remarkable parallel with his own life and suffering and this made his discourses lively, polemical and controversial. Hisliterary gifts, and study of philosophy and theology gave a unique flair and style to his presentation of Christian thoughts. His own sufferings were his primary assets. Various categories of religiosity he had developed in his early writings and he raised himself to the stature of a reformer as his writings in Instant and Fatherland show. He had also referred to Luther with whom he liked to be compared.

SK wanted a return-journey into the past feudal era, the good old days when the bourgeois attitudes had not 'polluted' the Christian concepts, an era marked by austerity in life and simplicity in the manners of enjoyment. For this reason we find in his Christian discourses an attack on the role of money that 'contaminates' the clerical order; money — the all-pervasive denomination that cuts across the social fabric.

As this new role of money, to his utter dismay, got the better of the society, it made all social establishments, including the church, vulnerable. Personal comforts, financial flexibility, sexual satisfaction, hob-nobbing with the Novo-riches, support for Hegelianism — all these got on his nerves and filled the pages of his discourses. His attacks were pungent and became more and more harsh and vehement.

Money and its possession develop distinct social strata which was unthinkable in the feudal context. It makes transparent the barriers of family, status, education, profession, etc. It makes social prestige, personal comforts, royal favour and matrimonial choice uppermost in a man's mind. In Denmark, the society was slowly transforming into a capitalist one. And SK's writings express definite views about various social, economic and political aspects. His view about Christianity as discussed in the Discourses, if read in the proper socio-economic context, and his marked preference for passion, belief, etc. would throw new light on the contents of the 'discourses'. Here one would discover a man interpreting Christianity with the experience of his life, his unique sufferings and complexes and self-justification with the help of religion and the Holy Book. Besides that, one would also discover the class viewpoint he has expressed in all its subtle ramifications. For this reason what we have analysed about his understanding of life and philosophy will find its corroboration in the Christian Discourses and other religious writings because, after all, Christian viewpoints also have a unique logic to be understood

with reference to the socio-economic context. As a Luther was necessary to express concern about the state of his time, so was SK needed to give expression to the feelings of a society in the throes of a change that was ushered in by the advent of science, technology and the industrial revolution. The changing social relationships, the change in the value system, changes to be wrought in the agrarian system, the chicanery practised by the feudal powers, etc. all found expression in these theological writings. The duel fought in the name of religion for and against Hegelianism was in fact a battle between two social forces finding their expression in two spokesmen of the respective ideologies and thus between their respective economic interests.

The year 1848 was extremely significant. That SK appeared in the battlefield then is also significant. That he decided to launch the attack against the church in his own name by abandoning the previous pseudonyms was also equally significant. The significance of all this will be rightly understood if the economic, social and particularly the political developments of Denmark of 1848 are seen in the right perspective, The personal reasons also should not be overlooked since SK had to suffer a great financial loss due to the devaluation of bonds as a result of war with Germany in 1848.

The doctrine of the newly emergent capitalism laid emphasis on the enjoyments in the temporal life, comforts, pleasure and freedom. As an opponent to the capitalist system, SK wanted to move backward, return to the golden past and even laid more stress on the life beyond. Viewed in this light, even this concept of Kierkegaard and his 'existen-tialism' was a political stand. Capitalism demands a free labour force which is not attached to the land. Capitalism demands competition, not the kind of stagnation that was characteristic of the feudal era. Capitalism demands reason, not blind faith and belief. Capitalism demands development and utilization of new scientific and technological discoveries. Capitalism demands profit. Capitalism demands action and work; not the lazy afternoon stroll and gossip. In short, capitalism demands a fast, challenging life pregnant with hope for the future. Capitalism also demands extinction of the individual in preference to the crowd. Capitalism demands faceless human bodies that will work and produce. Capitalism demands a working community in the service of the machine. It demands man in the form of a machine capable of handling other machines. The whole concept of SK's philosophy is opposed to all this. SK demands an ascetic religious order. SK demands the existence of status-conscious human individuals. That is why he is opposed to the crowd. That is why he is opposed to journalism. Journalism invests the man in the street with the right and the power to know and Comment.

SK demands abolition of the power of money to purchase the clerics. True, in his Discourses on Poverty and Riches, like a true Christian he has only made distinction on the basis of religious devotion. True, he himself was not rich. Yet, he detested the crowd, the man in the street, the barber who talks on philosophy. In short, SK detested everything that capitalism had brought forth. His Christian writings thus abound with his class viewpoints.

Economic, Political and Social Thoughts of Soeren Kierkegaard

In the light of the analysis of the preceding chapters, it is now possible to comment on the thoughts of Soeren Kierkegaard and try to understand what historical role he played in his time, that is, in the Denmark of mid-nineteenth century. In the very beginning of this treatise, we have outlined the state of affairs in Denmark in Soeren's time as also the links she had with the nations of Europe, Asia and America. Let us now recapitulate the salient points: First, Denmark in Soeren's boyhood had just experienced the decline of a

flourishing trade with the East and West Indies. Secondly, thorough land reform, the revolution in France and the industrial revolution in England made their impact felt in the Danish society. Thirdly, the philosophical revolution in Germany brought about by Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, etc. had divided the Danish intelligentsia. Fourthly, abolition of serfdom and rise in Danish capitalism had almost made the nation ready to plunge into the modern times. In this socio-economic background, how did Kierkegaard express himself?

(1) As we have noticed, Soeren Kierkegaard, from his early childhood, showed apathy towards science and technology. Even as a school boy, in a letter to Wilhelm Lund he had expressed his opinion about the truth of science and religion. This thought that scientific truths were empirical was not confined to his childhood fancy alone but grew to formidable proportions in his later years. The increasing number of innovations from science and technology that were revolutionising almost all aspects of man's life were to him like the advent of a demon out lo disquieten the peaceful life of private man. The printing press with its capacity to print thousands of copies of daily newspapers seemed to him a great curse. Irresponsible journalism of that nameless, faceless reporter without any duty towards public good (he was obsessed against yellow journalism and in his rage equated it with all kinds of journalism and finally his wrath fell upon the printing press like that of those English workers who destroyed their machines as they thought that the machines were responsible for their miseries) seemed to him a curse produced by science. His prediction that within some time even a barber would wear a stethoscope and while shaving his customer, would do a brisk business by stethoscoping him may seem lo us ridiculous today but this amply illustrates his dislike for science.

(2) Side by side with his apathy for science and technology and a corresponding inclination towards religiosity, there existed in him a deep-rooted political conservatism. Even as a student, he had sided with the forces of the establishment and adjourned a students' union meeting. In his later life, he had shown his interest in maintaining the political status-quo, expressing thereby that he was in favour of monarchy. He used to visit the King and was almost always in the good book of the establishment. The revolution of 1848 that sought to curb the powers of absolute monarchy and constitute a parliament and a constitution was vehemently opposed by him. He could not even tolerate Grundtvig and his followers. The message of the French Revolution — Liberty, Equality and Fraternity — not only carried no meaning for him, he was in fact against any sort of equality in this world.

(3) But on the other hand, he was a devout patriot. This will be evident from his love for the Danish language. In an eloquent passage extolling Denmark, Copenhagen and the Danish language, he said that instead of basking in the glory of other languages, a Dane should take due cognizance of the richness of the Danish language because it was rich enough to bring to fruition any idea be it literary or philosophical. His opposition to Hegel and other German philosophers though originated primarily from his stand against reason and logic, it had the undertone of patriotism. He counterposed his philosophy against Hegel's system as Danish patriotic philosophy against the German imperial philosophy. In his later writings, especially in his books of religious writings, he had harped on this theme again and again.

This is one of the most positive aspects of Kierkegaard's writings. A mystic, conservative philosopher, his patriotism was so pronounced that in the ultimate analysis, one cannot brand him as an incorrigible reactionary. In modern terminology he may be categorised as an exponent of patriotic feudalism, i.e., that section of the feudal elements

who in spite of their conservatism would ultimately support those forces that are anti-imperialist in character.

(4) As we have already discussed, his religious teaching was in favour of early Christianity, with its discipline, rigour and asceticism. His crusade against Christendom and the church establishment in Denmark is reminiscent of Luther's fight against the established church and its laxity, corruption and opulence. And hence there is also another role that he played. He unmasked the utter lack of ethics and morality of the church establishment. Just as the teachings of the French Revolution and other national and international events were hurling deathblows at the feudal system in Denmark, Kierkegaard also lent a helping hand towards dismantling a part of the feudal establishment — the church. Thus though a religious fanatic who can he considered to be belonging to that section of the ruling classes who were in favour of status-quo, yet his writings of the maturer years and his articles in *Instant* superseded that aspect and helped expose to the people the real character of the established church. Just as the railways built in India by the British not only helped them to consolidate their power in India and centralize and systematize the machinery of exploitation, but also gave birth to the Indian working class who would ultimately dislodge the whole structure of foreign exploitation, so also did the writings of Kierkegaard ultimately help the Danish people unmask the real face of the Christian establishment. Therefore, although he himself was a reactionary, he rendered positive service towards un-folding the potential for progress of the Danish society. Perhaps here lies the 'dialectics' of Kierkegaard's writings. And in this role he had marked resemblance with Luther, the father of Protestantism. Writes Professor R. H. Tawney in his *Religon* and the Rise of Capitalism:

"A society may perish by corruption, as well as by violence. Where the peasants battered, the capitalist mined; and Luther, whose ideal was the partiarchial ethics of a world which, if it ever existed, was visibly breaking up, had little mercy for the slow poison of commerce and finance as for the bludgeon of revolt. No contrast could be more striking than that between his social theory and the outlook of Calvin. Calvin, with all its rigour, accepted the main institutions of a commercial civilisation, and supplied a creed to the classes which were to dominate the future. The eyes of Luther were in the past. He saw no room in a Christian society for those middle classes whom an English statesman once described as the natural representative of the human race. International trade, banking and credit, capitalist industry, the whole complex of economic forces, which next to his own revolution, were to be the mightiest solvent of the medieval world, seem to him to belong in their very essence to the kingdom of darkness which the Christian will shun. He attacks the authority of the Canon Law only to reaffirm more dogmatically the detailed rules which it had been used to enforce. When he discusses economic questions at length, as in his Long Sermon on Usury in 1520 or his tract *On Trade and Usury* in 1524, his doctrines arc drawn from the straitest interpretation of ecclesiastical jurisprudence, unsoftened by the qualifications with which economists them-selves had attempted to adapt its rigours to the exigencies of practical life."

Here, in the above quotation, if we replace Luther by Kierkegaard and suitably substitute the Christian Discourses in place of 'sermons on trade and usury', we will get the views of SK without changing anything in the content. Yet Luther is considered by history as a reformer, and so can we view SK. In spite of all his personal beliefs, his attack on Christendom did sound the death-knell of feudalism and clerical establishment

BOOK TWO
MARTIN HEIDEGGER

1
RISE OF THE REICH : A HISTORICAL SKETCH FROM CHARLEMAGNE TO HITLER

The expansion of the empire under Charlemagne had distributed the German race over the adjoining lands of what constitute Germany today. The passage of one thousand years and the formation of various empires that took place over the centuries though changed the political maps of the German-speaking people, the national question had all through remained a problem. Hence, all German thinkers of any significance, whatever their philosophical leanings, had then pondered over the German national question and the problem of unification of the Germanic people. While the chauvinists and imperialists wanted to achieve this national unity over the body of the other races, the liberals, Marxists and other radicals wanted to achieve this goal by attaining economic, political and cultural emancipation. However, there was present an urge for unity among the German people which was being exploited by the various interest-groups to execute their narrow parochial designs. Hence, to understand the work of Heidegger, it is necessary to delve into that part of the German past that is invoked by the philosopher himself. Our study of the German history will, therefore, be limited to understanding this specific region of the German mind.

Charlemagne and German national existence

Historians declare that though the German national state is new, the consciousness of the German nationality is quite old. A German national character had evolved during the past one thousand years. Though the Germans residing in various parts of Europe differed from each other in various aspects of life, there was an invisible link that bound each group with the other, and this was the unmistakable thread of nationality. They were one German people ruled differently by different monarchies of central Europe. By the time of Charlemagne, the Germans had settled down. From then on, their history was being shaped by unchanging geographical conditions.

For a thousand years also, the Germans could identify themselves with a political form. The Reich, the oldest political organisation in Europe, was founded by Charlemagne in 800 AD. and since then there remained a continuity of this political organisation. When the old Reich was dissolved in 1806, it was replaced by the Confederation of the Rhine and then by the German Confederation of 1815. But this continuity of the Reich is also characterised by two apparent paradoxes for, most historians maintain, at no time before 1933, did the political energies of the German people find their sole outlet in the Reich; for most of the thousand years, more political energy went into maintaining German states independent of the Reich, or even hostile to it, than into the Reich itself. Secondly, at no time did the Reich coincide with the national existence of the German people; it has always either carried its frontiers far beyond the German national boundaries or failed to include all German people within its limits. This, of course, means that after Charlemagne the concept of the Reich was not identical with the political map of Germany. It was more a social and political concept that united all Germans speaking the same language and inheriting the same culture than a mere political organisation.

But the empire that Charlemagne founded set the tone of the German imperialist history. The Imperialists did not merely intend to form a German national state. They claimed to form a 'universal empire'. All empires — universal or not — are bound to exist on the basis of exploitation and subjugation of other peoples as well as exploitation of the lower strata of its own people. The German empires, throughout the ages, were based on the ruthless exploitation of the Slavs, Poles, Czechs and others.

From the time of Charlemagne this concept of a superior race had pervaded the very ethos of the German imperialist culture. Modern German mind was both disturbed and agitated by the innumerable divisions of Germany into a number of kingdoms and principalities and felt a tickle of the national pride in invoking those days of the German race when it had reached the pinnacle of power and glory. To most of them it seldom occurred that even the Reich of Charlemagne was founded on ruthless force and exploitation.

Charlemagne claimed that his empire was universal. By the fifteenth century the Empire acquired the dubious title of "The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" — an obvious contradiction in terms it both gave and denied the Germans a national existence. The Reich was the greatest of feudal organisations and the German nation with the title included only the great feudatories, the secular and ecclesiastical princes and the free cities. Throughout the middle ages, the Emperor and the great feudal lords were locked in an unending struggle—the emperor seeking to reduce the size and strength of the feudal lords and the feudal lords straining to gain more independence. This struggle for subjugation and independence ultimately resulted in relative independence of the feudal lords. There also took place another unceasing tussle for power — the one between the Emperor and the Pope. These overt and covert struggles also helped the great feudatories to maintain their relatively independent existence.

The position of the Emperor remained theoretically elective, though certain great families established a hereditary series; and the greatest of them, the Hohenstaufens might well have established a real monarchical power in Germany had it not been for the distractions of their Italian adventures and the resultant conflicts with the Papacy.

AT the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Imperial status was reduced to a mere title and the princes, out of a desire to have a more powerful monarchical line, offered the Imperial crown to the Habsburgs who had dropped out of the running about two hundred years ago. The Habsburgs were the greatest masters in contracting matrimonial alliances and within the next two centuries, their successful deals practically surrounded princely Germany on all sides. Charles V, who was elected emperor in 1519, hemmed Germany with his family possessions The Netherlands on the North-West, Burgundian lands on the West, Milan on the South and the reversion of Bohemia and Hungary on the South-East. In addition, he was King of Spain and thus could draw on the wealth of the West Indies and Latin America for subduing the German princes. The time for a showdown against the recalcitrant feudal lords seemed to have come. Within Germany everything called for national unification. The peoples both to the East and West of Germany, challenged by Imperial claims, had in answer created their own national states. France and England on the one side, Poland, Hungary and Bohemia on the other proclaimed the end of the middle ages and thus spurred the Germans on to achieve unification. In fact, the task was easier for the Germans than many other nationalities. It was the strength of the newly emergent mercantile capitalists of the urban trading centres that had clipped the wings of the feudal lords; where the urban trading centres were weak, as in Poland, the feudal lords could not be effectively dislodged.

Germany, at this time, was the life-line of the European commerce and her towns towered over all others in prosperity. Indeed the national unification of other peoples sprang not only from their resistance to the German Emperor but also from their resistance to the German commercial supremacy. The trade for Europe originated at various ports of Italy — especially Venice and was carried through the Rhine which almost bifurcated the huge land-mass of Europe. Thus on both sides of the Rhine, there emerged the trade-centres. These cities of the Rhine and of the Hanseatic League were the 'Germany' — the Germany that had given birth to the 'Burgher' civilisation, the Germany that led the world in trade and commerce. This Germany, proudly conscious of its national existence, now seemed eager for destruction of feudalism and the achievement of national unification.

But this was thwarted due to some sudden turn of events. The most important of these was the opening of the Cape route to India. It ruined Germany almost overnight and destroyed the confidence of the burghers. From being the centre of world's commerce, Germany became, within a generation, an economic backwater. The overseas markets passed to others; her great trade-centres shrank considerably in significance, and all this was no temporary phenomenon. For three hundred years at a stretch the Germans remained dumped in this gloom while her neighbours-France and England, Italy and Holland, prospered steadily. No trading community in modern Europe has ever experienced such a profound and lasting disaster as did the German middle classes just at the moment when their financial power was at its highest and their national consciousness fully asserted, just at the moment when from a dominant economic power, they were becoming a dominant political power.

During the first two decades of the sixteenth century, Germany was a nation of great wealth and high culture — self confident and the standard bearer of Rennaissance. The high watermark of this great age, historians assert, was the creation of a national and reformed religion, expressed in the enthusiasm for Luther and his movement, which swept over Germany in 1519 and 1520. Napoleon once said that if the Emperor Charles V had put himself at the head of the German Protestantism in 1520, he would have created a united German nation and solved the German question. But the failure, it has been argued, was more than personal: if the German development had continued at its previous rate, it would have created a united nation even against the Emperor and his universalist ideas. But the German impulse nagged with disastrous suddenness but no less rapidly than in Luther himself. The Peasants' Revolt of 1525 frightened Luther and transformed him from an inspiring popular leader to a mystic devoid of all wordly concern. Luther had hastily to decide whether by the 'German Nation', to which he had appealed, he meant the German people or merely the established authority — the Princes. He decided in favour of the latter and turned into a defender of exploitation and repression. The Luther who spoke against the peasants spoke for a Germany whose markets had collapsed. For another three hundred years the German national question remained unresolved.

Bismark and the Reich

1. From a Germany fragmented and torn apart with the Austrian Habsburg monarchy on one side and the Junker-dominated militarist Prussia on the other and the independent princely states enveloped in a loosely-knit confederation, it became by the end of 1870s one of the greatest powers in Europe. If the credit for this success has to be given to any single individual, then it should go to Bismark, the Prime Minister of Prussia. After three hundred years, Germany was again restored to its old glory. And it was the Second Reich established under William I. In the pages that follow, we will try to draw a sketch of how

this was achieved. For a German bourgeois thinker in the 1920s, then, the Second Reich might seem to be a continuation of the past — a history intercepted no doubt — but above all, a logical culmination and an optimistic indication to the future. Thus one could afford to forget a few hundred years that passed without any glory, one could forget hopelessness of the present day and look forward to the future with confidence. Let us therefore turn those pages of history that would help us understand in the proper perspective the meaning of 'Being and Time.'

The revolution and counter-revolution in Prussia and Austria are the most significant events of German history in the middle of the nineteenth century. Although counter-revolution triumphed over the forces of revolution and extinguished for the time being the political ambition of the bourgeoisie, monarchies had to relinquish a portion of their power and the constituent assemblies had regained some of its lost ground — at least in Prussia — by 1870s. This point of time marked the ascent to power of Bismark.

The conflict of King and Parliament in Prussia came to a head when Roon, the then Minister of War, wanted to increase the size of the army and sought sanction for an increased budget. He had also some far-reaching objectives like weeding out the radicals and members of the middle class from the officers' corps predominantly staffed with the reactionary Junkers. The Parliament agreed to the proposal for increased expenditure for the army, but for a single year, that is, 1861. In 1862, the same issue cropped up and Parliament refused to grant the extra expenditure. William I was afraid that an impasse would be created and was getting ready for abdication. But Roon convinced him to appoint Bismark as the Prime Minister with the hope that the new incumbent might be able to handle the situation better. On September 22,1862, Bismark became the Prime Minister of Prussia.

Bismark, on assuming office, ignored the directions of the Parliament, carried out the reforms and imposed the necessary taxes. He commented that he was taking advantage of a 'hole' in the Constitution which stipulated that the King and Parliament would discuss issues of legislation but did not say what would happen if they disagreed. The real power being in the hands of the King who controlled the army, the legislators and constitutional experts had no other alternative but to deliberate on the finer points of the Constitution. This was Bismark's first victory on the home ground.

Bismark's first achievement in foreign policy was the consolidation of the Russo-Prussian friendship over the body of Poland. Prussia's non-involvement in the Crimean War brought her closer to the Czar and the Polish revolt of 1863 led to the culmination of the friendship in the Treaty of Alvensleben. Austria, on the other hand, supported the Poles and thus estranged herself further from William I. Secure in Russia's friendship, Bismark turned against Austria.

The German radicals of all member states had then a soft corner for liberal Austria, who by supporting the Poles had earned their favour. Hence Francis Joseph took the initiative of calling a meeting of the German princes to achieve German unity through negotiations. Prussia was also invited at the summit of Frankfurt held on August 16, 1863. William I was dissuaded by Bismark from accepting the invitation and he reluctantly succumbed to his pressure. Without Prussia, the agenda on German unity became meaningless and the summit ended in failure.

Thus Frankfurt became the burial ground of some of the important achievements of German history. The ghost of the Holy Roman Empire, the dream of a civilized and stable Germany, the expectation of free cities and of the German liberals — all were buried at the summit of Frankfurt. The chance of achieving the German unification through

negotiations was fully nipped. Bitter animosity developed in the whole of Germany and each state waited for a chance to pounce on the other.

Liberal Austria and Junker Prussia were on the two opposite sides of the seesaw in the balance of power. But, in the early 1860s, the stale of affairs in Austria was in the doldrums and the policies of Francis Joseph were not contributing to the stability of the state. Some historians maintain that he was too autocratic to side firmly with the liberals and too ambitious to be satisfied with a negative conservatism. Hence the question of cooperation with Junker Prussia did not arise. Bismark tried, it has been argued, to restore the cooperation of the Holy Alliance. But the Junkers, led by Bismark, were not elements to be satisfied within the limits of Prussia when their military might had grown considerably. And Austria was wooing the liberals who could influence their counterparts within Prussia also. A revolution in Austria might jeopardise the prospect of a German empire. Austria was already isolated from the rest of the Imperial powers, especially from the Czar. Hence, at the opportune moment, Bismark invaded Austria and defeated her. Austria fell on July 3, 1866. German unity was achieved by force.

Bismark thereafter addressed himself to the task of consolidating the North German Confederation. The independent states south of Main were allowed to survive for a few more years. But their independence was as fragile as that of their brethren in the North.

Bismark had his eye on France. In 1866, he was not sure of the comparative strength of Prussia and France. Also he was not sure about the stand the other European powers might take in such a confrontation. But in 1870, he was very near to his goal. France was now isolated. Inherently she was a twin-state — a state of the bourgeoisie and a state of the working class and peasants. Already in 1848, the class-struggle had sharpened considerably and workers' revolt took place. Bismark must have calculated that a weak bourgeoisie would prefer imperialist domination to total dispossession at the hands of the working class. Russia was offered a last chance to prevent the rise of a great power in Central Europe. But the Czar held doggedly to his purpose of ending the disarmament of the Black Sea. He received his reward: early in 1871 the offending claims of the Treaty of Paris were torn up, but at a terrible price.

In July 1870 Bismark went to war with France. All the states south of Main joined him. The French armies were defeated at Sedan and Metz. And early in 1871, the workers of Paris who defended their city to their very last drop of blood succumbed to the combined offensive of their own bourgeoisie and the Germans. The French Republic, crippled and friendless, had to surrender Alsace and Lorraine, which had been under French domination for two hundred years, and pay a heavy indemnity.

As a consequence of all this, the German princes were induced by Bismark to offer the German crown to William I. On January 18, 1871, the German empire was proclaimed in the Palace of Versailles. Within nine years — from 1862 to 1871 — thus rose Prussia from the position of the weakest of the great powers to that of the most powerful empire in the continent. The Second Reich was proclaimed.

2. Prussianization of Germany, thus achieved by Bismark, performed a long-awaited task. The stunted growth of the bourgeoisie in Germany — at that time only a lot of shopkeepers and traders, a somewhat nineteenth-century version of journeymen of the middle ages — and the perpetuation of the peasantry in the feudal system, needed a jolt to rescue the society from underdevelopment and make it strive for industrialization. The Socialists and Communists including Marx and Engels had expressed their opinion in favour of a bourgeois democratic revolution that would emancipate the peasantry from the feudal yoke and pave the path of modernization. It was also obvious that a weak

bourgeoisie as then existed in Germany did not have the political power to carry out a revolution. Further, the working class movement in France and the flow of events in 1848 dampened the will of the German bourgeoisie because of a still more potential danger posed by the working class. Hence what happened in Germany during 1848-49 was a half-hearted attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to shake off the feudal system. What should have, therefore, been attempted from below waited to be executed from above. The conquest of Germany by Prussia fulfilled a standing desire of the bourgeoisie to exploit the whole of the German market.

The Battle of Sedan produced another far-reaching consequence. For the first time in modern German history Alsace and Lorraine were annexed and a huge compensation was extracted from the French. Germany was exceedingly short of capital. These double advantages gave a boost to German industrialisation. From a Germany infested with cottage and small-scale industries, suddenly it was placed on the path of industrialisation by Prussia. Within the next thirty years, the whole face of Germany changed. By 1900 Germany produced more steel than Great Britain, the then industrial giant of the continent, more coalthan Belgium and France put together and had a highly sophisticated chemical industry. The size of the urban population also increased at an amazing rate. The growth of the working class can also be attributed to the Wild Junker, the nickname given to Bismark by his fellow Junkers. The Reich that Bismark left behind was a domineering European power only comparable to that of Charlemagne.

The First World War

Before we discuss the causes that led to the First World War, a few introductory remarks are necessary to establish the link between the final objective of this study of German history with the explanation of the Heideggerian philosophy as expressed in ‘Being and Time’. The reader will observe that we have tried to bring in proper perspective the German chauvinistic ambition to establish a Reich similar to that of Charlemagne in 800 ad. The close of the middle ages saw the development of a nourishing German trade through the Rhine that was instrumental in raising the stature of the numerous German cities. But, unfortunately, the discovery of the route via Cape in Africa deprived Germany of a colonial future because of the distance from the seas she had to suffer — a landlocked country devoid of the maritime infrastructure that was bequeathed to Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, England, etc. Hence exploitation of foreign lands and resources, building up of the maritime power at par with France and England remained an empty dream. It was Bismark who, after many years, could rekindle the ambition in the German mind that a middle class German had forgotten to cherish. The long gap was filled up by ruthless plunder of the Slav territories on the East, subjugation of the Czechs, Turks and Russians (Lithuanians) etc. The Reich was the embodiment of the German chauvinistic desire for supremacy.

The development of the modern industrial capitalism that really began in the 1870s suddenly brought to the fore the anomalies in the huge and gigantic productive forces and the absence of an appropriate colonial market necessary for the export of goods and capital. Mitteleuropa was too small a territory to quench the thirst of the German big bourgeoisie. A new era had emerged — the era of Imperialism. Germany wanted her share in the colonial markets, ‘a place under the sun’ to feed her gigantic industrial hunger both in terms of raw material and the market for finished goods. The German petit-bourgeoisie, basking in the reflected glory of the German financial oligarchy, clamoured for a new appraisal of the German might. Bismark had given Germany a new foothold in Europe. Now she wanted a foothold in the other continents as well. After all,

colonial plunder should be shared on pro-rata basis depending on the respective military might and economic power of the plunderers. The first decade of the twentieth century was filled with clamours for such redivision.

1. CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION AND THE RISE OF MONOPOLIES :

The thirty years from 1870 to 1900 saw a far-reaching change in the German industrial scene. From a semi-capitalist system German industry not only achieved predominance, but within a short time it was found that free competition was on the wane and monopolisation of vertical and horizontal nature was everywhere visible. For example, the number of large industrial units with larger work force was on the rise and their total share in the industrial output was much more than all the medium and small scale industries put together. Concentration of production, however, was much more intense than the concentration of workers since in large and sophisticated enterprises labour was much more productive. Less than one-hundredth of the total enterprises utilized more than three-fourths of the total steam and electrical power. Two million nine hundred and seventy thousand small enterprises constituting ninety-one percent of the total industrial establishments utilized only seven percent of the total steam and electric power.

This enormous concentration could not be carried out if the large industries did not destroy by fair means or foul, the competing small industries. The big industries controlled the sources of raw material and restricted its sale by admitting quota system and raising the price exorbitantly at retail points. On the other hand, the large enterprises could sell their finished goods at a cheaper rate, sometimes even by incurring loss only to oust the smaller competitors. There were other methods for devouring up the smaller units. In short, large industries became larger through the combination of various factors and in this the German banking system had a very important role to play.

2. THE BANKS AND THEIR NEW ROLE :

During the same period of thirty years, i.e., 1870-1900, the banks which operated as middlemen by transforming inactive money into capital yielding profit, concentrated themselves into powerful monopolies having at their command almost the whole of the money capital of all the capitalists and small businessmen and also larger part of the means of production and the sources of raw material. This in Germany represented the fundamental processes in the growth of capitalist imperialism

In 1907-8 the combined deposits of the German joint-stock banks, each having a capital of more than a million marks, amounted to seven thousand million marks. Within five years (i.e. 1912-13) this capital Increased by Forty percent. In the process, most of the small banks perished and a few more transformed themselves into branches of the big ones. Only nine big banks dominated the whole economic scene of the German Empire.

But within this period another very significant development took place. There took place a union of industrial monopolists and the banking monopolists — a personal union, so to speak, between the banks and the biggest industrial and commercial enterprises, a merger through the acquisition of shares, through the appointments of bank directors to the boards of directors of the various industrial and commercial enterprises and vice-versa. Six of the biggest Berlin banks were represented by their directors in three hundred and forty four industrial companies; and by their board members in four hundred and seven others, thus making a total of seven hundred and fiftyone. In two hundred and eightynine of these companies, they either had two of their representatives on each of the

respective supervisory boards or held the posts of Chairmen. They were in diverse branches of industry — insurance, transport, restaurant, theatres, art industry etc. On the other hand, in the supervisory boards of these six banks were fifty one of the biggest industrialists, including the directors of Krupp, Hapag (Hamburg-American line), etc.

The connections between the banks and the industrial enterprises, with their new content, new form, new organisation, etc. took place shortly before 1900 when the economic crisis greatly accelerated this process of merger, intensified it and consolidated it.

3. FINANCE CAPITAL :

The foregoing discussion was done to come to an important conclusion that we wanted to arrive at — the development of finance capital and financial oligarchies and the phase of imperialism. Finance capital is the marriage of industrial capital with banking capital in the period when monopoly out-numbered smaller industries by either devouring them or putting them out of business. This is an era when capital has taken a lead over industry and the monopoly in banking and industry without their corresponding union becomes the gigantic power that controls all sections of industry and commerce. This is an era when competition — the main feature of capitalism — is progressively on the wane and the monopolists share the national and international market amongst themselves. The preceding sub-chapters have clearly shown that by the beginning of the twentieth century the German monopolists had achieved that concentration in the national arena and were out to exploit the international field.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the German industry, progressing at an enormous speed, became the number one industrial power in the continental Europe and posed a great threat — both on the economic and military fronts — to Great Britain which possessed the biggest colonial property. With the markets saturated within the country and in the neighbourhood, the German giants were looking for a congenial area where investment would fetch good dividends. On the other hand, Great Britain could pool the resources of raw materials in her colonies which the Germans could not do. However, these disadvantages, though they impaired an even more vigorous growth, impelled the German economy to look for areas of export of capital and goods in the international market. German banks now began to grant loans to the countries of Latin America, Asia and Europe. These loans not only earned interest on the capital, they also opened the possibility of exposing the borrowing countries to the Influx of capital goods. This was the principal method that the Germans adopted for penetration into semi-colonial and colonial markets. But within a short time they had to confront the British and the Americans who would not so easily give in to German economic expansion. Latin America was always an American property. Countries of Asia and Africa were either British properties or of their proteges. Germany had no colonial possession except in the continent and hence was greatly handicapped in. her imperialistic designs. But the German capitalism was young and aggressive and was not ready to take things lying down. During 1880-89 Germany grabbed a few colonies amounting to 7 per cent of the total held by Britain and France — not a very formidable economic gain but of course a morale booster.

But the young German finance capital wistfully looking at the colonies of her rivals was cursing them because they would not tolerate her expansion beyond a certain point. Besides, it was stiff competition against which she had to make inroads. There arose such a situation that no imperialist country would deny a loan once asked for lest the other

more adventurist ones would grab the opportunity. A loan always accompanied some advantages to the creditor country — a large Industrial contract, some exclusive right of trade, if the loan is big, a naval or military base. There were journalists who while writing on this out-throat competition in the world market remarked that it required the per of an Aristophanes to do justice to such a theme. The world was divided among the maritime capitalist nations — Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Holland and others. Beside Great Britain and France, others were small fries but they only existed because they sided with one or the other in the power game. Besides, the USA had her own economic domain — Latin America — where she would not allow anybody to penetrate. Only Germany was left high and dry.

German finance-capitalist oligarchies took this opportunity to arouse chauvinistic sentiments in the German public. Even, the working class with the sole exception of a microscopic minority began to feel that Germany was being deprived of her legitimate right in the division of the colonies. Karl Kautsky, the erstwhile 'pope of European and German communism', the standard-bearer of the Second International became a prey to the worst type of narrow nationalism: he urged the workers to fight the battle for finance-capital. The desire to possess colonies, to have a share in the international plunder, to become 'a great German race' that she was before had gripped the German mind. The opportunistic and chauvinistic working class leadership, which looked with envy at the British white-collar workers wanted a similar share in the plunder of colonies. The exponents of German imperialism were successful in inculcating among the great majority of the German people the narrow nationalist sentiment. The cause of Imperialism became a common cause of the German people. Only a tiny fraction of the working class movement — the adherents of the Third International — kept the flag of internationalism flying.

Years of frenzied propaganda aggravated the situation. The war that started in 1914 was the culmination of this economic and political turmoil prevalent in the international arena at the time. It was a war for a redivision of the world, for a redivision in favour of Germany, a war waged by Germany against the other imperialist powers. The Germany of 1914, ready with a huge army with high political ambition, swung into action.

Condition of Germany after the First World War

The German defeat in 1918 came to the German people as a great shock. They could not believe that after a successfully conducted offensive the result could be a stunning defeat. The majority of the Germans could not just take it. Germany won nearly all the battles between 1914and 1918. General Paul von Hindenburg, the Commander-in-Chief of the German army burst through the Allied lines and almost reached the French ports on the Channel. On May 30, the Germans reached the Marne river again where they had been defeated four years ago.

The scale was tilted in the second fortnight of July 1918, when the Germans began to lose. But the German War Communiques suppressed the facts from the German people. The Germans at home were under the impression that they would be victorious until by the end of October did they come to know that they were losing nearly all battles for the last three months. Ludendorff stated bluntly that the army had been beaten. The legend of German invincibility had been sedulously created in the minds of the people. If the invincible German army could be defeated, then there must have been something inside that caused It. Scapegoats had to be found.

The scapegoat was found among the German civilians. To lose the war after having won almost all the battles was so shocking and painful to the patriots that they invented the 'stab-in-the-back' theory. The phantom backstabbers were the Socialists, Communists, Jews, Democrats and the Pacifists. They were the 'fifth columnists', the wreckers who brought about the German defeat when the German military might was creating new history. It was nicer to succumb to the suggestion of a betrayal from inside than face the simple fact of defeat in a straight military encounter.

With the defeat of the German army, the internal situation suddenly turned chaotic and became ripe with revolutionary potential. The leadership of the German militarism was scattered. Ludendorff escaped to Sweden. Hindenburg went into silent retirement. Kaiser William II fled to Holland. On November 7, 1918, Kurt Eisner proclaimed a radical Republic at Munich, Bavaria. In the first days of November sailors rioted at Kiel. The military did not intervene. The monarchical government abdicated. It peacefully transferred the reins of power to Fritz Ebert, a conservative socialist. The working class did not rise in revolt and seize political power. For the moment the militarists went to the sidelines and waited. The ruling class was in disarray; the working class was not prepared.

The Socialists saved German capitalism from total rout. They force the Communists more than the reactionaries. The latter were bidding their time while the Communists threatened to act. The Communists wanted dictatorship of the proletariat and abolition of private properly. The Socialists or Social Democrats who had during the war supported the German militarists now saved them from total collapse. The monarchists withdrew from the scene and let the Socialists fight the Communists. As the Socialists now held the reins of power, they had now to sign the pact of Versailles. The guilt of the monarchists was thus shouldered by the Social Democrats and they earned the popular indignation. It restored the prestige of the military in the eyes of the gullible. The Junkers, monopolists and big bourgeoisie held intact their sway over the people.

In the early 1920s vestiges of the monarchy were more commonplace in Germany than indications of the ruling Republic. The Republicans had their flag in black, red and gold which took a back seat in deference to the black, white and red banner which flew atop private buildings and yachts in the lakes. A stroll through the streets of Berlin, Munich or Hamburg would give the impression that the country was still reigned by the Hohenzollerns. The stationery shops would sell for a few pfennigs glossy black and white or sepia postcard photographs of "William II; German Kaiser" as if he was still on the throne. In hotel foyers and rooms, in beer gardens and concert halls, portraits of the ex-Kaiser hung on the walls. Even the names of the streets Kaiserallee, Hohenzollerndamn, Koenigin Augusta Strasse and the like would arouse people's nostalgia of the past. The monarchists published numerous daily newspapers, weeklies, monthlies and books. They had money, position and political security. They banked on tradition. They pointed back to the good old days of the aristocratic past with opulence, pride and extravaganza. They wanted restoration of their power from the grip of the workers, democrats and the commoners.

Monarchy also evoked the memories of the Imperial might and supremacy of the German race. The anti-democrats made political capital out of the nostalgic past. But the political condition was such that the monarchists could not return by the front door. And hence when Hindenburg was elected President of the Republic, the monarchists heaved a sigh of relief. Ludendorff, the monarchist, worked with Hitler, an antimonarchist, for the achievement of their common aim — defeat of democracy.

The Germany of the 1920s was a nightmare for the common man. Inflation was at its peak. Stability of the prices was a thing of the past. German housewives required real financial wizardry to run the household. No person in Germany knew the value of the money he had in bank or in his pocket. This reached such tremendous proportions that a worker's fortnightly wage could melt to a week's wage within a day or two. Hence the workers clamoured for higher wages. State printed more money to meet the demand, and in the end, prices of almost all the commodities rose higher each day. Only owners of real estates and Industry had a good time for enjoyment. The industrialists could get their labour cheap and sell their products abroad in gold. They kept their proceeds abroad. The Junkers were getting on well.

But the common man suffered. People began to use kerosene instead of electricity and gas. Villages were deserted and the inhabitants thronged the cities in search of work. Markets and second-hand stores overflowed with items like musical instruments, carpets, paintings and books sold by the impoverished middle-class families. Thousands of amateur music teachers, typists, waitresses, salesgirls, etc. recruited from former middle-class families depressed the standard of pay. Cabarets, gambling dens, nude shows attracted large clientele of profiteers, get-rich-quick inflation millionnaires and the social flotsam and criminal scum. Fortunes made in a day were dissipated overnight. Prostitutes complained of heavy amateur competition. Students did not have slates, pencils and exercise books. Physicians organised themselves against soothsayers and quacks. Suicides multiplied. Many newspapers and weeklies stopped publication altogether. Medical examination of school children revealed the following statistics: 15.7% normally fed, 17.1 % overfed and 67.2% underfed. Children frequently fainted in classes.

This was the condition of Germany in the 1920s. Wreckers of the Republic found public support from the members of the aristocracy, middle-class and the underfed and under-nourished misguided workers who saw in. the fall of the Republic the end of their misery. The Social Democrats who were large in number but deficient in energy, vitality and quick action slowly waited for the days when they would be over-thrown own. The Communist Party and workers supporting them fought the would-be Nazis in the factories, localities and the streets. The Jews were the targets of attack in desolate places. Street fighting between different political parties was common in major cities. Murderers of Ministers and high officials of Republican government found political patronage with an influential section of the society.

Anxiety and fear had gripped the minds of the middle class. Always after security, comfort and conditions for the better, the middle class found itself in a social quicksand in which they were going down. Each day they slipped lower and lower and some even reached the bottom occupied by the starving working class.

The anxiety about what would happen the day after created tremendous psychological problems. The economic and political crises created an 'indefinite crisis' among the members of the middle class. The void gave rise to instability of thinking. The middle class unable to get along with poverty, unemployment and hunger and also unable to burden the tremendous psychological pressure succumbed to neuroses or extinction. Anxiety about the present would induce them to daydream about the imperial past. Some being unable to face the ordeal would commit suicide. Suicide or death was viewed as an escape from the maze of life. Hence the philosophers of death found their adherents. People mourned less over death because it was too common. Either way one was heading towards death. Malnutrition and physical and mental exhaustion shortened their span of life. Already thousands had died in the war. After the war the death rate increased from the prewar average. Hence death was welcome. Death was philosophised and eulogised.

These factors found their place in contemporary philosophy: the past — glorious, confident and authentic — was invoked. People looked back to the past when everyone ate enough, drank enough and was merry. The past looked golden against the bleak present. The present was full of anxiety. Steeped in this anxiety, people looked to the past for comfort and solace. Anxiety gave rise to day-dreaming. To escape from anxiety people welcomed death. Hence anxiety was the gateway to death which was salvation. A peculiar cycle — peculiar but not without reason. While studying Heidegger let us not forget this cycle. Because in it lies the clue to Heideggerian philosophy.

2

BIOGRAPHICAL OUTLINE

That a person's life is consistent with his thinking and, for that matter, with his work is a truism which no one disputes. It was this belief that led us to study the biographical details of Heidegger as a tool to interpret his philosophy. But here the analyst fails because we know very little about Heidegger's personal life, his early political beliefs, his basic philosophical ideas etc. Not only so. Heidegger and his adherents have been successful in suppressing all his personal communications and hence an objective study of Heidegger's life is well-nigh impossible. Walter Biemel, a great adherent of Heidegger writes in the introduction to his book, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study* thus, "Before we begin with the exposition, a word of explanation may be allowed regarding what is sought here. In a monograph one usually expects an account of unusual events in the life of the author. With this is connected the explanation that these events will furnish a key to the understanding of creative achievement of that person. It is a widespread view that through the life of a person we can gain access to, even explain, his work—be he a poet, a composer, a painter, a sculptor or a philosopher.

"This is not to deny that in certain cases a knowledge of biographical lads can provide considerable insights into the genesis of these productions, though never an explanation. (This term might safely be left to refer to the activity of grasping natural processes, as William Dilthey did when he distinguished explaining and understanding. In the case of Martin Heidegger, however, we are disappointed in this respect. It is not his life from which we can learn something about his work; his work is his life. Gaining access to his life means, therefore, following his creative activity, trying to grasp the leading idea behind this activity, understanding what it is that this activity opens up, how it unfolds, how it is in constant flux. That which his questioning is about must be of concern to us; far from appearing to be just one among many subjects about which questions might be asked, it should exhibit itself as that on which our questioning and seeking are ultimately grounded, even though we may not be aware of it." (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977 p. xi). There are sufficient reasons for expressing this kind of weird logic. The Heideggerians possibly believe that an objective study on Heidegger's life might bring to light those clues which would explain the roots of Heidegger's adherence to Nazism and even give a new twist to the inner meaning of 'Being and Time'. And so they want people to study only his 'philosophy'. Perhaps, they feel that once one starts peeling off the outer layers of the onion, one would lose sight of the content. And Heidegger, if one goes by what he says about his early interest in Being, wants the world to believe that right from his school days he was attracted to the task of unfolding the meaning of Being in the most abstract form. It seems that there is an international conspiracy to shield Heidegger and assert that though at certain point of his life he sided with Hitler and the Nazi Party

(which they claim to be his aberration) yet his philosophy and particularly his magnum opus 'Being and Time' were ultimately 'philosophical' work and should be viewed as such. Hanna Arendt writes 'Now we all know that Heidegger, too, once succumbed to the temptation to change his "residence" and get involved in the world of human affairs. As to the world, he was served somewhat worse than Plato, because the tyrant and his victims were not located beyond the sea, but in his own country. As to Heidegger himself, I believe, that the matter stands differently. He was still young enough to learn from the shock of the collision, which after ten short hectic months thirty seven years ago drove him back to his residence, and to settle in his thinking what he had experienced.' ('Heidegger at Eighty' included in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy edited by Michael Murray, Yale University Press, 1978 pp. 301-31.) And in a footnote she adds, "This episode which today —now that the embitterment has cooled and above all, the innumerable canards have been somehow set right — is usually called an 'error', has many aspects, among others that of the Weimar Republic, which didn't at all display itself to those who lived in it in the rosy light in which, viewed against the horror of what followed, it is now a days often seen". Before quoting further we must pause for a moment and comment that if any critic considers 'Being and Time' to be the answer of the gloom that set in the Weimar Republic and that Heidegger saw in Nazism the potential about which he reflected in 'Being and Time' what would Ms. Arendt say? Would then she admit that the 'short ten months' were but a logical extension of Heidegger's thesis? We know she would dub our analysis as politically motivated. To transform the crime committed by Heidegger into an 'error' Ms. Arendt now takes recourse to the 'theory of relativity.' She continues, 'Moreover, Heidegger's "error" differed considerably from the current "error" of the period. Who in the midst of Nazi Germany could possibly have thought that "the inner trend of the movement" consisted in "the encounter between global technology and modern man" (Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 166) — something about which the vast Nazi literature is entirely silent except, of course, somebody who had read instead of Hitler's Mein Kampf the writings of the Italian futurists who indeed had some connections with Fascism, as distinct from national socialism.' (The reader should note that Ms. Arendt now has begun her offensive from her earlier defensive position by referring to Heidegger's courage and distinguishes between Fascism and Nazism as if to say that Heidegger was more akin to Fascism which was relatively humane).

'There is no doubt that these writings make interesting reading, but the point of the matter is that Heidegger, like so many other German intellectuals, Nazis and anti-Nazis of his generation, never read Mein Kampf. This misunderstanding of what it was all about is inconsiderable when compared with the much more decisive 'error" that consisted in not only ignoring the most relevant 'literature' but in escaping from the reality of the Gestapo cellars and the torture-hells of the early concentration camps into ostensibly more significant regions.

'Robert Gilbert, the German folk poet (somehow in the tradition of Heine) and popular song writer, described even then in four lines of an unforgettable verse what actually happened in the spring of 1933:

No one needs to give a knock
With an axe through every door —
Burst open, the nation spews its matter
Like an abscessed sore.

‘This escape from reality turned out to be more characteristic and more tasting than all the Gleichschaltungen of those early years. (Heidegger himself corrected his own “error” more quickly and more radically than many of those who later sat in judgement over him — he took considerably greater risks than were usual in German literary and university life during that period.) We are still surrounded by intellectuals and so-called scholars, not only in Germany, who, instead of speaking of Hitler, Auschwitz, genocide and ‘extermination’ as a policy of permanent depopulation, prefer, according to their inspiration and taste, to refer to Plato, Luther, Hegel, Neitzsche, or to Heidegger, Junger, or Stefan George in order to dress up the horrible gutter-born phenomenon with the language of humanities and history of ideas.”

(It is said as if the language of humanities and history of ideas do not and cannot express the theoretical justification of the gutter-born phenomenon. It is as if only Hitler and Goebbles should be sentenced to death and not the exponents of German finance capital at whose behest the Hitlers acted. What simplification!)

We will now quote another Heideggerian, David Farrell Krell who in his introduction to the book ‘*Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1978) wrote, “That Heidegger’s early engagement in the Nazi cause was a monstrous error all concede; that this error sprang from basic tendencies of his thought only a few have argued.” And in a footnote on the same point he wrote, ‘It is of course convenient to decide that Heidegger’s shortlived but intense involvement in political despotism “taints” his works: that is the fastest way to rid the shelves of all sorts of difficult authors from Plato to Neitzsche and to make righteous indignation even more satisfying than it normally is” (General Introduction, p, 28).

We have not quoted these apologists for a pretext to avoid a fuller exposition of the life of Heidegger. On the contrary, though the material available about his early life is very scanty we shall try to exploit them as far as possible to find out a relationship between his life and work. Events, though scanty, of his early life before the publication of ‘Being and Time’ and the hectic political activity during 1933-34 will be shown to be intimately connected with the philosophy of ‘Being and Time’. And thus we shall achieve our objective of showing the real significance of Heidegger’s philosophy.

Fortunately, not all scholars on Heidegger show the same partisan attitude as those already quoted. There are some who have found a link between Heidegger’s thought and life. Before we proceed to discuss Heidegger’s life, we want to give to our readers a glimpse of this other view.

George Steiner, (*Heidegger*, Fontanna paperback J978) a biographer of Heidegger writes, ‘The evidence is, I think, incontrovertible; there were instrumental connections between the language and vision of “Sein und Zeit,” especially later sections and that of Nazism. Those who would deny this are blind or mendacious. In both — as in so much of German thought after Nietzsche and Spengler — there is the presumption of, at once mesmerized by and acquiescent in, a nearing apocalypse, of so deep a crisis in human affairs that the norms of personal and instrumental morality must be, shall inevitably be brushed aside. There was in the pseudo-messianism of the Hitler phenomenon a confirmation of some of Heidegger’s most shadowy but deep seated apprehensions.’ (p. 177)

In his article, ‘Heidegger as a political thinker’ Karsten Harris raises the same question: “what, if any, relationship is there between the apolitical stance of both Being and Time and the later works, and Heidegger’s political engagement in 1933?

"But is this even a philosophical question? Does it not rest on a confusion of biography and philosophy? The achievement of the philosopher, it has been suggested, should not be confused with the man's sins. This suggestion makes sense only if one is willing to admit the inauthenticity of Heidegger's work. Authenticity as Heidegger himself understood it, rules out such a separation of the political stance of the author and his philosophy. Those who argue that the ideal which finds expression in the Rektoratsrede stands in no relationship to his philosophy make that philosophy as rootless as most thinking in the "age of need". . . . The connections which link Rektoratsrede to Being and Time cannot be overlooked; at the same time the address leaves no doubt concerning Heidegger's sympathies with National Socialism, in spite of I he fact that it was found subversive by some Nazis. Thus it is not too surprising that in 1953, when the "Introduction to Metaphysics" was finally published, Heidegger left what he had said in 1935 about "the inner truth and greatness" of the movement standing without comment… (Karsten Harris, 'Heidegger as a Political Thinker, in *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy — critical essays*, Y. U. P. 1978, pp. 305-6).

The same conclusion is reached by Mark Blitz in his book *'Heidegger's Being and Time'*. He writes: "Nor, however, is it true that his philosophical activity was wholly without consequence, because his various remarks about labour service, military service and most obviously scholarship and the University in 1933 and early 1934 speeches are grounded in the attempt to root them in their original soil, that is, in Being and in man as transcendent to Being" (Cornell University Press, 1981, pp. 212-3).

Though we do not accept other observations of these authors, we do believe that there is a connection between Heidegger's 'Being and Time' and his political activity. Before we take up these issues, let us try to make use of whatever material is available on Heidegger's life for the purpose of constructing a workable outline.

Martin Heidegger was born on September 26, 1889 in Messkirch in the Black Forest region of Baden Wurtenberg. His father was a sexton in the catholic church (Steiner, p. 38), He was one among the group of boys who used to ring the church bell and got his name from that. As a boy he preferred swimming and skiing to almost everything else. (Krell, p. 5). Besides these two pieces of vital information (i) we know nothing about young Heidegger. We know nothing about his childhood memories, dreams and reflections, about his other likes and dislikes, about the authors he read and loved, about his religiosity, about his feeling of being a patriotic German. We know no thing about his classmates and school friends, about what he talked with them and argued on, subjects on which he differed with them and the point of view he held on various topics. And strange as it may seem, no 'Heideggerian' biographer has questioned the dearth of information that exists on young Heidegger. As Heidegger's personal archive is still beyond the reach of the public (Steiner, p. 74), we will have to trace his formative period in philosophy through the works of his biographers.

In the summer of 1907 the pastor of Trinity church in Constance gave a seventeen-year-old high school student a book that was too difficult for him (Krell, p. 3). It was the dissertation of Franz Brentano, 'On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle' (1862). Martin Heidegger later called that book "the chief help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy". ('My Way to Phenomenology' in On Time and Being (New York) 1972, p. 74). Studying the book the following question arose in his mind: If being is predicated with manifold significance, then what is its leading, fundamental signification? What does Being mean?

In 1909 Heidegger sought help for his question from a book written by one of his teachers, Carl Braig (Krell, p. 6). Braig taught Systematic Theology at Freiburg

University where Heidegger began to study Theology under him. *Braig's 'On Being: An Outline of Ontology'* attracted the attention of his young student. Some months later, he discovered another work written by a student of Franz Brentano— Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. Here he came in contact with Husserl's 'phenomenology' which captivated his attention (Krell, p. 7).

In 1911, after four semesters in Theology he switched to Philosophy and made it his major field of study. According to Krell, Heidegger at this time widely read philosophy and the human and natural sciences, studied the German poets Holderlin, Rilke and Georg Trakl, read the novels of Dostoevsky and the works of Soren Kierkegaard, and encountered the newly expanded edition of the unpublished notes by Fricdrich Nietzsche collected under the title The Will to Power (Krell, P 7).

The reader must have noted the important information contained in the above passages — that Heidegger started as a theology student and at that time sought the meaning of Being in Carl Braig's (another theologian) works and lectures. Simultaneously he read Nietzsche who stood out as an exponent of a particular ideology.

That other authors have also noted the theological background and found it extremely important for interpretation of Heidegger will be borne out by the following observation by Steiner:

"Heidegger was fortunate. His question, the one and total question which quickened his life into thought, appears to have overwhelmed him early, most probably in his late teens. I have referred to the impact on Heidegger of Brentano's study of the Manifold senses of Being according to Arislotle, which he read in the summer of 1907. There may have been other instigations also: the relaxation of a strict Catholicism into a secular, yet patently related, sense and vocabulary of the absolute; an almost uncanny personal sensibility to the grain and substance of physical existence, to the 'Thingness' and obstinate quiddity of things, be they rock or tree or human presence. Like Gerard Manley Hopkins, who was also steeped in scholastic attempts to delineate the exact mystery of substance and who was also overwhelmed by the radiant autonomy of organic and inorganic objects, Heidegger felt the world with a rare concreteness' (p. 38).

In 1913, Heidegger completed a doctoral dissertation entitled "The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism: A Critical-Positive Contribution to Logic." This work, done under the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, vigorously opposed the reduction of logical procedures and norms to psychological processes, a reduction encouraged by the general climate of positivism but resisted by the neo-Kantian schools. (Krell, p. 9). Yet, it would be a mistake, adds Krell, to assume that Heidegger felt perfectly at home with his director's neo-Kantian persuasion. In his first published article ('The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy' 1912) Heidegger had been sharply critical of all the well-known 'schools' of modern philosophy since Descartes, which seemed to him excessively pre-occupied with knowledge theory. Heidegger tentatively supported a brand of 'critical realism' which does not succumb to 'epistemological disputes within the horizonless desert of the subject-object split' (Krell, p. 10).

The First World War broke out in 1914. And Heidegger enlisted himself in the army. But due to reasons of health he was discharged after two months. We do not know what Heidegger's reaction was when he went into the armed forces, how he felt to be in the active exercise of a redivision of the world in favour of Germany. We do not also know whether he was disappointed or elated when discharged. But this short stint must have been very crucial to Heidegger's development as a philosopher.

Now he began to work on a second dissertation that would allow him to teach in the University as Privadozent. By the spring of 1915, he had largely completed a work entitled "Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Theory of Meaning" (Krell, p. 10). In the 'Conclusion' written especially for the publication of the book in 1916, Heidegger shifted from his earlier stand of 'Critical Realism' and proclaimed: 'Objectivity has meaning only for a Subject who judges' (Krell, p. 11). Then he argued that the proper context for all problems of logic must itself be 'translogical' since it is formed by the intersection of philosophy and history. The 'genuine optics' of the former was not epistemology but metaphysics; the proper use for metaphysics was not the 'Subject' of Knowledge-Theory but 'the living spirit' of a historical age. (Krell, p. 11). At the conclusion of a work committed to the systematic treatment of a problem in logic and theory of knowledge Heidegger wrote, "The Epistemological Subject does not express the most meaningful sense of spirit, much less its full context". Now Heidegger wished to confront the thinker who envisioned the multiform work of spirit and not the theoretician of knowledge. In a lecture delivered at the Philosophy faculty at Freiburg on July 27, 1915, Heidegger alluded to a kind of 'metaphysical compulsion' or philosophical 'will to power' that emboldened philosophers to the confinement of pure epistemology in order to pose questions concerning the genuine goals of philosophy and the sciences.

Heidegger's preoccupation with the subject, the reader will observe, grew with time and as the remarks just cited show, he had started alluding to a kind of metaphysical compulsion similar to Nietzsche's will. This similarity with Nietzsche assumes further significance as early in 1917, he once again joined the army and was posted at Freiburg with the 'interior services' working with the military mails. Later he was sent to a meteorological station on the Western Front near Verdun, where he served until the Armistice. Though only a conjecture, this defeat could have given him a shock quite disproportionate to his military responsibility.

At Freiburg, Heidegger used to teach on Aristotle. As a result of his new interpretations of Aristotle he received, in 1922, an invitation to teach as an associate professor at Marburg University (Krell, p. 14). Between 1923 and 1928, Heidegger enjoyed the most stimulating and fruitful years of his entire career.

According to Steiner, the period 1916-27 constitutes the spell of creative silence in Heidegger's development. He writes, "Many aspects of this period remain unclear, but the main lines of personal experience and intellectual contact can be traced. Heidegger works with Husserl whom he will succeed at Freiburg in 1928, and masters the mental discipline and vocabulary of phenomenology, of the search for a firm basis for perception and cognition in acts of pure consciousness. Karl Barth's commentary on the Epistle of the Romans appears in 1918. It influences Heidegger's whole style of textual exposition, of word by word interpretation, and directs his attention to the radical, psychologizing theology of Kierkegaard. This theological interest, from 1922 on, brings Heidegger into close exchange with Bultmann, (13) and forms the basis for a persistent mutual awareness between Heideggerian ontology and the 'modern theology of crisis' and demythologization. It is during these years, moreover, that Heidegger studies and lectures on texts from St. Augustine, the entire Pauline corpus and Luther. Together with Pascal, whose portrait hangs on the wall of his study, these will be the crucial sources for Heidegger's concept of Angst, of conscience and reality-principle and of the individuation of death.

'At the same time, Heidegger is much influenced by Dilthey's theory of history and by Dilthey's attempt to define the true relations between human consciousness and historical fact. It is from Dilthey that Heidegger seems to derive his fundamental and, surely,

evaluative distinction between the technical (ontic) truths of the exact and applied sciences and the orders of authentic insight aimed at in the historical and "spiritual" sciences, the Geisteswissen-schaften. The correspondence between Dilthey and Graf Von Yorck, with its debate on the nature of intuition and temporality, is published in 1923 and will figure importantly in "Sein und Zeit". Dilthey and Yorck, together with the argument on the nature of historicity are instrumental in Heidegger's insistence on the temporal determination and boundedness of human existence. The embedding of man's identity in history is, of course, a cardinal feature of Hegelian and revolutionary Marxism. To a degree which has become visible only recently (and to which we shall return), Heidegger is, throughout the 1920s, fully cognizant of the philosophico-ideological debates being pursued in the German and Central European Marxist movements. In particular, he knows the early works of Lukacs. He shares with the Lukacs of "Die Seele und die Formen" (1911) an interest in Kierkegaard and in the psychological and literary models of human consciousness initiated by Nietzsche's writings. He has in common with the Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness (first published in Germany in 1923) a commitment to the concrete, historically existential quality of human acts of perception and intellection.

Even more telling, perhaps, though difficult to gauge so long as personal archives remain closed, is the impact on Heidegger of the First World War and the moral and economic debacle of Weimar Germany. Though he later on evolved his own, very special reading of Western history as a Seinvergessenheit, a 'forgetting of Being' which deflects Western man after Plato from his authentic mission, there can be little doubt that Heidegger was influenced by the Spenglerian scenario of the fatal decline of the West (Vol. I of Spengler's treatise had appeared in 1918). This crepuscular vision found violent echo and analogy in the art and poetry of expressionism. A characteristically entitled anthology of expressionist verse, Menschheitsdammerung (Mankind's twilight) edited by Kurt Pintus was published in 1921. We know that it marked Heidegger's whole view of poetry, and it may well have prepared his later uses of Rilke and Trakl. Like his ex-pressionist contemporaries, Heidegger saw in Dostoevsky and Van Gogh, the ultimate masters of spiritual truth, of vision in and into depths. This assessment would, in turn, accord with the crisis theology which he had found in Pascal and in Kierkegaard. Though his personal role had not been an active one, the mere fact of an insanely destructive, internecine European war, and of its revolutionary aftermath, justified, if justification was needed, the notion of man and of culture in extremis, of final inauthenticity, of a descent into nihilism. It bore out the importance of Cartesian-Kantian rational confidence, and the apocalyptic obsessions to be found in the great solitary artists, theo-logians, thinkers of the nineteenth century. Thus there is a distinct sense in which "Sein und Zeit", for all its erratic singularity, does belong exactly to the same climate of catastrophe and quest for alternative vision as doT.S. Eliot's The Waste Land or Herman Hesse's Slick ins Chaos with which it is so nearly contemporary." (Heidegger, Steiner, pp. 73-5).

Heidegger began to formulate the question of the meaning of Being, as it appears in 'Being and Time', during lecture and seminars In 1924, although particular analysis goes back to the winter semester of 1919-20 (Krell, p. 18). According to Krell, by 1924 he had achieved three decisive insights: first, his training in "phenomeno-logical seeing"; second, a renewed study of Aristotle's 'Metaphysics' and 'Nicomachean Ethics' which were main sources of his lecture courses in 1924-25 and 1925-26. They revealed "the fundamental sense of this 'making manifest' in logos as disclosing and uncovering and hence determined the basic sense of truth to be unconcealment by which all beings show themselves to be"; third, insight into the character of 'aletheia' as diselosedness or unconcealment.

Krell also suggests (p. 20) that particular analysis of guilt and death as contained in Karl Jasper's "psychology and Weltanschauungen" of which Heidegger wrote a detailed review during 1919-21 impressed Heidegger. "It is not difficult to see their influence on some of the most famous sections of 'Being and Time'."

In 1928 the University of Freiburg offered him the Chair of Philosophy which fell vacant due to Edmund Husserl's retirement. Now he centred his lectures on Kant and German idealism. By this time he had also completed preparations for a book that would advance his first stage of the 'destruction of the history of ontology', planned as Part II of 'Being and Time'. In 'Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics' Heidegger confronted the neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation of Kant's first 'Critique' with his own perspective of the ontology of Dasein. This confrontation took a particularly dramatic form in April 1929 with the famous 'Davos Disputation' between the relatively unknown Heidegger and the widely esteemed neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirr (Krell, p. 26). A few months later Heidegger delivered his inaugural lecture in Freiburg entitled 'What is Metaphysics?'. This helped to build up his reputation as a powerful and original thinker.

As already stated, in the absence of archival data on Martin Heidegger's personal life, biographers will have to resort to conjectures about the twilight years of Heidegger's life.

Heidegger came to Freiburg in 1928. He joined NSDAP in May 1933. What were Heidegger's political views and political activities during these five years? It is not very easy to answer these questions. However, this much we know that it was a period of life and death struggle waged between the Democrats and the Fascists against each other. It was the period in which the wreckers of the Republic were hurling their deadly blows against the Communists and Social Democrats. It was also the period of progressive polarisation of the German society in favour of either Fascism or Democracy. If all sections of the German society were supporting one camp or the other, we may imagine that the Freiburg University, being very much within the German society, also underwent this schism within itself. There were Fascist, Social Democrat and Communist students locked in unending and violent contradictions; there were the faculty members who were either Communists or Social Democrats or Fascists. We can imagine that Heidegger, who was also the Head of the Department, and who would join the Nazi party within a few years, had expressed his likes and dislikes about the various political groups within the campus and outside. Al least, students, teachers and members of the staff with whom he had to interact everyday knew well where his heart lay. The Fascists within the campus, we may conjecture, knew perfectly well that here was a man, a reputed philosopher, who was on their side. That he was a sympathiser of NSDAP long before he joined the party will be evident from the fact that in March 1933 (before he assumed the office of the Rector) he addressed his colleagues and students on the occasion of the loyalty oath pledged to the new regime (Steiner, p. 113).

So far as the available data suggest, Professor Von Mollendorf, a Social Democrat was to assume the office of the Rector in 1933, but the Nazis prevented him. Our resources do not suggest whether the Ministry opposed him or he was opposed by the local Fascists of the University. It may be noted here that Hitler became the Chancellor of the Weimar Republic in January 1933. In these circumstances, Von Mollendorf and senior members of the faculty asked Heidegger to assume the post (Steiner, p. 112). However it should be pointed out that he was comparatively young (he was only 44 years of age).

As the later events suggest, those who prevented Von Mollendorf's appointment did not oppose Heidegger's. In fact they approved of it. It is clear they knew that Heidegger sympathised with them (we have already mentioned Heidegger's speech in March 1933).

Why Von Mollendorf and others who were opposed to Fascism supported him is not dear. We can only make conjectures. With Hitler as the Chancellor and NSDAP as the ruling party, they might have felt that any opposition would be carefully noted and dealt with 'properly' In future. Or they might have argued that Heidegger would be a saner person in comparison with other die-hard Nazis. Thus Heidegger joined his new office on April 21, 1933 (Steiner, p. 112). No one has suggested that Heidegger was forced to join this new post. In fact he assumed this responsibility rather willingly, and it seems that he knew too well what would follow. On May 3rd and 4th local Freiburg newspapers reported the new Rector's 'official entrance' into NSDAP (Krell, p. 27).

Heidegger had a brief but hectic association with Nazism which culminated in his resignation from the Rectorship in February 1934. Apparently it was due to Heidegger's refusal to dismiss two anti-Nazi deans of the University — Wolf and Von Mollendorf (Steiner, p. 112). Although Heidegger now became critical of the Nazis, his basic support of their ideology had never waned.

On assuming office as the Rector of Freiburg University, Heidegger spoke to his fellow colleagues and students. This lecture was published under the title "Rectoratsrede, Die Selfstbehauptang der deutschen Universitat' (Breslau: Korn, 1933) popularly known in the abbreviated form as Rektoratsrede. We will refer to it as SU. The text that we shall reproduce below is taken from Karsten Harris's article 'Heidegger as a political thinker' included in the anthology 'Heidegger and Modern Philosophy'.

Heidegger began his address by saying that his assumption of the Rectorate was the acceptance of the duty to provide the University with spiritual leadership (*SU* p. 5). And since the University should not only be the school which trained the leaders and guardians of the fate of the German people (*SU* p. 7, 18) but itself a place of spiritual legislation (*SU* p. 21), this leadership could not be confined to the academic sphere but should have had an impact on the entire nation. The disintegration of the old order, the collapse of an already ruined culture, which threatened to sweep everything into confusion and madness (*SU* p. 22) gave particular urgency to this task. Germany's students were on the march but this march still lacked direction. This made it into a search for those leaders, who through 'word and work' would reveal to these students their vocation (*SU* p. 14). The highly touted academic freedom was being banished from the German University: being merely negative, this freedom was spurious. It meant indifference, arbitrariness of goals and inclinations, actions without restraint (*SU* p. 15). However, the University would continue to set its own task and to determine the way and manner of its realization (*SU* p. 6). But it could do so only if the members of the University community, instead of permitting its disintegration into independent faculties and departments, knew about and committed themselves to its essence. Such a commitment was inseparable from a commitment to science (*SU* p. 7). But what is science? For an answer to this question, Heidegger suggested that one had to go to the beginning of science in Greek philosophy, a beginning which did not 'lie behind us as something which had long since happened but stood before us' (SU p. 11) and continued to preside over the destiny, not only of the University or of science, but of the German people ... because there, for the first time, Western man opposed himself to all that was and questioned and sought to grasp it in its being (SU p. 8). The distancing essential to science should not lead one to understand science as mere contemplation. Instead, said Heidegger, it must be understood as a product of human labour. The Greeks had recognised this and understood Theoria as the 'highest mode of energia' , of man's being-at-work (*SU* p. 10). Science, instead of letting what is be, strives to subject it to man's projective vision and thus to overpower it. The Greeks knew that such attempts could never succeed. The finally insurmountable resistance of what was

being Investigated must have been recognised if investigation was to be more than idle speculation; this resistance rendered all genuine knowledge Questionable.

(Heidegger spoke of) creative importance of knowledge and (suggested) that it was only the failure of even the most resolute attempt to overpower what is which revealed the unfathomable determinacy of what confronted us and gave to knowledge its truth (*SU* p. 9).

This world was established and reestablished by human work, said Heidegger. Authenticity depended on such establishment. Thus It demanded of those who lacked the strength to create their own work the subordination to the work of a creative leader which assigned them their place and joined them in a community. Such subordination might not be an unquestioning acceptance of the assigned place. Implicit In the demand for authenticity was the demand that no one followed a leader without challenging his leadership. Every following carried resistance with it. The essential tension between leading and following might not be obscured let alone eliminated (*SU* p. 21).

Questioning led to recognition of das Unumgangliche, of what could not be gotten around. Only out of such openness could the spiritual world of a people arise. For spirit was neither empty clever-ness. nor the uncommitted play of intellect, nor the limitless drift of conceptual distinction and it was especially not world reason; spirit was primarily attuned, knowing resolve towards the essence of being. And the spiritual world of a people was not a superstructure erected by culture, no more than it was an armory stuffed with useful bits of knowledge and values, but it was the power which most deeply preserved the forces stemming from earth and blood as the power which most deeply moved and profoundly shook our being (*SU* p. 13).

In his address to the Heidelberg students (The University in New Reich' reported in Heidelberger Neusle Nachrichten of July 1, 1933) Heidegger said that from the perspective of rooting scholarship and University in their original soil, scholarship is freed as an activity — is possible as an activity — only on the basis of the destiny that belongs to the people. The 'new teaching' means becoming master over (the unknown) in conceptualised knowledge and becoming secure in one's sight of the essential. It is out of such teaching that true research awakes. It is bound up with the whole because it is rooted in the people and bound to the state.

In another address Heidegger said "we have on the one hand the new Reich and on the other the University, that must take its tasks from the Reich's Daseinwillen. There is a revolution in Germany and we must ask ourselves, "Is there a revolution also in the University?" No. The fighting is still there in the skirmishing stage and has so far mounted only a single attack — the formation of a new life in the Hitler labor camps — in the educational circles close to our college. They have taken from us those educational tasks to which we hitherto thought we had sole claim.

There is always the possibility that the University may suffer death through forgetfulness and kiss goodbye any educational power. But it must be incorporated anew into the community of the people and bind itself to the state. The University must become once more a force in education that may educate the leaders of our state from knowledge to new knowledge. The goal requires a three some: (1) knowledge of the contemporary University; (2) knowledge of the current dangers of our future; and (3) a new courage, (reproduced from '*Nachlese Zu Heidegger* (Bern, 1962) by Guido Schneeburger quoted in *Heidegger's Being and Time* by Spitz.

It is evident from the speeches just quoted that Heidegger's philosophical language blends smoothly with the vocabulary of Nazism. In fact the transition from one to the

other seems automatic and natural. This, we believe, is due to the similarity of content. Note the excerpt from a speech he delivered to the newly appointed workers in Freiburg (reported in Der Alemanne, February 1, 1934) and quoted by Spitz in Heideggers's Being and Time): "Knowledge and possession of knowledge, as national socialism understands these words, do not divide the classes but bind and unite the Volksgenossen and stands in the one great will of the state."

"To us work is the title for every regulated deed and act that is done with responsibility to the individual, the group, and the state and so is of service to the people (Volk).

"Science is only the stronger and therefore more responsible way of that knowledge that the whole German people must demand and seek, for its own historical-political Dasein, if, in general, this people wills to securely place its duration and its greatness and preserve its future. The knowledge of genuine science is not distinguished in its essence from the knowledge of the farmer, the lumberjack, the miners, the craftsman. Knowledge means knowing one's way around the world in which we are placed communally and individually. Knowledge means to be growing in resolve and performance of the task given to each of us respectively whether this task is now ordering the fields, felling the trees, mining, questioning the laws of nature or placing history out in the power of fate. Knowledge means: to be master of the situation in which we are put."

In support of German withdrawal from the League of Nations, Heidegger told his fellow scholars: "the people is winning back the truth of its Daseinwillen, for truth is the manifestness (openness) of what a people makes secure, clear and strong in its action and knowledge. From such truth springs the genuine will to science. And this will to science determines the claims to knowledge. And from there the boundaries are finally set, within which genuine questioning and research must ground and preserve themselves. From such origins, science arises for us. It is bound up with the necessity of the self-responsible Volkischen Daseins". (Quoted from Schneeburger p. 149 by Spitz in *Heidegger's Being and Time*).

This transition from philosophy to politics crosses all limits in Heidegger' praise of Hitler as the embodiment of all that is genuinely 'German' and 'authentic'. Heidegger says, "This will, to complete the condition of work in a correct condition of knowledge, this will must be for us: inner certainty and never wandering belief. For in what this will wills we only follow the surpassing willing of our leader. To enter his following means: to will imperturbably and undeviatingly that the German people grows in its unity as a work people, finding again its simple worth and genuine power, and procuring its duration and greatness as a work state. To the man of this unheard of will, our Fuhrer Adolph Hitler, a threefold Sieg Heil." (Quoted from Schneeburger, p. 202 by Spitz in *Heidegger's Being and Time*.

And he declares (as reported in Freiburger Studentenzeitung of November 3, 1933) 'The Fuhrer himself and alone is current and future German reality and its law. To oppose him would be treason against Being'.

The circle of unreason is complete.

3
PHILOSOPHY OF 'BEING AND TIME': ANALYSIS

1. *Introduction*

Heodegger's 'Being and Time' ranks, along with 'Being and Nothing-ness' of Sartre, as the most important non-Marxian Philosophical work of the twentieth century. 'Being and Time' was first published in 1927 in Husserl's Jahrbuch fur Phanomenologie and Phanomenologiscje Forschung. It got an instant reception from the western critics and became a bible of existentialism. The American translators of this book, on which this analysis is based, commented that "It is a very difficult work, even for the German reader and highly resistant in translation, so much so that it has often been called untranslatable." (Translator's Preface, p. 13. Harper & Row, New York 1962). One can well imagine how difficult it will prove in the analysis.

'Being and Time', unlike the works of Sartre or Kierkegaard, does not reveal the reasons that gave birth to it. Emotionless and solid, the reader is confronted with a mountain without any pass or valley in sight so that one can have a glimpse of the massive rock from a convenient point. Rather it is like a step by step formation of a pyramid. One has to climb each step by taking a total detour of the whole basement. Only then the next higher step is visible. Or, we can take the example of onion. As one peels the outermost layer, one finds similar skin inside. Every outer layer when peeled, reveals similar inner crust until finally one reaches the core — the nothingness of onion. Heidegger's 'Being and Time' exactly resembles this experience.

Apparently, 'Being and Time' seems to have a logical and objective structure. But behind this apparent objectivity and logicality lies the total illogicality of Heidegger. This becomes apparent when one has deciphered the contents of the Heideggerian proposition. To achieve this we have taken recourse to the following method. Firstly, we have enunciated the principal arguments of Heidegger, using his own language and terminology whereever possible. When the various components of the Heideggerian structure have been brought to light, we have tried to provide analyses of the parts and the whole. There is a chapter by chapter analysis followed by an overall study of Heideggerian philosophy. We feel that this method will also prove useful to those who have no first-hand acquaintance with Heidegger's writings.

Being and Time

The basic contention of this book, which was considered by Heidegger as constituting just Part One of a two-volume work, is the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being. This Part One was also to have three divisions: (1) the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein; (2) Dasein and temporality; and (3) Time and Being. But the division (3) of Part One has never seen the light of the day nor the entire Part Two. However, this will not render our exercise fruitless as it has not rendered fruitless Heidegger's own exercises. The reason lies in the fact that Part One without division (3) will furnish us with enough information to make us understand Heidegger's conception of Being.

In the question about the meaning of Being what will be primarily searched are those entities which have the character of Dasein. Hence explication of the concept of Dasein is the primary task. Secondly, Dasein will be analysed as component part of the world or in Heidegger's terminology Being-in-the-world. Hence, before proceeding further let us try to understand what is Heidegger's Dasein.

Preparatory Analysis of Dasein

Before we proceed with this analysis, it will be worthwhile to restate to our reader how and why Heidegger came to this point of analytic of Dasein. In the Introduction Heidegger stated that both Plato and Aristotle had posed the question of Being. But they could not achieve much by their enquiry (p. 2). Considering that the question and meaning of Being are equally important today, Heidegger wants to restate the question in its proper perspective, and then proceed with finding an answer for it.

According to Heidegger, every inquiry is a seeking. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is sought. Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is. This cognizant seeking can take the form of' 'investigating' in which one lays bare that which the question is about and ascertains its character. Any inquiry, as an inquiry about something, has that which is asked about. But all inquiry about something is somehow a questioning of something. So, in addition to that is asked about, an inquiry has that which is interrogated. In investigative questions, what is asked about is determined and conceptualised. Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies always that which is to be found out by the asking; this is what is really intended; with this the inquiry reaches its goal. Inquiry itself is the behaviour of the questioner and therefore of an entity and as such has its own character of Being (p. 24).

The question about the meaning of Being is to be formulated.

Inquiry as a kind of seeking must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So, the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. We always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception. We do not know what 'Being' means. But even if we ask 'what is Being?' we keep within an understanding of the 'is' though we are unable to fix conceptionally what 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague average understanding of 'Being' is still a fact (p. 25).

In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being - that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities is not itself an entity. If we are to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical step consists in not defining entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities as if Being had the character of some possible entity. Hence Being as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in it way of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered. Accordingly, what is to be found out by the asking — the meaning of Being — also demands that it be conceived in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities acquire their determinate signification (pp. 25-6)

In so far as Being constitutes what is asked about, and 'Being* means the Being of entities, then entities themselves turn out to be what is interrogated. These are, so to speak, questioned as regards their Being. But if the characteristics of their Being can be

yielded without falsification then these entities must, on their part, have become accessible as they are in themselves. When we come to what is to be interrogated, the question of Being requires that the right way of access to entities shall have been obtained and secured in advance. But there are many things which we designate as 'being' and we do so in various senses. Everything we talk about, everything we have in view, everything towards which we comport ourselves in any way, is being; what we are is being and so is how we are. Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is, in Reality, in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the 'there is'. In which entities is the meaning of Being to be discerned? From which entities is the disclosure of Being to take its departure? Is the starting point optional or does some particular entity have priority when we come to work out the question of Being? Which entity shall we take for our example and in what sense does it have priority?

If the question of Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it in line with the elucidations given requires one to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood, and conceptually grasped; it requires one to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for the preceding example and to work out the genuine way or access to it. Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing access to it — all these ways of behaving are constitutive for this enquiry and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities, which we the enquirers are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity — the enquirer — transparent in its own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about — namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of Being, we shall denote, says Heidegger, by the term 'Dasein'. If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (Dasein) with regard to its Being.

This discussion of Heidegger on the question about the meaning of Being and turning the questioner himself into the object of analysis is what has been sought. Before embarking upon an analysis of Dasein we thought it pertinent to discuss about the origin of this proposition. Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities (p.32) Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being — a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.

That kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another and always does comport itself somehow, Heidegger calls existence. And because we — says Heidegger — cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a 'what' of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter, and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have chosen to designate this entity as 'Dasein', a term which is purely an expression of its Being. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence — in terms of a possibility of itself; to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through

existing itself. The understanding of oneself which leads along this way is called ‘existentiell’ question of existence is one of Dasein’s ontical ‘affairs’. This does not require that the ontological structure of existence should be theoretically transparent. The question about that structure aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. The context of such structure is called ‘existentiality’. Its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not ‘existcnticll' but rather existential. The task of an existential analytic of Dasein has been delineated in advance as regards both its possibility and its necessity in Dasein’s ontical constitution (p. 33).

So far as existence is the determining character of Dasein, the ontological analytic of this entity always requires that existentiality be considered beforehand. By ‘existentiality’ is meant the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But in the idea of such a constitutive state of Being, the idea of Being is already included. And thus even the possibility of carrying through the analytic of Dasein depends on working out beforehand the question about the meaning of Being in general (p. 33).

Sciences are ways of Being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself. But to Dasein Being in a world is something that belongs essentially. Thus Dasein’s understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world’ and to the understanding of Being of those entities which become accessible within the world. So whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, in which pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic (p. 33).

Therefore *fundamental ontology* from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein* (p. 34).

Dasein, accordingly, takes priority over all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the determinate character of existence The second priority is an ontological one: Desein is in itself ontological because existence is thus determinative for it. But with equal primordiality Dasein also possesses — as constitutive for its understanding of existence — an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own. Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological condition for the possibility of any ontologies. Thus Dasein has turned out to be, more than any other entity, the one which must first be interrogated ontologically (p. 34).

But the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical. Only if the enquiry of philosophical research is itself seized upon in an existentiell manner as the possibility of Being of each existing Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the existentiality of existence and to undertake an adequately founded ontological problematic. But with this, the ontical priority of the question of being has also become plain.

Hence, coming again to the theme of the Analytic of Dasein, we now understand that we are ourselves the entities to be analysed. The Being of any such entity is in each case mine. These entities in their Being comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. Being is that which is an issue for every such entity. The way of characterizing Dasein has a double consequence:

1. The essence of this entity lies in its ‘to be’. Its Being-what-it-is (*essentia*) must be conceived in terms of its Being (existentia). But one should be careful to note that Being of this entity termed as ‘existence’ does not and cannot have the ontological signification of the term existentia. Ontologically existentia is tantamount to Being-present-at-hand, a

kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein's character. To avoid confusion, presence-at-hand will be used to designate existentia and existence as the designation of Being solely allotted to Dasein (p. 67).

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence.

2. That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is in each case mine. Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case, Dasein is its possibility and it has this possibility but not just as a property as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, choose itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself : or only seem to do so. But only insofar as it is essentially something which can be authentic, that is, something of its own, can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterised by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any less' Being or 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterised by inauthenticity — when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment (p. 68).

In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is itself and which in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. At the outset of this analysis, it is particularly , important that Dasein should not be interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing but that it should be uncovered in its undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's every-dayness is not nothing but a positive phenomenal characteristic of the entity. Out of this kind of Being — and back into it again — is all existing such as it is. We, says Heidegger, call this everyday un-differentiated character of Dasein 'averageness' (p. 69).

And because this average everydayness makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity, it has again and again been passed over in explicating Dasein. That which is ontically closest and well-known is ontologically farthest and not known at all. And its ontological signification is constantly overlooked (p. 69).

Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here, too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies a priori. And here, too, Dasein's Being I is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the model; of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof (p. 67).

But the explication of Dasein in its average everydayness does not give us just average structures in the sense of a hazy indefiniteness. Anything which taken ontically is in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics of an authentic Being of Dasein (p. 70).

All explication to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, it is termed 'existentialia.' These are to be sharply distinguished from 'categories' — characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters of 'Being'. The entities which correspond to them require different kinds of primary interrogation

respectively: any entity is either a ‘who’ (existence) or a ‘what’ (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense). The connection between these two modes of characters of Being cannot be handled until the horizon of the question of Being has been clarified (pp. 70 -1).

In the existential analytic of Dasein a headway is also made of the task of laying bare that ‘a priori’ basis which must be visible before the question of ‘what man is’ can be discussed philosophically. The existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology and anthropology and certainly before any biology.

COMMENT

Heidegger initiated the discussion with the explicit motive of under-standing ‘Being’. It was expected that he would formulate the question In such a manner that the phenomenon of Being would be clarified — particularly when he has dwelt exhaustively on the art of how to put a question in the proper perspective. But immediately afterwards he has made a distinction between Being of one kind of entity with that of another - the Being of entity or entities without the character of Dasein with those of the character of Dasein. Here, too, he could make an objective and scientific study of the entity with the character of Dasein. But this hope has also been belied. He has diverted the whole discussion from the straightforward and scientific path.

We feel that he has given a false priority to Dasein. True, the entities with the character of Dasein are different from other entities and the analysis will also have to be different. But that does not mean that In a scientific analysis one sort of entity has a priority over another. Two methods and tools may be necessary for two different sorts of entities. One sort of entity may be lighted up by the sciences of physics, chemistry, mathematics, zoology, botany and physiology; the other sort may be clarified by scientific sociology, and psychology. But it would be wrong to award one sort of entity with any kind of priority over the other because the scientific tools of this analysis are different as the entities are.

The greatest subjectivity injected in an objective analysis has been done while the questioner himself has been turned into the question. This has robbed the high-sounding introduction of the modicum of objectivity essential for any philosophical and scientific study. Had the philosopher had this in mind, he could have posed the question quite simply. As we will see, this subjectivity will adulterate the entire analysis.

Heidegger, keeping cue with the character of Dasein, asserts that the existential analytic of Dasein comes before any psychology and anthropology and before any biology. A little pondering over this assertion will make it clear how unscientifically oriented this study is going to be. Any scientific analysis of Dasein must start with biology and proceed through anthropology and sociology. Existential analytic of Dasein, if there is any science of this nature, should be a part of sociology. He has not even once mentioned scientific sociology and has put this analytic before psychology. This only confirms our belief that Heidegger is going to present to us an unscientific and subjective analysis of Being.

2. Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein

It has already been argued by Heidegger that Dasein is an entity, which, in its very Being, comports itself understandably towards that Being. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. But these are the two ways in which Dasein’s Being takes on a definite character and they must be seen and understood a priori as

grounded upon that state of Being which has been earlier termed as 'Being-in-the world'. According to Heidegger, an interpretation of this constitutive state is needed if one has to set up the analytic of Dasein correctly.

The compound expression 'Being-in-the-world' stands for a unitary phenomenon. But there are several constitutive items in its structure; firstly, the *'in-the-world'*. With regard to this Heidegger wants to inquire into the ontological structure of the 'world' and define the *world-hood* as such. Secondly, that *entity* which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it is. Here it is seeking an answer to the question 'who'? Thirdly, *Being-in* as such. Here, the ontological constitution of inhood has to be laid bare. Hence, along with Being-in-the-world, these constitutive states are to be analysed properly to discover the spatial and temporal coordinates of Dasein.

Being-in, contrary to the general belief as something present-at-hand, (like water in the glass) is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale. So, one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal thing, (such as human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand. Nor does this term Being-in means a spatial 'in-one-another-ness' of things present-at-hand any more than the word 'in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind. This entity to which Being-in belongs in this signification is one which is characterised as that entity which in each case I myself am. Being-in is thus the formal essential expression for the Being of Dasein which has Being in the-world as its essential state (pp. 80-1).

Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain Tactual Being-present-at-hand'. And yet the 'factuality' of the fact of one's own Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is a fact; and the factuality of such a fact is what is termed Dasein's facticity'. This is a definite way of Being and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped as a problem until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity, within-the-world has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its destiny with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.

Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining.... All these ways of Being-in have concern as their kind of Being — a kind of Being which has to be characterised in detail. Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest — these, too, are ways of concern; but these are all deficient modes in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a 'bare minimum'. The term 'concern' has, in the first instance, its colloquial signification and can mean to carry out something, to get it done, to straighten it out'. It can also mean to 'provide oneself with something'. The term is used for another characteristic turn of phrase when someone says, ' I am concerned for the success of the undertaking'. Here concern means something like apprehensiveness. In contrast to these colloquial ontical significations, the expression concern is used here as an onto-logical term for an existentiale and designates the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. This term is chosen not because Dasein happens to be proximally and to a large extent 'practical' and economic, but because the Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care. This expression, too, is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. It has nothing to do with 'tribulation', 'melancholy', or the 'cares of life' though ontically one can come across this in many Daseins. Those — like their opposites 'gaiety'

and ‘freedom from care’ — are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood ontologically, is care. Because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein, its Being towards the world is essentially concern (pp. 83-4).

Being-in is not a property which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have and without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the ‘world’ — a world with which he provides himself occasionally. Dasein is never ‘proximally’ an entity, which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a ‘relationship’ towards the world. Taking up relationship towards the world is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand and outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can meet up with Dasein only insofar as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world (P. 84).

3. The Worldhood of the World

The world as one of the constitutive parts of Being-in-the-world has to be made transparent in the light of Heideggerian concept. And hence, the terminological significance of the ‘world’ and the world-hood that makes the ‘world’ have to be analysed and that will have its distinction from other meanings of the word ‘world’. Thus according to Heidegger, to give a phenomenological description of the ‘world’ will mean exhibiting the Being of those entities which are present-at-hand within the world, and fixing it in concepts which are categorical. Here, it is the phenomenological ontology that is the subject of study and hence entities present-at-hand will not be the object of discussion.

Now, if the question is raised — what world do we have in mind? This may be answered by saying that neither the common world nor the subjective world, but the worldhood of the world as such. World-hood is an ontological concept and stands for the structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world. But it is known that it defines Dasein’s character essentially. The worldhood itself is an existentiale. ‘World’ is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a character of Dasein itself (p. 92).

The discussion of the word ‘world’ makes it apparent that it is used in several ways. By unravelling these we can get an indication of the different kinds of phenomena and of the way in which they are interconnected;

1. ‘World’ is used as an ontical concept and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.

2. ‘World’ functions as an ontological term and signifies the Being of entities just mentioned.

3. ‘World’ can be understood in another sense — not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be en-countered within-the-world but rather as that wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said ‘to live’. World has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here again, there are different possibilities: ‘world’ may stand as public we-world or one’s own closest environment.

4. Finally ‘World’ designates the ontologico-existentiell concept of worldhood. Worldhood itself may have as its modes whatever structural wholes any special worlds may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of 'worldhood’ in general. Here, the term ‘world’ will be reserved for the third signification.

The derivative form ‘worldly’ will then apply terminologically to a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, never to a kind of Being which belongs to entities ‘present-at-hand’ ‘in’ the world. The latter entities will be designated as ‘within-the-world’.

It becomes apparent that if one fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, the phenomenon of worldhood likewise gets passed over.

The method has already been assigned.

The theme of the analytic is ‘Being-in-the-world’, and accordingly the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness — the kind of Being which is closest to Dasein. We must make a study, Heidegger asserts, of everyday Being-in-the-world; with the phenomenal support it will give, something like the world will come to view.

That world of everyday Dasein which is closest to it is environment. From this existential character of average Being-in-the-world, the investigation, Heidegger says, will take its course towards the idea of worldhood in general. We shall seek the worldhood of environment (environmentality) by going through the ontological interpretation of those entities-within-the-environment which we consider as closest to us, says Heidegger. The expression ‘environment’ contains in the ‘environ’ a suggestion of spatiality. Yet the ‘around’ which is constitutive for the environment does not have a primarily spatial meaning. Instead, the spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment can be clarified only in terms of the structure of world-hood. From this point of view Dasein’s spatiality becomes phenomenally visible (p. 94).

ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTALITY AND WORLDHOOD IN GENERAL:

In the disclosure and explication of Being, entities are primary and accompanying themes; but the real theme is Being, asserts Heidegger. In the domain of the present analysis, the entities taken as the preliminary theme are those which show themselves in our concern with the environment. Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the world theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced and so forth. As entities so encountered, they become the preliminary theme for the purview of a ‘knowing’ which, being phenomenological, looks primarily towards Being, and which, in thus taking Being as its theme, takes these entities as its accompanying theme. This phenomenological interpretation is accordingly not a way of knowing those characteristics of entities which themselves are; it is rather a determination of the structure of the Being which entities possess. But as an investigation of Being, it brings to completion, autonomously and explicitly, that understanding of Being which belongs already to Dasein and which ‘comes alive’ in any of its dealings with entities. Those entities which serve phenomenologically as our preliminary theme — in this case, those which are used or which are to be found in the course of production — become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves with them in some such way. Taken strictly, this talk about ‘putting ourselves into such a position’ is misleading; for the kind of Being which belongs to such concerned dealings is not the one into which we are used to putting ourselves first. This is the way in which everyday Dasein always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the latch. The achieving of phenomenological access to the entities which we encounter, consists rather in thrusting aside our ‘interpretative’ tendencies, which keep thrusting themselves upon us and running along with us and which conceal not only the phenomenon of such ‘concern’ but even more those entities themselves as encountered of their own accord in our concern with them (p.96).

Heidegger terms those entities which we encounter in concern as equipment. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement, etc. But taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to…' A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability (p. 97).

In the in-order-to as a structure there lies an assign or reference of something to something. Equipment — in accordance to its equip-mentality — always is in terms of its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room what we encounter as closest to us in the room and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself, Before it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered (pp. 97-8).

The kind of Being which equipment possesses, Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand. Only because equipment has this Being-in-itself and does not merely occur, it is manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal. If we look at things theoretically, we can get along without understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves in circumspection. The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspection theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work — that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered. The work to be produced, as the towards-which of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment (pp. 98-9).

The work produced refers not only to the 'towards-which' of its usability and the 'whereof of which it consists; under simple craft conditions it also has an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it. The work is cut to his figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges. Even when goods are produced by the dozen, this constitutive assignment is by no means lacking; it is merely indefinite and points to the random, the average. Thus along with the work, we encounter not only entities-ready-to-hand but also entities with Dasein's kind of Being — entities for which, in their concern, the product becomes ready-to-hand; and together with these we encounter the world in which wearers and users live, which is at the same time ours. Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with the public world, the environing nature is discovered and accessible to everyone. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings our concern discovers nature as having some definite direction (pp. 100-107).

As the Being of something ready-to-hand, an involvement is itself discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements. So in any involvement that has been discovered (that is in anything ready-to-hand which we encounter), what may be

called the ‘worldly character’ of the ready-to-hand has been discovered beforehand. In this totality of involvements which has been discovered beforehand, there lurks an ontological relationship to the world. In letting entities be involved so that they are freed for a totality of involvements, one must have already disclosed that for which they have been freed. But that for which something environmentally ready to hand has thus been freed (and indeed in such a manner that it becomes accessible as an entitity within the world first of all) cannot itself be conceived as an entity with this discovered kind of Being. It is essentially not discoverable, if *discoveredness* is henceforth reserved as a term for a possibility of Being which every entity without the character of Dasein must possess (p. 118).

To Dasein’s Being, an understanding of Being belongs. Any understanding has its Being in an act of understanding. If Being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being. The previous disclosure of that for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to nothing else than understanding the world — that world towards which Dasein as an entity always comports itself (p. 118).

Whenever we let there be an involvement with some thing in some-thing beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as the ‘with-which’ and ‘in-which’ of involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the ‘towards-this’ as that in which there is an involvement or such the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ to which every ‘towards-which’ ultimately goes back—all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility. In understanding a context of relations such as mentioned earlier, Dasein assigns itself to an in-order-to and it does so in terms of a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which it itself is — one which it seizes upon either explicitly or tacitly and which is either inauthentic or authentic. This ‘in-order-to’ prescribes a ‘towards-this’ as a possible ‘in-which’ for letting something be involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an involvement which something has—an involvement which is with something. Dasein always assigns itself from a ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ to the ‘with-which’ of an involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as ready-to-hand. That wherein Dasein understands itself beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which it has let entities be encountered beforehand. The ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that belongs to involvement; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world (pp. 118-9).

That wherein Dasein understands itself in this way is always something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. However, the possibility of giving these relations an explicit onto-logico-existential interpretation, is grounded in this familiarity with the world; and this familiarity, in turn, is constitutive for Dasein and goes to make up Dasein’s understanding of Being. This possibility is one which can be seized upon explicitly insofar as Dasein has set itself the task of giving a primordial interpretation for its own Being and for the possibilities of that Being, or indeed for the meaning of Being in general (p. 119).

In the act of understanding, the relations indicated above must have been previously disclosed; the act of understanding holds them in this disclosedness. It holds itself in them with familiarity; and in so doing, it holds them before itself, for it is in these that its

assignment operates. The understanding lets itself make assignments both in these relationships themselves and of them. The relational character which the relationships of assigning possess, is taken as one of signifying. In its familiarity with these relationships, Dasein signifies itself; in a primordial manner it gives itself both its Being and its potentia-lity-for-Being as something which it is to understand with regard to its Being-in-the-world (p. 120).

The 'for-the-sake-of-which' signifies an in-order-to; this in turn a 'towards-which'; the latter an 'in-which' of letting something be involved; and that in turn the 'with-which' of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial totality; they are what they are as this signifying in which Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in-the-world as something to be understood. The relational totality of this signifying is called significance. This is what makes up the structure of the world — the structure wherein Dasein as such already is. Dasein in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition of the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of Being, and which can thus make themselves known as they are in themselves. Dasein as such is always something of this sort: along with its Being, a context of the readiness-to-hand is already essentially discovered. Dasein, insofar as it is, has always submitted itself already to a world which it encounters and this submission belongs essentially to its Being (pp. 120-1).

If it has thus been determined that the Being of the ready-to-hand (involvement) is definable as a context of assignments or references and that even worldhood may so be defined, then, it may be asserted that the substantial Being-of-entities-within-the-world has been volatilized into a system of relations. And inasmuch as relations are always 'something thought', the Being-of-entities within-the-world has been dissolved into pure thinking (p. 121).

COMMENT

The world that Heidegger presents to us is the one known to Dasein primordially. We have seen how the worldhood of the world has been explained not as a world that exists at large but one that Dasein has conception about. How Dasein has conception about the world has been explained in a manner characteristic of the analytic put forth by Heidegger.

There are entities within the world which are present at hand and which do not have Being as that of Dasein. Now, these entities within the world — say, room, table, chair, pen, etc. — are nothing but equipments for various purposes. These entities are such that they get discovered by Dasein for such and such purpose. Dasein in fact frees these entities within the world and make them serviceable and usable. But how does Dasein do it? How does Dasein know that such and such entity within the world is for such and such purpose of Dasein. Heidegger says that this is discovered by circumspection. By circumspection Dasein can understand what is the purpose of such and such entity within the world. The entities thus by circumspection get discovered about its purpose for serviceability and usability. But how is circumspection possible? It is possible because Being-in-the-world which is a constitutive state of Dasein knows it beforehand. The primordially existential Dasein knows beforehand the entities within the world which are present at hand.

Similarly entities within the world in their 'dealings' with Dasein disperse themselves in manifold ways of concern. The kind of dealing which is closest to everyday Dasein is not bare perceptual cognition but rather that kind of concern that manipulates things and

put them to use. There are other concepts like involvement, totality of involvement etc. We arc not repealing the arguments put forth by Heidegger. We will, however, take this opportunity to comment briefly on the thesis of Heidegger put forth in this chapter.

The following is in a nutshell our observation about Heidegger's conception of the world:

(1) Heidegger's 'world' is not the world at large but the world as 'concerned' by individual Dasein.

(2) The whole conception of Heidegger's 'world' is topsy-turvy. It is not the world that gets interpreted objectively but it is 'my' interpretation of the 'world'.

(3) 'World', 'Worldly', 'Worldhood', etc. are explained in terms of Dasein and not Dasein in terms of the 'World'.

The relation between Dasein and entities within the world is a subject-object relationship. The basic error in Heidegger's approach is that it is neither circumspection nor concern that lights the entities within the world. Far from it. And, in the terms 'circumspection' and 'concern', there is an embryo of primordiality existent in it. Man in his relation with nature interacts with it and transforms the object of nature to suit his purpose. It is not by circumspection that he comes across the entities of Heidegger. Rather, as he creates his conditions of living, he transforms nature and objects of nature and put them into his service. The room did not exist from time immemorial. The fountain pen, ink and blotting pad were not placed before him as if in wonderland and he made use of them in circumspection. Each and every object that we use has to be produced by man and they came to the present stage of development through innumerable additions, alterations and improvements. The only concern was the condition of living and for that purpose the whole human society has endeavoured; nor does circumspection teach the utility of these objects of everyday use. It has to be learnt. The child, from the day it is born, is taught each and every human activity. Except for the few instincts, all other things it learns from the society itself. By circumspection one cannot operate a computer nor was steam engine invented by circumspection. Heidegger's whole analysis negates the basic characteristic of the human society. He has neatly described everything from imagination. But the world at large is a reality where real men create their conditions of living. And hence their activities can only be explained in terms of real logic. Heidegger's 'world' does not exist in reality.

4. Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-one's-self. The 'They'

In the previous sections we have discussed Heidegger's proposition regarding the constitutive parts of Being-in-the-world. There Heidegger had primarily dealt with the relationships between Being and the entities within the world. In this section, Dasein's relationship with entities of the character of Dasein will be discussed. Previously, we have elaborately discussed the view-points of Heidegger and as the readers are not familiar with the terminology used by Heidegger, we have devoted considerable space for the purpose. Now that the readers have become somewhat familiar with Heidegger's ways of interpretation, we would rather economise on space.

Heidegger puts forth the following propositions:

(1) That the 'who' of everyday Dasein is not the 'I myself and that though everyday Dasein claims louder that it is the 'I myself yet in actual fact it is far away from the ownmost Being of Dasein.

(2) That the everyday Being-with and Dasein-with of Others are equiprimordial structures of the existential Being-in-the world.

(3) That the Other is encountered by Dasein as Dasein-with of Others in the world.

(4) That those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself have the kind of Being called solicitude. With regard to its positive mode, solicitude has two extreme possibilities. It can take away 'care' from the Other and put itself in his position in concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal or disburden itself of it completely. In such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. The kind of solicitude, which leaps in and takes away 'care', is to a large extent determinative for Being-with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand.

In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care, that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a 'what' with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it (pp. 158-159).

(5) Being-with is an existential constituent of Being-in-the-world. Dasein-with has proved to be a kind of Being which entities encountered within the world have as their own.

One's own Dasein, like Dasein-with of Others, is encountered proximally and for the most part in terms of the with-world with which we are environmentally concerned. When Dasein is absorbed in the world of its concern, that is, at the same time in its Being-with towards Others, it is not itself. Dasein is taken over by the Other. The 'who' of the everyday Dasein is the neuter 'They'.

(6) In Dasein-with of Others, the Dasein acquires a 'They' self and loses its authentic self.

COMMENT

The above are in a nutshell Heidegger's propositions about man's relation to other men. Now let us examine Heidegger's propositions in the light of modern sociology, anthropology and psychology. As we will observe later, Heidegger differentiates between the ownmost potentiality of Being of Dasein and its Being-in-the-world, As opposed to the former, Being-in-the-world has as its constituent structure Being-with of Others where Others are not entities present-at-hand but are other entities with the character of Dasein. Just as Dasein's Being-in-the-world is a condition for Dasein to exist, so is the structure of Being-with of Others. This is an equiprimordial structure for the existential that is Dasein. In this dealing with Others, the Being of which is solicitude, there are two possibilities; to be carried away by the Other or to be transparent to himself. In most of the cases, Heidegger asserts, the former is operative. Then the Others take over the self of Dasein.

This means that according to Heidegger, apart from the worldly existence of man i.e. man-in-the-world, man has an ownmost potentiality for Being. In his daily 'average' existence man is oblivious of this ownmost potentiality — his real self. And as a social

being in his intercourse with the society at large, he goes further and further away from this self. His self is pervaded by the Others — the indefinite 'They' — the public — who dominate his self. His potentiality-for-Being lies hidden, undiscovered.

This thesis contradicts the important discoveries of sociology, anthropology and psychology. Man is a social being and a single individual carries with him the characteristics of the society he lives in. The relation between an individual and the society is a dialectical one. A man living in a particular society imbibes the social norms inherent in that society and, in so doing, he contributes to the society which then takes up his contributions and socializes them. This is true for any of man's discoveries of nature and any of his subjective pursuits. By studying the laws of nature, one individual man may discover a new law and discard the old one. The society takes up the new discovery and socializes it which then becomes a social possession. Because of the socialization process, the scientist could discover another law and, because of the same socialization process, the new discovery becomes a part of social possession. It is this dialectical relationship that exists between the individual man and the society.

Heidegger's contention is that various mass media agencies have permeated the individual mind in such a way that individual thinking is progressively on the wane. This of course is a totally different question and cannot be discussed within the limits imposed by Heidegger himself. It is a socio-political question and needs a suitable place and time for a thorough discussion.

But the contention that an individual's intercourse with the society paves the way for disintegration of one's own self and domination by the Others is totally untenable. The individual characteristic of a man — the blossoming of his potentialities—does not occur all by itself. There is also a social history to be found in the biography of the individual. The potentiality of a budding poet for becoming a mature one — the absorption by the poet of the poetry of his time and then surpassing it — is also a social phenomenon. One cannot develop one's potentiality without interaction with Others. The own-15 most potentiality of a Being is also a relation of the stage of development of the society one lives in. In a society where neither science nor arts are developed, say in a primitive tribal one, there the possibility of one to become either a scientist or an artist does not occur because his society is not differentiated enough. Of course, there is a difference between Heidegger's conception of the ownmost potentiality of Being with our discussion on the potentiality of a man becoming a poet. This aspect may also be touched upon. The ownmost potentiality of Being is also a social phenomenon. This develops in conformity with ethics, morality, religion, economic, political and social conditions etc. The individual either accepts a set of values or he opposes them. There is no hidden quarters within the self down below where the ownmost potentiality of Being is encountered and activated. If Heidegger has that weird idea about the ownmost Being of Dasein, it is a separate question then. But according to our analysis, to know oneself is thoroughly a social question — where does one stand vis-a-vis a particular set of values operating in the society. And from this point of view, we find Heidegger thoroughly unsatisfactory.

Heidegger says that man's intercourse with the society strips the individual man of his potentiality to develop. The 'They' pervades the individual self and the result is disburdening of one's self and distantiality, averageness and levelling down. The reader will find that this Heideggerian concept has a strong resemblance with the Kierkegaardian distaste for the crowd. The fact is that Heidegger, without attempting to find out the socio-political and economic reason for this 'levelling-down' process, generalizes the whole issue and finds his ownmost potentiality for Being in isolation from the society and social intercourse. We believe that he had a deep political reason behind this

philosophical proposition and we will be able to find out what it was in the course of our survey. For the time being, we will rather continue with our analysis of the averageness of everyday Dasein.

Heidegger, as is apparent, is extremely perturbed with the phenomenon of the 'They' who invade every nook and corner of the individual self and force the ownmost self to recede into the background. And to get rid of this, he has invented from sheer imagination something of the sort of ownmost potentiality of Being which would escape the 'They' onslaught. But if he would have approached the problem not so 'philosophically' and if he would have tried to find out the reason for such massive sub-culture from the point of view of the socio-economic conditions, we believe that he would have been able to furnish a clearer and scientific analysis of the phenomenon.

Thai the human individual loses his individuality and becomes a victim of the 'They'-culture has its origin in the capitalist system itself'. In a capitalist society, because of the peculiar relation of production and appropriation, all individuals are converted into producers of surplus value. Both the products and the producers become nameless objects of the market. The workers and their products become indistinguishable from one another — both may be denoted by number, if necessary. This being the basic structure, it is only logical that the superstructure will also be dominated by it.

Hence we find that in a capitalist system everything is reduced to a commodity. Even the values of previous feudal society like honour, love, faith, dignity and all the other abstract qualities become purchasable commodities — not to speak of men and women — both in crude and sophisticated senses.

Mass media in a capitalist society performs the job of a super leveller. Disinformation, distortion, misreporting, saucy story-making, etc. create a vicious atmosphere. Their power is so immense that whatever they propagate is lapped up as truth by the common man. A man in the street who is not in a position to get the correct information believes in what is propagated time and again and with considerable skill, too. This was the method perfected by Goebbels, the Nazi propagandist during the 2nd World War. The result is loss of self and pervasion by 'They'-self. It is the ruling class who need the 'They' self otherwise conscious human individuals would question the logic of this system. Hence, mass sub-culture, mass distortion, etc. are the only resort the ruling classes often turn to. Heidegger had also experienced both as a party in collusion and a philosopher the pervasion of the 'They' when Hitler and Goebbels resorted to an impervious system of deliberate falsehood.

5. Being-in as such

Heidegger's Dasein as Being-in-the-world is delivered over to the world. Its mode of Being in the world is Being-in. It is not to be confused as one present-at-hand in another present-at-hand in a spatial relationship. Rather, it is a mode of Being of Dasein in the world. As already explained by Heidegger himself, this Being-in is mode of Being alongside the world — in concernful circumspection with entities present-at-hand and in solicitude with Others. This is the sort of Being-in in-the-world. But so far as we have understood Heidegger, here also lies the crux of the argument on the inauthenticity of Dasein.

We will later graphically explain the mode of existence of Dasein. As we understand it, Heidegger's Dasein consists of a Being-in-the-world which is absorbed in the world. This Being is oblivious of the ownmost potentiality of Being of Dasein. It is in the world, enjoying it and is swayed by it. Its self is pervaded by the 'They'-self, its mode of

thinking and reasoning is also likewise pervaded. It no longer remains his own self; it loses itself in 'They' and publicness. Hence, it is not an authentic Dasein that one comes across in the everydayness of Dasein. It is in fact an inauthentic Dasein.

Now, it is necessary to qualify this inauthenticity which is instrumental for Dasein's fall. And this poses the question: what are the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, so far as the latter, as something which is everyday, maintains itself in the kind of Being of the 'They' ? Does the 'They' have a state of mind which is specific to it? A special way of understanding, talking, interpreting (this may be mentioned in the passing that these three are the constituents of the disclosedness of Dasein)? According to Heidegger, Idle talk, Curiosity and Ambiguity are the corresponding phenomena of discourse, sight and interpretation. The inauthentic Being of Dasein resort to Idle talk, Curiosity and Ambiguity in its existence as Being-in-the-world. And this inauthentic mode of existence brings about Dasein's fall.

Idle talk, Curiosity and ambiguity characterise the way in which an everyday Dasein goes about its Being, In these and the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to Dasein's everydayness; Heidegger calls it the 'falling' of Dasein.

The fallenness should not be confused with a fall literally from a higher and purer state to a lower and inferior level. Rather it is a mode of existence of Dasein. Without this fallenness, Heidegger's Dasein cannot even exist because existence presupposes an existence in-the-world. But because of this mode of existence in the world, Dasein is also away from its ownmost potentiality of Being. We will come to it later (p. 220). -

Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being towards its world, towards itself and towards Others — a Being in which these are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in such a way that Being-in is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides nothing from Dasein's understanding, but only in order that Being-in-the-world should be suppressed in this uprooted everywhere and nowhere (p. 221).

Idle talk and the way things have been publicly interpreted constitute themselves in Being-with-one-another. And it is just as far from letting itself volatilized to something universal which because it belongs essentially to nobody, is really nothing and occurs as 'real' only in the individual Dasein which speaks. Idle talk is the kind of Being that belongs to Being-with-one-another itself; it does not first arise through certain circumstances which have effects upon Dasein 'from outside'. But if Dasein itself, in idle talk and in the way things have been publicly interpreted, presents to itself the possibility of losing itself in the 'They' and falling into groundlessness, this tells that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation towards falling. Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting (p.221).

Since the way in which things have been publicly interpreted has already become a temptation to itself in this manner, it holds Dasein fast in its fallenness. Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that Dasein's disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, can guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will be secure, genuine and full. Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the 'They', it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state of mind that goes with it. The supposition of the 'They' that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine life, brings Dasein a tranquillity for which everything is in best of order and all doors are open (p. 222).

Falling Being-in-the-world, which tempts itself, is at the same lime *tranquillizing*. However, this tranquillity in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity but drives one into uninhibited 'hustle'. Being-fallen into the 'world' does not now somehow come to rest. The tempting tranquillization *aggravate* the falling. With special regard to the interpretation of Dasein, the opinion may now arise that understanding the most alien culture and 'synthesizing' them with one's own may lead to Dasein's becoming for the first time thoroughly and genuinely enlightened about itself. Versatile curiosity and restlessly 'knowing it all' masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at the bottom it remains indefinite what is really to be understood and the question has not even been asked. Nor has it been understood that understanding itself is a potentiality-for-Being which must be made free in one's ownmost Dasein alone. When Dasein, tranquillized and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time 'alienating' (p. 222).

This alienation closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering. It does not, however, surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity-into a possible kind of Being of itself. The alienation of falling — at once tempting and tranquillizing — leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting entangled in itself (pp. 222-3).

These phenomena of temptation, tranquillizing, alienation and self-entangling characterize the specific kind of Being which belongs to falling. This 'movement' of Dasein in its own Being, is downward plunge. Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the goundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publicly intepreted, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of 'ascending' and 'living concretely' (p. 223).

This downward plunge into and within the groundlessness of the inauthentic Being of the 'They', has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities, and into the tranquillized supposition that it possesses everything or that everything is within its reach. Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away, from authenticity and into the 'They' the movement of falling is characterized by turbulence (p. 223).

Falling is not only existentially determinative for Being-in-the-world. At the same time turbulence makes manifest that the thrownness which can obtrude itself upon Dasein in its state-of-mind, has the character of throwing and of movement. Thrownness is neither a 'fact that is finished' nor a fact that is settled. Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the 'They's' inauthenticity. Thrownness, in which facticity lets itself be seen phenomenally, belongs to Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is an issue. Dasein exists factically (p. 223).

COMMENT:

We had to digress a lot to understand what Heidegger meant by the falling of Dasein. This will be evident from the foregoing paragraphs that Dasein falls because it is a part of the 'world' — with all its connotations given by Heidegger, that is, man is doomed because he is a social being: that, man discovers the laws of nature and society and thus orients himself in his relationship with the environment, he is pervaded by 'publicness' and the 'They'. Man's relationship with his fellow beings is designated as 'Idle Talk'. His

exploration of nature is termed ‘Curiosity’. His interpretation of the world around him is interpreted as ‘Ambiguity’. And because of these ‘sins’, he is falling. Because man is social, he is forgetting himself, his potentiality-of-Being and is plunging downward.

Later while discussing Sartre, we will resort to the anthropological history of the development of man— right from the stage of ape to the present cromagnon period. And there we will observe that the morphological and phylogenetic development that was instrumental for the transition was due to social labour that the species homo sapiens had taken recourse to. It was the single most important factor that contributed to the ascent of man. Heidegger’s anthropology will shock the scientists and philosophers. He wants to negate the most important factor that gave rise to man as we are today. What has been termed as ‘falling’ by Heidegger is viewed by anthropologists all over the world as man’s key to ascending higher and achieving still greater success. We will discuss in the next chapter what Heidegger thinks to be the core of human substance — care. But let this be commented here and now that Heidegger propounds an anthropology — or to borrow his own terminology ‘philosophical anthropology’ — which contains neither philosophy nor anthropology. It is philosophising in sham anthropology. Heidegger’s anthropology is an ‘anti’-social anthropology which is a contradiction in terms because man is social.

6. Care as the Being of Dasein

According to Heidegger, an understanding of Being belongs to Dasein’s ontological structure. As something that is, it is disclosed to itself in its Being. The kind of Being which belongs to this disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind and understanding. Is there in Dasein, Heidegger asks, an understanding state-of-mind in which Dasein has been disclosed to itself in some distinctive way? Heidegger himself replies that as a state-of-mind which will open up the most far-reaching and primordial possibilities of disclosure and which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for his analysis. As one of Dasein’s possibilities of Being, anxiety together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it — provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being (pp. 226-7).

Hence, according to Heidegger, anxiety is that primal mood in which Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being comes face to face with Dasein itself and discloses this potentiality in the most unique manner whereby Dasein comes to a position to choose between the authentic and in-authentic Being.

Since our aim, says Heidegger, is to grasp the totality of this structural whole ontologically, we must first ask whether the phenomenon of anxiety and that which is disclosed in it, can give us the whole of Dasein in a way which is phenomenally equiprimordial and whether they can do so in such a manner that if we look searchingly at this totality, our view of it will be filled in by what has thus been given us. The entire stock of what lies therein may be counted up formally and recorded: anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world; that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Thus the entire phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The fundamental ontological characteristics of this trinity are existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen (p. 235).

These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the structural whole which we are seeking. In the unity of those characteristics of Dasein’s Being which we have mentioned, says

Heidegger, this Being becomes something which it is possible for us to grasp as such ontologically. How is this unity itself to be characterised?

Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. The phrase 'is an issue' has been made plain in the state-of-Being of understanding — of understanding as self-projective Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This potentiality is that for the sake of which any Dasein is as it is. In each case Dasein has already compared itself, in its Being, with a possibility of itself. Being-free-for one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness, in anxiety. But ontologically, Being towards one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being means that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself in its Being. Dasein is always 'beyond itself not as a way of behaving towards other entities which it is not but as Being toward the potentiality-for-Being which it is itself. This structure of Being, which belongs to the essential 'is an issue', we shall denote, says Heidegger, as Dasein's 'Being-ahead-of-itself (p. 236).

But this structure pertains to the whole of Dasein's constitution. 'Being-ahead-of-itself does not signify anything like an isolated tendency in a worldless 'subject', but characterises Being-in-the-world. To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the fact that it has been delivered over to itself— that it has in each case already been thrown into a world. The abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial concreteness in anxiety. 'Being-ahead-of-itself means, if grasped more fully, 'ahead-of-itself-in-already-Being-in-a-world'. As soon as this essentially unitary structure is seen as a phenomenon what we have set forth earlier in our analysis of worldhood also becomes plain. The upshot of that analysis was that the referential totality of significance (which as such is constitutive for worldhood) has been 'tied up' with a 'for-the-sake-of-which'. The fact that this referential totality of the manifold relations of the 'in-order-to' has been bound up with that which is an issue for Dasein, does not signify that a 'world' of objects which is present-at-hand has been welded together with a subject. It is rather the phenomenal expression of the fact that the constitution of Dasein, whose totality is now brought out explicitly as ahead-of-itself-in-Being-already-in is primordially a whole. To put it otherwise, existing is always factical, existentiality is essentially determined by facticity (p. 236).

Furthermore, Dasein's factical existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown-potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it is always also ascribed in the world of its concern. In this falling Being-alongside, fleeing in the face of uncanniness (which for the most part remains concealed with latent anxiety, since the public-ness of the 'they' suppresses everything unfamiliar), announces itself, whether it does so explicitly or not, and whether it is understood or not. Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world essentially includes one's falling and one's Being-alongside those things ready-to-hand within-the-world with which one concerns oneself (pp. 236-7).

The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure; the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term 'care', which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner. From this signification every tendency of Being which one might have in mind ontically, such as worry or carefulness is ruled out (p. 237).

Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous analysis as concern, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it within the world could be taken as solicitude. Being alongside something is concern, because it is defined in a way of Being-in by its basic structure —

care. Care does not characterise just existentiality, as detached from facticity and falling; on the contrary, it embraces the unity of these ways in which Being may be characterised. So neither does 'care' stand primarily and exclusively for an isolated attitude of the 'I' towards itself. If one were to construct the expression 'care for oneself following this analogy of "concern" and "solicitude", this would be a tautology. 'Care' cannot stand for some special attitude towards the self; for the self has already been characterised ontologically by "Being-ahead-of-itself", a characteristic in which the other two items in the structure of care — Being-already-in and Being-alongside have been jointly posited (p. 237).

With the expression 'care' we have in mind a basic existential-ontological phenomenon, which all the same is not simple in its structure. The ontologically elemental totality of the care-structure cannot be traced back to some ontical 'primal element', just as Being certainly cannot be 'explained' in terms of entities. In the end it will show that the idea of Being in general is just as far from being 'simple' as is the Being of Dasein. In defining 'care' as 'Being-ahead-of-oneself-in-Being already-in ... as Being alongside', we have made it plain that even this phenomenon is, in-itself, still structurally articulated. But is this not a phenomenal symptom that we must pursue the ontological question even further until we can exhibit a still more primordial phenomenon which provides the ontological support for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care? We must show that what is ontologically 'new' in this interpretation is ontically quite old. Accordingly we shall now cite a document which is pre-ontological in character, even though its demonstrative force is 'merely historical' (p. 241).

We must bear in mind, cautions Heidegger, that in this document Dasein is expressing itself 'primordially', unaffected by any theoretical interpretation and without aiming to propose any. We must also note that Dasein's Being is characterised by historicality, though this must first be demonstrated ontologically. If Dasein is 'historical' in the very depths of its Being, then a deposition which comes from its history and goes back to it, and which, moreover, is prior to any scientific knowledge, will have a special weight, even though its importance is never purely ontological. That understanding of Being which lies in Dasein itself, expresses itself preontologically. The document which we are about to cite should make plain that our existential interpretation is not a mere fabrication but that as an ontological 'construction' it is well grounded and has been sketched out beforehand in elemental ways (pp. 241-2).

There is an ancient fable in which Dasein's interpretation of itself as 'care' is embedded:

'Once when "Care" was crossing a river, she saw someday; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. "Care" asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this and demanded that it be given his name instead. While "Care" and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter and he made the following decision which seemed a just one: Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. And since "Care" first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called "homo" for it is made out of humus (earth).'

This pre-ontological document become especially significant not only in that 'Care' is here seen as that to which human Dasein belongs 'for its lifetime', but also because this priority of 'Care' emerges in connection with the familiar way of taking man "as compounded of body (earth) and spirit. 'Cure prima finxit'; in care this entity has the 'source' of its Being. 'Cura teneat, quamdiu vixerit', the entity is not released from the source but is held fast, dominated by it through and through as long as this entity 'is in the world'. 'Being-in-the-world' has the stamp of 'care', which accords with its Being. It gets the name 'homo' not in consideration of its Being but in relation to that of which it consists (humus). The decision as to wherein the 'primordial' Being of this creature is to be seen, is left to Saturn, Time'. Thus the pre-ontological characterisation of man's essence expressed in this fable, has brought to view in advance the kind of Being which dominates his temporal sojourn in the world and does so through and through (p. 243).

Man's 'perfectio' — his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection) is 'accomplished' by 'care'. But with equal primordiality 'care' determines what is basically specific to this entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (thrownness). In the 'double meaning' of 'care', what we have in view is a single basic state in its essentially two-fold structure of thrown projection.

COMMENT

Heidegger's positing of anxiety as the basic state of disclosure of its ownmost Being proves, we feel, his lack of understanding of the phenomenon of affects. Here we would like to present to our readers an outline of the affect anxiety, its reason for generation, etc. But that will not end our objective. We will later discuss the reasons — mainly sociopolitical — as to why anxiety has been chosen as the basic phenomenon of disclosing the potentiality for Being. At the very outset, we will begin with a discussion of Freud on anxiety. Freud says, 'It is possible to start to work upon the subject of anxiety for quite a time without thinking at all of neorotic states. You will understand me at once when I describe this kind of anxiety as 'realistic' anxiety in contrast to "neurotic" anxiety. Realistic anxiety strikes us as something very rational and intelligible. We may say of it that it is reaction to the perception of an external danger — that is, of an injury which is expected and foreseen. It is connected with the flight reflex and it may be regarded as a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct. On what occasions anxiety appears — that is to say, in the face of what objects and what situation — will of course depend to a large extent on the state of a person's knowledge, and on his sense of power vis-a-vis the external world. We can quite understand how a savage is afraid of a cannon and frightened by an eclipse of the Sun, while a white man who knows how to handle the instrument and foretell the eclipse, remains without anxiety in these circumstances. On other occasions, it is actually superior knowledge that promotes anxiety, because it makes an early recognition of danger possible. Thus the savage will be terrified at a trail in the jungle that tells an uninformed person nothing, because it warns him of the proximity of a wild animal; and an experienced sailor will look with terror at a small cloud in the sky that seems trivial to a passenger, because it tells of an approaching hurricane.

On further consideration we must tell ourselves that our judgement that realistic anxiety is rational and expedient calls for drastic revision. For the only expedient behaviour, when a danger threatens would be a cool estimate of one's own strength in comparison with the magni tude of the threat, and on the basis of that, a decision as to whether flight or defense, or possibly even attack, offers the best prospect of a successful issue. But in this situation, there is no place at all for anxiety; everything that happens would be achieved just as well

and probably better if no anxiety were generated. And you can see, indeed, that if the anxiety is excessively great it proves in the highest degree inexpedient; it paralyses all action, including even flight. Usually the reaction to danger consists in a mixture of the affect of anxiety and defensive action. A terrified animal is afraid and flees; but the expedient part of this is the "flight" and not the ''being afraid". Thus one is tempted to assert that the generation of anxiety is never an expedient thing. It may perhaps help us to see more clearly if we dissect the situation of anxiety more carefully. The first thing about it is the preparedness for the danger, which manifests itself in increased sensory attention and motor tension. This expectant preparedness can be unhesitatingly recognised as an advantage; indeed, its absence may be made responsible for serious consequences. From it there then proceeds on the one hand motor action — flight in the first instance and at a higher level active defense — and on the other what we feel as a state of anxiety. The more the generation of anxiety is limited to a mere abortive beginning — to a signal — the more will the preparedness for anxiety transform itself without disturbance into action and the more expedient will be the shape taken by the whole course of events. Accordingly, the preparedness for anxiety seems to me to be the expedient element in what we call anxiety, and the generation of anxiety the inexpedient one. ... A certain ambiguity and indefiniteness in the use of the word 'Angst' will not have escaped you. By 'anxiety' we usually understand the subjective state into which we are put by perceiving the 'generation of anxiety' and we call this an affect. And what is an affect in a dynamic sense? It is in any case something highly composite. An affect includes in the first place particular motor innervations or discharges and secondly certain feelings; the latter are of two kinds — perception of the motor actions that have occurred and the direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which, as we say, give the affect its keynote. But I do not think that with this enumeration we have arrived at the essence of the affect. We seem to see deeper in the case of some affects and to recognise that the core which holds the combination we have described together is the repetition of some particular significant experience. This experience could only be a very early impression of a very general nature, placed in the pre-history not of the individual but of the species'. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (pp. 441-4) Pelican 1973.

We have given here Freid's concept of anxiety. But we have a few remarks to add here by way of modification and elaboration. Anxiety is, in our view, a later development of human society. Just as sexual instincts and survival of the progeny developed, as a consequence of social interaction in man, into the concept of love, anxiety too has two constitutive features—one is the primordial sensation of fear which is related to the survival of the self and the other is an ability to think about a danger which has not yet appeared. The latter is definitely the qualifying factor. The more a society is developed, the more arc the members accustomed to independent thinking. An example may elucidate the point. For a savage, any danger will motivate him either to defend or to attack or flee. But he will be less inclined to brood over the danger. His reaction to the danger is exceedingly simple. But in a similar situation a civilized man becomes a victim of anxiety. He broods over the pros and cons of all his reactions, the immediate effect as well as the after effects.

Now, anxiety can be generated both as a result at an immediate danger or by one which is not imminent or, when one is not sure of its imminence. Say, an aerial bombing attack at a certain locality and the general preparedness for war in a certain state. The former is a real immediate threat and the latter is a general threat. Both might cause anxiety. In the former case anxiety will be associated with taking some definite measures to keep oneself safe from the attack. The latter will also generate anxiety but of a general

indefinite nature. But if we say that in the latter case anxiety is generated from "nowhere' it will not be a correct statement. Rather we might say that the cause of anxiety is not yet concretised. But any anxiety should be due to some known or unknown but apprehensible danger.

Contrary to Heidegger's belief that anxiety is a basic state of mind whereby Dasein discloses its potehtiality-for-Being, it can only be said that anxiety like fear is generated due to some objective possibility of danger and not, as he claims, due to the confrontation of Dusein's authentic and inauthentic Being. It is a Christian religious concept. His explanation of anxiety as a basic state is devoid of any scientific content. Heidegger also says that the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world). This Being fills in the signification of the term 'Care'. Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken as concern and Being with Dasein-with of Others could be taken as solicitude. In a unique style he is reiterating that man is a social being and finds its ontico-ontological proof in a mythological story. While we agree with Heidegger that man is a social being, we do not accept the structure and proof as these do not find corroboration in scientific sociological analysis.

7. *Dasein and Temporality*

Heidegger develops in this chapter his argument about the possibility of attaining the ownmost potentiality of Being in Death. We will briefly sketch the logic of this argument and then state our observation.

Heidegger says about the analysis of Dasein that the existential analysis of Dasein done so far cannot lay any claim to primordiality. Its fore-having never included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein and of Dasein as less than a whole. If the interpretation of Dasein's Being is to become primordial, as a foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it must first have brought to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its possibilities of authenticity and totality (p. 276).

Thus arises the task of putting Dasein as a whole into fore-having. This signifies, however, that we must first of all raise the question of this entity's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, argues Heidegger. As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the 'end' itself belongs. The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is Death. This end which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being — that is to say, to existence — limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein. If, however, Dasein's Being-at-an-end in death and therewith its Being-a-whole, are to be included in the discussion of its possibly Being-a-whole, and if this is to be done in a way which is appropriate to the phenomena, then, Heidegger argues, we must have obtained an ontologically adequate conception of death — that is to say, an existential conception of it. But as something of the character of Dasein, death is only in an existentiell Being-towards-death. The existential structure of such Being proves to be the ontologically constitutive state of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. Thus the whole existing Dasein allows itself to be brought into our existential fore-having. In other words, according to Heidegger, this question — both the existentiell question of whether a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is possible, and existential question of the State-of-Being of 'end' and 'totality' — is one in which there remains the task of giving a positive analysis for some phenomena of existence which uptill now have been left aside. In the centre of these considerations we have the task of characterising ontologically Dasein's Being-at-an-end of achieving an existential conception of death (p. 277).

Death, Heidegger claims, is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in every case. With death Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility of no-longer-Being-able-to-be there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein has been undone. This ownmost non-relational possibility is at the same time the uttermost one (p. 294).

As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational and which is not to be outstripped. As such, death is something distinctively impending. Its existential possibility is based on the fact that Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and disclosed indeed, as ahead-of-itself. This item in the structure of care has its most primordial concretion in Being-towards-death. As a phenomenon, Being-towards-the-end becomes plainer as Being towards that distinctive possibility of Dasein which has been characterised (p. 294).

This ownmost possibility, however, non-relational and not to be outstripped, is not one which Dasein procures for itself subsequently and occasionally in the course of its Being. On the contrary, if Dasein exists, it has already been thrown into this possibility. Dasein does not proximally, and for the most part, have any explicit or even any theoretical knowledge of the fact that it has been delivered over to its death and that death thus belongs to Being-in-the-world. Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that State-of-mind which has been called 'anxiety'. Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety 'in the face of that potentiality-for-Being which is one's ownmost, non-relational and 16 not to be outstripped. That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world itself. That about which one has this anxiety is simply Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. Anxiety in the face of death, Heidegger warns, must not be confused with fear in the face of one's demise. This anxiety is not an accidental or random mood of 'weakness' in some individual; but, as a basic state of mind of Dasein, it amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end. Thus the existential conception of 'dying' is made clear as thrown Being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped. Precision is gained by distinguishing this from pure disappearance, and also from merely perishing and finally from the experience of demise (p. 295).

Being-towards-the-end does not first arise through some attitude which occasionally emerges, nor does it arise as such an attitude; it belongs essentially to Dasein's thrownness, which reveals itself in a State-of-mind in one way or another. The factual 'knowledge' or 'ignorance' which prevails in any Dasein as to its ownmost Being-towards-the-end is only the expression of the existentiell possibility that there are different ways of maintaining oneself in this Being. Factically, there are many who proximally and, for the most part, do not know about death; but this must not be passed off as a ground for proving that Being-towards-death does not belong to Dasein 'universally'. It only proves that proximally and, for the most part Dasein covers up its ownmost Being-towards-death, fleeing in the face of it. Factically, Dasein is dying as long as it exists, but proximally and for the most part, it does so by way of falling. For factical existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown-potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world, but it has always likewise been absorbed in the 'world' of its concern. In this falling Being-alongside, fleeing from uncanniness announces itself; and this means now, a fleeing in the face of one's ownmost Being-

towards-death. Existence, facticity and falling characterize Being-towards-the-end and are therefore constitutive for the existential conception of death. As regards its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care (p. 296).

But if Being-towards-death belongs primordially and essentially to Dasein's Being, then it must also be exhibitable in everydayness, even if proximally, in a way which is inauthentic. And if Being-towards-the-end should afford the existential possibility of an existentiell Being a-whole for Dasein, then this would give phenomenal confirmation for the -thesis that 'care' is the ontological term for the totality of Dasein's structural whole. If, however, we are to provide a full phenomenal justification for this principle, a preliminary sketch of the connection between Being-towards-death and care is not sufficient. This connection has to be seen, above all, in that concretion which lies closest to Dasein — its everydayness (p.296).

Contrary to the interpretation of the everyday manner in which the 'they' talks about death and the way death enters into Dasein, the existential-ontological conception of death may be defined as follows: death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility — non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end (p. 303).

Defining the existential structure of Being-towards-the-end helps to work out a kind of Being of Dasein in which Dasein, as Dasein, can be a whole. The fact that even everyday Dasein already is towards its end, that is to say, is constantly coming to grips with its death, though in a 'fugitive' manner, shows that this end, conclusive and determinative for Being-a-whole, is not something to which Dasein ultimately comes only in its demise. In Dasein, as Being towards its death, its own uttermost 'not-yet' has already been included — that 'not-yet' which all others lie ahead of. So if one has given an ontologically inappropriate interpretation of Dasein's 'not-yet' as something still outstanding, any formal inference from this to Dasein's lack of totality will not be correct. This phenomenon of the 'not-yet' has not been taken over from the 'ahead-of-itself'; no more than the care structure in general, can it serve as a higher court which would rule against the possibility of an existent Being-a-whole; Indeed this ahead-of-itself is what first of all makes such 'a Being-towards-the-end possible (p. 303).

The problem of the possible Being-a-whole of that entity which each of us is, is a correct one, if care, as Dasein's basic state, is 'connected' with death—the uttermost possibility of that entity (p. 303).

Being-towards-death is grounded in Care. Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the world, has in every case already been delivered over to its death. Dasein is dying radically and indeed constantly, as long as it has not yet come to its demise. When we say that Dasein is Tactically dying, we are saying at the same time that in its Being-towards-death Dasein has always decided itself in one way or another. Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic Being-towards-death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity. In-authenticity characterizes a kind of Being into which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of Being. Because Dasein exists it determines its own character as the kind of entity it is, and it does so in every case in terms of a possibility which it itself is and which it understands (pp. 303-4).

Can Dasein also understand authentically its ownmost possibility, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, which is certain and as such, indefinite? That is, can Dasein maintain itself in an authentic Being-to wards-its-end? As long as this authentic Being-towards-death has not been set forth and ontologically defined, there is something

essentially lacking in our existential interpretation of Being-towards-the-end (p. 304). This is the question Heidegger poses. And the following is purported to be an answer to this question:

According to Heidegger, we must characterize Being-towards-death as a Being towards a possibility—indeed towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. "Being — towards" a possibility, that is to say, towards something possible, may signify "Being-out-for" something possible as in concerning ourselves with its actualizations (p. 305).

Manifestly Being-towards-death, which is now in question, cannot have the character of concernfully Being out to get itself actualized. For one thing, death as possible is not something possible which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but a possibility of Dasein's Being. So to concern oneself with actualizing what is thus possible would have to signify "bringing about one's demise". But if this were done, Dasein would deprive itself of the very ground for an existing Being-towards-death (p. 305).

Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is "anticipation" of this possibility. But in this way of behaving does there not lurk a coming-close to the possible, does not its actualization emerge? In this kind of coming-close, however, one does not tend towards concernfully making available something actual; but as one comes closer understandingly, the possibilily of the possible just becomes 'greater'. The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual. The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all. Death, as a possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be actualized, nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing. In the anticipation of this possibility, it becomes 'greater and greater'; that is to say, the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more no less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence. In accordance with its essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, 'picturing' to oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility. Being-towards-death, as anticipation of possibility, is what first makes this possibility possible and sets it free as possibility (pp. 306-7).

Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that entity whose kind of Being is anticipation itself. In this anti-cipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility. But to project itself on its ownmost potentiality-for-Being means to be able to understand itself In the being of the entity so revealed — namely, to exist. Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being, that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. How arc we to delimit this structure phenomenally? Manifestly, we must do so by determining those characteristics which must belong to an anticipatory disclosure so that it can become the pure understanding of that ownmost possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped — which is certain and as such indefinite. It must be noted that understanding does not primarily mean just gazing at a meaning, but rather understanding oneself in that potentiality-for-Being which reveals itself in projection (p. 307).

The ownmost non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped. Being towards this possibility enables Dasein to understand that giving itself up impends for it as the

uttermost possibility of its existence. Anticipation, however, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up and thus it shatters all its tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached. In anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself or behind the potentiality-for-Being which it has understood. It guards itself against 'becoming too old for its victories' (Nietschze). Free for its ownmost possibilities, which are determined by the end, and so are understood as finite, Dasein dispels the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognise that it is getting outstripped by the existence-possibilities of Others or rather that it may explain these possibilities wrongly and force them back upon its own, so that it may divest itself of its ownmost factical existence. As the non-relational possibility, death individualizes — but only in such a manner that, as the possibility which is not to be outstripped, it makes Dasein as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others. Since anticipation of the possibility which is not to be outstripped discloses also all the possibilities which lie ahead of that possibility, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the whole of Dasein in advance in an existentiell manner; that is to say, it includes the possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-Being (pp. 308-9).

In anticipating the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of its own "there". In this very threat Being-towards-the-end must maintain itself. So little can it tone this down that it must rather cultivate the indefiniteness of this certainty. How is it existentially possible for this constant threat to be genuinely disclosed? All understanding is accompanied by a State-of-mind. Dasein's mood brings it face to face with the thrownness of its 'that it is there'. But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety. In this State-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible impossibility of existence. Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. Anticipation utterly individualises Dasein and allows it, in this individualisation of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being. For this reason, anxiety as a basic State of mind belongs to such a self-understanding of Dasein on the basis of Dasein itself. Being-to wards-death is essentially anxiety. This is attested unmistakably, though 'only directly', by Being-towards-death as we have described it, when it perverts anxiety into cowardly fear and in summoning this fear, only makes known its own cowardliness in the face of anxiety (pp. 310-1).

We may now summarise our characterisation of authentic Being-towards-death as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom-towards-death — freedom which has been released from the illusions of the 'they' and which is factical, certain of itself and anxious (p. 311).

COMMENT

Death is the ownmost and uttermost possibility of Being-a-whole for Dasein. This is the gist of Heidegger's thesis enunciated in this chapter. He has provided various explanations on the ontological foundation of this thesis which we have sketched out earlier.

Dasein is always a not-yet as long as it exists. The potentiality-for-Being which does not find fulfilment because of the they-self—in fact which remains covered by the they-self—moves towards fulfilment as Dasein approaches the death. But then the paradox lies in the fact that in death though the potentiality-for-Being approaches the ownmost and uttermost potentiality, it by the same movement reaches death itself whereby Dasein no longer exists.

It would be superfluous if we analyse and oppose all the constituent parts of this thesis. However, we shall generally discuss the phenomenon of death and its relation to individual Being. Death is the end of all living beings. As soon as one is born, one's death is also a foregone conclusion. Death is the negation of life. In fact, in every birth, the embryo of death is also existent. From the moment of birth as life proceeds the forces of death becomes stronger until finally the protein bodies can no longer sustain themselves and succumb. But then what relation does this process have with the development of potentiality of a human being? Contrary to the locus described by Heidegger, we find that each human being traverses first through the periods of childhood and youth and then finally reaches the old age. Childhood is the period of learning. At this stage the child learns the laws of nature and the society. This prepares him for adulthood. The period of youth is the most eventful part of life whereby a person develops his potentiality as such to the utmost extent. The vital biological energies sustain man at this period to etch out his impression on the society itself. Then comes the old age when the faculties become weaker, the response to the objects, sounds and other phenomena of nature becomes slow and difficult. The brain does not work properly. It is that part of life of human beings which is characterised by detachment. For any human individual living in a concrete society — not the imaginary Dasein of Heidegger — youth is the most eventful period when the potentiality of Being comes to its fullest. All great men of science and arts will testify through their biographies that the middle span of their existence was the most fruitful part in their lives.

It is common knowledge that the old age, when man decisively proceeds towards death, is characterised by his failure to register the impressions of the world around, because it is through our five senses that we get and keep in constant touch with the outer world. When they give in one by one, the relation with the outer world also gets detached progressively. And the more this detachment, the more human beings approach the stages that were at the beginning of life — though in a reverse order — until they finally reach death itself, i.e., the state of inanimate object. Hence if a curve of potentiality is drawn with the age as abscissa and potentiality as ordinate, it will show that the curve reaches a pitch at the youth, levels off for sometime and then takes a sharp downward motion at the old age and finally becomes zero at death. It is the general biological and anthropological view about the potentiality-of-Being.

Heidegger's curve is exactly the opposite. It reaches the peak when the Dasein is approaching death. Which potentiality-for-Being is it? He has not furnished an explanation of what he understands by the potentiality-for-Being. No philosophical statement can be above all the postulates of biology, anthropology and sociology i.e., science. But in spite of a very rigorous analysis Heidegger comes to such conclusions that find no corroboration in the scientific analysis.

We have analysed the affect anxiety — how it is generated, what are its constituent parts, etc. According to Heidegger, in anxiety Dasein comes face to face against itself, that is, the potentiality-for-Being confronts the they-self. This confrontation is analogous to Dasein's confronting death. Because as in the former, so in the latter, Dasein comes up to the possibility of choosing between authentic and in-authentic Being. Thus the possibility arises for Dasein's Being-a-whole which is choosing the authentic potentiality for Being. But according to our interpretation, which we claim to be scientific and is not derived a priori, we have shown that anxiety is just another affect like love or hatred. Its basic origin is also the existence of external danger. This external danger may be at close or far. Anxiety is brooding over an external danger which is detrimental to the survival of the self. As love is brooding over a mate for the survival of the species. In both of these cases the root cause is the fundamental requirement — survival of the self and survival of the species. There is one similarity between anxiety and death; anxiety is brooding over an external danger which may annihilate the man who is anxious. But this apparent simple relation also contradicts Heidegger's thesis. In anxiety one tends to flee from death. There is no question of choosing. To satisfy Heidegger, one has to show that the concerned individual chooses his own end or annihilation. But anxiety is caused due to that only — from the instinct of survival of the self. Hence in anxiety one anticipates death in the form of choosing — this formulation is contrary to what exactly happens. In anxiety, one flees from death, and that is why one is anxious. There are some other anxieties too — anixety over the career of one's son, anxiety for the well-being of a neighbour, etc. These anxieties have no direct connection with the threat to life but some indirect relationship is evident. However, the point is that anxiety and death stand opposed to each other. This goes against Heidegger's central thesis equating these two. Hence let us reiterate:

(1) In old age, when one approaches death his potentiality-for-Being is on the decline.

(2) Anxiety is not a 'basic state of mind'. It is only an affect. The basic cause of anxiety comes from the threat to one's survival.

(3) In anxiety one tends to flee from the clutches of death.

(4) Death and anxiety are two opposing phenomena. One is anxious because of a threat of death.

8. *Dasein's attestation of an authentic potentiality-for-Being and resoluteness*

The existential interpretation of conscience is to exhibit an attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-Being — an attestation which is in Dasein itself. Conscience attests not by making something known in an undifferentiated manner, but by calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty. That which is so attested becomes 'grasped' in the hearing which understands the call undisguisedly in the sense it has itself intended. The understanding of the appeal is a mode of Dasein's Being and only as such does it give us the phenomenal content of what the call of conscience attests. The authentic understanding of the call has been characterised as 'wanting to have a conscience'. This is the way of letting one's ownmost self take action in itself of its own accord in its Being-guilty and represents phenomenally that authentic potentiality-for-Being which Dasein itself attests (p. 342).

Wanting to have a conscience is, as an understanding of oneself in one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a way in which Dasein has been disclosed. This disclosedness is constituted by discourse and state-of-mind as well as by understanding. To understand in

an existentiell manner implies projecting oneself in each case upon one's ownmost factical possibility of having the potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world (p. 342).

Understanding the call discloses one's own Dasein in the uncanniness of its individualisation. The uncanniness which is revealed in understanding and revealed along with it, becomes genuinely disclosed by the state of mind of anxiety which belongs to that understanding. The fact of the anxiety of conscience gives us, Heidegger asserts, phenomenal confirmation that in understanding the call, Dasein is brought face to face with its own uncanniness. Wanting to have a conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety (p. 342.)

The third essential item in disclosedness is discourse. The call itself is a primordial kind of discourse for Dasein; but there is no corresponding counter-discourse in which, let us say, one talks about what the conscience has said, and pleads one's cause. In hearing the call understandingly, one denies oneself any counter-discourse, not because one has been assailed by an 'obscure power', which suppresses one's hearing but because this hearing has appropriated the content of the call unconcealedly. In the call one's constant Being-guilty is represented, and in this way the self is brought back from the loud idle talk which goes with the common-sense of the 'they'. Thus the mode of Articulative discourse which belongs to wanting to have a conscience, is one of the reticence. Keeping silent has been characterised as an essential possibility of discourse. Anyone who keeps silent when he wants to give us to understand something must have 'something to say'. In the appeal Dasein gives itself to understand its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. This calling is therefore a keeping silent. This discourse of the conscience never comes to utterance. Only in keeping silent does the conscience call; that is to say, the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness, and the Dasein which it summons is called back into stillness of itself and called back as something that is to become still. Only in reticence, therefore, is this silent discourse understood appropriately in wanting to have a conscience. It takes the words away from the common-sense idle-talk of the 'they' (p. 343).

The common-sense way of interpreting the conscience, which 'sticks rigorously to the facts', takes the silent discourse of the conscience as an occasion for passing it off as something which is not at all ascertainable or present-at-hand. The fact that 'they', who hear and understand nothing but loud idle talk, can not 'report' any call, is held against the conscience on the subterfuge that it is 'dumb' and manifestly not present-at-hand. With this kind of interpretation, the 'they' merely covers up its own failure to hear the call and the fact that its 'hearing' does not reach very far (p. 343).

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience is thus constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience — this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety — we call 'resoluteness'.

In resoluteness the issue for Dasein is its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical possibilities. Resolution does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the 'they'. The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein includes the items constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a 'situation' (p. 346).

In the term ‘situation’ there is an overtone of a signification that is spatial. We shall not try to eliminate this from the existential conception for such an overtone is also implied in the ‘there’ of Dasein. Being-in-the-world has a spatiality of its own, characterised by the phenomena of deseverence and directionality. Dasein makes room insofar as it factically exists. But spatiality of the kind which belongs to Dasein, and on the basis of which existence always determines its ‘location’, is grounded in the state of Being-in-the-world, for which disclosedness is primarily constitutive. Just as the ‘spatiality’ of the ‘there’ is grounded in disclosedness, the situation has its foundation in resoluteness. The situation is the ‘there’ which is disclosed in resoluteness — the ‘there’ as which the existent entity is there. It is not a framework present-at-hand in which Dasein occurs or into which it might even just bring itself. Far removed from any present-at-hand mixture of circumstances and accidents which we encounter, the situation is only through resoluteness and in it. The current factical involvement — character of the circumstances discloses itself to the self only when that involvement character is such that one has resolved upon the ‘there’ as which that self in existing, has to be. When what we call accident befall from the with-world and environment they can be-fall only resoluteness (p. 346).

For the ‘they’ however, the situation is essentially something that has been closed-off. The ‘they’ knows only the ‘general situation’, loses itself in those ‘opportunities’ which are closest to it and paves Dasein’s way by a reckoning up of ‘accidents’ which it fails to recognise, deems its own achievement and passes off as such (pp. 346-7).

COMMENT

Heidegger’s concept and rigorous analysis of guilt and conscience are, to say the least, wildly imaginary and do not find any attestation from scientific sociology. Further, his claim that the primordiality of the concept precedes biology shows that Heidegger’s conception of biology is analogous to that of Christian theology. In the preceding pages we have given a sketch of the Heideggerian analysis of these phenomena and hence here we shall not refer to the incongruity of the analysis put forth by him. Rather we shall try to give a sketch of the origin and development of the phenomena like conscience, call of conscience and guilt. This will justify our objection to Heidegger’s interpretation.

Conscience or call of conscience cannot be viewed in isolation from the concept of morality in a particular society. And morality and along with it ethics cannot be viewed in isolation from the kind of society in which the concept is prevalent. And the society cannot be viewed in isolation from the kind of social relations existing therein in terms of classes. To borrow Marxian terminologies, morality, ethics, conscience both individual and social, are the superstructural characteristics of a particular society and differ from society to society varying from each other in terms of class relations existing in each society. Hence conscience or call of conscience for the same activity will be different in different individuals living in different societies although the acts performed by the individual may be similar.

In passing, we want to make another important point. Conscience, call of conscience, feeling of guilt, etc. are attributes of civilized man. Only at a particular development of a society, do these concepts arise. To claim that these are primordial concepts smacks of utter ignorance of the concepts of biology and anthropology. We will give historical sketch of the development of these concepts in due course.

While discussing Sartre, we have elaborated the origin and development of consciousness right from the lowest living organism upto human beings — the highest

expression of life. The origin and development of concepts like morality, ethics, conscience, etc. can be traced back to the origin and development of social consciousness — which is the higher form of non-human or animal consciousness which is in turn nothing but the crude reflection of outer reality for survival and propagation of species. Hence consciousness "is first, of course, …consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious. At the same time, it is the consciousness of nature which first appears to men as a completely alien, all-powerful and unassailable force, with which men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed by beasts; it is thus purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion).

"We see here immediately: this natural religion or animal behaviour towards nature is determined by the form of the society and vice-versa. Here, as everywhere, the identity of nature and men appears in such a way that the restricted relation of man to nature determines their restricted relation to one another and their restricted relation to one another determines man's restricted relation to nature, just because nature is as yet hardly modified historically; and, on the other hand, man's consciousness of the, necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This beginning is as animal as social life itself is at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.

"This sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension through increased productivity, the increase of needs and, what is fundamental to both of these, the increase of population. With these there appears division of labour, which was originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, then that division of labour which develops spontaneously or 'naturally' by virtue of natural disposition (e.g. physical strength), needs, accidents, etc. etc. Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. From this moment onwards, consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it is really conceiving something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it is really conceiving something without conceiving something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc. comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur as a result of the fact that existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production; this, moreover, can also occur in a particular national sphere of relations through the appearance of the contradiction, not within the national orbit but between this national consciousness and the practice of other nations, i.e. between the national and general consciousness of a nation.

"Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity — enjoyment and labour, production and consumption — devolve on different individuals and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour. It is self-evident, moreover, that 'spectres', 'bonds', 'the higher beings', 'concept', 'scruple', are merely the idealistic spiritual expression, the conception apparently of the isolated individual, the

image of very empirical fetters and limitations, within which the mode of production of life and the form of existence coupled with it, move." (K. Marx & F. Engles, German ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, pp. 50-1).

This sketch of the historical process of development of consciousness agrees with our remarks made in passing that idealistic concepts like conscience, guilt etc. originally appeared when there took place sufficient differentiation of the society in the sphere of social production i.e., during the period of differentiation of mental and physical labour. Just as the concept of beauty, taste, etc. were acquired by humanity after a certain development of the society from the primitive stage so also did the moral and ethical codes of conduct. Let us now enquire why on earth and how did these codes originate, what was the prime motive force for the development of these codes of morality. Here we come to the threshold of the history of development of the society from the stage of primitive communism to its higher stages.

With the division of labour taking root, there appeared in society division of classes — in the beginning at a very rudimentary level but Inter in a more pronounced way, differentiating and grouping the inmates. This division of labour also brought about the division between enjoyment and labour, consumption and production. Hence, it was necessary at this stage of social development to ensure this division between enjoyment and labour, consumption and production. How could this be achieved? It was only possible by the imposition of one class upon the other classes by the use of brute force. This is the rudimentary concept of state power. But only brute force was not the permanent guarantee for perpetuation of this division. There were chances of rebellions etc. and as the exploiting class has a tendency to exploit more and more in a bid to enjoy more, both the number of individuals getting exploited and their degree of exploitation have to be increased. Brute force was not the sufficient guarantee to keep the majority under control. Hence arose the social institutions like religion etc. that established the divine right to exploit. It will be observed, particularly in the ancient societies that the king possesses the divine right to rule. Along with the king, the divine right is also enjoyed by the priests who perform their functions in the society as demigods. Religion then is that social institution in which both the exploiters and the exploited, the rulers and the ruled are brought as though under one roof. But as is already observed, the prime motive of religion, particularly the religion of the ruling class, is to instil among the coreligionists the inviolable right of the ruler to exploit. In all religions, there are codes of conduct that are binding for the members of the society. An analysis of these codes will reveal that they agree with the requirement of the society for the benefit of the ruling class. In most cases, these are claimed to have come to the heathen from the mouth of the god or gods or his prime representatives. Not to abide by it is to go against the will of God and is punishable. As we have observed a while ago, only brute force of the ruling class is not the sufficient guarantee for perpetuation of this exploitation. Religion along with the codes of conduct is a far superior guarantee for keeping the people in check and obedience. Hence for each society, depending on the relations of production, the codes of conduct of the individual members and community vary. With the change in productive forces and production relations, the requirement of a society changes and so does the code of conduct. In one society, polyandry may be a rule and in another a crime. In one society, polygamy may be a common practice and, in another, punishable by stoning to death. Hence, in societies, codes of conduct vary with the requirement of the ruling class.

Now where does conscience come from? It also comes from the existing codes of conduct. In an unequal society, an individual belonging to the non-exploiting class if appropriates something from a member of the same society — even if that member

belongs to the exploiting class — may suffer from guilty conscience whereas the members of the exploiting class feel no qualms of conscience because the codes of conduct prevailing in that society permit appropriation from others in the sphere of relationship of production.

Hence conscience, call of conscience, consciousness of guilt, etc. arise from an individual's class relation in a particular society. As we have pointed out earlier, different societies with different class-relations existing therein will instil among the members such idea of conscience that is compatible with the class relations of that society and the code of conduct operating therein. There are periods when one set of values existing certain society faces enormous stress because the society cannot proceed further with that set of values. Then the values that were previously strictly adhered to get slackened and are ultimately honoured more by breach than by observance. It is not the place to discuss at length the materialist conceptions of these subjects, namely, conscience, call of conscience, consciousness of guilt, etc. However, we want to conclude this discussion by quoting from Frederick Engels who In his book 'Anti-Duhring' has given a comprehensive idea about it, Engels wrote, "when we see that the three classes of modern society, the feudal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, each have a morality of their own, we can only draw the conclusion that men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort from the practical relations on which their class position is based from the economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange. Hut even so, there is quite a lot which the three moral theories mentioned above have in common—-is this not at least a portion of a morality which is fixed once and for all? These moral theories represent three different stages of the same historical development, have therefore a common historical background, and for that reason alone necessarily have much in common. Even more. At the same or approximately at the same stages of economic development, moral theories must of necessity be more or less in agreement. From the moment when private ownership of personal property developed, all societies in which this private ownership existed had to have this moral injunction in common: Thou shalt not steal. Does this injunction thus become an eternal moral injunction? Not at all. In a society in which the- motives for stealing are done away with, in which therefore, in the course of lime at the very most only the lunatics can steal, how 17 the preacher of morals would be jeered at who tried solemnly to proclaim the eternal truth: Thou shalt not steal (Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, FLPH Peking 1976, pp. 117-8).

Hence Heidegger's theory of the call of conscience by which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being hears the call and when Dasein can choose between authentic and inauthentic Being falls flat on the ground because conscience is a term which has no existence in a savage society and develops only as a result of differentiation of classes and the division of labour. This individual conscience which is nothing but a reflection of the code of ethics prevailing in a certain society is also differentiated depending upon which class this individual member of the society belongs to. Hence the call of conscience of Dasein will be different for different Daseins belonging to different classes. In fact at the end of this critique we will show to which class Heidegger's Dasein belongs. At present, however, it will suffice to say that Heidegger's claim about the primordiality of this phenomenon is nothing but imaginary. But as all imaginations have to take off from a certain context of reality, Heidegger's imagination has also a certain socio-politico-cultural root. This will be investigated in due course.

9. Dasein's Authentic Potentiality-for-Being-a-whole and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care

Dasein is either authentically or inauthentically disclosed to itself as regards its existence. In existing, Dasein understands itself, and in such a way indeed, that this understanding does not merely get something in its grasp, but makes up the existentiell Being of its factical potentiality-for-Being. This Being which is disclosed is that of an entity of which this Being is an issue. The meaning of this Being — that is, of Care — is what makes care possible in its constitution, and it is what makes up primordially the Being of this potentiality-for-Being. The meaning of Dasein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and outside of itself, but is the self-understanding Dasein itself (p. 372).

That which was projected in the primordial existential projection of existence has revealed itself as anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness when taken formally and existentially is Being towards one's ownmost distinctive potentiality-for-Being. This sort of a thing is possible only in that Dasein can, indeed, come towards itself in its ownmost possibility and that it can put up with this possibility as a possibility in thus letting itself come towards itself—-in other words, that it exists. This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of future as coining towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death belongs to Dasein's Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible only as something futural, in the sense now indicated. By the term 'futural' it does not mean a 'now' which has not yet become 'actual' and which sometime will be for the first time. It expresses the coming in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, comes towards itself. Anticipation makes Dasein authentically futural and in such a way that the anticipation itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always coming towards itself, that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in general (p. 372).

Anticipatory resoluteness understands Dasein in its own essential Being-guilty. This understanding means that in existing one takes over Being-guilty; it means being the thrown basis of nullity. But taking over thrownness signifies Being Dasein authentically as it already was. Taking over thorownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost 'as it already was'—that is to say, its 'been'. Only in so far as Dasein is as an 'I-am-as-having-been', can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back. As Authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as 'having-been'. Anticipation of one's uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one's ownmost 'been'. Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of 'having been' arises, in a certain way from the future (p. 373).

Anticipatory resoluteness discloses the current situation of the 'there' such a way that existence, in taking action, is circumspectively concerned with what is tactically ready-to-hand environmentally. Re-solute Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand in the situation, that is to say, lacking action in such a way as to let one encounter what has presence environmentally, is possible only by making such an entity present. Only as the Present in the sense of making present, can resolute-ness be what it is, namely, letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes upon in taking action (pp. 373-4).

Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness brings itself into the situation by making present. The character of 'having been' arises from the future, and in such a way that the future which has been the future, and in such a way that the future which has been (or better, 'which is in the process of having been') releases from itself the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been;

we designate it as ‘temporality’. Only in so far as Dasein has the definite character of temporality, is the authentic-potentiality-of-being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness, as we have described it, made possible for Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care. The phenomenal content of this meaning, drawn from the State of Being of anticipatory resoluteness, fills in the signification of the term ‘temporality’. In our terminological use of this expression, says Heidegger, we must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of ‘future’, ‘past’ and ‘present’, which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary conception of time. This holds also for conceptions of a time which is ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ ‘immanent’ or ‘transcendent’. Inasmuch as Dasein understands itself in a way which, proximally and for the most part, is inauthentic, we may suppose that time as ordinarily understood does indeed represent a genuine phenomenon but one which is derivative. It arises from in-authentic temporality, which has a source of its own. The conceptions of ‘future’, ‘past’ and ‘present’ have first arisen in terms of inauthentic way of understanding time. In terminologically delimiting the primordial and authentic phenomena which correspond to these, we have to struggle against the same difficulty which keeps all ontological terminology in its grip. When violences are done in this field of investigation, they are not arbitrary but have a necessity grounded in the facts. If, however, we are to point out without gaps in the argument, how in-authentic temporality has its source in temporality which is primordial and authentic, the primordial phenomenon, described earlier in rough and ready fashion, must be worked out correctly (pp. 374-5).

If resoluteness makes up the mode of authentic care, and if this itself is possible only through temporality, then the phenomenon in which we have arrived at by taking a look at resoluteness, must present us with only a modality of temporality by which, after all, care as such is made possible. Dasein’s totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-Being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world). When it was first fixed upon this articulated structure, it was suggested that with regard to this articulation the ontological question must be pursued still further back until the unity of the totality of this structural manifoldness has been laid bare. The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality (p. 375).

The ‘ahead’ indicates the future of a sort which would make it possible for Dasein to be such that its potentiality-for-Being is an issue. Self-projection upon the ‘for-the-sake-of-oneself is grounded in the future and is an essential characteristic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future. Likewise, with the ‘already’, We have in view the existential temporal meaning of the Being of that entity which, in so far as it is, is already something that has been thrown. Only because care is based on the character of ‘having-been’, can Dasein exist as the thrown entity which it is. ‘As long as’ Dasein factically exists, it is never past, but it always indeed as already having-been, in the sense of the “I-am-as-having-been.” (pp. 375-6).

On the other hand, we call an entity ‘past’ when it is no longer present-at-hand. Therefore, Dasein, in existing, can never establish as a fact, which is present at hand, arising and passing away ‘in the course of time’, with a bit of it past already. Dasein never finds itself except as a thrown fact. In the state-of-mind in which it finds itself, Dasein is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already was, that is to say, which it constantly is as having-been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in the character of ‘having-been’. In the pre-ceding formulation of the structure of care, the temporal meaning of existentiality and facticity is indicated by the expression ahead and already. The third item constitutive of care is Being-alongside which falls, This should not signify that falling is also grounded in temporality; it should, instead, give us a hint

that making-present, as the primary basis for falling into the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves remains'included in the future and in the having-been and is included in these in the mode of primordial temporality. When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment vision' as regards the situation which has been disclosed (p. 376).

Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity and falling in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care. The items of care have not been pieced together cumulatively any more than temporality itself has been put together 'in the course of time' out of the future, the having been and the present. Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself. Temporality temporalizes and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of Dasein's modes of Being and the basic possibility of authentic or inauthentic existence (pp. 376-7).

Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been and the present, the 'ecstases' of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases. What is characteristic of the 'time' which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of the 'nows', without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatical character of the primordial temporality has been levelled off. But this very levelling off in accordance with its existential meaning is grounded in the possibility of a definite kind of temporalizing, in conformity with which temporality temporalizes as inauthentic the kind of 'time' just mentioned. If therefore it is demonstrated that the 'time' which is accessible to Dasein's common sense is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, one is justified in designating a 'primordial time' the temporality which has been now laid bare (p. 377).

10. Temporality and Everydayness

Resoluteness, characterized with regard to its temporal meaning, represents an authentic disclosedness of Dasein — a disclosedness which constitutes an entity of such a kind that in existing, it can be its very 'there'. Care has been characterized with regard to its temporal meaning but only in its basic features. To exhibit its concrete temporal constitution, means to give a temporal interpretation of the items of structure, taking them each singly: understanding, state-of-mind, falling and discourse. The current temporal constitution of these phenomena leads back in each case to that one kind of temporality which seems as such to guarantee the possibility that understanding, state-of-mind, falling and discourse are united in their structure (pp. 384-5).

TEMPORALITY AND UNDERSTANDING

Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present-an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding "having-been". The authentic coming-towards-itself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming-back to one's ownmost self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. It Being-as-having-been is authentic, it is called 'repetition'. But when one projects onself inauthentically, towards those possibilities which have been drawn from

the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a positive ecstatical mode of one's having been — a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of hacking away in the face of one's ownmost "been", and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself—in such a manner Indeed, that, this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is backing away and thereby closes itself off too (pp. 388-9).

THE TEMPORALITY OF STATE OF MIND

Understanding is never free-floating, but always goes with the same state of mind. The "there" gets equiprimordially disclosed by one's mood in every case — or gets closed off by it. Having a mood brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness in such a manner that this thrownness is not known as such but disclosed far more primordially in 'how one is'. Existentially, "Being-thrown" means finding oneself In some state-of-mind or other. One's state" of mind is therefore based upon thrownness. My mood represents whatever may be the way in which I am primarily the entity that has been thrown (p. 389).

One's mood discloses in the manner of turning thither or turning away from one's own Dasein. Bringing Dasein face-to-face with the that-it-is of its own thrownness — whether authentically revealing it or Inauthentically covering it up — becomes existentially possible only if Dasein's Being, by its very meaning, constantly is as having been. The "been" is not what first brings one face to face with the thrown entity which one is oneself; but the ecstasis of the "been" is what first makes it possible to find oneself in the way of having a state-of-mind (p. 390).

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one's state of mind, however, temporalizes itself primarily in having-been. Moods temporalize themselves, that is, their specific ecstasis belongs to a future and a present in such a way, indeed, that these equiprimordial ecstases are modified by having been (p. 390).

The task is to exhibit the ontological structure of having a mood in its existential — temporal constitution. And, of course, this is proximally just a matter of first making the temporality of moods visible. The thesis that 'one's state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having-been' means that the existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back to something. This bringing-back does not first produce a having-been; but in any state of mind some mode of having-been is made manifest for existential analysis. So if one has to interpret state-of-mind temporally, the aim is not one of deducing moods from temporality and dissolving them into pure phenomena of temporalizing. What is to be demonstrated that except on the basis of temporality, moods are not possible in what they 'signify' in an existential way or in how they signify it (pp. 390-1).

Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself — or in other words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one's object of concern. The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be lit up. What is the temporal meaning of this revealing? Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into uncanniness. It brings one back to pure "that-it-is" of one's ownmost individualised thrownness. This bringing back has neither the character of an evasive forgetting nor that of remembering. But just as little does anxiety imply that one has already taken over one's existence into one's resolution and

done so by a repeating. On the contrary, anxiety brings one back to one's thrownness as something possible which can be repeated. And in this way it also reveals the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being — a potentiality which must, in repeating, come back to its thrown "there", but come back as something future which comes towards. The character of having-been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatical mode of this character (pp. 393-4).

THE TEMPORALITY OF FALLING

In the temporal interpretation of understanding and state-of-mind, Heidegger says that he has not only come up against a primary ecstasis for each of these phenomena, but at the same time, has always come against temporality as a whole. Just as understanding is made possible primarily by the future, and moods are made possible by having-been, the third constitutive item in the structure of care, namely falling, has its existential meaning in the present (pp. 396-7).

THE TEMPORALITY OF DISCOURSE

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having-been (whether in repetition or in having-forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots primarily in the present (whether in making present or in the moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in every case a present which 'is in the process of having-been'. All the same one's state-of-mind temporalizes itself as a future which is 'making present'. And all the same the present 'leaps away' from a future that is in the process of having-been, or else it is held on to by such a future. Thus we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity and falling, that is, the unity of the Care-Structure.

Temporalizing does not signify that ecstasis come in a 'succession.' The future is not later than having-been and having-been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been.

When the 'there' has been completely disclosed, its disclosedness is constituted by understanding state-of-mind and falling; and this disclosedness is articulated by discourse. Thus discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in any definite ecstasis.

11. *Temporality and Historicality*

Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch 'of life' — one which is somehow present-at-hand — with the phases of its momentary actualities. It stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching-along. The 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies in the Being of Dasein. On the other hand, it is by no means the case that Dasein 'is' actual in a point of time, and that apart from this, it is surrounded by the non-actuality of its birth and death. Understood existentially, birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand and death is just as far from having the kind of Being something still outstanding not yet present-at-hand but coming along. Factical Dasein exists as born; and as born it is already dying, in the sense of Being towards death. As long as Dasein factically exists both the 'ends' and their 'between' are and they are in the only way which is possible on the basis of Dasein's Being as care. Thrownness and that Being to wards death in which one either

flees it or anticipates it, form a unity; and in this unity birth and death are connected in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein is the 'between' (pp. 426-7).

In temporality, however, the constitutive totality of care has a possible basis for its unity. Accordingly, it is within the horizon of Dasein's temporal constitution that we must approach the ontological clarification of the 'connectedness of life" that is to say, the stretching along, the movement and the persistence which are specific for Dasein. The movement of existence is not the motion of something present-at-hand. It is definable in terms of the way Dasein stretches along. The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, is called 'historizing'. The question of Dasein's connectedness is the ontological problem of Dasein's historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicality (p. 427).

Dasein factically has its 'history' and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted by historicality. This thesis must be justified with the aim of expounding the ontological problem of history as an existential one (p. 434).

Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out. Only Being-free for death gives Dasein its goal outright and pursues existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one — those of comfortableness, shirking and taking things lightly — and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate. This is how is designated Dasein's primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen (p. 435).

Dasein can be reached by the blows of fate only because in the depths of its Being Dasein is fate in the sense it has been described. Existing fatefully in the resoluteness which hands itself down, Dasein has been disclosed as Being-in-the-world both for the 'fortunate' circumstances which 'come its way' and for the cruelty of accidents. Fate does not first arise from the clashing together of events and circumstances. Even one who is irresolute gets driven about by these — more so than one who has chosen; and yet he can 'have' no fate (p. 436).

Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness for adversities — the power of projecting oneself upon one's own Being guilty, and of doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety. As such, fate requires as the ontological condition for its possibility, the state of Being, of care, that is to say, temporality. Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the mode of fate; that is to say, only then can it be historical in the very depths of its existence (pp. 436-7).

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical "there" by shattering itself against death, that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over Its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like late, — that is to say, authentic historicality (p. 437)

It is not necessary that in resoluteness one should explicitly know the origin of the possibilities upon which that resoluteness projects itself. It is rather in Dasein's temporality, and there only, that there lies any possibility that the existentiell potentiality-for-Being upon which it projects itself can be gleaned explicitly from the way Dasein has

been traditionally understood. The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly, that is to say, going back into the possibilities of Dasein that has-been-there The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been — the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero — is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated. But when one has, by repetition, handed down to oneself a possibility that has been, the Dasein that has-been-there is not disclosed in order to be actualized over again. The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something that is 'past', nor does it bind the 'present' back to that which has already been 'outstripped'. Arising as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is 'past', just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the 'today', is working itself out as the 'past'. Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives (pp. 437-8).

Repetition is characterised as a mode of that resoluteness which hands itself down — the mode by which Dasein exists especially by fate. But if fate constitutes the primordial historicality of Dasein, then history has its essential importance neither in what is past, nor in the 'today' and its 'connection' with what is past, but in that authentic historizing of existence which arises from Dasein's future. As a way of Being for Dasein, history has its roots so essentially in the future that death as that possibility of Dasein which has already been characterized, throws anticipatory existence back upon its factical thrownness and so for the first time imparts to having been its peculiarly privileged position in the historical. Authentic Being-towards-death, that is to say, the finitude of temporality, is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicality. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this, no historiology is as yet needed (p. 438).

Resoluteness implies handing itself down by anticipation to the 'there' of the moment of vision; and this handing down is called 'fate'. This is also the ground for destiny, by which we understand Dasein's historizing in Being-with-Others. In repetition, fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest. Historizing is itself grounded existentially in the fact that Dasein, as temporal, is open ecstatically; so too is the disclosedness which belongs to historizing or rather so too is the way in which we make this disclosedness our own (p. 438).

That which we, says Heidegger, have hitherto been characterizing as 'historicality' to conform with the kind of historizing which lies in anticipatory resoluteness, we now designate as Dasein's 'authentic historicality'. From the phenomena of handing down and repeating, which are rooted in the future, it has become plain why the historizing of authentic history lies preponderantly in having been. But it remains all the more enigmatic in what way this historizing, as fate, is to constitute the whole 'connectedness' of Dasein from its birth to its death. How can recourse to resoluteness bring us any enlightenment? Is not each resolution just one more single 'Experience' in the sequence of the whole connectedness of our experiences? Is the 'connectedness' of authentic historizing to consist, let us say, of an uninterrupted sequence of resolutions? Why is it

that the question of how the 'connectedness of life' is constituted finds no adequate and satisfying answer? Is not our investigation overhasty? Does it not, in the end, hang too much on the answer, without first having tested the legitimacy of the question? Nothing is so plain from the course of the existential analytic so far, as the fact that the ontology of Dasein is always falling back upon the allurements of the way in which Being is ordinarily under-stood. The only way of encountering this fact methodologically is by studying the source of the question of how Dasein's connectedness is constituted, no mailer how 'obvious' this question may be and by determining within what onlological horizon it moves (pp. 438-9).

The thesis of Dasein's historicality does not say that the worldless subject is historical, but that what is historical is the entity that exists as Being-in-the-world. The historizing of history is the historizing of Being-in-the world. Dasein's historicality is essentially the historicality of the world, which, on the basis of ecstatico-horizontal temporality, belongs to the temporalizing of that temporality. In so far as Dasein exists factically, it already encounters that which has been discovered within-the-world. With the existence of the historical Being-in-the-world, what is ready-to,-hand and what is present-to-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world. Equipment and work—for instance, books — have their 'fates'; buildings and institutions have their history. And even nature is historical. It is not historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of 'natural history', but nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult. These entities within the world are historical as such, and their history does not signify something 'external' which merely accompanies the 'inner' history of the soul. We call such entities as 'the world-historical'. Here we must notice that the expression 'world-history' which we have chosen and which is here understood ontologically, has a double signification. The expression signifies, for one thing, the historizing of the world in its essential existent unity with Dasein. At the same time, we have here in view the 'historzing' within the world of what is ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in so far as entities within the world are, in every case, discovered with the factically existent world. The historical world is factical only as the world of entities within-the-world (pp. 440-1).

The transcendence of the world has a temporal foundation; and by reason of this, the world-historical is, in every case, already 'objectively' there in the historizing of existing Being-in-the-world, without being grasped historiologically. And because factical Dasein, in falling, is absorbed in that with which it concerns itself, it understands its history world-historically in the first instance. And because, further, the ordinary understanding of Being understands 'Being' as present-at-hand without further differentiation, the Being of the world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of something present-at-hand which comes along, has presence and then disappears. And finally, because the meaning of Being in general is held to he something simply self- evident, the question about the kind of Being of the world-historical and about the movement of historizing in general has 'really' just the barren circumstantiality of a verbal sophistry (p. 441).

Our lostness in the "they" and in the world-historical has earlier been revealed as a fleeing in the face of death. Such fleeing makes mani-fest that Being-towards-death is a basic attribute of care. Anticipatory resoluteness brings this Being-towards-death into authentic existence. The historizing of this resoluteness, however, is the repetition of the heritage of possibilities by handing this down to oneself in anticipation; and we have interpreted this historizing as authentic historicality. Is perhaps the whole of existence stretched along in this historicality in a way which is primordial and lost, and which has no need of connected-ness? The Self's resoluteness against the inconsistency of

distraction, is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along—the steadiness with which Dasein as fate 'incorporates' into its existence birth and death and their 'between' and holds them as thus 'incorporated', so that in such constancy Dasein is indeed in a moment of vision for what is world-historical in its current situation. In the fateful repetition of possibilities that have been, Dasein brings itself back 'immediately', — that is to say, in a way that is temporally ecstatical, to what already has been before it. But when its heritage is thus handed down to itself, Its 'birth' is caught up into its existence in coming back from thepossibility of death (the possibility which is not to be outstripped) if only so that this existence may accept the thrownness of its own "there" in a way which is more free than illusion (pp. 442-3).

Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have - of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence. Resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose that it would be actual as 'experience' only as long as the 'act' of resloving lasts, In resoluteness lies the existentiell constancy which by its very essence, has already anticipated every possible moment of vision that may arise from it. As fate, resoluteness is freedom to give up some definite resolution, and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible situation or other. The steadiness of existence is not interrupted thereby but confined in moment of vision. This steadiness is not first formed either through or by the adjoining of 'moments", one to another; but these arise from the temporality of that repetition which is futurity in the process-of-having-been — a temporality which has already been stretched along (p. 443).

In inauthentic historically, on the other hand, the way in which fate has been primordial stretched along has been hidden. With the inconstancy of the they-self Casein makes present its 'today'. In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The 'they' evades choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 'actual that is left over', the world historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of the 'today', it understands the past in terms of the 'present'. On the other hand, the temporality of authentic historically, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition deprives the 'today' of its character as present, and weans one from the conventionalities of the 'they'. When, however, one's existence is inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with the legacy of a 'past' which has become unrecognizable, and it seeks the modern. But when historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence' of the possible and knows that a possibility will recur only if exitence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition (pp. 443-4).

Historiology, as the science of Dasein's history, must presuppose as its possible object the entity which is primordially historical. But history must not only be, in order that a historiological object may become accessible; and historiological cognition is not only historical, as a historizing way in which Dasein comports itself. Whether the historiological disclosure of history is factually accomplished or not, its ontological structure is such that in itself this disclosure has its roots in the historicality of Dasein. This is the connection we have in view when we talk of Dasein's historicality as the existential source of historiology. To cast light upon the connection signifies methodologically that the idea of historiology must be projected ontologically in terms of Dasein's historicality. The issue here is not one of 'abstracting' the concept of historiology from the way something is Tactically done in the sciences today, nor is it one of assimilating it to anything of this sort. For what guarantee do we have in principle that

such a faction! procedure will indeed be properly representative of historiology in its primordial and authentic possibilities. And even if this should turn out to be the case — we shall hold back from any decision about this — then the concept could be 'discovered' in the fact only by using the clue provided by the idea of historiology as one which we have already understood. On the other hand, the existential idea of historiology is not given a higher justification by having the historian affirm that his factical behaviour is in agreement with it. Nor does the idea become 'false' if he disputes any such agreement (pp. 444-5).

So far as Dasein's Being is historical, that is to say, in so far as by reason of its ecstatico-horizontal temporality it is open in its character of 'having-been' — the way is in general prepared for such thematizing of the 'past' as can be accomplished in existence. And because Dasein, and only Dasein, is primordially historical, that which historiological thematizing presents as a possible object of research, must have the kind of Being of Dasein which has-been-there. Along with any factical Dasein as Being-in-the-world, there is also, in each case, world history. If Dasein is there no longer, then the world too is something that has-been-there. This is not in conflict with the fact that, all the same, what was formerly ready-to-hand within-the-world does not yet pass away, but becomes something that one can, in a present, come across 'historiologically' something which has not passed away and which belongs to the world that has-been-there.

Remains, monuments and records that are still present-at-hand are possible 'material' for the concrete disclosure of Dasein which has-been-there. Such things can turn into historiological material only because, In accordance with their own kind of Being, they have a world-historical character. And they become such material only when they have been understood in advance in regard to their within-the-worldness. The world that has already been projected is given a definite character by way of an interpretation of the world-historical material we have 'received'. Our going back to 'The Past' does not first get its start from the acquisition, sifting and securing of such material; these activities presuppose historical Being-towards the Dasein that has been there, that is to say, they presuppose the historicality of the historian's existence. This is the existential foundation for historiology as a science, even for its most trivial and 'mechanical' procedures (p. 446).

If historiology is rooted in historicality in this manner, then it is from here that we must determine what the object of historiology 'really' is. The delimitation of the primordial theme of historiology will 18 have to be carried through in conformity with the character of authentic historicality and its disclosure of "what-has-been-there", that is to say, in conformity with repetition as this disclosure. In repetition the Dasein which has-been-there is understood in its authentic possibility which has been. The birth of 'historiology' from authentic historicality therefore signifies that in taking as our primary theme the historiological object we are projecting the Dasein which has-been-there upon its own most possibility of existence. Is historiology thus to have the possible for its theme? Does not its whole 'meaning' point solely to the facts — to how something has factually been? (p. 446).

If historiology, which itself arises from authentic historicality, reveals by repetition the Dasein which has-been-there and reveals it in its possibility, then historiology has already made manifest the 'universal' in the once-for-all. The question of whether the object of historiology is just to put once for all 'individual' events into a series, or whether it also has 'laws' as its objects, is one that is radically mistaken. The theme of historiology is neither that which has happened just once for all nor something universal that floats above it, but the possibility which has been factically existent. The possibility does not

get repeated as such, that is to say, understood in an authentically historiological way, if it becomes perverted into the colourlessness of a supra-temporal model (pp. 446-7).

Only by historicality which is factical and authentic can the history of what-has-been there as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factical existence, in other words, that it comes towards that existence in its futural character. The historicality of unhistoriological Dascin does not take its departure from the Present and from what is 'actual' only today, in order to grope its way back from there to something that is past; and neither does historiology. Even historiological disclosure temporalizes itself in terms of the future. The 'selection' of what is to become a possible object for historiology has already been met with in the factical existentiell choice of Dasein's historicality, in which historiology first of all arises and in which alone it is (p. 447).

The historiological disclosure of the 'past' is based on fateful repetition, and is so far from 'subjective' that it alone guarantees the 'objectivity' of historiology. For the objectivity of a science is regulated primarily in terms of whether that science can confront us with the entity which belongs to it as its theme, and can bring it, uncovered in the primordiality of its Being, to our understanding. In no science are the 'universal validity' of standards and the claims to 'universality' which the 'they' and its common sense demand, less possible as criteria of 'truth' than in authentic historiology (p. 447).

Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has-been-there and because the latter exists radically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of itself that it lakes orientation inexorably from the 'facts'. Accordingly, this research as factical has many branches and takes for its object the history of equipment, of work, of culture, of the spirit and of ideas. As handing itself down, history is, in itself, at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it, and which has a history of its own; so for the most part, it is only through traditional history that historiology penetrates to what has-been-there itself. This is why concrete historiological research can in each case maintain itself in varying closeness to its authentic theme. If the historian 'throws' himself straightway into the 'world-view' of an era, he has not thus proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical way and not just 'aesthetically'. And on the other hand, the existence of a historian who 'only' edits sources, may be characterised by a historicality which is authentic (pp. 447-8).

COMMENT

We will not engage in a detailed discussion of temporality as we will have to resort to it while analysing Sartrian concepts. Rather, we will posit Heideggerian concepts in their proper perspectives and draw certain conclusions. These will come handy in our future analysis. As Heidegger puts it, Dasein does not have any future, past or present as we understand these concepts from our common sense developed through usage. Rather, the future unfolds itself as anticipatory resolute-ness in being-towards-death. And by this unfolding of itself futurally it wants to 'be' as it already 'was'. That is, it repeats itself. To put it more lucidly, in Being-towards-death, Dasein is in the process of Being-Its-ownmost potentiality. And this potentiality-for-Being is not some-thing free-floating. It exists in Dasein itself. Hence when the ownmost-potentiality-for-Being is realised futurally, it is in fact a repetitive process in the sense that the ownmost potentiality which is hidden in Dasein gets unfolded. Hence, it is a 'past' or in the Heideggerian language a 'having-been' which is realised futurally. The character of 'having-been' arises from the

future and in such a way that the future which has been releases from itself the present. This confluence of 'having-been' (past), future and present is the temporality of Heidegger. And from this conception of temporality of Heidegger do we explain the philosophy of Heidegger. From the foregoing can we not infer that the ownmost potentiality of any Dasein is not a new phenomenon but only a resurrection of 'having-been' in the future? If we are not mistaken, then Heidegger's ownmost Being is immortal. It is inherited by every Dasein at the time of its birth and attains its fullest exposition at the time of its death. The present is nothing but the becoming of this ownmost potentiality. If this is true, then this ownmost potentiality for Being is hereditary, immortal and repetitive.

Now we come to the gateway of another daredevil thesis of Heidegger — the meaning of History. We have already discussed Heidegger's conception about time which, because it is not the commonsense conception of time has been very confusing as a concept. He does not seem to have any scientific outlook with which to back up his innovative approaches. It is a sort of philosophizing on an empty concept, like those ancient philosophers who used to presuppose the existence of God and explain everything in terms of God alone. Heidegger gave his own conception of Dasein's temporality without the slightest regard to the science of time. Now he is coming up with his peculiar concept of historicality. It will be apparent that both temporality and historicality are explained in terms of Dasein. While discussing Sartre, we will present the scientific conception about time.

Like time and temporality, history, historicality and historiology are also relations of Dasein. There is no objective history as such as there is no objective time. In fact, temporality and historicality are complementary phenomena. 'The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along is called "historizing". The question of Dasein's connectedness is the ontological problem of Dasein's historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicality. Dasein factically has its "history" and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted by historicality. We must justify this thesis with the aim of expounding the ontological problem of history as an existential one.'

It follows from the above that if temporality and historicality are complementary phenomena, both to be derived and understood in terms of Dasein, then history as we know it, becomes not only a relation of Dasein in the commonsense way but also becomes particularly derivative of Dasein's temporality — the confluence of having-been, making present and future. Hence, like Dasein's temporality, history is also like a repetitive phenomenon. Hence all history is repetition of what happened in the past in the realms of the future. It follows that Heidegger's history is totally undialectical, static and narrow. With time this history does not unfold the new. In fact, what seems new in this history is nothing but the resurrection of the past.

Besides, Heidegger's history is not objective. It is a subjective history always ways trying to find its coordinates in relation to Dasein. The question that one can pose against this history is that now that science has decisively discovered the geological history of the earth, biological history of evolution and anthropological history of man and expressed them in terms of commonsense time or time that is scientifically under-stood, how can Heidegger's 'history' explain the history of the formation of the earth and that of other biological species in terms of Dasein when Dasein itself did not appear?

In fact, there is no answer that Heidegger can give to these questions. Only what he can say is that he is not concerned with those histories that are prior to Dasein.

For us who want to understand the reason why Heidegger has so much deviated from scientific definition of history, we will have to interpret both Dasein's temporality and historicality in a way aptly suitable for understanding Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger has said at one point that Dasein is not a man as we understand it. In fact, Dasein, its temporality, and historicality should be interpreted in terms, of Heidegger's own conviction about history as such, that is, the repetition of German history from its past glory. Here we are not elaborating this concept because it needs a few more steps prior to that. In the discussion on Heidegger's Being, we have tried to explain why Heidegger had propounded this theory of history and how it served his purpose.

The problem with early Greek philosophers was that they wanted to explain the world with the resources of knowledge available to them. This had serious limitation. But in one respect they deserve appreciation. Though constrained by a class divided society and also forced by the ruling class not to express anything that would weaken the class basis of the society, they had originality of approach — an originality that may seem ridiculous to us today because we are now armed with more knowledge to explain the same phenomena. This is also true of the speculative philosophers. Their various limitations are attributable to the lack of scientific knowledge. But for Heidegger who wants to ask the age-old question, 'What is Being', and answers it with the same inconspicuousness that was permissible for the Greeks and speculative philosophers, we have serious objections. When someone, in the second or third decade of the twentieth century asks this question naively, one might find important reasons behind such an act. While discussing 'Being and Time' this motive will become apparent to us.

The phenomenon of Being, according to Heidegger, has remained obscure from the time of ancient Greek philosophers. That no need was felt to understand Being was the reason for its total neglect in ancient philosophy. Hence, today, it is all the more necessary to ask the question because neither the older generation nor their modern descendants have shown any clearsightedness in approaching the concept. As Heidegger puts it, even the very placing of the question needs to be done correctly. Only one who is transparent about himself, who understands himself, can understand Being in general. Hence his logic is that before embarking on an analysis of Being in general, investigation should start for becoming transparent about the Being of Dasein. The reader can understand how clearly Heidegger has sidetracked the original question, that is, the meaning of Being and has engaged in an investigation that was not given in the agenda.

11. With the help of a diagram let us try to understand Dasein and its ownmost Being.

Let us suppose that the big circle denotes Dasein. It exists in the world. It can also be called Being-in-the-world. Within this big circle there is a solid circle of smaller dimension. Let this signify the ownmost Being. For every Being-in-the-world that ownmost potentiality for Being is an issue. That is existential. Average everyday Dasein is ignorant about this potentiality for Being. The movement towards this inmost potentiality is called existentiell — which is a process that tends towards the inmost



possibility from the everyday Being of Dasein. From this picture, we can roughly explain the various structures of Dasein. The following formulations may be made about Dasein of Heidegger:

1) There is something within Dasein that distinguishes man from an average understanding of him.

(2) That this something within man — his ownmost potentiality of Being — has primordial existence.

(3) That this primordial existence is what the essence of man is.

(4) That there is a possibility that Dasein may reach this Being within — it is a process.

Heidegger at the very outset attributed Being in general to all entities— man and other objects. Then he distinguished man from other entities. He termed the Being of man as Dasein as distinguished from Being of entities in general. Then he proceeded to establish the ontico-ontological priority of Dasein over other entities.

Here we do not want to enter into a vague discussion about Being of entities in general. Being of any inanimate object is the object itself. Being of chalk is chalk. If we proceed further, it will be calcium carbonate. If we proceed still further, we will find calcium, carbon and oxygen, and at the next higher stage, electrons, protons, etc. in various combinations.

On the other hand, contrary to Heidegger's assertions, Being of man is not its primordial existence. It is rather man's consciousness. What man primordially inherits are the instincts. What distinguishes man from other entities is consciousness. Consciousness is the distinctive characteristic of man and is a relation of the development of man from ape to the present stage. It developed through social interaction with nature. We have elaborately discussed the development of consciousness in our analysis of Sartre. It will be observed that various attributes of Heideggerian Dasein does not stand the test of logic and the related sciences i.e., anthropology, physiology, psychology, etc. We could have discussed here the various questions raised against Dasein. But this would not serve any useful purpose as Heidegger's Dasein though synonymous to man has in fact other connotations. More than man, it represents a philosophy of history. This similarity will be dealt with in the following pages. However, we will just mention here one striking similarity between Heidegger's Dasein and Jung's collective unconscious. Jung's collective unconscious exists below the substrata of personal unconscious and like Heidegger's ownmost Being remains hidden and isolated. This is also primordially existent. This is also, as the hypothesis goes, present in all men. While discussing Jung we concluded that Jung's collective unconscious does not have any support from science. So is Heidegger's Dasein. Both have been invented to substantiate a certain ideology. This may seem a little far-fetched to begin with, but as we shall proceed in our analysis, the truth of it will come out.

Heidegger's Being I

Now, we have come to the final stage of our objective, i.e., explaining Heidegger's philosophy in terms of history. Before we have embarked upon the venture, we shall do well to review the locus of our analysis.

(1) In the beginning we have discussed the course of German history that has a direct bearing on the philosophy of Heidegger.

(2) Then we have brought forth those aspects of Heidegger's biography which have the potentiality of illuminating the philosophy propounded by Heidegger.

(3) Thirdly, we have presented the crux of 'Being and Time' interspersed with critical observation.

(4) Finally, we are submitting our observation on Heidegger's Being:

(a) ISOLATED

The ownmost Being of Heidegger is a very isolated entity. It hides in the innermost of Dasein, in oblivion and total seclusion. Dasein, proximally and for the most part, is immersed in the 'they'. It enjoys itself as the 'they', it explains the world as the 'they'. The 'crowd', the 'multitude', various relationship of the world — human and material — all conspire to keep Dasein busy in its everyday living. From birth till death, average Dasein wastes away its potentiality by being carried away, swayed away, by the 'they' and the 'world'. It is an inauthentic existence that is ultimately the locus of life of average Dasein. The potentiality-for-Being which is an issue of every factical Dasein always remains immersed within Dasein, very seldom finding its way towards the unfolding of itself. It is only when anticipatory resoluteness finds itself in situation in fateful anxiety that the possibility arises for the ownmost potentiality-for-Being to come to the fore. But only a possibility. Whether this anticipatory resoluteness will ultimately pave the way for Being-a-whole in death depends on how intently Dasein hears the call in its guilty conscience. As such, the process is a very complicated one and the probability of its coming to itself in its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being is so limited that it can safely be assumed that the ownmost-potentiality-for-Being is an isolated existence. Heidegger says that when this ownmost Being is discovered by Dasein, the road to authentic existence is laid. But according to Heidegger, when this becomes a reality Dasein ceases to be a part of the 'they', the Being-with of others and entities present-at-hand within the world; Dasein then is on the verge of death. As care, Dasein has to exist with the 'they' but that is an inauthentic existence. It resembles the cup of Tantalus; the water recedes from the thirsty man when it has nearly touched his lips.

(b) ANXIOUS

Anxiety is the basic mood in which the ownmost potentiality comes face to face with the 'they-self'. The authentic existence of Dasein is anxious. It is a confrontation in which what Dasein should be comes face to face with what Dasein is in its average everydayness. This anxiousness is not a sort of fear either on the part of Dasein's 'They self or its ownmost Being. It is a sort of mood in which resolute anticipation of Dasein gets expressed.

(c) IMMUTABLE

This ownmost Being is immutable. There is no 'past' of Dasein's ownmost Being. It is as 'having been'. In anxiety and Being-towards-death the potentiality-for-Being of Dasein goes through the process of Being-a-whole. This process of becoming is futural. In this futural realisation of the potentiality-for-Being the self tends towards what it 'was' or, in Heidegger's language, its 'having-been' in future. At the 'present' when Dasein's potentiality-for-Being comes face to face with the they-self, in the mode of anticipatory resoluteness, the present is expressed in the futural 'becoming' of Dasein to be its 'having-been'. It means that from birth to death it is the unfolding of its potentiality-for-Being. But how could this process be initiated if during the birth of Dasein itself this potentiality was not already given? How could likewise Dasein have this potentiality if it

is not inherited? Heidegger has expressed time and again his thesis of repetition. This only means that every Dasein in its authentic existence 'becomes' the ownmost Being by repeating itself, that is, by invoking that potentiality which was inherited by it at the time of its birth.

Heidegger's Being II

Heidegger's ownmost Being has striking similarity with Jung's unconscious. Heidegger's Being remains hidden under the outer crust of the 'they'-self. It is away from everydayness of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. It comes to the fore through the mood of anxiety or when Dasein comes face to face with death. It is immutable, i.e., Dasein inherits the potentiality-for-Being and in the course of existence of Dasein the potentiality-for-Being tends towards Being-a-whole. These three basic characteristics i.e., isolation, anxiety and immutability have been discussed. Jung's theory of collective unconsciousness has also been studied. Strange as it may seem, neither Heidegger nor Jung has discussed about the contents of each other in their fundamental theoretical writings. Yet there are striking similarities;

(1) The ownmost Being of Heidegger's Dasein resides in the very depth of Dasein. In normal everydayness of Dasein, this ownmost Being does not come to the fore. Dasein in its everyday existence forgets itself in the 'they' — the Being-with others and the present-at-hand. When anxiety, a basic mood, seizes Dasein does this ownmost Being come face to face with the 'they' self and get rid of its average everydayness. In anticipatory resoluteness does the ownmost Being of Dasein get the possibility of tending towards Being-a-whole in death.

Jung's collective unconscious also resides in the interior. As distinguished from personal unconscious which he attributes to Freud the collective unconscious remains for the most part suppressed and dormant. General cases of neurosis originate from the sphere of personal unconscious. Only on special occasions — as in dream or during the spurt of psychosis' — does the collective unconscious suddenly erupt. It makes itself known through archetypal images which the subject begins to see.

(2) Anxiety is the basic mood that brings forth the self of Dasein. But anxiety is an affect. Hence, according to Heideggerian hypothesis, it is due to an affect that the self is brought forth. So this may be said that affects are specially suited to disclose the potentiality of Being. What organic relation does affect have in general with Dasein's Being has not been very clearly spelt out by Heidegger. But, according to Heidegger's hypothesis, various affects disclose Being-in-the-world and the potentiality-for-Being. It can safely be remarked that affects stand in special relation towards disclosing of Being of Dasein.

Jung's Collective Unconscious stands in very direct relation to a fleets or emotions. The autonomy of the unconscious begins, according to Jung, where emotions are generated. Emotions are instinctive, involuntary reactions which upset the rational order of consciousness by their elemental outbursts. Affects are not 'made' or wilfully produced. In a state of affect, a trail of character sometimes appears which is strange even to the person concerned or hidden contents may erupt involuntarily. The more violent an affect, the closer it comes to the pathological, to a condition in which the ego-consciousness is thrust aside by autonomous contents that were unconscious before. This view suggests that Jung's unconscious is directly related to emotions.

Hence this is apparent that although there are divergent views on details, both Heidegger and Jung consider affect as basic for disclosure of their principal entity — Heidegger's ownmost Being and Jung's collective unconscious.

(3) Heidegger's ownmost Being though remains dormant for most of its tenure in a living Dasein, it exists at the birth and goes towards the possibility of unfolding itself at death. It is 'having been' that futurally exists. This means that it is a repetitive process whereby the 'having been' discloses itself futurally. In plain language the ownmost Being that unfolds in the future is the same as it existed at the time of birth. This means that the ownmost Being of Dasein is immutable.

Jung's collective unconscious is also hereditary. This is as old as the human race itself. It does not differ from individual to individual as it is the same in all individuals. These are instincts. Individuals may differ in their process of coming across this uncoscious. But, at the root, all individuals inherit the same unconscious which is why it is called the Collective Unconscious.

Heidegger's Being III

These similarities in their views are not the only similarities between them. Striking resemblances will also be found in their personal views. Both of them, at the prime of life,, were supporters of Pan-Germanism. Heidegger joined the Nazi Party of Germany and became one of their principal spokesmen among the intellectuals. Promoted to the post of Rector (Vice-Chancellor) of the University he taught in (Freiburg) he remained one of the Nazi propagandists till 1934. Later he fell from grace. Jung was also a supporter of Pan-Germanism. But he had not actively taken part in Nazi activities, one of the reasons being that he was a Swiss national. Another issue can also be raised at this stage. Some apologists of Heidegger maintain that though his proximity to Fascism was no doubt condemnable, it could still be dismissed as just a minor aberration on his part. What we want to show is that his adherence to Nazism was but a logical outcome of his philosophy. When we will explain his philosophy in the next chapter, it will be quite apparent to our readers. The same is also true for Jung, but in a roundabout way. From his mysticism and Pan-Germanism he moved towards a psychology of revivalism. Jung's pro-Fascist and revivalistic attitudes will not be palpable from his works on psychology, but we are quoting from a dream of Jung's which will explicitly prove his mental adherence to Pan-Germanism.

"It was during the Advent of the year 1913 — 12th December to be exact — that I resolved upon the decisive step. I was sitting at my desk once more, thinking over my feats. Then I let myself drop. Suddenly it was as though the ground literally gave way beneath my feet and I plunged down into dark depths. I could not fend off a feeling of panic. But then, abruptly, at not too great a depth, I landed on my feet in a soft, sticky mass. I felt great relief, although I was apparently in complete darkness. After a while my eyes grew accustomed to the gloom which was rather like a deep twilight. Before me was the entrance to a dark cave, in which stood a dwarf of leathery skin, as if he was mummified. I squeezed past him through the narrow entrance and waded knee-deep through icy water to the other end of the cave where, on a projecting rock, I saw a glowing red crystal. I grasped the stone, lifted it and discovered a hollow underneath. At first I could make out nothing, but then I saw that there was running water. In it a corpse floated by, a youth with blond hair and a wound in the head. He was followed by a gigantic black scarab and then by a red newborn sun, rising up out of the depths of the water. Dazzled by the light I wanted to replace the stone upon the opening but then a fluid

welled out. It was blood. A thick jet of it leaped up and I felt nauseated. It seemed to me that the blood continued to spurt for an unenduringly long time. At last it ceased and the vision came to an end.

I was stunned by the vision. I realised of course that it was a hero Mini solar myth, a drama of death and renewal, the rebirth symbolised by the Egyptian Scarab. At the end, the dawn of the new day should have followed, but instead came that intolerable outpouring of blood — an altogether abnormal phenomenon, so it seemed to me. But then I recalled the vision of blood that I had had in the autumn of the same year and I abandoned all further attempt to understand.

Six days later (18th December 1913), I had the following dream. I was with an unknown brown-skinned man, a savage, in a lonely rocky mountain landscape. It was before dawn, the eastern sky was already bright, and the stars fading. Then I heard Seigfried's horn sounding over the mountain and I knew we had to kill him. We were armed with rifles and lay in wait for him on a narrow path over the rocks. Then Siegfried appeared high up on the crest of the mountain, in the first ray of the rising sun. On a chariot made of the bones of the dead he drove at furious speed down the precipitous slope. When he turned a corner, we shot at him and he plunged down, struck dead.

Filled with disgust and remorse for having destroyed something so great and beautiful, I turned to flee, impelled by the fear that the murder might be discovered. But a tremendous downfall of rain began, and I knew that it would wipe out all traces of the dead. I had escaped the danger of discovery. Life could go on, but an unbearable feeling of guilt remained.

When I woke from the dream, I turned it over in my mind but was unable to understand it. I tried therefore to fall asleep again, but a voice within me said, "You must understand the dream and must do so at once" The inner urgency mounted until the terrible moment came when the voice said, "If you do not understand the dream, you will shoot yourself," In the drawer of my right table lay a loaded revolver, and I became frightened. Then I began pondering once again and suddenly the meaning of the dream dawned on me. "Why, that is the problem that is being played out in the world." Siegfried, I thought, represents what the Germans want to achieve, heroically to impose their will and have their way. "Where there's a will, there's a way!" I wanted to do the same. But now that was no longer possible. The dream showed that the attitude embodied by Siegfreid, the hero, no longer suited me. Therefore it had to be killed.

After the deed I felt an overpowering compassion, as though I myself have been shot: a sign of my secret identity with Siegfried, as well as of the grief a man feels when he is forced to sacrifice his ideal and his conscious attitudes. This identity and my heroic idealism had to be abandoned, for there are higher things than the ego's will and to these one must bow." (C. G. Jung "Memories, Dreams, Reflections" Collins Fount Paperbacks, pp. 203-51).

The similarities between Heidegger's Being and Jung's unconscious as well as the identical affinity that both displayed for Pan-Germanism explain one common riddle; that the philosophy of Heidegger and psychology of Jung should be studied with particular reference to German social, economic and political history and their own life-processes. Revivalism was visible as a trend in German cultural life for the one hundred years before the Second World War. Both Heidegger and Jung expressed their concepts through their respective media. Although Jung refers to the victory of reason over unreason, his theories bear testimony to the opposite. He might have dissociated himself from Nazism but that was his individual decision. The psychology of revivalism — which had

resemblance with Nazism — he had ad hered to and never revised any of his theories. In fact, he moved, over the years, from non-science to mysticism.

Heidegger's Being IV

It has often been observed in the history of philosophy that several schools, as a general rule, contain living traces of the contemporary phenomena of the society. Say, for instance, the concept of pure reason in Kant or in Greek Philosophy. This pure reason was the reflection of the then emerging social relations where the producer and consumer were being progressively differentiated. Or, say the concepts of noumena and phenomena. This also was attributable to the degree of scientific outlook and confidence in the capacity of human being to explain mysteries of nature. It has been pointed out at the very beginning (i.e. Introduction) that the philosophers have, instead of explaining the world scientifically, often taken recourse to their personal observations of things. Some philosophers, Hegel being one of them, have also brilliantly expressed the laws of nature in the garb of obscure phenomena. When transferred to real axes this has given wonderful results. Hegel's idea on Idea when transferred to the real world brought about the most revolutionary change in the whole concept of history and philosophy. Hence reading someone's philosophy does not bear I'm it if the relationship that the concepts have with the real world is not discerned. Heidegger's Dasein and its ownmost Being have to be understood then in terms of the world. We have seen that the concepts expressed there on men are totally erroneous. But then he might have some reason in propounding his thesis. We had started our analysis of Heidegger with a sketch on German history. We began right from the time of Charlemagne who founded the Reich and stretched it down to the aftermath of World War I. We had our reason behind this plan, i.e., that of showing how the idea of Reich had always appealed to the imagination of a section of the German people, particularly the ruling elite and the intelligentsia. The concept of the Great German Empire persisted, at times vigorously and languidly at others in a few states like Austria, Prussia, etc. and was soon idealized. The rise and fall of the various German empires — Austro-Hungarian, the Bismarckian, the Kaiserian (Wilhelm II) and of course the original Carolingian — were the high watermarks in the long-drawn history of the endeavour for imperial glory. In the whole realm of German literature, philosophy included, this intense longing for glory, greatness and power has found its expression in various forms. Schopenhauer, Nietzche and Heidegger represent this trend in the field of philosophy. Their counterparts will be found in literature, music, theology, painting etc. If the whole concept of Heidegger's Dasein and its ownmost Being is substituted by German history and the imperialistic achievement of the German ruling elite we will observe that everything that is being attributed to Dasein and not finding corroboration in anthropology will have little difficulty to be explained by historiology. The concept of Heidegger's authentic and inauthentic existence, temporality, historicality etc. in short, the locus of Dasein's ownmost potentiality to Being-a-whole can be explained with the help of the phases and epochs of German history. The historicality of Dasein is, in fact, the Daseinification of history of German imperialism. Heidegger's joining the Nazi Party was an absolutely philosophical action. The Germany that Heidegger saw when he took part in the First World War as a soldier, found its reflection in the petite-bourgeois 'self-confidence' of the average German. From a self-confident member of the 'great' German race, a time came when the average man in the street sank into the deep morass of defeatism and disillusionment. The result was, as reflected in philosophy, the emergence of an urge to regain the lost glory. From an inauthentic, inferior existence German Dasein

has to achieve an authentic existence. In the pages to follow we are elaborating upon this aspect of the German history.

(1) AUTHENTIC AND INAUTHENTIC EXISTENCE OF THE GERMAN RACE

Before beginning an analysis of the contention of 'Being and Time,' we have in Chapter I taken note of the milestones of the history of German imperialism from the period of Charlemagne in 800 A.D., when the first German Reich was founded, down to the outbreak of World War I. The emergence of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the rise of Bismark and the subsequent German victory in Central Europe in 1871, the founding of the Reich in reality and the onward march of Germany upto 1914, i.e., till the outbreak of World War 1 are those phases an average German would look back upon: the German existence in these periods took on a new meaning. On the one hand the fragmented, defeated and subjugated that Germany was during the period of Napoleonic invasion, a predominantly agricultural country with little international trade and commerce, conditions of living nowhere comparable to England and France and on the other the subsequent unification of Germany by Prussia under the Machiavelli of the modern German history Otto Von Bismarck and the regaining of self-confidence with huge addition of land area that almost realized the cherised dream of the German mind since Charlemagne were the two opposite poles in the German history. For the chauvinists and egoists the phases of imperialist victory were the periods worth living in. German existence found its meaning in self-confidence, in better standard of living, in the glory of superior German intelligence, in the might of the German imperialism. The dream of German invincibility came true. This can be called the authentic existence of Germany. Heidegger himself saw another face of Germany, the Germany in the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany defeated and subjugated, her French conquests wrested, the military as a weapon of war crippled, replaced only by Nazi terroristic groups and armed gangs of other political parties. On the economic front, it was total collapse of the very foundations, with unprecedented inflation, prices of commodities of everyday use soaring sky-high, and unemployment to be counted only in astronomical figures. On the internal political front, political feuds to the extent of gang warfare between the parties, assassination of political leaders and members of the Government, anti-semitism etc vitiated the whole atmosphere. It was one of the darkest periods when Germany was dying a slow and painful death. As a professor of philosophy Heidegger watched his times and like many petite-bourgeois intellectuals, did not like the order of things. Hence for Heidegger there existed two Germanies and two existences of Germany — the Germany of Charlemagne, Kaiser and Bismarck and the Germany in the sorry days of its democracy in the 1920s. The former was powerful, confident and big. The latter was weak, shaky and small. The former towered over all others in European mainland, the other a weak neighbour of the strong powers. The former Being-a-whole, the latter only a surfacial Being-in-the-world. I Hence in 1926 when Heidegger was writing his 'Being and Time', the potentiality-for-Being was in the 'having-been' of Kaiserian Reich only to be realised 'futurally'. On the other hand, the present was an inauthentic existence when Germany was oblivious of the great task ahead and wasting itself away in the idle talk of democracy. The factical existence lagged far behind from what was expected of the German people. Fallen in the midst of the they-self, the self of German history was languishing in everydayness.

(2) REPETITION OF GERMAN AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE

The 'having-been' of the authentic potentiality-for-Being repeats itself futurally. If this is Heidegger's thesis, then transferred in the sphere of history it means that the authentic history of Germany will be repeated in the future. But what was the authentic history of Germany? In the preceding explanation we have discovered what is the authentic history of Germany. The various phases of German imperialism right from the Reich of Charlemagne till the one dissolved in the authentic existence of the German race repeated one after the other. The latest of this authentic existence was repeated in 1871 and extended till the reign of Wilhelm II. Heidegger expects that this potentiality-for-Being existing in the womb of this historical process will become a reality in the near future.

The view that Heidegger's proximity to Nazism was an aberration and does not therefore disclose his genuine bend of mind does not bear testimony. On the other hand a proper explanation of his philosophical position reveals the fact that Heidegger was mentally inclined to find Germany restored to its former imperialist glory. The Nazis wanted a resurgence of the German race. Heidegger wanted that too. And hence there was no reason why the two would not cooperate with each other in principle. That he did not like the Nazi pressures only explains the differences in approach between them as to how to realize the objective. But so far as the theme of Resurgence of Germany was concerned, Heidegger may be considered to be the theoretician. Many attribute to Nietzsche the origin of the latter-day system of persecution of the Jews in Germany. Although he never lived to see what the Nazi black shirts were doing in their zealous antisemitism, the historical responsibility should undoubtedly fall on him if the germs of this is found in Nietzche. Similarly, if one can forgive Heidegger for his direct involvement in Nazism and its atrocities, he has to take the responsibility of propounding this thesis of Resurgence of the German People which led them to commit the most barbaric crimes.

(3) HIS FAITH IN REPETITION

We have already characterised Heidegger's Being as isolated, anxious and immutable. Transferred to the context of German history these characteristics will have appropriate connotations. Transferred to the situational realities of the middle of the twenties, the concept of Resurgence was a far cry. The memories of defeat were very fresh in the German mind. To add injustice to injury, the Treaty of Versailles had imposed upon the German Government such conditions that bled white the already shattered German economy. Germany was forbidden to increase the strength of her military beyond a certain limit, Her industries were forbidden to produce military wares. Further-more, the allied forces kept a constant watch on each and every move of Germany. At the same time, for the first time in modern German history the experiment with democracy was continuing with a degree of enthusiasm. Although there were forces out to sabotage the attempt, the people were taking a lively interest in the democratic process. It was attempted earlier in1848 but unfortunately that experiment had failed. In the middle of 1920s another opportunity came to revive the democratic norms. The 'doves' were then exerting a greater influence upon the people than the 'hawks'. After all, people never desire war on their own. Almost in every case, it is the handiwork of an interested clique who stand to gain more from disorder than from order and stability So the people were enjoying peace and democracy. Production was registering a rise. The American loans were giving results after the trouble of the early twenties. And few were then nurturing the wish of again turning the German nation into a dominant imperialist power. The German people wanted a dignified existence, a good standard of living and, above all,

peace. Therefore, the slow but steady growth of the German economy after the initial troubles was viewed by many as a welcome development in the right direction. It may not be out of place here to quote from Hitler's one of the ablest generals, Karl Doenitz who was the Chief of the Navy in 1939: "Those who were in Germany in September 1939 know that the people showed 1 no enthusiasm for war. But war nevertheless came and demanded sacrifice after sacrifice." (Admiral Karl Doenitz, Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days, p. 249). If this was the condition in 1939, one can well imagine what the condition could be in 1926. But, for Heidegger, the common people's mood was that of an inauthentic existence. And because this mood was predominant, those who wanted Germany to be strong enough to dictate her terms to the world, especially the, small but powerful clique representing the finance capital and those swayed by its propaganda, were a minority quite isolated from the masses. This potentiality-for-Being of the German history was then I leading an existence outside the common man's aspiration who was I fed up with war and devastation. But it existed as a potential force to I 'Being-a-whole' as the developments in the then Germany decisively I presaged the rise of Hitler. Similarly, the phenomenon of anxiety can I be explained. Heidegger is right in stating that this anxiety should not I be confused with fear. This anxiety is the anxiety of the whole German I society at this crucial juncture. The war-mongering theorists of the I 'superior German race' could be said to have embodied the Heideggerian idea of authentic existence while 'inauthentic existence' was I borne by the peace-loving peasants, workers and members of the I middle class. National economy was in a shambles. The old political I structure was being destroyed and the new democratic structure was still to strike roots; no one was sure about what the future held for them. It was in these great critical moments of the German history when the democrats were waging a last-ditch battle with the warmongers, racists and the anti-semites that the great issues of the German people were being determined. A war had already been lost with the resultant loss of thousands of lives and millions of marks of property. Whether another war would not ruin the whole country was the question then anxiously asked. Mothers and wives were anxious about their | children and husbands, men were anxious about the state of affairs — about employment and inflation; property-owners were anxious to know if another war would not make them penniless. Only a small section of the people representing finance-capital were anxious to regain their hitherto existing omnipotence in commerce and business.

BOOK THREE

JEAN PAUL SARTRE

1

FRANCE: RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

I

The years immediately following Paris Commune witnessed an unprecedented repression unleashed by the propertied classes, especially the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat. If the Commune was the workers' state in embryo, the ruthless repression was the barometer of the extent to which the bourgeoisie all over the world would go when faced with the possibility of the extinction of its own class. Thousands of workers died lighting; thousands more were buried alive; many thousands Were shot dead in captivity; and the rest were driven out of the country. The Third Republic became, in fact, a state of the bourgeoisie because the workers were either physically eliminated or excommunicated, But a capitalist state without the working class is a contradiction in terms. It is a queer axiom of history that for capitalists to exist and flourish they need the services of the workers — in greater and greater numbers. Hence, however ruthless and revengeful the bourgeoisis were they began to realize that the workers they so detested should be brought back into the system to ensure their well-being. However there were conditions. There should be enough safeguards so that the Commune could never repeat itself. Learning from the past, the French bourgeoisie took a series of steps to keep the workers restrained.

It was not until 1884, thirteen years after the Commune, that trade-union activities were legalised. Even after the legalization the workers' movement grew slowly and it faced various hurdles. First, there were the followers of Blanqui and Proudhon who were in favour of 'direct action' by the workers. Secondly, the Socialists were divided amongst themselves. Thirdly, the bourgeoisie were constantly endeavouring to keep the labour movement under their jurisdiction. Last but not the least, it was the memory of the Commune which maintained a certain fear-psychosis among the masses of workers. Fighting against all these odds, the French working class was slowly regrouping itself.

Between 1880 and 1900 various trends in the French socialist; movement developed independently, but it was not until 1905 that a united Socialist Party was formed. Even then, as already mentioned, ' there remained a large section of the working class led by George I Sorel, that was in favour of 'direct action' and opposed to any form of political struggle. One of the important phenomena of the 1890's was the growing influence of Marxism in the French labour movement, initiated by Jules Guesde. It was about this time that Marx's important works were translated by Paul Lafargue, his son-in-law. Guesde had a strong following among the miners of the North and they eventually came into the fold of the French Communist Party. Another socialist wing was shaped by Jean Jaures, the principal architect of the unity move of 1905. It was said that Jaures was an orator of genius, a powerful journalist and a distinguished historian whose work on the French

Revolution was a major contribution. He was the editor of L' Humanite. In spite of all the personal qualities of Jaures, the Socialist Party in France was not very strong even after 1905, and it had to face stiff competition from the 'direct action' groups. Proudhon and Blanqui had left behind the anarchist disciples who commanded a large section of the French working class. They did not believe in the theory that trade-union activity was a component part of the broad political struggle. On the other hand they had faith only in 'direct action', which besides strikes in factories also found expression in bomb-blasts in cafes and apartment blocks, and a few isolated murders. In the early-twentieth-century parlance this came to be known as Anarcho-Syndicalism. The movement found adherents not only in France but also in the countries of Latin America, Spain and the United States. It found a theorist in George Sorel, who in his famous 'Reflections on Violence', published in 1908 expounded his view thus: "The leaders of the proletariat would provide a new force of regeneration of society and that direct violent action by the workers could at once both purge and transform the corrupt old order." By the First World War, the syndicalist organisation, the Confederation Generate du Travail(CGT) became a major force in the French working class movement. Along with these diversionary trends, there were the government-sanctioned Labour Exchanges (Bourses du Travail). These were to collect, according to the constitution laid down, information about the day to day price of labour. But in addition, they were to be the centres of workers' education, organisation and social life, and even instruments of workers' liberation. But to all practical purposes they were created by the government to keep an eye on the workers' movements. The intention was also to develop white-collar proletariat in the British model. In spite of all these safeguards these Labour Exchanges sometimes did become weapons of the labour movement when the municipalities and the Exchanges were controlled by the Leftists. More often than not, these served the purpose of the government.

The Paris Commune, even in its defeat, had brought about a chain of reaction in the French socio-economic structure. Sociologists may question whether 'labour' as a constituent part of 'land, labour and capital' had anything to do with the slow rate of industrialization after 1871. Traditional agro-raw-material-based decentralized rural economy became once again the backbone of the French economy.

Unlike Great Britain, French heavy industry took years to develop and that too, it is said, because of German folly and internal protection. The steel industry — the backbone of any nation, started in a small way in Lorraine in 1864. After the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, the Germans secured for themselves all the valuable mineral resources of the province. However bad geology misled them as far as the location of the main deposits were concerned. When the new process of Gilchrist-Thomas made it possible to use the Lorraine sulphurous ore, it was discovered that in Lorraine, under French occupation;, the quality of ore was comparable to the best available in the world. From 1886 onwards France developed steadily in this direction. There also took place a link-up with the adjoining German coalminers through exchange of French ore and German coal. Thus both sides of this warring pair developed their all-important foundation of basic Industries. France, which was dependent on her competitors for machinery, began to be self-sufficient by the end of the nineteenth century. Towards the beginning of the twentieth century her automobile Industry was one of the very best in the world. The electrical power industry including hydroelectric power, was also a force to be reckoned with.

II

(i) The First World War ended with the defeat of Germany. Out of all the victorious nations in Europe, it was France which had sacrificed the most in terms of dead and maimed soldiers, devastated land, and related infrastructures. Although victors, their condition was no better than that of the vanquished. As the War came to a close, soldiers became restless and demanded demobilization. The War had continued for four years at a stretch and the man in the trench had seen enough, and done enough, and he was now only too willing to leave the ranks and go home. Mutinies, small and big, erupted. There was an antiwar feeling in the air that was hard to ignore.

The victory brought in its wake very disquieting news for the bourgeoisie. The enrolment of trade-unionists in industry rose four to five times higher than the number enrolled in pre-war years. Demobilization brought back to the Union ranks many militants. Strikes broke out at many factory gates when workers demanded higher wages to cope with the rising prices. However what was really disquieting was the news of the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in Russia. The German menace was an external one, but the Bolshevik revolution had struck at the very roots of the existence of the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks had already declared that they had no intention of paying the Czar's debts. The French bourgeoisie, alarmed at the great working class solidarity with the Russian workers, denounced Internationalism. Only History remained witness to the demagogy of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, it was also the Russian Revolution which created a commotion among the masses of workers. The French working class was aghast at the allied intervention of the Soviet Union. The mutiny in the French Black see fleet led by Andre Marty was a reflection of their mood. Police fired at the marchers of the 1st May Rally of 1919 and killed a number of workers. The Russian Revolution kindled the French workers' imagination about the possibility of overthrowing their own bourgeoisie. The Bolshevik Revolution affected all sections of the French working class. CGT, the anarchist trade union, whose membership increased to a million on the eve of the War, faced large-scale desertion of the militants. It was apparent that revolutionary seizure of power could not be affected without political struggle. The revolution also created a schism in the socialist ranks. At the Socialist Party Congress of 1920 differences of opinion arose on the course of action to be adopted in view of the successful Russian Revolution. The Party became divided, with the majority siding with the pro-Bolshevik faction. The organ of the Socialist Party, L' Humanite, founded by Jean Jaures became the official organ of the subsequent Communist Party of France.

(ii) After the German invasion the French agricultural regions bore the scars of war. The land was totally devasated and forlorn-looking. The soil had been torn up by shell-fire, poisoned by chemicals, passed from trenches and churned up by invading and retreating armies. By the time of armistice the population had been reduced from slightly less than five million to two million. Eight hundred thousand houses and farms had been destroyed. Live stock was reduced to one-tenth, five thousand miles of roads seriously damaged, and six hundred miles of railway lines needed restoration.

It was only due to the indomitable spirit of the French workers and peasants, and generous financial help from the government, that this enormous devastation could be repaired and land restored to its former condition. In industry improvement was also registered. Old machinery was replaced by new and sophisticated models. To meet the competition those industries which had not been affected by War also replaced their machinery. But the most striking change in the French industrial scene was wrought by

the Treaty of Versailles. When annexed Lorraine was returned to France, it had in its possession the second largest iron field in the world.

The ore deposit of erstwhile German Lorraine almost equalled that of the French part. The total output made France one of the largest non-ore possessor in the world. Now France became not only a great consumer of steel but an exporter too. And here also post-War renovation and replacement played a significant role. Modern steel making machineries enhanced both the quality and quantity of steel. France was now also the possessor of the greatest European source of bauxite and this facilitated the development of a powerful aluminium industry. Recovered Alsace added its strength to the French cotton industry and it became the third major cotton producer in the world. With the help of money borrowed from the Americans, and reparation made by the Germans under the obligation of the Treaty — it was restored and modernised. Economically the French bourgeoisie were now a power to be reckoned with. The War had killed two million Frenchmen, but at the same time benefitted the economic barons.

III

The world economic crisis between 1929-1933 gripped France by the end of this period and turned sour the fruits of victory. The Young Plan was buried before it was active, and the French expectations of reparations from Germany were gone for ever. The American President Hoover imposed a moratorium on German reparations, but demanded French debts to be paid in time. The economic crisis rendered one and a half million jobless, and both industry and agriculture faced grave difficulties.

Already the situation in Germany was taking a turn for the worse. In 1930 Hitler's Nazi Party had 107 members in the Reichstag. Mussollini had already started his crusade against the Communists in Italy, and France was having her share of this experience with a number of pro-fascist groups who had become restive. Action Francaise, the most notorious of these organisations, along with a number of other Fascist groups staged a massive and bloody demonstration in Paris on February 6, 1934. This endangered the very existence of the Republic. It was being increasingly felt that the Fascists would make an all-out effort to capture state power. It also did not escape the notice of the Left and democratic forces that in Italy and Germany a large section of workers, peasants and unemployed youths had been misguided by Nazi propaganda. They had joined the storm-troopers. There was very little room for complacence and something needed to be done immediately.

The rising strength of the Fascists alarmed the Left and made them fear for the future. The only bright spot was that there was also an anti-fascist mood among the people. It was reflected in a Paris by-election. Radicals, Socialists and Communists were also increasingly feeling the need for unity to fight the Fascist menace. This feeling found expression in a magnificent rally and procession on July 14, 1935. From the alleys of the industrial suburbs of the east, demonstrators poured in thousands. The very disorganisation of the processions spoke of the mood of the processionists and the degree of participation of the masses from all walks of life. There were blacks and whites, mothers and their daughters, professors and intellectuals, war veterans and young pacifists. They were singing all the way Carmagnole or the Marsellaise or the Internationale. They were shouting slogans like 'De La Rocque to the gallows' referring to the Fascist De la Rocque, leader of the Croix de Feu, one of the chief organisers of the 6th of February riots in Paris. The defenders of the Republic, one and all, took, it as a duty to stall any attempt from the Right towards seizure of power. But most vociferous

among them ware the Communists, who had forged this unity despite all sorts of provocations from the Right. Even the die-hard pessimists saw a flicker of hope in these anti-fascist demonstrations.

Officially the unity move started in July 1934 when the Socialists and Communists signed a pact of unity of action. By the beginning of I 936, the Communists, Socialists and Radicals had agreed on a common minimum program and on common tactics for the forthcoming General Election. The Radicals, who were in the government, resigned. In January 1936, it was possible to publish the programme of the Popular Front. It called for a return to the system of Collective Security, and consolidation of the recently concluded Franco-Soviet pact. It also urged for dissolution of the Fascist leagues and extensive economic mill social reform. The common election slogan was 'Bread, peace mill liberty.'

The long weary years of economic depression had prepared the ground for a thorough-going change in the political and social arena. The Rights' continued appeal for violence was decisively changing the attitude of the masses. At this time an incident occured which made it crystal-clear idea of what the days ahead would be like if the Fascists controlled the state power. Leon Blum, the Sociaist leader, on his way back from the Chamber, had the misfortune to come across the funeral of an Action Francaise theoretecian Jacques Bainville. Recognised by the Fascist mourners, he was seized upon. He was saved from probable lynching, though not from injury, only by the intervention of nearby construction workers.

The new political alliance of the Left had been well cemented by the time the Chamber was dissolved. The election of April 1936 was noted for its remarkable solidarity among the constituent parties of the Front, and a corresponding disarray of those of the Right. The result was that the Front had an overwhelming majority — 380 deputies against 237 of the Right. Within the Front, Socialists gained 39 seats more than their share of the previous Parliament, independent Socialists 12, and Communists, who had had a mere 10 seats in the previous Parliament, now gained 62 seats and had a total of 72 deputies. Previously division of Left votes cost the Communists hard. But once Left votes were consolidated, the Communists gained most.

Thus Leon Blum formed a government composed of Socialists and Radicals with the support but not participation of the Communists. After the Popular Front government took office, it looked as though a new era of social reforms and economic recovery had commenced. The workers celebrated the electoral victory with wide-spread 'sit-in' strikes, and occupied the factories and department stores. In Blum's words this manifested 'a feeling of impatience to see realize those reforms for which the electoral victory allowed them to hope.' Indeed the effect of the occupation of factories and strikes was to force immediate concessions from the employers: concessions such as a rise in wages and the right to collective contracts about wages and conditions of work. This success was followed by legislation for social and economic reform — a forty-hour week, holidays with pay, a programme of public works, nationalization of the arms industry and reform of the Bank of France. A long-overdue effort to improve the condition of the French working class had started.

The new reforms were rapidly put into practice. This infuriated the propertied classes. Organs of the big bourgeoisie began slandering the Leftists and expressed grave concern at the future of the French state. The slightest of reforms brought forth strong reactions from the bourgeoisie and were given expression in those morning deluges called newspapers. The Socialists — like social democrats of other countries — now swung to the position of appeasing the bourgeoisie. When the Leftists were in the offensive, the

bourgeoisie were on the run. Now when the bourgeoisie started their offensive, the Socialists immediately gave in. They called for a pause in social reform.

So, in March 1937, Leon Blum in his attempt to appease the bourgeoisie proclaimed a 'pause' in the reforms of the Popular Front government — less then a year after it was constituted. This, of course, merely encouraged the enemies of the Front. The allies of the bourgeoisie, big newspaper groups raised the slogan 'better Hitler than Blum.' The Radicals, fifth column of the bourgeoisie within the Front, deserted the Blum government. In addition to it, another international situation brought about a sharp polarisation. This was related to the Spanish Republic. In June 1936, the Popular Front government came into power in Spain with an overwhelming majority. As the Front constituents were strong advocates of wide-ranging social reforms, the Spanish propertied classes, especially the big land-owners and Royalists, started conspiring against the Republic. Led by a little-known army officer, later known as Generallissimo Franco, the African legion of the Spanish army rose in open revolt against the constitutionally elected government of the Republic and started invading the Spanish mainland, directing this offensive towards the seizure of Madrid. Immediately Spain became the focal point of the global fight between democracy and dictatorship. Hitler and Mussollini came out openly to assist the Rebels with the most modern tanks, planes and other sophisticated arms. (In fact Spain was the testing ground for Hitler's new military hardware). The peace and democracy-loving people all over the world came out to its assistance. Democrats from all corners of the globe came to Spain to fight against the Fascists, and the famous International Brigade was formed. Ernest Hemingway, Christopher Caudwell, Louis Fischer, Andre Malraux and thousands of other Democrats, Socialists and Communists all over the world thronged to Spain to help the Republic. It was generally expected that France with its Popular Front government would extend a helping hand to the Spanish fighters of democracy. Instead, exactly the opposite happened. The Socialist government of Blum agreed with the British to observe complete non-interference. France did not even sell war materials to the Spanish government, though it could not be regarded as assistance but simple trade. On the other hand, Germany and Italy were helping Franco with men and materials. Many Germans fighting for Franco were actually caught by the Republican soldiers.

In the face of the Fascist International and the evident collusion of Mussollini and Hitler with Spanish Nationalists, what would the French government do? Would it assist the Spanish Republican government, or at least open trade relations with it in the sphere of arms? The answer seemed to be an emphatic 'no'. The French government would not do anything out of the way to help the Spanish government. It would deliberately not permit the Spanish government to buy arms, although the Spanish government had the money to pay for them, had the means of importing them, and by all international precedent, had every right to buy them. This decision could not be justified by any menus, and for the Blum ministry it was highly illogical. Under the pressure of the Rightists from both within the government and outside, Blum's ministry ignored its moral duty to help the neighbouring democracy fight those forces which were out to wreck the French Republic from the inside. The Communists and other democrats set up an outcry and built up a strong campaign against this cowardly act of the People's(?) Government of France. On the domestic front, the Blum government declined to carry out the long-overdue reforms and was browbeaten by the Rightists. Its foreign policy and the steps it was taking would ultimately dig its own grave. Hence the Communists found it had no obligation to support an impotent government. The Rightists i.e., the Radicals, withdrew their support. As a result, in June, 1937, the Popular Front government of France fell.

The grave of the Third Republic was dug on February 6, 1934 when the Fascist Croix de Feu, Action Francaise and Jeunesses Patiotes hatched the conspiracy to bring about a coup, and capture power. However the plan did not materialize, as we have seen, due to the timely intervention of the Socialists and Communists and also due to the vacillation of a section of the bourgeoisie about openly raising hands in favour of the Fascists. The outcome was the Popular Front. But the situation in 1936-37 was so explosive both within France and outside that a Popular Front government had to depend on a section of the bourgeoisie and that too on the French bourgeoisie, one of the most reactionary and opportunist bourgeoisie in Europe. It could not respond to the situation and ultimately fell. Capitulation to the Germans was only a matter of time. The bourgeoisie had lost their willingness to fight the Germans and the Popular Front experiment proved that the French bourgeoisie were more afraid of a class struggle than of German Fascism.

Hitler started his offensive against France on May 10, 1940. His forces cut through the French defence like a knife through butter. The Maginot line, pride of the French army, proved to be an illusion. The victors of 1918 totally collapsed in the face of Hitler's troops. But no less was it a political defeat. In fact, if one observed minutely the series of events, it would be apparent that the defeat at the Front coincided with the victory of the Fascist fifth columns within the country. The Generals who led the French army against the Germans were themselves either sympathisers or supporters of Fascism. Besides, almost al sections of the bourgeoisie had expressed their preference for Fascisml to internal class-struggle. Hence alibis were created like non-interference and desertion of the British, inadequate American help etc. But the truth was that the bourgeoisie favoured fascism, if not outright occupation by the Germans. Hence the day Marshal Petain, the victor of the First World War, declared that 'the fight must cease', it had already ceased. The capital was shifted from Paris to Tours and then from Tours to Bordeux where amidst pandemonium and confusion Reynaud abandoned the future of France to the frail hands of eighty-five year old Marshal Petain. Supported by a cabinet of fatalists, careerists, opportunists and Fascists, the Marshal asked for an armistice. Between May 10 and June 17, 1940 what had transpired was the logical culmination of the French politics of February 6, 1934. The ideology of 6th February was the fore-runner of the ideology of the Vichy government. Vichy was the ultimate triumph of the Action Francaise and other Fascist groups. Their men had an active role in its formations.

Looking back to the years between 1871 and 1939 few observations can be made about the development and growth of the working-class movement in France, and the influence of various doctrines that struck root in the French society. First, the Third Republic was the outcome of an evil collusion of the victor and vanquished bourgeoisie belonging to two different nations, but united over a common objective of exterminating the working class movement. The events also showed the lack of vertebrae of the petit-bourgeoisie represented by politicians, Intellectuals, novelists, painters etc., very few of whom had opposed the deep-rooted conspiracy of the bourgeoisie. As a corollary this can also be said that for the French bourgeoisie patriotism was a bargain-able and exchangeable commodity. In 1871 they showed their real face.

On the other hand, the French workers of the Commune not only fought against the foreign invaders but also against the bourgeois fifth columns within the country. Although they lost the battle, they proved their mettle —-their patriotism, integrity and sincerity.

After trade union rights were restored in 1884 and workers began to consolidate their strength, the Proudhonists and Blanquists retained their influence among the workers and till the First World War, CGT was under the influence of the anarchists. Guesde and

Jaures were not very successful at the trade-union front. In spite of their outstanding personal qualities as organisers, neither of them had shown much understanding or comprehension of Marxism, as was observed among the contemporary Germans and Russians. They did not, and could not establish the tradition of refuting bourgeois and petit-bourgeois anarchist philosophy. Hence the theoretical foundation of the French Marxists was not very strong. Besides, they themselves were not very clear on how to creatively apply Marxism to the local condition. Jaures was a great pacifist, but contrary to all his belief, Marxism is anything but pacifism. Marxism has definite understanding about peace and war, bourgeois peace and people's war, people's peace and bourgeois war etc. Because for Marxists neither peace nor war can be so simply supported or opposed. Jaures in his bid to oppose all wars became a petit-bourgeois pacifist in the ultimate analysis. Guesde all his life championed the cause of the workers. But he, too, at last, participated in the ministry of national defence. The Socialists, in short, only fought against the bourgeoisie by organising the workers. Adequate attention was not paid to the fact that Marxism had to be defended from the onslaught of the bourgeois intellectuals. The result was that Marxism did not make any inroad among the progressive individuals and intelligentsia. It remained confined within a section of the working class only.

The Socialist movement in France was divided till 1905. After a brief period of unity it again split in the 1920's. This division within the Socialist ranks was one of the reasons why the Socialist ideology of Marx and Engels' tradition could not spread much among the petit bourgeois intellectuals. On the other hand, Proudhonists and Blanquists preached a sort of anarchism that found adherents and patrons both among the intellectuals and a sizable section of the working class. Hence, excepting at the end of World War I when a successful Socialist Revolution took place in the Soviet Union, and some famous intellectuals like Henry Barbousse joined the Communist Party, the tradition of siding with the Communists did not develop in France. What Sartre had hinted in 'Problem of Method' was partly true. Among the renowned professors of philosophy at the Universities there were very few who had a clear understanding about dialectical and historical materialism. Henri Bergson with his queer philosophical theories was towering above all others and obtaining official patronage that greeted him as a great philosopher. But Marxism was neither taught at the Universities seriously nor did it attract erudite scholars of philosophy.

The crux of the matter was that in France there did not develop that tradition among the petit bourgeois intellectuals that could ultimately culminate in a show of solidarity with the working class. The French working class fought the bourgeoisie so violently that the bourgeoisie, and along with them the petit-bourgeoisie, were engaged In one of the bitterest struggles in history. Further, the bourgeoisie and Petit-bourgeoisie in France had on several occasions sacrificed patriotism favour of class struggle. They proved themselves to be the worst collaborators with foreign invaders. This tradition they also carried with them during the Second World War. In sharp contrast, the French working class had, throughout history, not only raised the flag of class-struggle but equally strongly preserved the independence of the French nation. They did this great service to the nation in 1871 and in 1941.If at times during 1939 to 1945, the prospect of the French nation looked gloomy, it was the working class which helped restore the self-respect of the French as a nation.

IV

The terms of Armistice were hard, but to Petain and his Fascist colleagues they were acceptable. The Germans would occupy the northern half of France and the Atlantic coast. The French military would be demobilized and disarmed; the navy would be handed over to the Germans, who assured that they would not use it. The French would hand over the refugees from Nazi Germany who had fled to France, would bear the huge cost of the occupation forces and supply French labour for the war industry in Germany. In exchange for all this the Germans would not occupy a small southern portion of France where 'an independent' French state would be allowed to exist.

To the French Fascists the fall of France came as a gift. Marshal Petain, who had long hoped to become the Head of State, did not hesitate for a moment to agree to this. The organizers of 6th February, who had no hope of seizing power in the Third Republic thanked their lucky because at last their dream had come true. For the careerists and opportunists the reward of collaboration was quick promotion, unlimited power, and the sadistic pleasure of persecuting their own countrymen. Vichy, the health resort in the south of France, full of big hotels and places of pleasures in peace time, became the Mecca of the new-fortune-seekers.

On June 17, Marshal Petain was appointed the Head of State of truncated France and on July 9, the parliament was called to session. There the call was given to rally round the Marshal and the next day the 'Law of July 10' was promulgated. It read, 'The National Assembly gives all powers to the Government of the Republic under authority and signature of Marshal Petain to promulgate in one or more acts, a new constitution of the French State.' So Marshal Petain became the dictator of the 'new France'. The law was passed by 569 to 80 votes. The Communists were already in jails and among these 80 dissenters, there were Socialists and others who had not sold themselves, or could not be cowed by threats. Of course, many were later driven into jails where they were starved to death. But the overwhelming majority — representatives of the bourgeois parties — showed sign of having guilty consciences. There was a general atmosphere of defeatism and collaboration. The French people, and a large section of the French army, were completely bewildered by the suddenness of the German attack. The collapse of the Maginot line myth followed by the unobstructed sweep of the German tank divisions across France, the tragedy of Dunkirk, the fall of Paris on June 14 —-all these created a feeling in the French people that their country was beaten. Could they continue their fight in Africa? To many politicians and similar thinking people, it was the right thing to do. But to the shopkeepers of Tours, to the farmer of Limousin, to the winegrower of the Midi it was all unrealistic and remote. What had happened was a bitter blow to France's pride but if a referendum had been taken, claim many historians, say on June 15, on whether France should try to negotiate an armistice, there was no doubt that the vast majority would have said 'yes'. But then if the question was posed who created this mood, the answer would be — the French bourgeoisie. The army generals who were mostly reactionary and Fascists in ideology and the Government behind them were reluctant to fight Germany at all. Otherwise the defeat could be interpreted as de Gaulle did — 'one battle was lost only and the war had just begun.'

For four years (1940-44) the people of France passed through the excruciating pain of seeing their beloved land 'engulfed in a sweet fire small and alone.' If many Frenchmen were worried during these years about the place of France in the World, they could not be criticised. A proud and great nation succumbed to slavery or worse than that, handing over their own Jewish population to the Gestapo and sending their own children to die in

the labour camps of Germany. The bourgeoisie betrayed France and subjected her to unprecedented humiliation.

If this was the role of the bourgeoisie, what did the French petit-bourgeois intellectuals do? This is a black page of France's intellectual history also. Andre Gide who denounced Communism because it in-fringed on individual freedom looked at this disaster as the repetition of die historical absorption of the Franks by the Gauls and argued that it might work very well this time also. Roger Stephane', one of Gide's Intimate friends wrote in his wartime diary, 'No doubt Gide would like freedom, but would not freedom today, he wonders, simply mean disorder? He would like France to revive but he does not believe in such a revival; politically, he says, France is destined to be protected either by Germany or by the Anglo-Saxons. But after the victory of either of them will not all the problems still be left unsettled? On the other hand Gide continues to be impressed by the grandiose dimensions of the Hitler Plan. And will not Hitler, he wonders, having won all along the line, suddenly become transformed into Augustus, a prisoner of his own greatness and of the grandeur of his mission.' But when Hitler did not transform himself into Augustus, and the little-known Undersecretery of War, de Gaulle, was fighting the Germans from Algiers, one fine morning in the year 1943, this Communist-hater Hitler-lover Gide appeared in Algiers as a Gaullist.

Economically and socially the petit-bourgeoisie are an extension of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie themselves do not always write In the papers, formulate plans and programmes. The petit-bourgeoisie do this for the bourgeoisie. They are the officers and clerks of the bourgeois establishments, the representatives of the political parties of the bourgeoisie, professors and advisers to the Institutes that the bourgeoisie finance. Hence, in the absence of a strong counterforce, any working-class movement, the petit-bourgeoisie become quite often the standard bearers of the bourgeoisie. Barring few exceptions, this is historically true. In spite of the ear-splitting propaganda by the French bourgeoisie about the role played by the petit-bourgeois intellectuals, it is a black page in the history of the French people. Barring a few conscience-keepers, the French petit-bourgeoisie became collaborators of the Vichy government ready to do anything to please the masters.

'The great majority of the French intellectuals', writes a historian, 'either whole-heartedly or with reservation, followed Marshal Petain. This is more true for those over forty. The French Academy, with the sole exception of Mauriac, (and the partial exception of Duhamel) was whole-heartedly pro-Marshal. Two celebrated poets of France, Valery and Claudel were Petainists.'

Claudel, who was an ambassador during the regime of the Third Republic wanted assignments in Madrid. Hence he dedicated his poetry to Marshal Petain. In 1944 he wrote his 'Ode to de Gaulle' and thus absolved himself of his sins of the past. And Valery? He was a particular favourite of Petain, and used to visit the Marshal at Vichy. Jean and Jerome Tharaud, Abel Hermont and Abel Bonnard, all members of the French Academy, the loftiest of France, were either Petainists or collaborators and often there was no Chinese Wall in between. A few like Cocteau, Gide etc., though they were not outright collaborators or Vichyites, were resigned more to the theory of historical design, than willing to oppose the system, however insignificantly. Besides, there was the anglophile Andre Maurois whom Churchil thought 'to be a friend, but who turned out to be only a client.' Among the painters and musicians most were collaborators. And little wonder that the German ambassador Abetz got immense pleasure in declaring that 'the intellectual life' continued unabated — rather flourished— during German occupation.

Often no clear line of demarcation could be drawn between Vichyism and pure collaboration.

As observed by France-watchers during the war years, the elite in France more or less cooperated and supported the Vichy regime. The famous names in active resistance could almost be counted on the fingers of one hand: Mauriac, Bernanos, Malraux and Roger Martin du Gard. Among the Communists, Eluard and Aragon. Nearly all the rest of the intellectual opposition was composed of young people in the Resistance. Of the official elite of the French Academy, Mauriac was the only real rebel.

If almost all sections of the bourgeoisie and a sizable section of the petit-bourgeoisie surrendered to the German and native Fascists, how did France redeem herself and after the end of the War, assert her place in the world? How and why in France did there develop a growing awareness to stand up and take up arms against the foreign invaders, and their internal collaborators? Description and analysis of this subject can fill up volumes as they have already done. Here, in the following pages, we will briefly touch upon the subject.

It was the working class which again pulled the country out of this crisis. In 1871 members of the Commune defended Paris from the invading Germans. In 1941, full seventy years after, they again took up arms against the combined forces of German occupation troops, and their internal protectors. This time also they were arrested, imprisoned in concentration camps, and executed in thousands. But in the long run, with the capitulation of Germany, they at last came out victorious. All too soon they were outwitted and outmaneuvered by the bourgeoisie, and later bourgeois propaganda succeeded in shifting the credit away from them. But the truth written in blood and iron could not be totally crazed. To furnish even an outline of the Resistance struggle, one has to divide the subject matter in three parts: (1) The part played by de Gaulle from outside France, especially from London and the African colonies (2) The Resistance as it developed in Northern France under direct occupation of the Germans (3) The Resistance movement that grew up in Southern France against the Vichy government. The latter two developed differently because of the difference in objective conditions. But when the Germans moved into Vichy France and the Resistance movement came under similar oppression and persecution as in the North, the various movements of the North and South came under unified command, and that again became centrally coordinated with de Gaulle's headquarter in London.

The first voice of Resistance was heard from London in the historic broadcast on June 18, 1940 when de Gaulle declared that the flame of French Resistance had not been put out, and could not be put out. Of course, at this early stage there was no flame of resistance burning in France, though there were a few sparks here and there. De Gaulle, a little known Undersecretary of the Ministry of War managed to escape from France when the Germans captured Paris, and with the help of the British established the Free French government in London. De Gaulle immediately after the establishment of the Free French government in London planned to bring under his command the African colonies. In August 1940 the government of French Chad announced its allegiance to de Gaulle. Colonel Leclerc established his authority over Douala. Simultaneously in a Gaullist coup Brazzaville came under London. Thus the greater part of the French Equatorial Africa went Gaullist very early in the War, followed by other territories like the Cameroons, French territories in the Pacific and India. These developments strengthened the hands of the Free French government in London and gave it a prestige which other governments in exile did not enjoy. In spite of de Gaulle's increasing strength, the Anglo-American landing in French North Africa in late 1942 was kept secret from him, but after the

successful capture of Algiers the administration of North Africa was handed over to de Gaulle, who then became the sole Chairman of the French Committee of National Liberation. Thus outside France, de Gaulle's Free French government became the rallying point of the French people's anti-German struggle. It was because of its own resources, this also became the central coordinating body that linked Resistance within France and outside.

Within occupied France, Resistance grew much faster, except in the South under Vichy. It was the daily presence of the German Fascists and their inhuman brutality to suppress any form of opposition that accelerated the rate of growth of the French Resistance movement. In the beginning a few groups began working in this direction and were wiped out very early. Comite National de Salut Public, Defence de la France, 1'Homme libre etc. were some of the most prominent ones at the early stage. But with the passage of time, as the degree of German repression grew alarmingly, well-knit organisations, capable of handling the complicated situation, began to make their appearance.

The largest and the most important among these groups was the National Front, formed in the pattern of the Popular Front, and led by the Communists. The National Front aimed at incorporating in its ranks all sections of the population, and in the style of the Communist mass organisations, sub-National Front groups were created such as Women's National Front, Peasants' National Front, Shopkeepers' National Front, Lawyer's National Front etc.

The second most important Resistance group was known as 'Liberation-Nord' composed of Socialists, Anarchists and Catholic trade-unions. Beside organising small bands of saboteurs, they used to publish a clandenstine paper regularly, and during liberation it had a circulation of 50,000 copies a week.

The third most important group was known as 'Organisation Civile et Militaire' (OCM) composed of soldiers, members of civil service and other professionals. They claimed to have had a membership of a few thousand, and they were mainly responsible for sabotage from within.

In course of time these three organisations developed their network throughout France and eventually became truly national in their expanse.

In the Vichy zone, growth of Resistance was a slow process. In the beginning it was mainly limited to verbal denunciation of Petain and the 'Collabos'. But with the German occupation of Vichy in November 1942, and the resulting change in the objective condition, Resistance began to take a more concrete shape and finally it developed along lines of the North.

Among the early groups that later became well-known 'Movement de Liberation Nationale', previously known as 'Petites Ailes' became quite active and after joining with a left-wing catholic group called 'Liberte' it adopted the familiar name 'Combat'. In the early stage 'Combat' limited itself to publication of a clandenstine newspaper of the same name, which reached circulation of 30,000 copies. Later they were engaged in producing forged papers that needed expertise and entailed considerable risk.

Another important group, with a more revolutionary aim than that of 'Combat', to organise a popular revolt and general strike — was known as 'Liberation'. Led by a naval officer this group tried to bring into its fold Communists, Socialists, Anarchists and Catholic trade unions. In the Spring of 1942 it decided to form a para-military organisation. In 1942 it had a total membership of 20,000. There were many University students in this group including a number of intellectuals who had fled from Paris.

'France-Tireur' was another important Resistance group which had a membership of 30,000 in November 1942. It was comprised of Paris intellectuals who had fled from the capital, and members and supporters of left parties.

In course of time co-ordination was brought about between London and the resistance groups operating within France. At first a 'Delegation Generate de General de Gaulle en France' was established. Later a National Council of Resistance was set up to link de Gaulle with various resistance movements. Although separate organisations of Resistance still retained their identity, CNR helped to establish a direct link between the Allies on the one hand, and the Resistance movements in France on the other. And during the Normandy landing of 1944 this link helped provide enormous back-up support to the Anglo-American troops. But beside this there was not much that the CNR could do. Advisory in nature, CNR helped de Gaulle to out-maneuvre the Resistance groups after liberation.

As already pointed out, Resistance movement was primarily taken up by those who could not tolerate the complete surrender of the bourgeoisie to Fascism. Hence Resistance against the German Fascists and their local collaborators culminated into an anti-bourgeois, anti-Fascist movement. Even non-communist Resistance leaders, while opposing the bourgeoisie's collusion with German Fascism, turned in favour of a new order and new deal different from that meted out by the bourgeoisie in the Third Republic. Terms like Socialism and revolution were in the air and even de Gaulle once gave a call for Revolution which he was quick to rectify into 'Renovation'. However, Communists and non-Communists alike, all were in favour of a total change after liberation. This was the reason why many non-Communist intellectuals, Sartre was one of them, were attracted to Marxism after the liberation. On the eighth anniversary of the liberation of Paris various resistance leaders reminisced over the expectations and moods of the years of the Resistance struggle. Bourdet, one of the leading organisers of Combat wrote "...what was the force that could transform France? Some said simply the Communist Party and the Fronts surrounding it. No doubt if the CP had taken the lead immediately after capitulation, I, like many others, would certainly have followed. This unique and priveleged position of the CP would no doubt have created in the Party itself a new spirit which might have satisfied all the Resisters ...

'A great political force should have been contributed, comprising the Communists, all the revolutionary, Socialist and near-Socialist elements of the Resistance, regardless of the philosophical views and comprising the entire rank and file and most of the leaders of the Resistance....

'The old bourgeois society was rapidly put back in its place, while the spontaneous, somewhat anarchical, but still terribly vital reforms of the Resistance were cast aside. Later point was added to this by the catastropic replacement of Mendes-France by Pleven ... for months afterwards I still tried to go on believing in de Gaulle but in the end I Understood that at Algiers de Gaulle had already fallen into the hands of the military and administrative castes of the bourgeoisie, and that in Paris he was back in his old obsolete milieu and that here, in Paris, a hundred thousand 'haves' were counting on de Gaulle to save them from ' Revolution' — our Revolution, the revolution of the Resistance.' If this was the mood of the participants of the Resistance, how did the Communists fight during occupation?

After Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the French

Communists, overcoming their dilemma of yesteryears joined the ranks of the Resistance and within no time became the most organised, courageous and

uncompromising section of the movement. Both the Germans and the Vichy agents regarded the Communists as by far the most dangerous group in the Resistance. They were exceptionally prominent in the rural guerrilla formations (known as Maquis) and though persecuted in thousands, they relentlessly engaged the Germans and their local collaborators in innumerable battles. Hence in the Vichy vocabulary they were termed as bandits. They were the most numerous among the hostages shot by the Germans. There are many Communist grave-yards strewn all over France where thousands were shot and buried; and many thousands died in the concentration camps. The Party, not without reason, called itself the 'Party of bullets'. There have been many attempts to belittle the Communists' role in the Resistance. To put the record straight, we would like to quote from Alexander Werth who had stayed in France during the decisive years of 1940-44. He writes, '... even a man like Beuve-Mery, the editor of the Monde, who was anything but pro-Communist, still referred in 1945 to the Communists as the most dynamic part of the Resistance,-as its *aile marchants*. Also, the attraction the Communists exercised on many intellectuals (always an important point in France) after the War is unquestionable. Aragon and Eluard, whose war-time poetry was full of national, anti-German and revolutionary inspiration, came very close to becoming the true national poets of Prance. A poem like Eluard's Liberte caught the mood and innermost feelings of France under the occupation — or rather of all those who resisted, actively or even passively better than almost any-thing else. If Vichy had its 'intellectual elite' and its writers (who were playing for safety) so the Resistance, too, had its elite and its writers who risked their lives) — and among these Aragon and Eluard, Surrealists in the past but Communists now were amongst the most famous.

'The attraction that, for years afterwards, the Communists continued to exercise on a very large part of the French intellectuals — though less per se than as a powerful corrective to "bourgeois democracy" and to so many of the Free World shibboleths of the cold war epoch is a reality which cannot be overlooked in any examination of the subsequent course of French history….

Parodying Bourdet who said that everything in France is "anti-neutralist, but…" one may well say that a large part of France is "anti-communist, but...." Among the intellectuals in particular anti-Communism is usually of a milder quality than it is in Britain or in the U.S.A. There are many reasons for this. Nearly everybody has personal contacts with at least a few Communists and Communists they personally know do not eat babies; also, there is no profound conviction that the Communists are always wrong; there is a guilt-feeling vis-a-vis the working class; and there is the consciousness that the Communists were in the front rank of the Resistance, and received no reward for it....

'Sometimes it has been argued that this would be different (anti-Communist feeling-author) if only the Communists were 'national Communists'. But would it be? There was no Moscow in 1848 or in 1871'.

2

LIFE AND TIMES OF JEAN PAUL SARTRE DURING 1905-1943

Childhood;

Jean Paul Sartre, left behind some autobiographical works that explain, to an extent, the reason why his philosophical works abound in contradictions —how time and time again he has sought to arrive at materialism through idealism. A few examples will prove our point. In 'Transcendence of Ego' he sought to modify the Husserlian concept about 'ego' and 'consciousness' and through some idealist machinations wanted to bring existentialism nearer and acceptable to the materialists. In 'Psychology of Imagination', Sartre propounded the thesis that it is because of and through imagination that man gets the inspiration to change the world. He does not like the world that he finds around him. It is not mere idea that he seeks to change but the real concrete world that he lives in. Here lies his materialism. How? Through 'imagination' — not by resolving the contradictions existing in our real life process. In 'Being and Nothingness' he praised the Communists who wanted to act. But the reason why one acts he has totally idealized. And this dilemma has haunted him throughout his life. He has been drawn towards materialism but his idealism has time and time again pulled him away from materialism.

We find the embryo of this insoluble contradiction in his very life process — particularly in those formative years of childhood which he has described in his autobiographical sketch 'Words' (penguin edition, paper back 1967 edition, 1983 reprint). An unfortunate child who lost his father early in his childhood, young Jean Paul and his mother Ann-Marie were given shelter by his maternal grandfather and were always conscious that they were shown pity. Brought up thus, the small child, as Sartre reflects later about those days, also learnt how to keep the head of the family in good humour, and hence he lived in an incessant dualism of what he liked and what his grandfather liked, He learnt to keep his liking always away from the eyes of the grandfather who wanted to fulfil, through the child, what he himself could not achieve. This dual existence of living — according to his own liking and to that of his grandfather, interpenetrated each other with the queer result that the child was forced into a make-believe world where he confused the two at times. To give credence to his grandfather's desire that he would one day grow up to be a famous writer, he found himself in the study of the old man leafing through the books which his grandfather had not yet read, and imagining, this time believing, that one day he would write books that would adorn libraries too. Sartre writes, 'I began my life as I shall no doubt end it: among books. In my grandfather's study they were everywhere; it was forbidden to dust them except once a year, before the October term. Even before I could read, I already revered the raised stones; upright or leaning, wedged together like bricks on the library shelves, or nobly spaced like avenues of dolmens, I felt that my family prosperity depended on them. They were all alike and I was romping about in a tiny sanctuary, surrounded by squat, ancient monuments which had witnessed my birth, which would witness my death and whose permanence guaranteed me a future as calm as my past. I used to touch them in secret to honour my hands with their dust but I did not have much idea what to do with them and each day I was present at ceremonies whose meaning escaped me: my grandfather—-so clumsy, normally, that my grandmother buttoned his gloves for him — handled these cultural objects with the dexterity of an officiating priest' (p. 28). As the child grew up and learnt how to spell and read, he immersed himself inside those thick books, particularly the Encyclopedia, and

tried to read them — not because he liked it but because it pleased the old man. His mother, however, smuggled for him some children's books. 'From these books and magazines I derived my most personal fantasy — world: that of optimism. This reading matter was long kept a secret; … aware of their unworthiness, I did not breathe a word of them to my grandfather. ... It never ended: even today, I would rather read "thrillers" than Wittengstein' (p.49). It is as if the writer of 'Being and Nothingness' is saying that he would be pleased to write cheap commercial books rather than the one-thousand-page indecipherable philosophy.

But this dual existence created an insoluble contradiction to which we have alluded in the beginning. To him the world did not come as the real world that we see around us. Instead the world that he came across in the Encyclopedia was represented by words first and then In reality. 'A Platonist by condition, I moved from knowledge to its object; I found ideas more real than things because they gave them-selves like things. I met the Universe in books: assimilated, classified, labeled, and studied, but still impressing and I confused the chaos of my experiences through books with the hazardous course of real events. *Hence my idealism which took me thirty years to undo'* (p. 34). The passage is self-explanatory. Once again he explained 'In the end, the idealism of the cleric was based on the realism of the child. I explained this earlier: since I had discovered the world through language for a long time I mistook language for the world. To exist was to have a registered trade-name somewhere on the infinite Tables of the word; writing meant engraving new beings on them or — this was my most persistent illusion — catching living things in the trap of phrases: if I put words together ingeniously, the object would be entangled in the signs and I would hold it. In the Luxembourg gardens, I began to be fascinated by a gleaming image of a plane tree: I did not study it; on the contrary I trusted in space and waited; after a moment its real foliage loomed up in the form of a simple adjective or sometimes a whole clause: I never committed my discoveries to paper: they were accumulating, I thought, in my memory. In fact I forgot them. But they gave me a glimpse of my future role: I would impose names. For several centuries, at Aurillac, some idle reams of whiteness had been crying out for fixed contours, for meaning; I would make genuine monuments of them. As a terrorist, I aimed only at their existence: I would construct it through language. As a rhetorician, I loved only words: I would raise my cathedrals of words beneath the blue gaze of the word sky. I would build up for thousands of years' (pp. 114-5).

This topsy-turvy understanding of the world has haunted him throughout his life. His early philosophical works abound in examples and hypotheses that corroborate what Sartre himself wrote in 1963 with hindsight. As he had also embraced Marxism at a certain point In his life, we are rather fortunate to have found the early roots of his philosophical outlook in his childhood itself. Sartre's idealism was born in the very milieu of his existence. Cut off from the world, to him only ideas appeared concrete and real.

But where are the strands of materialism in his childhood? It is found in his material existence. The child knew instinctively that his mother was helpless, that they were provided shelter, food and clothing out of pity, that they had no right in the family. A sensitive child, he understood that he had to behave properly otherwise they would be in peril. The mother, through her various ways of communication, j through her own example, instilled the idea into the child that he could not afford the luxury of being disobedient and irritating to other members of the family. Dispossessed, fatherless, brought up like parasite, young Sartre was always conscious of their precarious existence. And this alienated him from the rest of the affluent community to which his grandfather belonged. On the other hand he found himself mentally akin to that section of the society

which was as helpless and as unfortunate as he was. Alienated from his own class and akin to the downtrodden, but materially isolated from them, he was caught in a strange dilemma: 'Today, 22 April, 1963 I am correcting this manuscript on the tenth floor of a new house: through the open widow, I can see a cemetery, Paris and the blue hills of the Saint-cloud. This shows my pertinacity. Yet everything has changed. If, as a child, I had wished to deserve this exalted position, my love for pigeon lofts would seem to have indicated some play of ambition, or vanity or compensation for my lack of height. But no; it was not a question of climbing my sacred tree: I was there and I refused to come down; it was not that I wished to set myself up above men; I wanted to live in pure ether among the airy likeness of things. Later on, far from clinging to balloons, I made every effort to sink down: I had to put lead soles in my shoes. With luck, on bare sands I sometimes managed to brush against underwater species, whose names I had to invent. At other times, I was powerless: an irresistible lightness buoyed me up. In the end, my altimeter went out of order: sometimes I am a cartesian diver, sometimes a deep sea diver, often both at the same time, as it should be in our profession: I dwell in the air by habit and I nose about down below without too much hope' (p. 40). It was only ideally that young Sartre was conscious of their material condition. Only materially did he grow up in the bourgeois environment of his grandfather's house. Thus both the connotations of ideal and material living interpenetrated each other in his life-process confusing meaning of each. This peculiar upbringing of Sartre explains many a riddle that one finds in his philosophical writings — upto the point of 'Being and Nothingness'. After that he was decisively turning a marxist. But due to the peculiar notions in-grained in him he again dissociated himself from it. Of course that is a different story which does not concern us here.

This alienated childhood inculcated in him a peculiar aim in life. Brought up within books and away from the world he found pleasure In books only. To him real life had no concern at all. He wrote, 'I had found my religion: nothing seemed more important to me than a book. I saw the library as a temple. Grandson of a priest, I lived on the roof of the world, on the sixth floor, perched on the highest branch of the central tree: its trunk was the lift-shaft. I came and went on the balcony, cast a glance from on high at the passers-by, waved through the rallings at Lucette Moreau, my neighbour, who was my age and had the same fair curls and youthful femininity, and retired into my cella or pronaos, but never went down in person: when my mother took me to the Luxembourg Gardens — that is to say, every day — I lent my human body to these lowly regions but my glorious substance never left its perch, and I believe it is still there. Every man has his natural place; it is not pride or worth that settles its height: childhood decided everything. Mine is a sixth floor in Paris with a view of the rooftops. For a long time I suffocated in valleys, and plains over-whelmed me: I dragged myself round the planet Mars and the pressure crushed me; all I had to do to be happy again was climb on to a mole-hill: was hack on my symbolic sixth floor and was again breathing the rarefied air of Belles Lettres. The universe lay spread at my feet and each thing was humbly begging for a name and giving it one was like both creating it and taking it. Without this fundamental illusion, I should never have written' (p. 39-40).

We should also refer to another of his daydreams that would explain the state of mind of little Jean Paul. The child was thinking about his authorship after several decades: 'round about 1955, a larva would burst and twenty five folio butterflies would escape, feverishly beating their pages and settle on a shelf of Bibliotheque Nationale. These butterflies would be none other than myself. Me: twenty five volumes, eighteen thousand pages of text and three hundred illustrations, including a portrait of the author. My bones

are leather and cardboard, my parchment flesh smells of glue and mildew, and I strut at my ease across a hundred weight or so of paper. I am reborn, I have at last become a complete man, thinking, speaking, singing, thundering, and 21 asserting himself with the preemptory inertia of matter. I am taken I up, opened out, spread on the table, smoothed with the flat of the hand and sometimes made to crack' (p. 122). We could go on quoting from Sartre about the unearthly pleasure that he derived from projecting himself half a century later. Words, their thick alignment in pages, and successions of pages, numbering thousands, made into volumes bound and kept in order, all bearing the authorship of himself— this was rather an unusual ambition for a child who had just learnt how to spell.

As we read in his autobiography, the child was not concerned about anything happening around him — in the country at large. Only the effect of German annexation of Alsace seemed to attract some of his attention but he rather thanked the Germans for it because bow otherwise would his grandfather have run the Institute of French which I taught Germans, the language of Alsace, and that too at a profit — which in turn sustained the family!

The workers' movement that grew rapidly by the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth did not send its ripples to the door of the old linguist. Excepting through some patriotic stories published in the morning newspaper the War also did not have any impact upon the members of the household, and particularly upon the child. Everything seemed motionless and still and life went on with unique boredom. The child broke a tooth one day by stumbling against a door, but did not repent it because this would at least force some change from the daily monotonous routine of existence. Even the dreams and day-dreams were sewn in the same pattern.

Youth

If childhood had confused Sartre about object and its nomenclature how was his youth—particularly those years of college and university years that decisively influence the course of events in an individual's life? We have no first-person autobiographical account that can enlighten us about those days—Sartre has not written anything — though we have important observations by Simone de Beauvoir. In book four of 'Memoirs of a dutiful daughter' (Penguin 1965 reprint), we have enough clues that can allow us to draw a sketch of Sartre as he was in those days. From Beauvoir's description it is pretty clear that the Sorborne was then quite free from left-wing student movements. There were isolated groups and individuals who studied Marxism — like Georges Polizer, a young lecturer, or Nizan, one of the closest friends of Sartre.

Simone became friendly with Sartre and his friends only at the very end of her university days when she was preparing for the competitive examination that would enable her, if she succeeded, to secure a respectable job in the teaching profession. The group consisted of three young men Herbaud, who introduced her to Sartre, Nizan and Sartre himself. On the first day when she went to Sartre's room for study she was struck by Sartre's scholarship: 'I was feeling a bit scared when I entered Sartre's room; there were books all over the place, cigarette ends in all the corners and the air was thick with tobacco smoke. Sartre greeted me in a worldly manner; he was smoking a pipe. Nizan, who said nothing, had a cigarette stuck in the corner of his one-sided smile and was quizzing me through his pebble lenses, with an air of thinking more than he cared to say. All day long, petrified with fear I annotated the 'Metaphysical Treatise' and in the evening Herbaud took me back home.

I went back each day and soon I began to thaw out. Leibniz was boring, so we decided that we knew enough about him. Sartre took it upon himself to expound Russeau's 'The Social Contract' upon which he had very decided opinions. To tell the truth, it was always he who knew most about all the authors and all the aspects of our syllabus: we merely listened to him talking. I sometimes attempted to argue with him; I would rack my brains to find objections to his views. "She is a sly puss!" Herbaud would laugh, while Nizan would scrutinize his fingernails with an air of great concentration; but Sartre always succeeded in turning the tables on me. It was impossible to feel put-out by him: he used to do his utmost to help us to benefit from his knowledge' (pp. 334-5)

We will come to Sartre's other aspects in a moment but before that let us learn something about the other members of the group. Writes Beauvoir, 'Sometimes we would abandon the Cite for Nizan's study. He lived with his wife's parents in a house in the rue Vavin whose facade was covered with glazed earthenware tiles. On the walls of his study there was a large portrait of Lenin, a Cassandre poster, and the Venus of Botticelli: I admired his ultra-modern, furniture and his very carefully chosen books. Nizan was the most go-ahead member of I the trio; he had already had a book published, belonged to various literary circles, and had joined the Communist Party; he introduced us to Irish literature and the new American novelists. He was abreast in all the latest fashions in the Arts, and even ahead of them. He took us to the dreary Cafe de Flore "to do the old Deux Magots in the eye", he said, gnawing at his fingernails like a mischievous rat. He was working on a pamphlet attacking 'official' philosophers and was also engaged in writing a book on "Marxist Wisdom" (p. 336). So this was Nizan. Herbaud was the most non-serious among them. Nizan, as the vanguard of the trio must have had decisive influence on young Sartre, particularly in forming an outlook on social and political matters. Simone de Beauvoir observes on this point: 'He (Sartre) shrugged disdainful shoulders at all metaphysical disputes. He was | interested in social and political questions; he sympathised with Nizan's position; but as far as he was concerned, the main thing was to write, and the rest would come later. Besides, at that point he was much more of an anarchist than a revolutionary; he thought society as it was then, detestable, but he didn't detest detesting it; what he called his "opposition aesthetics" admitted quite openly the existence of imbeciles and knaves, and even required their presence in the world: if there was nothing to attack and destroy, the writing of books wouldn't amount to much' (pp. 341-2).

'He certainly had no intention of leading the life of a professional literary man; he detested formalities and literary hierarchies, 'literary movements,' careers, the rights and duties of life. He could not reconcile himself to the idea of having a profession, colleagues, superiors, of having to observe and impose rules; he would never be a family man and would never even marry. With all the romanticism of the age, and of his twenty-three years, he dreamed of making tremendous journeys: in Constantinople, he would fraternize with the dock-workers; he would get blind drunk with pimps and white-slaves in sinks of iniquity; he would go right round the world, and neither the pariahs of India, nor the monks of Mount Athos, nor the fishermen of Newfoundland would have any secrets from him. He would never settle down any where and would never encumber himself with possessions: not merely in order to keep his freedom of movement but in order to prove how unnecessary possessions are. All his experiments would benefit his writing, and he would sweep aside all experiences which would in any way detract from it. We were arguing on firm ground here. I admired, In theory at any rate, the systematic derangement of the senses, dangerous living, lost souls, all excesses — drink, drugs and sex. Sartre held that when one has something important to tell the world, it is criminal to

waste one's energies on other occupations. The work of art and literature, was, in his view, an absolute end in itself; and it was, even though he never said so, I was sure he believed this — the be-all and end-all of the entire universe (p. 341).

By this time Sartre was also crystallizing some of his ideas on Man and his transcendence. Considering his later development, these views might prove to be interesting to the readers. He wrote: 'It is a paradox of the human mind that Man, whose business it is to create the necessary conditions, cannot raise himself above a certain level of existence, like those future-tellers who can tell other people's future but not their own. This is why, as at the root of humanity, as at the root of nature, I can see only sadness and boredom! It's not that Man does not think of himself as a being. On the contrary, he devotes all his energies to becoming one. Whence derive our ideas of Good and Evil, ideas of men working to improve Man. But these concepts are useless. Useless, too, is the determinism which oddly enough attempts to create a synthesis of existence and being. We are as free as you like, but helpless.... For the rest, the will to power, action and life are only useless Ideologies. There is no such thing as the will to power. Everything is too weak: all things carry the seeds of their own death. Above all, adventure - by which I mean that blind belief in adventitious and yet inevitable concatenations of circumstances and events — is a delusion. In this sense, the 'adventurer' is an inconsequential determinist who imagines he is enjoying complete freedom of action (pp.342-3)

During 1929 to 1944 a veritable metamorphosis was taking place in Sartre. Slowly, with the turning of Europe into a hot cauldron with sharp cracks it was becoming increasingly imperative to recognize to which side one belonged: Fascism or Democracy. The man Sartre — a lecturer of philosophy, a lover of human freedom and liberty, a petit-bourgeois bourgeois who hated the bourgeoisie as a class, — was slowly but decisively renouncing his self-centred individualism, and taking sides against Fascism in favour of Socialism, though remaining ignorant about the philosophical basis of the latter. The man whose utmost concern in life was to live for literature, was positively transforming ' himself into one for whom literature which was not 'engaged' was meaningless. From an intent observer of contemporary history and 1 life around him, he was transformed into one who actively participated in helping to bring about decisive changes in the social, economic and political spheres. This transformation in Sartre the man was also evident in Sartre the litterateur as well as in Sartre the philosopher. While in 1933 he was working on Nausea which depicted an individual self, in 1939 he was working on his trilogy of freedom where the pro- I tagonist was not a loner but a part of the collective.

In the early 1930's Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were 'anti-bourgeois' but this was in a petit-bourgeois, anarchist way. 'Between I us we tore the bourgeoisie to shreds, tooth and nail. In the case of I Sartre and myself, such hostility remained individualistic, ergo bourgeois: It was not so very different from that which Flaubert I attributed to the 'grocers' and Barres to the 'barbarians'... We sympathised in principle with the workers because they were free of any bourgeois blemish; the crude simplicity of their needs and the constant struggle they kept up against physical odds meant that they faced the human situation in its true colours. Accordingly while we shared Nizan's hopes for a revolution of the proletariat, it was only the negative aspect of such a revolution that concerned us. In the Soviet Union the great blaze of the October Revolution had long since nickered out, and, as Sartre said, by and large what was emerging there was a "technological culture." We should not, we decided, feel at ease in a socialist world. In every society, the artist or writer remains I an outsider, and one which proclaimed with such dogmatic fervour its I intention of "integrating" him struck us as being about the most unfavourable environment he could have.' (Simone de Beauvoir, Prime of Life, Penguin Paperback

1966, pp. 32-3). Perfectly petit-bourgeois intellectuals! (They did not know why they hated the bourgeoisie. There sympathy for the proletariats did not stem from any philosophical position). They were also not transparent about the role of the artist or writer in different societies having different socio-economic structure. For them historical materialism did not exist. This enormous confusion in thinking has been described well by Beauvoir: 'Sartre built his theories, fundamentally, upon certain positions which we both adhered to with some passion. Our love of freedom, our opposition to the established order of things, our individualism, and our respect for the working classes — all these brought us close to the anarchist position. But to be quite frank, our incoherence defied any sort of label. We were anti-capitalist, yet not Marxists; we glorified the powers of pure mind and perfect freedom, yet we rejected the spiritual approach; though our interpretation of man and the universe was strictly materialistic, we despised science and technology. Sartre was not bothered by these inconsistencies and refused so much as to formulate them. "When you think in terms of problems" he told me, "you aren't thinking at all." He himself skipped from one conviction to the next, without rhyme or reason' (p. 42). 'These confusions of thought did not surprise me', continues Beauvoir. 'We were lost in a world the complexities of which lay far beyond our understanding, and we possessed only the most rudimentary instruments to guide us through it. But at least we persisted in hacking out our own path. Every step we took brought fresh conflicts, and moved us on to yet further difficulties; and so during the years that followed we found Din-selves swept far away from these first beginnings' (p. 44).

While they were living in their own world of likes and dislikes, they did not take much interest in the day-to-day happenings. These included the first symptoms of the Fascist groups raising their heads In France and the numerous changes in the alignment of the Third Republic. 'While books and entertainments meant a good deal to us, public events touched us scarcely at all. Changes of Cabinet and League of Nations' debate we found about as futile as the scuffles provoked from time to time by the *Camelots du Roy*. Vast financial scandals did not shock us, since for us capitalism and corruption were synonymous terms. The only difference about Oustric was that he had been unlucky, that was all. There was nothing of real interest in the newspapers, which seemed to be concentrating on attacks upon taxi drivers: two or three such incidents were reported weekly. The only thing that stirred red our imaginations was the affair of the Butcher of Dusseldorf: In order really to understand something about human beings, we thought, it was necessary to investigate cases of gross abnormality. But, by and large, the world about us was a mere backdrop against which our private lives were played out' (pp. 50-1).

By 1933, when the world was passing through the great depression and thousands of millions became unemployed throughout the world, and the strange capitalist law of demand and supply forced businessmen to dump wheat into the sea and slaughter cattle to keep the price from falling, Sartre was, though perturbed, not thinking in terms of joining the Communist Party, although he supported the struggles waged by it. He thought 'if you belonged to the proletariat you had to be a Communist, but though proletarian struggle was of concern to us, it was even so not our struggle; all that could be asked of us was that we should always speak out on its behalf in any argument. We had our own tasks to fulfil, and they were not compatible with joining the Party' (p. 134).

It was about this time that 'Sartre was strongly attracted by what he had heard about German phenomenology. Raymond Aron was spending a year at the French Institute in Berlin and studying Husserl simultaneously with preparing a historical thesis. When he came to Paris he spoke of Husserl to Sartre. We spent an evening together at the Bec de Gaz in the Rue Motparnasse. We ordered the speciality of the house, apricot cocktails;

Aron said; pointing to his glass: “you see, my dear fellow, if you are a phenomenologist, you can talk about this cocktail and make philosophy out of it!” Sartre turned pale with emotion at this. Here was just the thing he had been longing to achieve for years — to describe objects just as he saw and touched them, and extract philosophy from the process. Aron convinced him that phenomenology exactly fitted in with his special preoccupations: by-passing the anti-thesis of idealism and realism, affirming simultaneously both the supremacy of reason and the reality of the visible world as it appears to our senses. On the Boulevard Saint-Michel Sartre purchased Levinas’s book on Husserl and was so eager to inform him of the subject that he leafed through the volume as he walked along, without even having cut the pages. His heart missed a beat when he found references to contingency: had someone cut the ground from under his feet, then? As he read on he reassured himself that this was not so. Contingency seemed not to play any very important part in Husserl’s system — of which, in any case, Levinas gave only a formal and decidedly vague outline. Sartre decided to make a serious study of him, and took the necessary steps to succeed Aron at the French Institute in Berlin for the coming year, this on Aron’s own instigation’ (pp. 135-6).

These anarchist attitudes and aloofness from the world at large corresponded with their attitude towards the United States and the Soviet Union. ‘America for us consisted primarily of a montage of whirling images, superimposed on a sound-track of hoarse voices and broken rhythms: Negroes in Hallelujah dancing or entranced, sky-scrapers towering upto heaven, prison mutinies, blast furnaces, strikes, long silk-sheathed legs, locomotives, aeroplanes, wild horses and rodeos. When we managed to detach ourselves from this miscellaneous elutter, we thought of America as the country where capitalist oppression flourished in its most odious form. We loathed its racial policy, its lynchings, its twin evil of exploitation and unemployment. But there was something about life over there, something vast and unencumbered, which fascinated us at a deeper level, beyond all question of right or wrong.

We looked at the USSR with a far less excited eye. Some Russian novels revealed aspects of the Revolution which we had not previously known about: the relationship between the towns and the countryside, for instance, between Commissars whose duty it was to carry out requisitions or collectivizations and peasants who stubbornly maintained their rights as freeholders. Even in books which displayed a somewhat crude and naive technique—such as Panferov’s Beggar’s Community,, or Leonid Leonov’s The Badgers, which did not, however, shrink from claiming affinity with Dostoevsky in its preface — we found the scope and novelty and complexity of this new adventure most exciting. The whole thing was admirably portrayed in Mikhail Sliolokov’s *Seeds of Tomorrow*. We were also familiar with the other novel, *And quiet Flows the Don*: this lengthy Cossack epic had rather put us off, and we had failed to finish it. But Seeds of Tomorrow struck us as a masterpiece. Like his great predecessors, Sholokov knew how to bring a gigantic cast of characters into individual life; he got right inside their skins and motives, even when drawing a counter-revolutionary kulak. He managed to make his ‘positive hero’, the Commissar, both human and sympathetic; but he also got us Interested in the old obscurantists who were fighting to keep their corn. He let us touch the individual injustices and disappointments which are the very staff of history. We regretted the absence of this complex approach in the Russian Cinema, which had become resolutely didactic: we took care to keep away from films designed to glorify the Kolkhozes ... Thus, paradoxically, we were attracted by America though we condemned its regime, while the USSR, the scene of social experiment which we wholeheartedly admired, nevertheless left us quite cold. We still were not actively for anything. This struck us as

quite reasonable, since in our opinion, as I have said, both the world and humanity were still to be created anew. I have already pointed out 1 that there was no disenchantment in our negative attitude, far from I it; our strictures on the present were made in the name of a future that must inevitably come to pass, and which our own criticism were actively helping towards fruition. Most intellectuals took the same line as we did' (pp. 140-1).

It was also about this time that Sartre and Beauvoir visited Italy and did not like the place at all. 'The truth was that he hated passing black-shirted rank and file Fascists in the street… and it was in Venice… that we had our first sight of SS men in their brown shirts. They were a wholly different species from those little black-clad Fascists, being very big men, with empty eyes, who marched along in a stiff military fashion. Three hundred thousand Brown Shirts on parade at Nuremburg; it was frightening to think of it. Sartre had a sudden sinking feeling as he realized that in a month's time he would be passing them daily in the streets of Berlin' (pp. 154-5).

In 1935 the left to the centre parties in France forged a unity that heralded a new era. Sartre and Beauvoir were witnesses to the great celebrations. 'The Left decided to celebrate its victory with a vast demonstration, and a committee set about organising on an unprecedented scale for the 14 July celebrations. Sartre and I went along to the Bastille, where five hundred thousand people marched past, flourishing tricolor flags, singing and shouting. The favourite slogans were "Death to La Rocque" and "Long live the Popular Front" Up to a certain point we shared this enthusiasm, but we had no inclination to march in procession or sing or shout with the rest. This more or less represented our attitude at that time: events could arouse strong emotions in us, whether anger, fear or joy but we did not participate in them. We remained spectators' (p. 216).

In 1936 the Popular Front contested in the General Election. A great majority of the working population were hopeful about the outcome. 'All our friends and indeed we ourselves, rallied to this position. We were relying on the Popular Front to save the peace abroad and to lend cohesion at home to a movement which one day would lead to true Socialism. Both Sartre and I had its victory very much at heart; and yet our individualism hampered our more progressive instincts, and we still maintained the attitude which had restricted us to the role of witness on 14 July 1935. I cannot now remember where we spent the night of 3 May. It was out in a public square — somewhere in Rouen, no doubt—where loudspeakers were announcing results and figures that filled us with great satisfaction. Yet Sartre had not himself voted. The political aspirations of leftwing intellectuals made him shrug his shoulders. Jacques Bost had listened to the Election results in Paris, together with his brother Dabit and Chamson. He told us how Chamson uttered exclamations of triumph, such as, "What a heating we are giving them!" "Chamson never gave any sort of a beating to anyone" Sartre remarked impatiently. Talk, declamations, manifestoes, propaganda—what a lot of pointless fuss! Would it all have seemed so ridiculous to us, I wonder, if we had been given a chance of participating in it? I just don't know. On the other hand I am almost certain that if we had found ourselves in a position to take effective action we would have done so: our habit of abstention was largely due to our powerlessness and, we did not a priori object to participating in events. The proof of this is that when the strikes came and they went through the streets taking up collections for the strikers, we gave all we could. Paginez reproached us for doing this: it was the first time there had been a serious divergence of political opinion between us. According to him, the strikes, imperilled the 'Blum experiment', whereas we saw in them the one chance to make it truly radical. We welcomed the picketing of factories with great enthusiasm: workers and employees astonished us, not only by the courage and solid unanimity with which they acted, but also by their skilful tactics, discipline, and

cheerfulness. At last something new and significant and really revolutionary was being done. The signing of the Matignon Agreement filled us with joy: what with collective contracts, wage increases, a forty-hour week and paid holidays, working class conditions were beginning to look up. Defence industries were nationalized; Special Corn Marketing Board was set up, and the Government issued decrees dissolving all Fascist associations. Stupidity, injustice and exploitations were losing ground, and this put fresh heart into us. Nevertheless, and all things considered, I see no inconsistency here— we still found conformity irritating, even when it changed the color of its coat. We had no liking whatsoever for the new style chauvinism now sweeping over France. Aragon was writing jingoistic articles while at the Alhambra Gilles and Julian got a rousing reception when they sang 'La Belle France.' The old blue and red boutonniere, cornflower and poppies began to appear; it was like the days of Deroulede again. The previous year we had joined in the celebrations on the Fourteenth of July, but this time we stayed away: Jacques Bost went along eagerly and afterwards we tried to convince him of the futility of his behaviour. It had been wonderful to watch the masses marching towards victory; but now victory was theirs, and the spectacle of them commemorating their triumph seemed to us insipid (pp. 264-5).

The days that followed seemed more hopeless with the Fascists gaining world-wide foothold. Spain was defeated and with that was extinguished the last hope of democracy in the Western Europe. But Sartre was gradually moving from a position of non-commitment to that of positive support for the Left. With the War looming large over the horizon, many left-wing intellectuals began to suffer from defeatism. But for Sartre exactly the opposite took place. He was gradually taking a firm stand vis-a-vis Hitler's war. Beauvoir writes, 'In this connexion I remember a discussion that took place between Colette Audry and Sartre. She had been so shaken by the Spanish disaster that politically speaking she no longer had any beliefs at all. "Anything is preferable to war", she said, to which Sartre replied: 'No, not anything — not Fascism, for instance" Beauvoir continues, 'But visions of the First World War kept recurring in my mind: what a contradiction in terms it was to condemn a million Frenchmen to death for the sake of humanity! Sartre retorted to this that it was not a matter of humanitarianism or any other such moral abstraction: we ourselves were in peril, and if Hitler was not crushed, France would suffer more or less the same fate as Austria. Like Colette Audry and many of Alain's disciples, I said: "Surely France at War would be worse than France under the Nazis?" But Sartre shook his head. "I have no wish", he said, 'to be made to eat my manuscripts. I don't want Nizan to have his eyes gouged out with teaspoons' (p. 358).

With the War imminent, all youngmen were mobilized and Sartre was no exception. He was posted at a meteorological outpost in a border area. Here Sartre began to think seriously about the future course of action he would adopt. Beauvoir writes, 'One day early in February I went off to meet Sartre at the Gare de 1'Est, and we spent a week walking and talking. Sartre was thinking a good deal about the post-War period; he had firmly made up his mind to hold aloof from politics no longer. His new morality was based on the notion of 'genuineness', and he was determined to make a practical application of it to himself. It required everyman to shoulder the responsibility of his situation in life; and the only way in which he could do so was to transcend that situation by engaging upon some course of action. Any other attitude was mere escapist pretence, a masquerade based upon insincerity. It will be clear that a radical change had taken place in him — and in me too, since I rallied to this point of view immediately; for not so long ago our first concern had been to keep our situation in life at arm's length by means of fantasy, deception and plain lies… Sartre us yet did not know the exact nature of his

future political commitments… but one thing of which he was convinced was that he had a duty to the younger generation (pp. 428-9).

The War broke out and the invading Germans faced little or no resistance at all. Sartre was taken a prisoner and moved to a camp near the Luxemburg border. After a few months of captivity he managed to escape and return to Paris again, but he returned a different man. The War and the period of imprisonment cast him in a different mould. ‘ What did disorientate me rather’, writes Simone de Beauvoir, ‘was the stringency of his moral standards. Did I buy things on the black market? A little tea, occasionally, I told him. Even this was too much. I had been wrong to sign the paper stating I was neither a Freemason nor a Jew. Sartre had always asserted his ideas, not to mention his likes and dislikes, in a most dogmatic fashion, whether verbally or through his personal actions. Yet he never formulated them as universal maxims; the abstract concept of duty repelled him. I had been prepared to find him full of convictions and plans for the future and bursts of bad temper, but not armoured with principles. Gradually I began to understand how this state of affairs had come about. Since they were daily confronted with Germans, collaborators, and quietists, the anti-Fascists in the Stalag formed a sort of small, tight-knit fraternity, whose members were bound by an unspoken oath — never to compromise, to reject all concessions. Each member swore to keep rigorously to this rule when separated from the others. But the position in the Stalag was easier than that in Paris, where simply to be alive implied some sort of compromise. It was with some regret that Sartre now abandoned the tense atmosphere and clear-cut simplicity of his life as a prisoner. But in civilian life his intransigence would have become mere formalism, and gradually he adopted himself to these new conditions’ (pp. 479-80).

These were not the only new things that he acquired in the prison. ‘The first evening he gave me yet another surprise. He had not come back to Paris to enjoy the sweets of freedom, he told me, but to act. How? I inquired, taken aback. We were so isolated, so powerless! It was precisely this isolation that had to be broken down, he said. We had to unite, to organise a resistance movement. I remained sceptical. I had already seen Sartre open up unlooked-for possibilities with a few well-chosen words, but I feared that this time he was nursing an illusion (p. 480).

No sooner had he decided on this course of action than he ‘began to look around for good political contacts. He sought out former pupils of his; he also met Merleau Ponty, who had fought as an Infantry lieutenant, and was now writing a thesis on Perception. He knew various philosophy students at the E’cole Normale who were violently anti-German, including Cuzin and Desanti, whose interests embraced both phenomenology and Marxism. Our first meeting took place one afternoon in my room at the Hotel Mistral, where we were now living again. Those present included Cuzin, Desanti, three or four of their friends, Bost, Jean Pouillon, Merleau-Pontry, Sartre and myself. Desanti, with cheerful ferocity, proposed organising attacks upon various individuals—Deat, for instance. But none of us felt qualified to manufacture bombs or hurl grenades. Our main activity for the time being, we decided, apart from recruiting further support, would be the compiling of information, which we would then circulate in the form of a news bulletin and various pamphlets. We very soon discovered that many other groups analogous to ours were already in existence. Although those running the so-called Pentagon were all right-wingers, Sartre got in touch with them: he had a meeting with one of his boyhood friends, Alfred Peron, an English teacher who was now acting as a British intelligence agent. He also had several interviews with Cavailles, who had started the ‘Deuxieme Colonne’ movement at Clermont, and kept on the move between Paris and Auvergnc. I went along with Sartre to one of these sessions in the Closcric dcs Lilas; it

was always here or in the gardens of the Petit-Luxembourg that Cavailles arranged his rendezvous. All these groups had two things in common: a very limited effective strength, and extra-ordinary lack of common caution. We held our meetings in hotel rooms or someone's study at the E'cole Normale, where walls might well have ears. Bost walked through the streets carrying a duplicating machine and Pouillon went around with his briefcase stuffed full of pamphlets.

'Over and above making contacts and collecting intelligence, we had a long-term objective: we believed it was vital to make preparations for the future. If the democracies won, it would be essential for the Left to have a new programme; it was our job, by pooling our Ideas and discussions and research, to bring such a programme into being Its basic aim could be summed up in two words—though their reconciliation posed vast problems—which also served as a watchword for our movement: 'Socialism and Liberty'. But the possibility of eventual defeat also had to be envisaged, and in his first news bulletin Sartre showed that if Germany won the War our task would be to see that she lost the peace' (pp. 481-2).

The group continued its activities for a few months but given Sartre's own lack of political experience and the mounting pressure of the Gerrman and Vichy agents, it faced insurmountable difficulties. Writes Beauvoir, 'Politically, we found ourselves reduced to a condition of total impotence. When Sartre started "Socialism and Liberty he hoped this group would attach itself to a much larger central body; but our trip had produced no very important results, and our return to Paris proved no less disappointing. Already the various movements that had sprung up right at the beginning were disbanded or in the process breaking up. Like ours, they had come into being through Individual initiative, and consisted mainly of middle-class intellectuals without any experience of underground action—or indeed of action in any form. It was far more difficult to establish communications or amalgamate the groups here than in the Free Zone; such enterprises remained sporadic, and their lack of cohesion doomed them to the most discouraging ineffectually. The Communists, on the other hand were well-organised, well-disciplined, and possessed an excellent administrative machine, with the result that from the moment they decided to intervene they obtained spectacular results. Rightwing patriotic groups refused to cooperate with them, though the non-Communist Left was not opposed to a rapproachment. Its members did not regard the German-Soviet pact quite so severely as they had done in 1939: perhaps the USSR would have been powerless to resist a German invasion without guaranteeing themselves a temporary respite, by any means whatsoever. So though the Left still was chary of regarding Stalin's diplomacy with wholehearted approval, radical condemnation of it was no longer desirable... . The isolation to which we saw ourselves condemned dampened our enthusiasm, and there were numerous defections from the group; on top of this Cuzin, the young philosopher who was our most brilliant and reliable member, came down with renal tuberculosis, and had to move to the Midi for cure. Sartre made no attempt to check the progress of this debacle; by June he had already fallen a prey to tormenting scruples and doubts. The Gestapo had arrested numerous members of the "Pentagon"; Sartre's boyhood friend Peron had been deported, and so too, from a group operating in the close vicinity of ours, had one of my most brilliant former philosophy student, Yvonne Picard. Would they ever come back? (They did not return.) How absurd it would be if they died! They had not yet done anything of the slightest possible use. Hitherto we had been lucky; none of our members had been bothered by the authorities. But Sartre could now see just what risks, and all to no purpose, the continued existence of "Socialism and Liberty" would have meant for our friends. All through October we had interminable discussions on the subject — or, to be

more precise, Sartre argued it over with himself, since I agreed with his view that to make yourself responsible for someone's death out of sheer obstinacy is not a thing lightly to be forgiven. Sartre had brooded over this plan of his for months in the Stalag, and had devoted weeks of his time and energy to it after his release, so it hit him hard to abandon it; but abandon it he did, though his heart told him otherwise. Then he obstinately settled down to the play he had begun, which represented the one form of resistance work still open to him' (pp. 499-500).

The circumstances forced Sartre to leave the path of active resistance to the German occupation forces. But this also opened up another method of raising the consciousness of the people regarding German occupation and how to resist them—through plays. Some of Sartre's best plays were written on this theme. Then in. 1943, certain members of the Communist intelligentsia invited Sartre to join the 'Comite National de Escrivans'. And overcoming his initial misgivings, Sartre joined them. From now onward he took part in various meetings under Eluurd's presidency and contributed to Lettres Francaises. '...I was very glad', comments Simone de Beauvoir, 'we had emerged from our isolation, all the more so since I had often felt how tedious Sartre found a life of passive inaction' (p. 536).

'Being and Nothingness' was published in Paris in. 1943. Beauvoir writes, "'Being and Nothingness" was published by Gallimard but only made its way slowly; it sold very few copies, and was very little discussed' (p. 555).

Sartre's sojourn from childhood to youth and his transformation from the role of an observer to that of a participant as described in the previous pages will go a long way towards understanding Sartre at this period-expressed in so many pages in the philosophical work 'Being and Nothingness'. Philosophically brought up in the tradition of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger and confronted with a world that could be truly interpreted with Dialectical and Historical Materialism, 'Being and Nothingness' shows the author's utmost desire to explain the real life drama with philosophical tools suitable to comfortable class rooms. The outcome is a violent contradiction—an honest but uninitiated man's dilemma. But as the man is honest, we find him exploring the path of human transcendence, the watchword of which is freedom. 'Being and Nothingness' is an epitaph of a soldier fighting for freedom. But as he is ignorant of the philosophical tools necessary for exploring this path he cannot really find the way and we find him groping in the dark. Being and Nothingness' is a blind man's honest yearning.

3

‘BEING AND NOTHINGNESS’: ANALYSIS

Introduction

‘Being and Nothingness’ is by far the most important philosophical work of Jean Paul Sartre, and like Heidegger’s, Sartre’s style of writing is also extremely convoluted. While studying Sartre, one might wonder why he sought to be so difficult when his primary aim was to communicate certain ideas. It seems as if each sentence, paragraph, and page is arranged like a defence formation and the reader has to grapple almost literally with each sentry of word or expression. Once the reader gains insight into the work, it appears that the concepts are not irrefutable. Students of Dialectical and Historical Materialism will find Sartre to be another bourgeois philosopher who would like to rise above ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. To borrow a metaphor from Mao-Tse-Tung, Sartre’s journey into the philosophy of existence is like braving the rains with a leaky umbrella.

However, we have a specific objective in studying Sartre. If we believe that like literature, every philosophy is also a product of time and space, the question remains as to why Sartre wrote ‘Being and Nothingness’ at all. In spite of its apparent similarity with ‘Being and Time’, it professes a philosophy very different from that of Heidegger. Hence our attempt to posit Sartre,

There is another motivating factor, Sartre and his existentialist followers had declared that no single philosophy of our time was capable of taking care of the complexities that humanity faced in the second half of the twentieth century (See ‘Problem of Method’ by Sartre). According to this theory, the contribution of Marx in the field of economics could be the fundamental basis of all future Socialist societies. But Marx, or rather Marxism, was not relevant in the spin-re of human essence. Hence Sartre prescribed a new philosophy which would be an amalgamation of Marxism and Existentialism ensuring economic equality and individual liberty. It is necessary to investigate how far this proposition is tenable.

‘Being and Nothingness’ in the original French as L’etre et le neant was published in Paris by Gallimard in 1943. This was preceded by his four other books on philosophy and psychology. His literary works however are not taken into account here. ‘The Imagination’ was published in 1933, followed by ‘The Transcendence of Ego’ in 1939, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions’ in the same year and ‘The Psychology of Imagination’ in 1940. In all these works he had put forward his concepts on psychology, philosophy, phenomenology and other related topics. We have not considered the early writings because the nix of his views expressed in his early works were carried over and matured into the work of 1943.

1. *The origin of negation*

I. In the Introduction (our analysis is based on the translation of *L’etre et le Neant* by Hazel E. Barnes, paperback edition, Washington Square Press, 1966), Sartre put forth his concept about the two regions of being: being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Now he proceeds to quality these two regions with the help of his concept of negation or non-being. ,

He starts with the Heideggerian term being-in-the-world which, according to him, is a totality. It is from here that he poses two questions: What is the synthetic relation which we call being-in-the world? What must man and the world be in order for a relation between them to be possible?’ (p. 37), He observes that the two questions are

interdependent: each type of human conduct, being the conduct of man in the world, can release simultaneously man, the world and the relation that unites them (p. 37). To start the enquiry he chooses just one human conduct to pose the question.

It seems that at the very outset Sartre is confusing the issue. The relation between man and the world is a subject-object relationship. Man, the subject, in his struggle discovers the world, the object. This knowledge about the world is utilized to work on nature and its applications are manifested in science and art.

However, let us sec how Sartre poses the question. He asks 'is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man with the world?' (p. 35), According to Sartre the question elicits a reply which will reveal 'a human altitude filled with meaning' (p. 35). In every question we stand before a being which we are questioning. Every question pre-supposes a being who questions and a being who is questioned. This being which we question, we question about some thing. That about which we question the being participates in the transcendence of being. We question being about its ways of being, or about its being. From this point of view, Sartre asserts, the question is a kind of expectation. We expect a reply from the being questioned. On the basis of a pre-interrogative familiarity with being, we expect from this being a revelation of its being, or of its way of being. The reply will be a 'yes' or a 'no'. It is the existence of these two equally objective and contradictory possibilities which on principle distinguish the question from affirmation or negation. Thus at the moment I ask, 'Is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man with the world?', I admit on principle the possibility of a negative reply…. 'No, such a conduct does not exist.' This means that we admit to being faced with the transcendent fact of the non-existence of such a conduct (p. 35).

Though Sartre has already said that all human conduct reveals the relation between man and the world, posing the same question subsequently he is admitting the possibility of non-existence of such a conduct. Besides, he is dealing with the man who questions and the man who is questioned. But he has never mentioned anything about the question itself. Supposing the question is 'Does the Earth move round the Sun' and reply comes back 'no'. Do we accept the objective possibility of such a negation?

Then Sartre refutes the disagreement that 'commonsense1 has with philosophy. One will perhaps be tempted, says Sartre, not to believe in the objective existence of a non-being; one will say that in this case the fact simply refers to the questioner of his subjectivity. The questioner would learn from the transcendent being that the conduct sought is pure fiction. But to call this conduct a pure fiction is to disguise the negation without removing it. Consequently, to destroy the reality of the negation is to cause the reality of the reply to disappear. This reply is the very being which gives it to the person questioned; it reveals the negation to the questioner. There exists for the questioner the permanent objective possibility of a negative reply. In relation to the possibility, the questioner, by the very fact that he is questioning, places himself in a state of indetermination; he does not know whether the reply will be affirmative or negative. Thus the question is a bridge set-up between two non-beings: the non-being of knowing in man, the possibility of non-being of being in transcendent being. Finally, the question implies the existence of a truth. By the very question, the questioner affirms that he expects an objective reply such as 'it is thus and not otherwise.' The truth, as differentiated from being introduces a third non-being as determining the question—the non-being of limitation. This triple non-being conditions every question and in particular the metaphysical question (pp. 35-6).

If this be the foundation of the philosophy of non-being, the reader can well appreciate the depth of 'philosophy' we are going to encounter. The bridge between being and non-being is a very unstable one and depends only upon the reply 'yes' or 'no'. This reply is being given without any consideration whatsoever of who questions, whom and about what. Secondly, if the question has no objective foundation, the whole exercise becomes a fruitless one. Say, for example, a capitalist is questioned as to whether it is possible to achieve Socialism or not, and he replies in negative, do we in that case accept that the reply has any objective possibility of non-being? In fact, as we will see later, Sartre confuses the whole concept of negation. Negation is a dialectical process and does not depend on the will of the questioner or the one who is questioned. It is, in fact, the law of nature. He has quoted Hegel who said 'mind is the negative', and thus without delving into the whole theory of negation, where Hegel substituted matter with idea, Sartre has taken him too literally. For Hegel, it was absolutely in the nature of his philosophy to say that 'mind is the negative', and negation comes to the world through mind or subject.

From the preceding analysis of non-being Sartre asks, 'Is negation as the structure of the judicative proposition at the origin of nothing-ness? Or, on the contrary, is nothingness as the structure of the real the origin and foundation of negation?' (p. 38).

'It is evident', says Sartre, 'that non-being always appears within the limits of human expectation. It is because I expect to find fifteen hundred francs that I find only thirteen hundred. It is because a physicist expects certain verification of his hypothesis that nature can tell him no. It would be in vain to deny that negation appears on the original basis of a relation of man to the world. The world does not disclose its non-being to one who has not first posed them as possibilities' (p. 38).

This is sheer idealism. The whole line of reasoning places mind as primary, and matter secondary. It is because I expect fifteen hundred francs that the non-being of fifteen hundred in the form of thirteen hundred is disclosed to me. But why on earth should I expect fifteen hundred and not thirteen hundred? Why should a physicist expect to find something which he does not get? Granted that scientists do not often get the expected result. But it is not because a scientist expects something that he is eventually disappointed. On the contrary his expectations only have meaning when these are based on some previous experimental results. True, he might not get the expected results. This is probably because he has not taken into consideration certain other parameters. But Sartre's logic is unsound. Lastly, it does not make any sense to claim that the world does not disclose its non-beings to one who has not first posited them as possibilities. What the world will disclose depends upon how the expectation has been posed. The expectation does not originate from imagination. It is derived from a real, existing situation. Only this will determine (whether the expectation is derived from imagination or reality) how the expectation will be realized — in being or non-being.

Knowing that this thesis may not be accepted, Sartre asks, 'But is this to say that these non-beings are to be reduced to pure subjectivity?' (p. 38). He himself dispels any misgiving on this score. In his unique style he continues, 'it is not true that negation is only a quality of judgement. The question is formulated by an interrogative judgement > but it is not itself a judgement; it is a prejudicative attitude. I can question by a look, by a gesture. In posing a question I stand facing being in a certain way and this relation to being is a relation of being; the judgement is only one optional expression of it... the being in question is not necessarily a thinking being. If my car breaks down, it is the carburattor, the spark plugs etc. that I question. ... And if I expect a disclosure of being, I am prepared at the same time for the eventuality of a disclosure of non-being. If I question the carburettor, it is because I consider it possible that "there is nothing there" in

the carburettor. Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain prejudicative comprehension of non-being. It is in itself a relation of being with non-being on the basis of the original transcendence; that is, in a relation of being with being' (p. 38-9).

But, then, where do we stand? If it is pre-judicativc comprehension that determines our expectation, then where does our judiciousness come from? Is this an instinct? In that case we are bound to pronounce that Sarire's school of philosophy cannot stand 'outside the domain of both realism and idealism.' It is pure and simple idealism. Where he stands among the idealists may be our next concern. But it has no relation with any brand of realism — not even with vulgar mechanical materialism.

'Moreover', Sartre continues, 'there are numerous non-judicative conducts which present this immediate comprehension of non-being Ion the basis of being—in its original purity' (p. 39). To prove this point he considers the phenomena of destruction and fragility. He feels that it is necessary to recognize that destruction is an essentially human thing and it is man who destroys his cities through the agency of earthquakes or directly, who destroys his ships through the agency of cyclones or directly. But at the same time it is necessary to acknowledge that destruction supposes a prejudicative comprehension of nothingness as such and a conduct in the face of nothingness. In addition, destruction although coming into being through man, is an objective fact and not a thought. Fragility has been impressed on the very being of this vase, and its destruction would be an irreversible absolute event which I could only verity. There is a transphenomenality of non-being as of being (p.40).

The reader may please testify if it is man who destroys the city through the agency of earthquake or earthquake is a natural phenomenon. One can also testify if ships are wrecked by man through the agency cyclones or cyclonic storm in the sea is a natural phenomenon. We know Sartre could retort — 'with common sense as your only asset you have ventured to understand the philosophy of Existentialism! No, my dear, philosophy is hot that simple! You do not have specific philosophical bent. My philosophy about transphenomenality of being is not for you who is not properly oriented. You are not believer of philosophy. You are talking run-of-the-mill materialist. We have no dialogue with you.'

Non-being does not come to things by a negative judgement; it is the negative judgement, on the contrary, which is conditioned and supported by non-being. To prove this point Sartre takes recourse to an example. I have an appointment with Pierre at four 'O' clock. I arrive at the cafe a quarter of an hour late. Pierre is always punctual Will he have waited for me? I look at the room and the patrons and I say, "He is not here". Is there an intuition of Pierre's absence or does negation enter in only with judgement? (p. 40-1). Sartre supports the former view. '… The original nihilation of all figures which appear and are swallowed up in the total neutrality of a *gronnd* is the necessary condition for the appearance of the principal figure, which is here the person of Pierre. This nihilation is given to my intuition; I am witness to the successive disappearance of all the objects which I look at and which as quickly decompose precisely because they "are not" the face of Pierre. Nevertheless, if I should finally discover Pierre, my intuition would be filled by a solid element, I should be suddenly arrested by his face and the whole cafe would organise itself around him as a discrete presence.

'But now Pierre is not here.... This figure which slips constantly between my look and the solid real objects of the cafe is precisely a perpetual disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothingness on the ground of the nihilation of the cafe. So that what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness; it is the nothingness of the ground, the nihilation of which summons and demands the appearance of the figure, and it is the

figure—the nothingness, which slipsas a *nothing* to the surface of the ground. It serves as the foundation for the judgement — "Pierre is not here". It is in fact an intuitive apprehension of a double nihilation. To be sure, Pierre's absence supposes an original relation between me and this cafe; there is an infinity of people who are without any relation with this cafe for want of a real expectation which establishes their absence. But, to be exact, I myself expected to see Pierre, and my expectation has caused the absence of Pierre to happen as a real event concerning this cafe. It is an objective fact at present that I have discovered this absence, and it presents itself as a synthetic relation between Pierre and the setting in which I am looking for him. Pierre absent haunts this cafe and is the condition of its self-nihilating organization as ground (p. 41-2).

Is the above description a running commentary of a film-script? Cafe, its patrons, bearers, chairs, tables—all recede to the background only to clear the foreground where Pierre appears. My intuition like a beam of rays moves towards each and every nook and corner of the cafe" to light up the face of Pierre. But now that he is absent the beam does not fall on any one's face, does not take anybody into consideration— after hovering round the cafe it recedes. But this is Sartrian definition of consciousness. Consciousness moves towards a thing as a beam of light goes towards an object. Hence we may find a Sartrian relation between consciousness and nothingness.

Sartre sums up his argument thus: …negation is a refusal of existence. By means of it a being (or a way of being) is posited, then thrown back to nothingness. If negation is a category, if it is only a sort of plug set indifferently on certain judgements, then how will we explain the fact that it can nihilate a being, cause it suddenly to arise and then appoint it to be thrown back to non-being? If prior judgements establish fact ... negation must be like a free discovery, it must tear us away from this wall of positivity which encircles us. Negation is an abrupt break in continuity which cannot in any case result from prior affirmations; it is an original and irreducible event. Here we are in the realm of consciousness. Consciousness moreover cannot produce a negation except in the form of consciousness of negation. No category can. 'inhabit' consciousness and reside there in the manner of a thing. The not, as an abrupt intuitive discovery, appears as consciousness (of being), consciousness of the not. … The necessary condition for our saying not is that non-being be a perpetual presence in us and outside of us, that nothingness haunt being (p. 43-4).

Now the reader will decide whether in spite of all his refutations, Sartre is subjective or objective. Because I do not see Pierre in the cafe, the whole cafe along with its furniture, crowd and other objects recedes to the background. In fact only if 'I' were Pierre's love-lorn lady, the absence of Pierre could create that 'negation'. Even in that case anyone would call this experience subjective. Furthermore, Sartre himself that in negation we are in the realm of consciousness. It is T who allows the whole cafe to disappear. There is no doubt that Sartre's negation has no objective basis. It is at best a poetic form of negation. In the broad divisions between what is primary, mind or matter, Sartre definitely supports the former. And hence whatever may be his own assertion or refutation, his point of view confirms that he belongs to the idealist school. To which shade of idealism is a matter of investigation. How he differs from Heidegger, however, will be enquired in due course.

II

'Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm'(p.56)—with these words Sartre negates both Hegel and Heidegger, though for different reasons. According to Sartre, for Hegel, pure being and pure nothingness are absolutely identical and they exist

as contemporary without any temporal, quantitative and qualitative differentiation between them. Sartre says that to oppose being to nothingness, as thesis and anti-thesis, as Hegel does, is to suppose that they are logically contemporary. Thus simultaneously two opposites arise as the two limiting terms of a logical series. Here we must note carefully, asserts Sartre, that opposites alone can enjoy this simultaneity because they are equally positive or equally negative. But non-being is not the opposite of being; it is its contradiction. This implies that logically nothingness is subsequent to being, first posited, then denied (p. 47).

It is misinterpretation of Hegel's dialectics that allows Sartre to pronounce this refutation of Hegel. It is true that for Hegel, 'mind is the negative' i.e., negation is not an objective phenomenon but a subjective one. But it is tantamount to refuting all his Logic to prove that being and nothingness are contemporary to Hegel. Further, it remains to be seen what Sartre really implies by the expression: 'non-being is not the opposite of being; it is its contradiction'. Are opposition and contradiction different? We are not referring to Marx here who had put the Hegelian dialectics, which was walking on its head, back to its feet. But even in Hegel negation of being is a gradual process — where quantity changes into quality. Being and its negation are not contemporary to Hegel as Sartre asserts. Furthermore, the Sartrian proposition that nothingness is subsequent to being since it is being first posited, then denied is also full of misconception. Here Sartre only places emphasis on the question of temporality. But where are the questions of quantity and quality? Even if being and non-being are not contemporary, Sartre should have clarified the Hegelian position of gradual quantitative summation of negation of being, which at a certain stage becomes strong enough to oppose being, and negate it. At this point it may be seen that Sartre's negation is a subjective assertion; it does not follow the Hegelian dialectics on the question of quantity and quality. Sartre's being and non-being are unidimensional, subjective concepts. Not knowing why he was opposing Hegel he refuted the Hegelian concept of negation. And in the same breath he decided in favour of Heidegger. But excepting for some superficial similarity, Sartre's concept of negation is exactly opposed to that of Heidegger. For Heidegger, being negates the world only to find refuge in the ownmost self. But as Sartre himself argues, 'we have just discovered a swarm of ultra mundane beings which possess as much reality and efficacy as other beings but which enclose within themselves non-being. They require an explanation which remains within the limits of the real. Nothingness, if it is supported by being vanishes qua nothingness and we fall back upon being. Nothingness can be nihilated only on the foundation of being; if nothingness can be given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a general way outside of being' (p. 56). We will discover later that Sartre's being and nothingness have affinity for the world. Though the philosophical reasons innovated for this purpose have no real basis, Sartre's being is a being of this world; it wants to struggle in this world and remain in this world. Conceptually Sartre's being resides at the opposite pole of Heidegger's Being. One wants to leave this world, the other wants to stay on. One favours a journey to the ownmost self—away from this madding crowd, the other wants to negate itself and rejuvenate in this world.

Ill

Sartre distinguishes between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. And this he does in terms of nothingness. He says that Nothingness can be conceived neither as the outside of being, nor a complimentary abstract notion, nor as an infinite milieu where being is suspended. Nothingness must be given at the heart of being in order for us to be able to apprehend that particular type of realities which have been called negatites. But this intra-

mundane Nothingness cannot be produced by being-in-itself; the notion of being as full positivity does not contain Nothingness as one of its structures. It cannot even be said that being excludes it. Being lacks all relation with it. Hence the question: if Nothingness can be conceived neither outside of being nor in terms of being and if on the other hand since it is non-being, it cannot derive from itself the necessary forces to 'nihilate itself' where does Nothingness come from? (p. 56).

This is the fundamental logic of Sartre in his bid to distinguish between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself is all positivity and hence nothingness cannot be conceived in it. But how does Sartre assert that negation or the laws of dialectics are not applicable to non-living matter? In fact, Marx and Engels based their theory on Socialism on the universal laws of dialectics. While applying them to history the Marxists termed it Historical Materialism, and while applied to nature, it was termed Dialectical Materialism. Engels' 'Dialectics of Nature' shows with remarkable clarity how the laws of dialectics are applicable to nature. To consider inanimate (or non-human) matter or being as full positivity is to deny the change in nature. Even a layman can refute Sartre's argument with the help of scientific proof from geology, physics and chemistry. In fact, Sartre's understanding of dialectics, specifically Hegelian dialectics, is faulty and he has himself admitted it in his 'Problem of Method'. However, let us proceed with Sartre's arguments.

Nothingness 'is not', continues Sartre, Nothingness is 'made-to-be,' Nothingness does not nihilate itself; Nothingness 'is nihilated'. It follows therefore that there must exist a Being (this cannot be the in-itself) of which the property is to nihilate Nothingness, to support it in its being, to sustain it perpetually in its very existence, a being by which nothingness comes to things. ... The Being by which Nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its Being, the Nothingness of its Being is in question. The being by which Nothingness comes to the world must be its own Nothingness — It remains to learn in what delicate, exquisite region of Being we shall encounter that Being which is its own Nothingness' (pp. 57-8).

It may appear from above that Sartre is searching for that exquisite, delicate region of being which is its own nothingness. But this search is a superficial one as the author knows the answer before posing the question.

Coming back to the question posed Sartre says, it is essential therefore that the questioner has the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the causal series which constitutes being and which can produce only being. ... In so far as the questioner must be able to effect in relation to the questioned a kind of nihilating withdrawal, he is not subject to the causal order of the world; he detaches himself from Being. This means that by a double movement of nihilation he nihilates the thing questioned in relation to himself by placing it in a neutral state, between being and non-being — and that he nihilates himself in relation to the thing questioned by wrenching himself from being in order to be able to bring out of himself the possibility of a non-being. Thus in posing a question, a certain negative clement is introduced into the world. … Nothingness making the world irridiscent, casting a shimmer over things. But at the same time, the question emanates from a questioner who, in order to motivate himself in this being as one who questions, disengages himself from being. This disengagement is a human process. Man presents himself, at least in this instance, as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, in as much as he himself is affected with non-being to this end (p. 58).

Our anticipation has come true. By discarding Being-in-itself as all positivity, we knew that he was moving towards man or being-for-itself as he has termed it. But we have the following reservation about his thesis (1) Man, as we know today, evolved from the ape,

which according to his definition and categorisation belongs to being-in-itself. How could this be possible if being-in-itself is full positivity and being-in-itself only begets being-in-itself? (2) The nihilating withdrawal of the questioner from the thing questioned is a subjective phenomenon. How can this be given the status of objectivity? On analysis it will be apparent that Sartre's categorisation of being is an illusory concept which cannot be confirmed either by Anthropology or Sociology or by any other science. It has no real foundation.

Thus the rise of man in the midst of the being which 'invests' him causes a world to be discovered, says Sartre. But the essential and primordial moment of this rise is the negation. Thus the first goal is readied. Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world. But this question immediately provokes another: what must man be in his being in order that through him nothingness may come to being? (p. 59).

Being can generate only being and if man is inclosed in this process of generation, only being will come out of him. If we are to assume that man is able to question this process — i.e., to make it the object of interrogation— he must be able to hold it up to view as a totality. He must be able to put himself outside of being and by the same stroke weaken the structure of the being of being. Yet it is not given to "human reality" to annihilate, even provisionally, the mass of being which it posits before itself. Man's relation with being is that he can modify it. For man to put a particular existent out of circuit is to put himself out of circuit in relalion to that existent. In this case, he is not subject to it; he is out of reach; it cannot act on him for he has retired beyond a nothingness. Descartes following the stoics has given a name to this possibility which human reality has to secrete a nothingness which isolates it — it is freedom. ... What is human freedom if through it nothingness comes into the world? (pp. 59-60).

What we have been trying to define, Sartre continues, is the being of man in so far as he conditions the appearance of nothingness and this being has appeared to us as freedom. Thus freedom as the requisite condition for the nihilation of nothingness is not a property which belongs among others to the essence of the human being ... with man, the relation of existence to essence is not comparable to what is for things of the world. Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in freedom. Man does not exist first in order to be free subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being free (p. 60).

This thesis too deserves the same critical approach. That nothingness comes to the world through man is a subjective proposition and cannot be accepted by any scientific reasoning. Secondly, it is equally subjective to say that man can put a particular existent out of circuit by putting himself out of circuit in relation to that existent. This proposition also contradicts the relation of man with other men in the society and with nature. Hence the third proposition of that possibility by which human reality secretes a nothingness which isolates it — which Sartre terms as freedom — is also untenable because freedom is not a wholly subjective concept without any objective basis. In short, the entire structure is untenable because it is founded on imaginary factors. Fourthly, the proposition that human freedom precedes human essence is also untenable because essence of man is nothing but his consciousness, and freedom is a qualitative relation of dial consciousness. In other words, freedom is the recognition of necessity and this recognition can only be expected from a conscious being — man himself. In fact all the reasoning marshalled by Sartre fell to the ground. We can only say that philosophy by the middle of the twentieth century cannot stand in isolation from other branches of knowledge. Sartre possibly sounds naive though he has tried his best to offer an explanation of the relationship between man and the world. But the philosophy that does

not take into account the advanced knowledge is bound to degenerate into illogical and unscientific philosophising. Freedom is the cardinal point of Sartrian philosophy, but his conception of freedom is based on unscientific and illogical foundations. However, a fuller exposition of this concept is given in part four of 'Being and Nothingness.' This will be dealt with at length at the appropriate time.

Now, from Sartre's concept of nothingness we arrive at the germination of the concept of temporality. We will see that like the former, this concept is also equally untenable, being unscientific and imaginary. However, we shall not go into details here because these questions have been adequately dealt with by Sartre in the chapter on temporality.

Sartre continues: the condition of which human reality can deny all or part of the world is that human reality carry nothingness within itself as the nothing which separates its present from all its past... the nothing envisaged would not yet have the sense of nothingness; a suspension of being which would remain unnamed, which would not be consciousness of suspending being would come from outside consciousness and by reintroducing opacity into the heart of this absolute lucidity, would have the effect of cutting it in two (p. 64).

The reader should be warned at the very outset. Nothingness separates the present from the past. This is the crux of Sartrian temporality. This nothingness does not arise out of the contradictions within nature and society. On the contrary, it is a subjective phenomenon and man can bring about this nothingness by willing it. This nothingness drives a wedge into being: here is the germ of the distinction between being and non-being. Furthermore, Sartre continues, this nothing would by no means be negative. Nothingness ... is the ground of the negation because it conceals the negation within itself because it is the negation as being. It is necessary then that conscious being constitute itself in relation to its past as separated from this past by a nothingness. It must necessarily be conscious of this cleavage in being, but not as a phenomenon which it experiences rather as a structure of consciousness, which it is. Freedom is the human being putting his past out of play by secreting his own nothingness (p. 64). Thus Sartre presents his thesis of nothingness, temporality and freedom. We have already seen that the basis of this thesis is totally unacceptable on scientific grounds. Neither Sartrian nothingness, nor Sartrian temporality nor his concept of freedom has any real basis. They are the outcome of a wish-fulfilment and hence we are not willing to give these theories any status in the modern and scientific theory of knowledge. But to have an idea about these concepts is very important if we are to analyse what Sartre was really aiming at.

This leads one to appreciate the play on words which is the true Sartrian style. Sartre says: Consciousness continually experiences itself as the nihilation of its past being. ... If the nihilating consciousness exists only as consciousness of nihilation, we ought to be able to define and describe a constant mode of consciousness, present qua consciousness, which would be consciousness of nihilation. Does this consciousness exist? It is here that a new question has been raised: if freedom is the being of consciousness, consciousness ought to exist as consciousness of freedom. What form does this consciousness of freedom assume? (pp. 64-5). It would be wrong to assume that the idea expressed in this paragraph signifies nothing. On the contrary, the term 'consciousness' has been used in the unique Sartrian style. As we have already mentioned, to Sartre, consciousness is like a beam of ray going towards an object. Sartre's conception about consciousness is so muddled, unscientific and imaginary that we have devoted a full chapter on the origin, development and states of consciousness from the scientific point of view. However, to limit ourselves to a discussion on the present context and see how Sartre's conception of freedom unfolds, we will revert back to our preceding discussion.

As if to answer his own question about the form that consciousness of freedom takes, Sartre says, 'in freedom the human being is his own past (as also his own future) in the form of nihilation … there ought to exist for the human being, in so far as he is conscious of being, a certain mode of standing opposite his past and his future, as being both this past and this future and as not being them ... it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom or if you prefer, anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself (p. 65).

On the basis of our analysis of Heidegger, it may be inferred that Sartre is parrotting his predecessor's concept too literally, though in a diametrically opposite direction. But there is no denying the fact that in Heidegger the concept of anguish came in a much more logical sequence and stuck to the whole analytic of Being as a solid constituent of Hie thesis. In Sartre this concept has arrived very abruptly without having any organic link. To understand where Sartre is proceeding we will explain in simple language the whole concept of nothingness and freedom. Beings may be classified into two categories: being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself is full of positivity and there is no provision of introducing nothingness in it. Being-for-itself is all lucidity and nothingness slips in it like a worm. It is because of this nothing-ness, being negates itself. Each and every instant it is negating itself to transcend towards non-being. This ability of being-for-itself for negation is termed as freedom. But this freedom is not also normally achieved. At each moment being-for-itself confronts itself in anguish. It is in anguish that freedom is in question for itself.

I am in anguish, Sartre explains, precisely because any conduct on my part is only possible and this means that while constituting a totality of motives for pushing away that situation, I at the same moment apprehend these motives as not sufficiently effective. At the very moment when I apprehend my being as horror of the precipice, I am conscious of that horror as not determinant in relation to my possible conduct. In one sense that horror calls for prudent conduct, and it is in itself a pre-outline of that conduct; in another sense, it posits the final development of that conduct only as possible, precisely because I do not apprehend it as the cause of these final developments but as need, appeal etc. … This means that in establishing a certain conduct as a possibility and precisely because it is my possibility, I am aware that nothing can compel me to adopt that conduct. Yet I am Indeed already there in the future; it is for the sake of that being which I will be there at the turning of the path that I now exert all my strength and in this sense there is already a relation between my future being and my present being. But a nothingness has slipped into the heart of this relation; I am not the self which I will be. First I am not that self because time separates me from it. Secondly, I am not that self because what I am is not the foundation of what I will be. Finally I am not that self because no actual existent can determine strictly what I am going to be. Yet as I am already what I will be (otherwise I would not be Interested in any one being more than another), I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it. …Anguish is precisely my Consciousness of being my own future in the mode of not being it (p.68).

The reader must have noticed the similarity between the concept of Heidegger and Sartre. Heidegger's 'anxiety' was visible when Being confronted its ownmost Being. Sartre's anguish is visible when being-23 for-itself confronts its own future possibility. Note also how the philosophers have elevated a purely psychical phenomenon like anguish to a philosophical level. Sartre says, anguish only arises in reflective consciousness. Pre-reflective consciousness does not give rise to anguish (Sartre classified consciousness into pro-reflective and reflective. I see a picture. This is an

example of pre-reflective consciousness. When I think over that picture the pre-reflective consciousness is the object of my consciousness. He calls it reflective consciousness). The consciousness of man in action is non-reflective consciousness. It is consciousness of something and the transcendent which discloses itself to this consciousness is of a particular nature; it is a structure of exigency in the world and the world correlatively discloses in it complex relations of instrumentality. In the act of tracing the letters which I am writing, explains Sartre, the whole sentence, still unachieved, is revealed as a passive exigency the sentence to be written. It is the very meaning of the letters which form and its appeal is not put into question, precisely because I cannot write the words without transcending them towards the sentence, and because I discover it as the necessary condition for the meaning of the words which 1 am writing. At the same time in the very framework of the act an indicative complex of instruments reveals itself and organises itself (pen-ink-paper-lines-margins etc), a complex which cannot be apprehended for itself but which rises in the heart of the transcendence which discloses to me as a passive exigency the sentence to be written. Thus in the quasi-generality of everyday acts, 1 am engaged, I have ventured and I discover my possibilities by realizing them and in the very act of realizing them as exigencies, urgencies, instrumentalities (p, 74).

On the other hand, Sartre explains,, anguish then is the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself (p, 74), In this sense it is mediation, for although it is immediate consciousness of itself, it arises from the negation of the appeals of the world. It appears at the moment that disengage myself from the world where 1 had been engaged in order to apprehend myself as a consciousness which possesses as a pre-onto-, logical comprehension of its essence and a pre-judicative sense of its possibilities. Anguish is opposed to the mind of the serious man who apprehends values in terms of the world and who resides in the reassuring, materialistic substantiation of values. In the serious mood, I define myself in terms of the object by pushing aside apriori as impossible all enterprises in which I am not engaged at the moment; the meaning which my freedom has given to the world, I apprehend as Coining from the world and constituting my obligations. In anguish I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself (p. 78).

We should not however conclude, continues Sartre, that being brought on to the reflective plane and envisaging one's distant or immediate possibilities suffice to apprehend oneself in pure anguish. In each instance of reflection anguish is born as a structure of the reflective consciousness in so far as the latter considers consciousness as an object of reflection; but it still remains possible for me to maintain various types of conduct with respect to my own anguish — in particular, patterns of flight. Everything takes place, in fact, as if our essential and immediate behaviour with respect to anguish is flight (p. 78).

Yet to flee anguish and to be anguish can not be exactly the same thing. If I am my anguish in order to flee it, that presupposes that I can decenter myself in relation to what I am, that I can be anguish In the form of 'not-being it', that I can dispose of a nihilating power at the hear of anguish itself. This nihilating power nihilates anguish so far as I flee it and nihilates itself in so far as I am anguish in order to flee it. This attitude is, what Sartre terms, 'bad faith'. There is then no question of expelling anguish from consciousness nor of constituting it in an unconscious psychic phenomenon; very simply I can make myself guilty of bad faith while apprehending the anguish which 1 am and this bad faith, intended to fill up the nothingness which I am in relation to myself, precisely, implies the nothingness which it sup presses (p. 83)

We feel that the Sartrian concept of anguish and its relation to freedom are purely fictitious and do not carry even a grain of objectivity in it. There is also a strong desire to imitate the master and predecessor Heidegger. The manner in which this concept has made its appearance shows all too clearly that Sartre has inserted a Heideggerian concept into his theory. The concept of anguish or anxiety as a psychological disorder, have already been discussed in. the section on Heidegger. It is enough to say that Sartre's understanding of freedom, negation etc. are purely subjective whereas there are scientific notions that clearly explain these phenomena.

IV

This book starts with a fundamental question which is perhaps the basic question of all philosophy, the relationship between man and the world. At the very outset we also posed a similar question — though in a different form — what is philosophy? While making an attempt to answer the question it has been observed that basically the relationship of man with the world is a subject-object relationship, man the subject coming into relationship with the world the object. It is a complex mutually interacting relationship by which both man and the world change. In sociological terminology this is known as historical materialism.

All schools of idealism, including the one we are discussing now are distinguished by the fact that they also pose the same question to start with. However while elucidating, they confuse the basic methodology and bring in such subjective factors that instead of leading to a scientific reply to the question, they end up in a muddle of scienceless, subjective thought process.

Sartre lifts the curtain with the cardinal question: 'Is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation of man and the world?' He explains that if the answer is 'no', he is then in a position to bring in the concept of non-being. The non-existence of such a conduct brings forth the concept of negation. According to Sartre, by posing a question, I expect a reply. This expectation brings forth the possibility of a non-being. It is because I expect fifteen hundred francs, Sartre says elsewhere in the same chapter, that 1 find thirteen hundred francs. It is because the scientist expects some result from the experiment that he does not find the result. In all these examples there emerges the possibility of a non-being, a negation.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to comment on this question of the possibility of non-being. The expectation, without any real basis, is a subjective one. I may expect something, with or without any logic. When I pose a question about the possibility of a conduct' that reveals to me the relationship between man and the world, I must be transparent about the conduct and the way in which it reveals the relationship. In fact all our conducts reveal this relationship. Any question can become a real one and not a figment of imagination, if the questioner himself is transparent about the question he poses. A scientist may expect a certain result, because he has been led to believe by the results of his earlier experiments to expect that result. If however, his expectations are negated, it is probably because he did not take into consideration other factors influencing the result of the earlier experiment. A scientist does not expect something magical to happen. His reasoning is based on hard facts.

It would be futile to delve into the illogicality of every example that Sartre furnishes to prove the existence of non-being. Take for example the absence of Pierre in the cafe. In fact, the whole series of events, the disappearance of the whole multitude, the blurring of other faces, 'my' indifference to anything else other than the existence or non-existence

of Pierre are based on a certain subjective factor; my expectations to meet Pierre and my anxiety of not being able to meet him. The whole philosophical explanation, the emergence of nothing-ness, the existence of transcendent non-beings, all these are brilliant concoctions of imagination and do not have any objective reality.

According to Sartrian anthropology, man's emergence as man lies In his capacity to effect a nihilating withdrawal. Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world. But it will be evident from our discussion on consciousness that it is social labour that has been instrumental for the emergence of man. It is not the individual affirmation or negation that played any significant role in the development of human civilization. Further, we may outright reject Sartre's thesis on freedom. The freedom of putting oneself outside the circuit of a being or a host of beings has been termed as freedom. But this freedom is very shallow. In fact, a man, ignorant of the laws of nature and society, may try to put himself outside the circuit but he cannot really flee from it. The whole social and natural complexities pulls him down. He cannot flee the various laws of nature, neither can he flee the laws of society; if he is living in a society he has to transact with other people either directly or indirectly. Man is free only to the extent that he understands the natural and social laws and he can, by putting into practice this knowledge of the natural and social laws, effect a nihilating withdrawal, a negation. By knowing the laws of physiological disorder, he cures it. By knowing the laws of social development, he negates the existing system in favour of a more advanced and progressive one. Negation does not emerge from ignorance, expectation, or nihilating withdrawal. Negation is bred through scientific knowledge.

The difficulty with Sartre is that he wanted to present a philosophy similar in form to that of Heidegger but opposite in content. Though Sartre had studied the philosophers of the idealist school, his understanding of the philosophers is possibly questionable as is evident at least from 'Being and Nothingness.' His understanding of the philosophers of the other stream i.e. materialism suffers from identical lacuna. As we have observed, in 'Transcendence of Ego', he had wanted to come closer to the people through some loopholes he discovered with Husserl. But he had never questioned the Husserlian or Heideggerian philosophy in their totality. Hence he is found struggling hard to bring about a philosophy 'in the world' — borrowing heavily from Heidegger. As a result his important philosophical proposition of nothingness does not have any real basis.

Sartre says, that the condition on which human reality can deny all or part of the world is that human reality carries nothingness within itself as the nothing which separates its present from all its past. This is the crux of the Sartrian notion about man. Let us try to understand it with the help of an example. Suppose there exists a ball which is hollow at the core. I cut open this ball. Each part immediately takes the form of a new ball and is hollow at the core. Again cutting open this ball, I find the same result. We may term this hollowness as 'nothingness'. Hence everytime a man negates a world or part of the world, nothingness is transcendent in immanence. It is because of nothingness that the human reality negates the present to transcend to the future—adinfinitum. Therefore human reality carries nothingness within it; it will always forge ahead because nothingness is coiled within him like a worm.

Sartre's negation does not seem to have any rhyme or reason. Sartre's man negates the present to transcend into the future. But for what? Is it like a spider which is continually spinning a web? Even the spider has its own logic. If this be the reason for man's freedom, one might well argue that this is not freedom. This is slavery of the worst kind. Without knowing what he is negating, where he is transcending, the Sartrian man goes on negating the present. This is not freedom just as Russeau's natural man did not have

freedom, the beasts in the jungle or the birds in the sky do not enjoy freedom in the real sense of the term.

How docs Sartre's man come to understand this freedom? Sartre says it is in anguish that man gels the consciousness of his freedom. But how? According to Sartre, in anguish one comes face to lace with one's possibilities and one has to chose one's own possibility against all other possibilities. A writer is faced with the possibility of writing against the possibility of not writing. He makes his choice, but this choice is made in the face of other possibilities which include that of not choosing this possibility. Not to choose one's own possibility may relieve one of one's anguish. Kill as Sartre points out, both the phenomena are existent. To face anguish and to flee in the face of anguish — both possibilities are present. It reminds one of the famous Shakespearean question 'to he or not to be'. One is in two minds as one comes nearer to anguish. One may (lee it or face it. This is Sartre's freedom of choice.

What kind of freedom is it? Or is there any freedom in it as such? According to this theory a man could be a dacoit or a saint. He has the choice of being the former instead of the latter. Is it all that simple? Does the bourgeois society really give this freedom of choice or does it not deny it? Don't we too often confront the example of what one wanted to be and what one becomes? Does this not make Sartrian freedom of choice a doubtful proposition? Even in his own life, could Sartre be a writer had the Fascists subjugated France for another fifty years? Could Brecht choose in Germany after 1933? Even today there are millions of people who are dying of hunger, malnutrition and persecution by the ruling class in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Is Sartre's freedom of choice applicable to these people also? In fact, Sartre's freedom of choice is devoid of any sociological foundation. He was just echoing the voice of the bourgeoisie, albeit unknowingly.

But then why does Sartre couple anguish with freedom of choice? The reason may be similar to that of Heidegger. He saw with his own eyes how the great French nation prostrated itself before the Nazi invaders. He saw the bourgeoisie making their choice in favour of capitulation. With great anguish, coming face to face with his own self, without making any attempt to flee from himself, he made his choice in favour of freedom. He saw many who were fleeing from themselves — who wanted to live by any means — even by compromise if need be. They were also free to choose their own course of action. 'Being and Nothingness' was written in 1942 when Paris was under the Nazis. The way he himself rose to the occasion and made his choice might have induced him to theorize the experience.

2. *Presence to self:*

In the preceding chapter we have discussed Sartre's conception of 'nothingness'. Here we will deal with his thesis on the upsurge of the Being-for-itself. While discussing 'nothingness' we had a glimpse of the Sartrian 'two regions of being'. Here the same thesis is presented in greater detail. Sartre says, the being of consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question (p. 120). The reader may perhaps remember that this definition has close similarity with the definition of "Being" given by Heidegger. However, Sartre continues, this means that the being of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence. Such equivalence which is that of the in-itself is expressed by this simple formula: being is what it is. In the in-itself there is not a particle of being which is not wholly within itself without distance' (p. 120; please note the Sartrian difference between matter and mind). When being is thus conceived there is not

the slightest suspicion of duality in it; ... the density of the being of the in-itself is infinite. It is a fullness. The principle of identity can be said to be synthetic not only because it limits its scope to a region of definite being, but in particular because it masses within it the infinity of density. "A is A" means that A exists in an infinite compression with an infinite density. Identity is the limiting concept of unification: it is not true that the in-itself has any need of a synthetic unification of its being; at its own extreme limit, unity disappears and passes into identity. Identity is the ideal of 'one' and 'one' comes into the world by human reality. The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in' (pp. 120-1). So, this is the Sartrian definition of being without consciousness; a dense, compact, crackless mass — complete identity.

'The distinguishing characteristic of consciousness' says Sartre, 'on the other hand, is that it is a decompression of being. Indeed it is impossible to define it as coincidence with itself (p. 121). (Now a peculiar distinction will be brought about between a subject and his/her self and on the basis of his definition of in-itself, Sartre will prove his definition of for-itself. But both of these definitions are derived from imagination although he proves one with the help of the other. Neither in mathematics nor in logic does this kind of proof have any validity.). 'Let us note first that the term in-itself, which we have borrowed from tradition to designate the transcending being, is inaccurate. At the limit of coincidence with itself, in fact, the self vanishes to give place to identical being. The self cannot be a property of being-in-itself. By nature it is a reflexive. … The self refers, but it refers precisely to the subject. It indicates a relation between the subject and himself and this relation is precisely a duality ... on the other hand, the self does not designate being either as subject or as predicate. ... In fact the self cannot be apprehended as a real existent; the subject cannot be self, for coincidence with self. … causes the self to disappear. But neither can it not be itself since the self is an indication of the subject himself. The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity—in short, of being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between identity as absolute cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of multiplicity (pp. 123-4). This is what Sartre calls 'presence to itself. The law of being of the for-itself, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be itself in the form of presence to itself.

Presence to self … supposes that an impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because it is not wholly itself. Presence is an immediate deterioration of coincidence for it supposes separation. But if we ask ourselves at this point what it is which separates the subject from himself, we are forced to admit that it is nothing (p. 124). (And now if we ask why then this empty philosophizing? Sartre may retort: 'You have not understood anything of my philosophy. This 'nothing' is everything in my philosophy. Have you not noticed that I have already coined the word 'nothingness' which signified negation, negation of negation, opposition, contradiction and so on. This 'nothing' is also pregnant with 'philosophical significance').

'This negative which is the nothingness of being and the nihilating power both together, is nothingness. Nowhere else can we grasp it in such purity. Everywhere else in one way or another we must confer on it being-in-itself as nothingness. But the nothingness which arises in the heart of consciousness is not. It is made-to-be … the for-itself must be its own nothingness. The being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from itself as a presence to itself and this empty distance which being

carries in its being is Nothingness. Thus in order for a self to exist, it is necessary that the unity of this being include its own nothingness as the nihilation of identity. … The for-itself is the being which determines itself to exist in as much as it cannot coincide with itself (p. 125).

'Nothingness is always an elsewhere. It is the obligation for the for-itself never to exist except in the form of an elsewhere in relation to itself, to exist as a being which perpetually effect in itself a break in being. This break does not refer us elsewhere to another being; it is only a perpetual reference of self to self, of the reflection to the reflecting of the reflecting to the reflection. This reference, however, does not provoke an infinite movement in the heart of the for-itself but is given within the unity of a simple act. The infinite movement belongs only to the reflective regard which wants to apprehend the phenomenon as a totality and which is referred from the reflection to the reflecting, from the reflecting to the reflection without being able to stop. Thus nothingness is this hole in being, this fall of the in-itself towards the self, the fall by which the for-itself is constituted. But this nothingness can only 'be made-to-be' if its borrowed existence is correlative with a nihilating act on the part of the being. The perpetual act by which the in-itself degenerates into presence to itself we shall call an ontological act. Nothingness is the putting into question of being by being — that is, precisely consciousness or for-self. It is an absolute event which comes to being by means of being and which without having being, is perpetually sustained by being. … Since nothingness is nothingness of being, it can come to being only through being itself. Of course it comes to being through a particular being, which is human reality. But this being is constituted as human reality in as much as this being is nothing but the original project of its own nothingness. Human reality is being in so far as within its being and for its being it is the unique foundation of nothingness at the heart of being (p. 126).

Sartre's concepts about Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself arc typical of the bourgeois philosophers for whom concepts appear without any reference to other branches of knowledge and who wish to modify or contradict the predecessors not on the basis of enhanced knowledge hut on differences in technical details. Sartre has 'coined' the two most important props of his thesis — Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself; he has borrowed the former from tradition (from Kant) and the other is his own coinage. For Kant Being-in-itself was such a being about which any knowledge was impossible. Sartre has used the same term to denote what Heidegger calls, things-in-the-world. Of course, there are some technical differences. Being-for-itself if divested of the nothingness may transform into Being-in-itself. We have seen how Sartre analyses Being-in-itself—it is plenitude, identity, total positivity and so on. Thus Sartre drains the object of any quality and movement. But scientific discoveries have brought to the fore the important facts about I In- origin of life on earth; it is now common knowledge that an inorganic object—inanimate matter—was transformed, at appropriate natural condition, into organic matter — first plant cells and then into biological cells. Hence Sartre's idea about Being-in-itself is unscientific.

He has used the term 'dialectic' on several occasions but has never taken into consideration the dialectics of nature — intrinsic actions and reactions within matter itself. This knowledge would have informed him that Being-in-itself, so far as he understands objects by the term, is also subjected to the same laws of dialectics.

In the preceding pages we have also given an outline of the Sartrian concept of Being-for-itself analysing the unscientific nature of his proposition, He has given an analysis of pre-reflectivecogito, reflection, etc. According in Sartrian hypothesis being-for-itself is distinct from in-itself because Being-for-itself is presence to self as opposed to complete

identity in the later case. There is a separation between the self and the- subject and what causes this separation is a 'nothing'. 'Nothing' separates the self from the subject. And this separation, this fissure is instrumental in the making of Being-for-self. But, as we know, human brain, the seat of human consciousness, is the highest form of matter in motion and can only be differentiated from objects in the world in terms of mailer and its development. The criteria that Sartre provides for being-for-itself that it negated the present and transcends are not based on any scientific data or observation. In fact, if we look closely at nature, we will find that not only man but all animate beings. 'negate' the present. This is the crux of evolution. Furthermore, Sartre's being-for-itself negates without any explicit reason, whereas human being negates out of necessity. In all stages of evolution, necessity has been the driving force. So is it true in the history of social development. It was social necessity that gave rise to different forms of society. Sartre's being-for-itself is not scientific enough to take into consideration the complexities of human upsurge from all aspects including anthropological, sociological, historical, economic, political and cultural. As Sartre's thesis is not based on science, it cannot explain man's multidimensional upsurge in the world.

II

Sartre, on the basis of his analysis of the upsurge of the for-itself, furnishes an explanation for the reason of this upsurge. As we will see, the reasons given by Sartre do not originate from the postulates of Anthropology and Sociology. On the contrary, it has the same subjective bias as we have noticed in his analysis of nothingness.

Sartre says, first we have encountered a nihilation in which the being of the for-itself is affected in its being. This revelation of nothingness did not seem to us to pass beyond the limits of the cogito. But let us consider more closely.

The for-itself cannot sustain nihilation without determining itself as a lack of being. This means that the nihilation does not coincide with a simple introduction of emptiness into consciousness. An external being has not expelled the in-itself from consciousness; rather the for-itself is perpetually determining itself not to be the in-itself. This means that it can establish itself only in terms of the in-itself and against the in-itself. Thus, since the nihilation is the nihilation of being, it represents the original connection between the being of the for-itself and the being of the in-itself. The concrete real in-itself is wholly present to the heart of consciousness as that which consciousness determines itself not to be' (p. 134).

Hence, according to this theory, the constant tendency of the being-for-itself is to be converted into being-in-itself by expelling the nothingness within consciousness. This means that except for the existence of nothingness, there is absolutely no qualitative difference between being-for-itself and being-in-itself i.e. subject and object. From this we can conclude that Sartrian subject and object are poorer in quality than worldy subject and object.

Sartre Continues: What our ontological description has immediately revealed is that this being is the foundation of itself as a lack of being; that is, that it determines its being by means of being which it is not. Nevertheless, there are many ways of not being and some of them do not touch the inner nature of I he being which is not what it is not, If, for example, I say of an inkwell that it is not a bird, the inkwell and the bird remain untouched by the negation. This is an external relation which can be established only by a human reality acting as internal relation between what one denies and that concerning which the denial is made

Of all Internal negations, the one which penetrates most deeply into being, the one which constitutes in its being the being concerning which it makes the denial along with the being which it denies — this negation is luck. This lack does not belong to the nature of the in-itself, which is all posilivity. It appears in the world only with the upsurge of human reality. It is only in the human world that there can be lacks. A lack presupposes a trinity: that which is missing or 'the lacking', that which misses what is lacking or 'the existing' and a totality which has been broken by the lacking and which would be restored by the synthesis of 'the lacking' and 'the existing' — that is 'the lacked'. The being which is released to the intuition of human reality is always that to which something is lacking, i.e., the existing. For example, if I say that the moon is not full and that one-quarter is lacking, I base this judgement on full intuition of the crescent moon. Thus what is released to intuition is an in-itself which by itself is neither complete nor incomplete but which simply is what it is, without relation with other beings. In order for this in-itself to be grasped as the crescent moon, it is necessary that a human reality surpass the given toward the project of the realized totality — here the disc of the full moon — and return toward the given to constitute it as the crescent moon; that is, in order to realize it in its being in terms of the totality which becomes its foundation. In this same surpassing the lacking will be posited as that whose synthetic addition to the existing will reconstitute the synthetic totality of the lacked. In this sense, the lacking is of the same nature as the existing; it would suffice to reverse the situation in order for it to become the existing to which the lacking is missing while the existing would become the lacking. This lacking as the compliment of the existing is determined in its being by the synthetic totality of the lacked. Thus, in the human world, the incomplete being which is released to intuition as lacking is constituted in its being by the lacked—that is, by what it is not. It is the full moon which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent; what-is-not determines what-is. It is in the being of the existing, as the correlate of a human transcendence, to lead outside itself to the being which it is not — as to its meaning.

Human reality by which lack appears in the world must be itself a lack. For lack can come into being only through a lack; the in-itself cannot be the occasion of lack in the in-itself. In other words, in order for being to be lacking or lacked, it is necessary that a being make itself its own lack; only a being which lacks can surpass being towards the lacked (pp. 135-6).

In fact, the above deliberation on the lacking and the lacked has been necessary because Sartre's being-for-itself is a lack. Being-for-itself strives incessantly to synthetically add the lacking. But, as we will see, the moment the addition is made, the for-itself again develops another lack and strives towards synthetic totality. This is a perpetual process and as long as being-for-itself exists, this ascendance continues unabated. This is the Sartrian basis of transcendence.

Sartre explains: 'The existence of desire as a human fact is sufficient to prove that human reality is a lack. In fact, how can we explain desire if we insist on viewing it as a psychic state; that is, as a being whose nature is to be what it is? A being which is what it is, ... summons nothing to itself …. An incomplete circle does not call for completion unless it is surpassed by human transcendence. In itself it is complete and perfectly positive as an open curve. A psychic state which existed with the sufficiency of this curve could not possess in addition the slightest 'appeal to' something else; it would be itself without any relation to what is not it. In order to constitute it as hunger or thirst, an external transcendence surpassing it toward the totality 'satisfied hunger' would be necessary just as the crescent moon is surpassed toward the full moon (p. 137). Thus, according to Sartrian explanation, desire is the driving force of human transcendence.

Hence, the being of the hole of nothingness in being-for-itself is desire. Desire is the motive force of human history.

Excellent! It is distressing to see that out of all these explanations and sociology the cat of Sartrian anthropology is out of the bag. Sartre might have thought that he was serving 'pure' philosophy to his readers. To conceal the muddle-headedness of his thought he has presented his view in relatively understandable language. Hut all these schemes have failed. Now we know that Sartre considers desire as the driving force of human upsurge and the making of human history. But can we not tell Sartre that this shows that he is completely overrun by the philosophy of profit, where desire for profit is the driving force for capitalist development ? Can he deny that this theory is perfectly compatible with the social ethics of Capitalism? His well-chosen 'thought' has betrayed him. It shows all too clearly that he has added nothing new to our knowledge. In fact, desire cannot explain the evolution from ape to man. Desire cannot explain the transition from primitive communism to slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and scientific communism. Contrary to what Sartre prescribes, all human transcendence is characterized by recognition of necessity. We will later discuss this in more detail. We have only taken this opportunity to refute the Sartrian explanation of human transcendence.

So now we have come across two most important Sartrian discoveries of anthropology and sociology. We now know that it is as lack that human reality exists, and that desire is the driving force of human progress. It is by virtue of desire that man negates the present and transcends into the future, and it is 'lack' which accompanies man in his journey towards the future. This is an incessant process; if ever for-itself reaches itself, it will become a plenitude which being-in-itself cannot be.

One wonders if Sartre has forgotten that his readers belong to the twentieth century, He also seems to have underestimated his reader who when once able to tear off the crust to reveal the core begin to reach the crux of his ideas. Having done this they will then pose two simple questions; (I) What is this lack? (2) Can he explain the social progress from primitive society to present day by his theory of desire? Surely he cannot give a suitable reply. Sartre's lack (comparable to Heidegger's guilt) docs not have any scientific explanation. Desire also cannot explain the transition of society from a lower to a higher stage of development,

It is not a dimensionless 'lack' that is instrumental in causing human upsurge. In fact there exists a lark of knowledge on the part of man about the laws of nature and society. Every step of human progress— big or small — has been achieved by man's understanding of the laws of nature and society, and of taking advantage of this knowledge by applying it creatively for his own purpose. It is true that this striving towards more knowledge about nature is an incessant process and scientists and philosophers are unanimous about this enhancement of knowledge being a continuous and ceaseless process. Nature is vast and inexhaustible and man is a part of nature. Hence man will for ever explore the laws of nature but will not be able to exhaust its possibilities.

Therefore it is not due to a dimensionless lack that man negates his present only to find himself once again as a lack. If this is the explanation of human transcendence that Sartre subscribes to, it seems to be nothing but sheer fatalism. Sartre's man is ignorant of what he lacks, yet he goes on negating his present only to find himself as lack — ad infinitum.

But in a scientific analysis of the development of human consciousness, it can be shown that at every stage of development, it was the recognition of necessity that played a decisive role in the development of man from ape, as well as from primitive man to man,

in a civilized society. Now, this concept of recognition of necessity is a complex phenomenon which needs elucidation. Recognition of necessity is visible in all animate beings — in their struggle for survival, reproduction and metabolism. But for animals this recognition is indirect, hereditary and instinctive. For man, this recognition is direct, social and conscious. Recognition of necessity also presupposes that man derives advantages for himself. For example, recognition of necessity is the revelation of the characteristics of the fertility of soil. This knowledge about the characteristics of the soil as well as the sowing of particular seeds in a particular soil changed man's life from that of a nomadic being to that of a settled agricultural tribal existence. Another example: recognition of necessity is the knowledge of the natural law of the repetition of seasons and the application of this knowledge. It is expressed by the sowing of particular seeds in a particular season, taking pre-emptive measures, and preparing the community for the ensuing season. A river in spate overflows its banks and when the water recedes it leaves behind alluvial soil. The whole Egyptian civilization grew out of the knowledge that during a particular time of the year the Nile would be in spate, and alluvial soil thus deposited on its banks. Consequently the harvest in these areas would be much greater than that of areas further away from the river. It is this primary knowledge about the laws of nature and not any inherent lack, that gave rise to one of the greatest civilizations in human history. Man did not know about the law of gravitation until Galileo, Kepler and finally Newton revealed their theories. Once this law had been placed in its proper perspective, rockets have been built which can overcome the earth's gravitational pull. No one will dispute the fact that this conquest of space is one of the most gigantic steps ever taken. It is one of the greatest upsurges that humanity has ever achieved. But this upsurge has not been possible because of 'man's inherent lack in himself. It was only made possible because man was armed with the requisite knowledge of the laws of nature.

In all stages of human social development, recognition of the necessity and interdependence on nature has been instrumental for the upsurges — big and small. Sartre's theory of lack does not satisfy any of the questions that anthropologists and sociologists may put to him. He is an idealist with an explanation which has no validity beyond theorisation.

Recognition of necessity is also to be understood in the appropriate context of time and space. Primitive man might also have dreamt of flying like a bird, but recognition of the necessity required to realize flying could not be achieved at that stage of social development. Hence for primitive man flying was only wish-fulfilment. History of science and society teaches us that recognition of necessity is closely related to the development of the society — the development of the productive forces and the production relations. At each stage of social development only certain laws of nature can be mastered by the society. Hence there will be a corresponding relationship between the development of the society and the recognition of necessity. Thus it is neither inherent 'luck' nor 'desire' that can explain the upsurge of man in the world. The upsurge of man in the world can only be explained by his recognition of necessity in nature and society. This is the only possible scientific explanation of man's meteoric upsurge.

3. *Temporality*

Space and time have long been the favourite subjects of philosophers until Einstein seized the contents from the arm-chair practitioners to give them a new meaning. Before him Newton also performed the same feat with some other favourites of the philosophers. In his article 'End of philosophy' Heidegger accused Marx of digging the grave of 'Philosophy' as such. The accusation is partly true. After Marx, it has become all the

more difficult to weave weird mental images and pass them as ‘pure’ philosophy. The time has come when even ‘philosophizing’ will have to appear logical and scientific. Sartre, ignorant of the Marxist school of thought, followed Heidegger in pursuit of Being, and like Heidegger he also thought it necessary to reflect on time and space.

To Sartre, time is a subjective phenomenon. Sartre’s temporality is closely connected with the upsurge of being-for-itself. As Sartre’s being-for-itself ignores the past, negates the present and transcends towards the future the concepts of past, present and future lose their universal meaning. Temporality becomes a relation of being-for-itself and loses its objective existence. But as Nature could not conform to Hegel’s *Logic*, Time also could not satisfy Sartre’s ego-centric explanation. Temporality is an objective phenomenon of nature and must be understood as such. King Canute wanted to rule the waves but failed. Time also cannot be a personal possession of Sartre’s being-for-itself.

THE PAST

Like Heidegger, Sartre connects temporality with for-itselt. Time does not remain an independent entity. Temporality becomes personal possession of for-itself. He says, ‘my’ past is first of all mine; that is, that it exists as the function of a certain being which I am. The past is not nothing; neither is it the present; but at its very source it is bound to a certain present and to a certain future, to both of which it belongs. That “myness” ... is not a subjective nuance which comes to shatter the memory; it is an ontological relation which unites the past to the present. My past never appears isolated in its ‘pastness’; it would be absurd even to imagine that it can exist as such. It is originally the past of this present’ (p. 163).

Sartre continues: The past is characterized as the past of something or of somebody; one has a past. It is this instrument, this society, this man, who have their past. There is not first a universal past which would later be particularized in concrete pasts. On the contrary, it is particular pasts which we discover first. The true problem will be in find out by what process these individual pasts can be united so as to form the past (p. 165)!

One agrees with Sartre that every being has his/her own past. And that one’s past, present and. future are different points of a continuous process. There is also no doubt that ‘the past is characterized as the past of something or somebody.’ But we strongly differ with Sartre on the conclusion that he arrives at. He says: the true problem will be to find out by what process these individual pasts can be united so as to form the past. The problem that Sartre has posed is truly a Herculean one, If suddenly a philosopher arrives and proclaims that the Sun moves round the Earth and he sits down to correct all the mathematics and astronomy so that they conform to his imagination — don’t you think he would be shouldering an impossible task? But will he succeed? His topsy-turvy mathematics will only amuse posterity. Sartre has taken upon himself such a task. He will not find out the individual past out of the universal past. He will do it the other way round. Plato bad once conceived of banishing the poets from the Republic. We shdder to imaging Sartre’s fate in Plato’s judgement.

Sartre gives an example: ‘I can say of Pierre, who is dead, ‘He loved music’, In this case, the subject like the attribute is past. There is no living Pierre in terms of which the past being can arise. But we conceive of such a subject. We conceive of him even to the point of recognizing that for Pierre that taste for music has never been past. Pierre has always been contemporary with this taste, which was his taste; his living personality has not survived it, not has it survived the personality. Consequently here what is past is Pierre-loving-music. And I can pose this question ... : of whom is this past Pierre the past?

It cannot be in relation to a universal present which is a pure affirmation of being; it is then the past of my actuality. And in fact Pierre has been for me, and I have been for him …Pierre's existence has touched my inmost depths; it formed a part of a present 'in the world, for me and for others' which was my present during Pierre's lifetime — a present which I have been. Thus concrete objects which have disappeared are past in so far as they form a part of the concrete past of a survivor, 'The terrible thing about Death', said Malranx, 'is that it transforms life into destiny.' By this we must understand, that death reduces the for-itself-for-others to the state of simple for-others. Today I alone am responsible for the being of the dead Pierre, I in my freedom. Those dead who have not been able to be saved and transported to the boundaries of the concrete past of a survivor are not past; they along with their pasts are annihilated (pp. 165-6).

The above example given by Sartre is one of extreme absurdity, and is perpetrated in the name of philosophy. The pastness of Pierre-loving-music, Sartre affirms, cannot be considered in relation to a universal present, it has to be a past of my actuality. This is a gross I distortion of pastness as a temporal phenomenon. Secondly, Sartre says I that those dead who have not been able to be saved and transported to the boundaries of the concrete past of a survivor are not past; they along with their pasts are annihilated. If that be the case, Alexander I the Great can be dismissed from Indian history because no survivor I exists. The Pathans, Mughals, British etc. have nothing to do with I Indian culture because no survivor is there to enlighten us. By one I stroke Sartre annihilates all history — individual and collective — when the last survivor is dead. Hence there was no Greek civilization, no Roman civilization, no Napoleon and no Louis XVI because these historical pasts cannot be transported to us with the help of a survivor. The reader may have wondered how these absurd notions could be uttered. But they may be reminded that in bourgeois philosophy this absurdity is common-place. The whole controversy on sense-perception and objective reality had long been raging in philosophical circles. The pen I am holding in my hand may not be a pen or the pen as I see it, Some claimed that we cannot say about things that they exist the .way 1 see it. Even that absurd notion has been given a place in philosophy and in most text books of philosophy in non-socialist countries this ' philosophy is taught even now. In comparison Sartre's absurd notion seems to be a child's fantasy.

Sartre says: ... it is very clear that the expression 'to have a past' which leads us to suppose a mode of possession in which the possessor can be passive and which as such can without violence be applied to matter, should be replaced by the expression 'to be its own past'. There is a past only for a present which cannot exist without being its past — back there, behind itself; that is, only those beings have a past which are such that in their being, their past being is in question, those beings who have to be their past. These observations enable us to refuse a priori to grant a past to the in-itself (which docs not mean however that we must confine it within the present) (p. 167).

Thus in another stroke Sartre wipes away pastness from the in-itself, The grand father clock does not have a past. The mahogini table does not have a past. The figurines of Mohenjodaro and Harappa do not have any past. The house, the almirah, the objects we use everyday do not have any past. Neither they are present. So where do these inanimate being-in-itselfs exist temporally? If the antique and curio dealers had heard this they would have protested loudly. Jokes apart, we cannot seriously take Sartre's view on temporality.

Sartre continues: We shall not thus settle once and for all the question of the past of living beings. We shall only observe that if it were necessary — which is by no means certain — to grant a past to life, this, could be done only after having proved that the

being of life In such that it allows a past. In short, it would be necessary first to prove that living matter is something other than a physical-chemical system..... For Human Reality alone the existence of a past is manifest because it has been established that human reality has to be what it is. It is through the for-itself that the past arrives in the world because its ' I am' is in the form of T am me' (p, 167-8).

So this is Sartre's idea of being-for-itself. It is through for-itself that the past arrives in this world. This is also a novel idea and deserves to be considered as a piece of' pure philosophy'. In fact the whole book a bounds in such examples. There are many strands of idealism. Sartre's existentialism deserves to be considered as unique for the originality of thought

Let us listen to Sartre once again. Sartre says that the term 'was' which serving as intermediary between the present and the past, is itself neither wholly present nor wholly past. In fact, it can be neither the one nor the other since in either case it would be contained inside the tense which would denote its being. The term 'was' indicates the ontological leap from the present into the past and represents an original synthesis of these two temporal modes (p. 168).

Although by now we have come to know what it means by Sartre's brand of existentialism we could not imagine that such mundane, Commonplace intransitive verb expressed in the past tense-was-can be an ontological leap from the present into the past, and represents an original synthesis of two temporal modes. In fact this faculty to create a mountain out of an insignificant mole-hill is itself a feat.

What must we understand by this synthesis? Sartre continues: I see first that the term 'was' is a mode of being. In this sense I am my past. I do not have it; I am it. A remark made by someone concerning an act which I performed yesterday or a mood which I had does not leave me indifferent; I am hurt or flattered, 1 protest or I let it pass; I am touched to the quick. I do not dissociate myself from my past. Of course, in time I can attempt this dissociation; I can declare that 'I am no longer what I was', argue that there has been a change, progress. But this is a matter of secondary reaction which is given as such. To deny my solidarity of being with my past at this or that particular point is to affirm it for the whole of my life. At my limit, at that infinitesimal instant of my death, I shall be no more than my past. I alone will define me.... By death the for-itself is changed for ever into an in-itself in that it has slipped entirely into the past. Thus the past is the ever-growing totality of the in-itself which we are (pp. 168-9).

Now we understand what pastness means to for-itself. By death a for-itself is changed into in-itself. It is not necessary to enter into any debate about the validity of these statements. We have already objected to Sartre's concept of being-for-itself and being-in-itself. We said that these are empty philosophies and neither anthropology nor sociology support this view. Hence once again we reaffirm our stand. Only we would like to draw the reader's attention to a significant comparison with Heidegger. For Heidegger, Being towards death is the most authentic sojourn; there Being identifies itself with the most meaningful conclusion. But in Sartre it is exactly the opposite. By death being-for-itself changes into being-in-itself for ever. For one life is being-for-itself (for human being) and for another death is that authentic existence. This is not a difference in detail. We will find that this is a fundamental difference between two philosophers both of whom claim themselves to be existentialists.

THE PRESENT

'-Like Past, Sartre's Present is also integrated with the for-itself. Sartre says: in contrast to the Past which is in-itself, the Present is for-itself (p. 175). After a brief introduction about the nature of the present, Sartre says, taking cue from his earlier proposition on presence to-self, the present therefore can be only the presence of the for-itself to being-in-itself. And this presence cannot be the effect of an accident, of a concomitance and it must be an ontological structure of the For-itself. This table must be present to that chair in a world which human reality haunts as a presence. In other words one cannot conceive of a type of existent which would be first For-itself in order subsequently to be present to being. But the For-itself makes itself presence to being by making itself be For-itself, and it ceases to be presence by ceasing to be For-itself. The For-itself is defined as presence to being (pp. 176-7).

The topsy-turvy world of Sartre is also visible here. We have already briefly put forth Sartre's other concepts on the present. 'To, what being does the For-itself make itself presence? The answer is clear: The for-itself is presence to all of being-in-itself. Or rather the presence of the For-itself is what makes being-in-itself exist as a totality. For by this very mode of presence to being qua being, every possibility is removed whereby the For-itself might be more present to one privileged being than to all other beings. Even though the facticity of its existence causes it to be there rather than elsewhere, being there is not the same as being present. Being there determines only the perspective by which presence to the totality of the in-itself is realized. By means of the there the for-itself causes beings to be for one and the same presence. Beings are revealed as co-present in a world where the for-itself unites them with its own blood by that total ekstatic sacrifice of the self which is called presence. 'Being' the sacrifice of the For-itself, it would have been impossible to say that beings existed either together or separated. But the for-itself is the being by which the present enters into the world; the beings of the world are co-present, in fact, just in so far as the one and the same for-itself is at the same time present to all of them. Thus for the in-itselfs what we ordinarily call present is sharply distinguished from their being although it is nothing more than their being. For their present means only their co-presence in so far as a For-itself is present to them' (p. 177).

No special comment is necessary here. Everything is being weaved round the For-itself. It is the For-itself by which the present enters the world. 'Presence to a being implies that one is bound to that being by an internal bond; otherwise no connection between present and being would be possible. But this internal bond is a negative bond and denies, as related to the present being, that one is the being to which one is present. If this were not so, the internal bond would dissolve into pure and simple identification. Thus the For-itself's presence to being implies that the For-itself is a witness of itself in the presence of being as not being that being; presence to being is the presence of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself is not. For the negation rests not on a difference in mode of being which would distinguish the For-itself from being but on a difference of being. This can be expressed briefly by saying that the present is not' (p. 178).

There is nothing new in the above paragraph. We have already learnt it in sub-chapter 2. We have already taken note of this empty philosophizing.

Again, let us listen to Sartre: 'The For-itself constitutes itself outside in terms of the thing as the negation of that thing; thus its first relation with being-in-itself is negation. It 'is' in the mode of the For-itself; that is, as a separated existent in as much as it reveals

itself as not being. It doubly escapes being, by an internal disintegration and by express negation. The present is precisely this negation of being, this escape from being inasmuch as being is there as that from which one escapes. The For-itself is present to being in the form of flight; the Present is a perpetual flight in the face of being. Thus we have precisely defined the fundamental meaning of the Present: the Present is not. The present instant emanates from a realistic and reifying conception of the For-itself; it is this conception which leads us to denote the For-itself according to the mode of that which is and that to which it is present — for example, of that hand on the face of the clock. In this sense it would be absurd to say that it is nine V clock for the For-itself, but the For-itself can be present to a hand pointed at nine 'o' clock. What we falsely call the present is the being to which the present is presence. It is impossible to grasp the Present in the form of an instant, for the instant would be the moment when the present is. But the present is not; it makes itself present in the form of flight.

But the present is not only the For-itself's non-being making itself present. As For-itself it has its being outside of it, before and behind. Behind, it was its past; and before, it will be its future. It is a flight outside of co-present being and from the being which it was toward the being which it will be. At present it is not what it is (past) and it is what it is not (future) (p. 179).

The reader must have found this elucidation of present as nothing but repetition. Hence it bears out one of our conclusions: Sartre's conception of temporality has nothing to do with temporality as such. Sartre's temporality is integrated with For-itself. It has no independent existence.

THE FUTURE

Sartre writes: Let us note first that the in-itself can neither be future nor contain a part of the future. The full-moon is future only when I regard this crescent moon as 'in the world' which is revealed to human reality: it is only by human reality that the Future arrives in the world. In itself this quarter of the moon is what it is. Nothing in it is potentiality. It is actuality. The future, like the past, does not exist as a phenomenon of that original temporality of being-in-itself. The future of the in-itself, if it existed, would exist in-itself, cut off from being — like the past. ... If the future is pre-outlined on the horizon of the world, this can be only by a being which is its own future; that is, which is to come for itself, whose being is constituted by a coming-to-itself of its own being. Here again we discover ekstatic structures analogous to those which we have described for the Past. Only a being which has to be its being instead of simply being it can have a future (p. 180)

Thus 'future' is also integrated with For-itself. As Sartre has said, Being-in-itself even if it has any future, would exist in-itself. This will have no relationship with the 'future' which is purely an attribute of For-itself.

Sartre further explains: We must not understand by the future a "now" which is not yet. If we did so, we should fall back into the in-itself, and even worse we should have, to envisage time as a given and static container. The future is what I have to be in so far as I cannot be it. Let us recall that the For-itself makes itself present before being as not being this being and as having been its own being in the past. This presence is flight. We are not dealing here with a belated presence at rest near being but with an escape outside of being toward. … And this flight is two-fold, for in fleeing the being which it is not, Presence flees the being which it was. Toward what is it fleeing? We must not forget that in so far as it makes itself present to being in order to flee it the For-itself is a lack. The possible is

that which the For-itself lacks in order to be itself or if you prefer, the appearance of what I am — at a distance. Thus we grasp the meaning of the flight which is Presence; it is a flight towards its being; that is, toward the self which it will be by coincidence with what it lacks. The Future is the lack which wrenches it as lack away from the in-itself of Presence. If Presence did not lack anything, it would fall back into being and would lose presence to being and acquire in exchange the isolation of complete identity. It is lack as such which permits it to be presence. Because Presence is outside of itself toward something lacking which is beyond the world, it can be outside itself as presence to a in-itself which it is not (p. 182)! The project of the For-itself toward the future which it is a project toward the In-itself. In this sense the For-itself has to be its future because it can be the foundation of what it is only before itself and beyond being. It is the very nature of the for-itself that it must be 'an always future hollow'. For this reason it will never have become, in the Present, what it had to be, in the Future. The entire future of the present For-itself falls into the Past as the future along with this For-itself itself. It will be the Past future of a particular For-itself or a former future. This future is not realized. What is realised is a For-itself which is designated by the Future and which is constituted in connection with this future. For example, my final position on the tennis court has determined on the ground of the future all my intermediary positions and finally it has been reunited with an ultimate position identical with what it was in the future as the meaning of my movements. But precisely, this "reuniting" is purely ideal; it is not really operative. The future does not allow itself to be rejoined; it slides into the Past as a bygone future, and the Present For-itself in all its facticity is revealed as the foundation of its own nothingness and once again, as the lack of a new future. Hence comes that ontological disillusion which awaits the for-itself at each emergence into the future. 'Under the Empire how beautiful was the Republic'! Even if my present is strictly identical in its content with the future toward which I projected myself beyond being, it is not this present toward which I was projecting myself; for I was projecting myself toward the future qua future—that is, as the point of reuniting of my being, as the place of the upsurge of the self (p. 185).

'Now we are better able to raise the question of the being of the Future since this Future which I have to be is simply my possibility of presence to being beyond being. In this sense the future is strictly opposed to the past. The past is, to be sure, the being which I am outside of myself, but it is the being which I am without the possibility of not being it. This is what we have defined as being its past behind itself. The being of the future which I have to be, on the contrary, is such that I can only be it; for my freedom gnaws at its being from below. This means that the Future constitutes the meaning of my present For-itself, as the project of its possibility, but that it in no way predetermines my For-itself which is to-come, since the For-itself is always abandoned to the nihilating obligation of being the foundation of its nothingness. The future can only effect a preoutline of the limits within which the For-itself will make itself be as a flight, making itself present to being in the direction of another future. The future is what I would be if I were not free and what I can have to be only because I am free. It appears on the horizon to announce to me what I am from the stand point of what I shall be ("what are you doing? I am in the process of lacking up this tapestry, of hanging this picture on the wall"). Yet at the same time by its nature as a future present-for-itself it is disarmed; for the For-itself which will be, will be in the mode of determining itself to be and the Future, then become a past future as a pre-outline of this For-itself, will be able only as the past to influence it to be what it makes itself be. In a word, I am my Future in the constant perspective of the possibility of not being it. Hence that anguish which we have described above which springs from the fact that I am not sufficiently that Future which I have to be

and which gives its meaning to my present: it is because I am a being whose meaning is always problematic, In vain would the For-itself long to be enchained to its Possibility, as to the being which it is outside itself but which it is surely outside itself. the For-itself can never be its future except problematically for it is separated from it by a Nothingness which it is. In short the For-itself is free, and its freedom is to itself its own limit. To be free is to be condemned to be free. Thus the future qua future does not have to be. It is not in itself and neither is it the mode of being of the For-itself since it is the meaning of the For-itself. The Future is not. It is possibilized (pp. 185-6).

Now this is the conception of Sartre's future. We have already expressed our views on Sartre's concept of transcendence which can be linked with the future of the For-itself. One thing is certain: Sartre's For-itself is condemned to be free. And anyone who is condemned to be free is not free at all. Hence Sartre's idea of freedom is synonymous to imprisonment. Furthermore this never-ending cycle of leaping to a future hollow is also not a pleasant upsurge towards the future. There is practically no difference between Sartre's Being-for-itself 's past present and future because they are at best temporally differentiated without having any material distinction. In fact, Sartre's conception of temporality and For-itself are rooted in an erroneous concept of anthropology and sociology. We have already come across Sartre's basic outline of the upsurge of the For-itself. That upsurge did not come from a journey to the ownmost Being of the Past as outlined by Heidegger. Sartre negates the past on the threshold of the present and strides forward towards the future.

Sartre's concept of temporality totally ignores the scientific notion about space and time. It contradicts the physics of the universe. It also contradicts all scientific theories of anthropology. His conception may be likened to that of those ancients who naively believed that the Sun rose to give the earth light and warmth, the moon rose to add beauty to the nocturnal sky, and the stars were studded in the blue velvet to satisfy our aesthetic sense. In Sartre's scheme, the for-itself is the centre of temporality. Time can only be studied in relation to it. What existed before For-itself is non-existent in this theory.

But contemporary philosophers cannot accept this notion. It is too poetic to believe that man has given meaning to time. On the contrary, man is subject to time. Not only this: but man's upsurge from the animal world can be studied in the context of time; as also man's striving forward in history. Time does not abide by man's dictates. Although man can study time, understand it and the natural laws that are connected with it. Knowing these laws, man can even escape the domination of earthly time. However the related science is still at a nascent stage. We are referring to the concept of the theory of Relativity. Here are the errors and inadequacies of Sartre's concept:

(1) Sartre claims that there is no universal past. He says, 'there is not first a universal past which would later be particularized in concrete pasts. On the contrary, it is particular past which we discover first. The true problem will be to find out by what process these individual pasts can be united so as to form the past.' We have already commented on this erroneous proposition. Fastness is a law of nature. It is applied universally. The individual past can only be computed from the universal past. Furthermore, it is not through the For-itself that the past arrives in the world. On the contrary the fact is that human intellect by virtue of its understanding of the laws of nature has a conception of time. This understanding of the laws of temporality is not true for all time to come. In fact as far as our present knowledge about time goes, time is a form of matter, as space is. Time is a form of matter's existence. If I discover it now, it does not mean that matter was devoid of this form before I knew it. It is not by my revelation about it that it exists. Hence

universal past does not appear in the context of the concrete pasts. Both universal and concrete pasts exist in accordance with the laws of nature.

(2) Secondly, it is erroneous to infer that only For-itself 'has' past. All beings in nature 'have' past. The sort of internal relation that Sartre considers that only the For-itself has with the past, is in reality a universal phenomenon. Inanimate objects decompose and disintegrate with time. With time trees under the earth are transformed into coal, buildings become dilapidated and finally become dust and earth; this is the law of nature. Living beings also 'have' past. As I have a relationship with my past, so is there a relationship between the past and present of human society. Both the individual and social pasts are integrated, and give rise to the human civilization of which we form a part and have helped to make. Hence to say that only the For-itself 'has' past as an internal relation is only partly true. As already stated other living beings also 'have' past as an internal relation. This is evident in the development of their instincts. The struggle for survival—both of the individual and the species necessitates learning from the past, and developing physiologically those organs, traits and instincts that broaden the possibility of survival. Hence the past is also integrated with the present of all living beings in an integral internal relationship. Sartre has totally ignored this aspect and narrowed down the conception of temporality (of the past) as applicable to For-itself only.

Similarly Sartre has repeated his arguments on present as For-itself as discussed in Chapter Two, Section I ('Being and Nothingness'). Here again the same subjective explanation has been provided, the same reversal of logic appears. It is through the for-itself that the present is revealed. The implication is that if I cease to exist today, time will also cease to exist simultaneously. In reality my absence cannot be instrumental for the presence or absence of other objects in the world. Sartre might argue that his present is a particular present with respect to which there lies a future ahead and a past behind. It is a measure of temporality with respect to a certain present. However without taking into consideration the relative nature of temporality for a particular subject, he gives his absolute verdict on temporality.

Thirdly, like Heidegger's world, he discovers his co-present(s) with respect to a certain For-itself. But in reality the world exists independently of the For-itself. The relationship among things in the world also exist independently of their existence and revelation to For-itself. It is only partly true that the For-itself discovers the relationship among objects in the world. On the contrary in most of the cases the For-itself discovers itself in a world which exists independently of him.

Fourthly, the concept that the For-itself is not what it is, and the present is therefore a truce between being and non-being has come as an explanation and qualification of the present. Our views on this has already been expressed in connection with the concept of negation. Suffice it to say that the world docs not exist according to Hegel's scheme or Sartre's idea of temporality. Nature has its own logic. The degree of the development of the human civilization is directly linked to our knowledge about the laws of nature. The laws are there in the world. We have to discover and understand these laws. Instead of trying to understand them, philosophers of the idealist schools have formed their own imaginary concepts about the world and man. They also try to fit their ideas into a scheme. The result is a dichotomy between imagination and reality. This is exactly what Sartre has done. He invented from his imagination the conception of being-for-itself and being-in-itself. These he wanted to legitimize with the queer ideas of temporality, but as we have already observed, this is absolutely impossible. Neither time nor man can conform to Sartre's temporality and being-for-itself.

According to Sartre, the future does not also exist independently of the For-itself. Like the past and the present, the future is associated with For-itself. It is through For-itself alone that there emerges a future. If the future is pre-outlined, this can be only by a being which is its own future. By now we are conversant with the Sartrian logic and we know that Sartre's idea of future is closely connected with the upsurge of the For-itself, its transcendence from the present towards a future which it will have to be.

However, as we know, the temporality of the future does not emerge through the upsurge of the For-itself. The For-itself, when it is, can have an idea about the future. All inanimate beings have a future in which they will have to be in the form of chemical and physical changes. All living beings have future as outlined in their growth-pattern and evolution. For human beings this is a conscious striving towards the future.

We have already commented on the fact that the concept of lack (or hollow) is an erroneous concept. Sartre's For-itself is condemned to be free to strive toward a future to overcome this hollow/lack. Hence it is almost a fatalist upsurge, whereby the For-itself will strive towards a future for being it that it posits in the horizon, and which it cannot be because the lack is a perpetual lack of the For-itself. We have already discussed that the future of human being in particular and of human society in general are linked with man's incessant effort to know the laws of nature. If there is any 'lack' for mankind, it is the lack of knowledge about nature and its laws. Every discovery of the fundamental laws of nature and society — natural Jaws and social laws, means a great leap forward for the human race, and this widens the horizon of human stride. This knowledge has brought about the essential difference between the human and the animal world. There was practically no difference between the human and the animal world in the past before man separated himself from animals. It was when man discovered that he- could conquer barrier of nature, and succeeded in widening the gulf between these two worlds, that Charles Darwin's theory of the evolution of species came in for condemnation as he proved man's ancestry to ape. Even today there is a school of thought which does not agree with the theory of evolution and man's ancestry from apes.

It is not to fulfil a lack that the animal like man strove forward. It was social labour that brought about this great leap forward.

SPATIALITY

In line with his definition of time, Sartre has his own definition of space too. The world of objects, according to Sartre, is revealed to the for-itself. Now an object in the world — a 'this — can be identified in the world because For-itself is not the object—the 'this'. Thus the continuous as a formal quality of the ground allows the discontinuous to appear as a type of external relation between the 'this' and the totality. It is precisely this perpetual evanescence of the totality into collection, of the continuous into the discontinuous that defines space. Space cannot be a being. It is a moving relation between beings which are unrelated. It is the total independence of the in-itselfs, as it is revealed to a being which is presence to '-all', the in-itself as the independence of each one in relation to the others. It is the unique way in which beings can be revealed as having no relation, can be thus revealed to the being through which relation comes into the world; that is, space is pure exteriority" (p. 254). (Thus Sartre differentiates between time and space: time, according to him, is an internal relation, space external. Both time and space arrive in the world through For-itself). 'Since this exteriority cannot belong to any of the thesis considered, and since in addition a purely local negativity is self-destructive, it can neither be by itself nor 'be-made-to-be'. The spatializing being is the For-itself' as co-

present to the whole and to the 'this'. Space is not the world but it is the instability of the world apprehended as totality, inasmuch as the world can always disintegrate into external multiplicity. Space is neither the ground nor the figure but the ideality of the ground in as much as it can always disintegrate into figures. It is neither the continuous nor the discontinuous but the permanent passage from continuous to discontinuous. The existence of space is the proof that the For-itself, by causing being 'to be there' adds nothing to being. Space is the ideality of the synthesis. In this sense it is at once totality to the extent that it derives its origin from the world and at the same time nothing inasmuch as it results in the pullulation of the thesis. Space does not allow itself to be apprehended by concrete intuition for it is not, but it is continuously spatialized. It depends on temporality and appears in temporality since it can come into the world only through a being whose mode of being is temporalization; for space is the way in which this being loses itself ekstatically in order to realize being. The spatial characteristic of the this is not added synthetically to the this but is only the "place" of the this; that is, its relation of exteriority to the ground inasmuch as this relation can collapse into a multiplicity of external relations with other thesis when the ground itself disintegrates into a multiplicity of figures. In this sense it would be useless to conceive of space as a form imposed on phenomena, by a priori structure of our sensibility. Space cannot be a form for it is nothing; it is on the contrary, the indication that nothing except the negation — and this still as a type of external relation which leaves intact what it unites— can come to the in-itself through the For-itself. As for the For-itself, if it is not space, this is because it apprehends itself precisely as not being being-in-itself in so far as the in-itself is revealed to it in the mode of exteriority which we call extension. It is precisely by denying exteriority in itself and apprehending itself as ekstatic that the For-itself spatialized space. The relation between the For-itself and the in-itself is not one of juxtaposition or indifferent exteriority. Its relation with the in-itself which is the foundation of all relations, is the internal negation and it is through this that being-in-itself continues in in-different exteriority in relation to other beings existing in a world. When the exteriority of indifference is hypostasized as a substance existing in and through itself — which can be effected only at a lower stage of knowledge — it is made the object of a type of particular study under the title of geometry and becomes a pure specification of the abstract theory of multiplicities (pp. 254-255).

The above conception of space is also an. unscientific one. Space is not a continuity of this or discontinuity with that. 'This' and 'that' are merely forms of space and space is a form of matter. Time and space constitute the wholeness of matter. Nor is it true that space is revealed to For-itself. It exists independently of human perception. Against this erroneous concept of space we will present to our reader a scientific conception of spatiality. Sartre's conception of space and time shows clearly his infamiliarity with the great strides that science had made in this field at the beginning of the twentieth century. We have already seen that his is a false and subjective concept of time without any objective basis. Similarly his concept of space, though it contains a semblance of objectivity, is imaginary and unscientific. Against this Sartrian concept of time and space we will present the scientific and materialist concept of time and space. As we go ahead we will discover how the concept of time and space, that natural science arrived at, matches the Marxist philosophical concept of Engels.

It was Hegel who said that space and time are filled with matter. If that be so, then what is space and what is time? Hegel did not elaborate although, in fact, he came very near to the truth. What is the relation between the contained and the container, water and the pitcher — one that is filled with the other? It is the relation of form and content.

Engels saw the relation of space, time and matter. As a great scientific philosopher he was prophetic in his conceptual definition. In his 'Dialectics of Nature', Engels remarked that time and space are two forms of matter which are nothing without matter. Science took no less than four decades to come to this conclusion and it needed the appearance of Einstein to prove it mathematically. In the brief discussion that follows we will see how science in the first decade of the twentieth century stormed the dearest citadels of the philosophers •— temporality and spatiality. It is a pity that philosophers paid only scant attention to his theories.

Newton had formed our great grandfathers' conception of time and space. Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and is otherwise called duration. Absolute space in its very essence, regardless of anything external, always remains identical and immovable. Within this ideal concept of time and space, his mechanics moved giving proper room to inexactitudes of terrestrial time and externally applied force. Hence, time was an independent entity and space was another, only unified to find velocity and acceleration of a body of definite mass moving through space and in time. Their union did not determine any change of quality of matter other than an external one — whether a body is at rest or in motion. Thus the picture of the Newtonian world was a very simple one — so simple that the real relationship between space, time and matter did not entail any dialectical relationship amongst them, each maintained its distance and independence.

The advent of modern science, particularly electromagnetism and atomic physics, demanded that a few riddles be explained. One such riddle was the explanation of the experimental data of the Michelson-Morley experiment. This experiment came face to face with the inexplicable result that velocity of light does not obey the relative velocity principle as enunciated in Newtonian mechanics. According to this principle if a source of light moves with a velocity 'V and light is emitted from the source and if C' is the velocity of light then the resultant velocity of light C'=C+V. But a strange result was observed. It was found that C+V=C i.e., the velocity of the source was ignored. In fact Michelson and Morley expected that in their huge experimental set-up they would be able to measure even the hundredth part of the expected amount, when they were considering the velocity of the earth at 30 km./sec. and that of light 300000 KM/Sec., the velocity of the source would be computable. Experimental results showed rather conclusively that the velocity of light does not depend on the velocity of the source that emitted light. Another riddle was that Newtonian mechanics does not satisfy Maxwell's equation of electromagnetism. To solve this riddle Lorentz, Fitzerald, Poincare etc. came forward with various hypotheses. However as these lacked sound scientific reasoning, they could not be taken into consideration. It was with this background that one Albert Einstein, an unknown figure in the Swiss Patent Office published a paper in 1905. Einstein was then only 25.

Suddenly the concept of the world, built by Newton brick by brick, and layer upon layer, began to shake. No other event in the history of science could have possibly caused such devastation to all that is classical and time-honoured. Copernicus had shattered the world of Ptolemy in 1543, but that was a much smaller event when compared to this. At the time of Copernicus, science had not made such all-embracing progress. What he shattered was the orthodoxy of Catholicism. But Newton was a different personality. His laws of motion built the modern bourgeois world with its epoch-making industrial revolution, Newton was invincible. In all spheres of scientific knowledge he had left his mark. So far as mechanics were concerned, he completely classified and regularised it. His was a disciplined world where a body if at rest or in motion would continue to be at

rest or in motion, unless anything external changed that state. The Sun and the planets orbiting it were all obeying the divine scheme, apparently were all other bodies in the Universe. This disciplined bourgeois world began to crack by the end of the nineteenth century. The experiments of Roentzen, Thomson, Rutherford and finally Niels Bohr started another chapter of science that could in no way be explained by the science of Newton. But the real crevices were seen somewhere else that we have already mentioned — in the inexplicable experimental results of Michelson-Morley and the impossibility in the Galilean transformation of Maxwell's electromagnetic equation. But apparently Einstein did not know anything about the Michelson-Morley experiment although he had come across Lorentz's work of 1895. He had taken his cue from Mach who in his 'Mechanics in its Development' wrote a critique of the foundations of Newtonian Mechanics. However, this was his first discovery known as Special Theory of Relativity (STR). In comparison to his General Theory of Relativity (GTR, 1916) it was exceedingly simple. By the age of thirty five Einstein became the greatest scientist of all times. The Special Theory of Relativity brought about two fundamental changes in our concept of time and space. Einstein arrived at two postulates: (i) All identical physical phenomena proceed alike in inertial frames of reference in the case of equal initial conditions. In other words, there is no privileged frame among inertial frames of references and the state of absolute motion is impossible to find. This postulate extends the Galilean principle of relativity to all phenomena of nature. It put an end to the concept of absolute space once and for all; since all inertial frames of reference are equivalent, there cannot be any privileged frame among them. It was just absolute space that served as such a privileged frame. The concept of 'absolute' motion in vacuo which was meant as the motion relative to the absolute frame of reference was rejected exactly in the same way. (ii) The velocity of light in vacuo is equal in all directions and in any region of a given inertial frame of reference (Ugarov V. A., *Special Theory of Relativity* MIR publishers, Moscow 1977, p. 38).

From these two postulates Einstein came to his epoch-making conclusion. Time and space are not absolute entities. An event which is simultaneous in one IFR may register a flow of time in another IFR. Similarly space which was considered to be the same in one inertia! frame may not appear so in another inertial frame. A rod of length L in one inertial frame will be subjected to Lorentz contraction when seen from another inertial frame moving with a uniform velocity.

Einstein arrived at these two postulates through arguments that necessitated reflection of light between two inertial frames and synchronisation of clocks in the inertial frames. Thus in experiments time and space could be interchanged for one another. Further, if an object moves with a velocity nearing that of light, not only does its spatial coordinates change but also its temporal characteristics. This showed the close relationship of time and space. In 1908-9 Herman Minkowsky discovered the deeper significance of the relativistic postulates. He did not change any of the substance of Einstein's work but translated Einstein's ideas from the world of physics, into the world of geometry, Minkowsky represented a point event by x, y, z, t that denoted the complete spatial temporal coordinate of a point. Thus time and space were amalgamated and from this amalgamation a new concept emerged - the concept of space-time. The co-ordinate of space-time completely posited an event, and depending on the frame of reference the physical position of the event could be determined. The geometrisation of space and time is represented by Minkowsky world line.

The theory of relativity discovered the connection between space and time. This connection is implied in the very constancy of light velocity. Velocity is the ratio of

distance to time and its constancy, or equality in all systems signifies accordingly a universal connection between spatial and temporal magnitudes. The absolute must be contained in the union of time and space rather than in space and time taken separately. This idea was realized by Minkowsky who expressed it in the opening words of his famous lecture 'Space and Time': The views of space and time which I wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics and therein lies their strength. They are radical. Henceforth space by itself and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality (Einstein and the Philosophical Problems of the Twentieth Century Physics, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1983, p. 105).

But we will soon observe that this amalgamation of space and time into space-time, although a great leap forward in the advent of science, was also not a complete concept. Space and time that had existed in human thought as independent phenomena from time immemorial were given a new representation. It was proved that time and space are not independent entities. They are related to each other and x, y, z, t, completely posit an event. But what is space and what is time? It is apparent that the Special Theory of Relativity does not answer these fundamental questions.

The General Theory of Relativity satisfies all our queries. In the Special Theory of Relativity space-time is flat, uniform and isotropic. In General Theory of Relativity space-time is non-uniform and anisotropic. When transformed to an inertial system, say heliocentric system, becomes flat and isotropic — in a small domain. The difference between the structure of space-time of the General Theory of Relativity and that of Special Theory of Relativity is determined by the distribution and motion of masses of matter. In its turn this structure determined the motion of masses under the impact of the gravitational forces. Thus masses of matter determine the structure of space-time as well as their own movement. The gravitational field is instrumental in showing the difference of the structure of space-time from the flat metric — the field of curvature tensor. Since the structure of space-time depends on the distribution of masses of matter, the structure is not absolute. Hence space-time is not also absolute. The division of space and time becomes even more relative and on a large scale may even prove to be impossible in a precise and unambiguous sense. It is the material world as a whole that in absolute, while all its forms, phenomena etc. are relative.

Thus General Theory of Relativity (GTR) unifies space, time and matter. It is an outstanding achievement in the field of natural science. Previously only philosophers concerned themselves with time and space and that too in a very haphazard and speculative manner. But after the advent of the materialist conception of the world, science owed this discovery to philosophy. GTR confirmed Engels' remark that time and space are inalienably connected with matter. The concept of space-time of GTR specifically proved Engels right. It also broadened our knowledge of the world immeasurably. Now on the basis of General Theory of Relativity (GTR) let us try to understand the concept of space-time. As we have already seen space-time is the form of existence of matter. The form of an object is nothing but the totality of the relations of its part. Therefore, we must deal with the material links between the elements of the world, the assembly of which defines space-time. In the GTR one comes across the concept of an 'event'. An 'event' is the simplest element of the world. Like the concept of point in two-dimensional geometry which is defined as having no extension in space other than its existence, — an 'event' is a point in the four-dimensional space-time manifold. It may be said that an 'event' is a phenomenon whose part is nothing — it is monatomic. Any phenomenon or process is a coherent ensemble of a number of events —just as a straight

line is a coherent ensemble of points. In four-dimensional manifold the whole world — or rather the entire known universe — may be considered an ensemble of events. The characteristics of the parts of this ensemble in turn depend on the characteristics of space-time at each specific region. They in turn depend on the distribution of masses and their motion. As already discussed, if we, as we are used to thinking in geometry — disregard all other properties of an 'event' other than existence, we may present an 'event' as a point — a 'world-point.' Space-time then is the set of all world points. But if space-time is an ensemble of all world-points then what is the relation between one event on another and one set of events on another? In other words what are the relations of events in the space-time manifold? As we know, the basic characteristic of matter is motion. Each event acts in some way or other on other events and is itself acted upon by other events. Action is manifested through propagation of light, emission of particles etc. This action is carried out either directly or indirectly. The movement itself of a small body is a number of events in which preceding events affect subsequent ones. In physical concepts, action may be defined as transmission of momentum and energy. These concepts, as Alexandrov puts it, are basic and are in accord with the essence of the matter. Momentum-energy is the principal physical characteristic of motion and action (EPPTCP p. 118).

Now, the events experiencing the action of a given event form the domain of the action of the given event. These domains define a certain structure in the set of all events. An ensemble of these domains determine the spatio-temporal characteristics of the ensemble. Hence Inking our cue from the above discussion we may say that space-time is the set of all events in the world having no properties except those defined by the relations of the action of some events on others. This is nothing but the cause and effect relation among events.

We have defined space-time as the ensemble of action relation of events. Taking cue from the above discussion we may attempt to define space and lime individually. We may define space as an ensemble of parallel series of events determined by the mutual action of gravitational fields of the masses. Time is the rate of change in an ensemble of events determined by the action of point events on one another.

Even after the discovery of the General Theory of Relativity (GTR), time and space have been subjected to many controversial definitions. Even Einstein had to come forward to explain the meaning of time. That temporal relations are conditioned by the existence of material Interactions between events, and the absence of temporal relations or the existence of the relation of simultaneity is conditioned by the impossibility of material interactions between events, had to be reiterated by Albert Einstein: "In order to give physical significance to the concept of time, processes of some kind are required which enable relations to be established between different places … space and time data have a physically real and not a mere fictitious significance" (EPPTCP, p. 133). Similarly Einstein defined space as positional quality of the world of material objects (EPPTCP, p. 151). In classical mechanics absolute space and time functioned as structures of the theoretical level, representing the substantial conception. In the theory of relativity, the same status is ascribed to the unified four dimensioned space-time manifold. Explaining space-time Einstein said, "Just as it was consistent from the Newtonian standpoint to make both the statements, tempus est absolutum, spatium est absolutum, so, from the standpoint oft he Special Theory of Relativity, we must say, continuum spatii et temporis est absolutum. In this latter statement absolutum means not only 'physically real', but also 'independent in its physical properties, having a physical effect, but not itself influenced by physical conditions' (EPPTCP, p.151). As for space and time taken

separately, they are empirical objects within the framework of this theory, being in actual fact projections of unified space-time onto a corresponding reference frame.

But, as we know, the real novelty about the materialist basis of the concept of space lies in Einstein's mathematical formulation of the GTR. The function gik which Einstein utilized from the Riemannian equation represents components of the fundamental metric tensor responsible for the geometry of space, and the potential of the gravitational field. It brought forth the outstanding relation between the mass of an object and the corresponding geometry of space. Einstein himself said, "we are now in a position to see how far the transition of the GTR modifies the concept of space. In accordance with classical mechanics and according to the STR, space (space-time) has an existence independent of matter in field. In order to be able to describe at all that which fills up space and is dependent on theco-ordinates, space-time or the inertial system with its metrical properties must be thought of at once as existing, for otherwise the description of that 'which fills up space' would have no meaning. On the basis of the GTR, on the other hand, space as opposed to 'what fills space' which is dependent on the co-ordinates, has no separate existence- Thus a pure gravitational field might have been described in terms of the gut (as functions of the co-ordinates) by solution of the gravitational equations. If we imagine the gravitational field i.e. the function gik, to be removed, there does not remain a space of the type but absolutely nothing and also no 'topological space' ... space-time does not claim existence of its own but only as a structural quality of the field (EPPTCP, p. 154). Thus mathematically Einstein showed that space and time are the forms of existence of matter.

From the above discussion we can safely conclude that Sartre's assertion that time is an internal relation of Being-for-itself and space an external relation fall flat. Time and space exist independently of Being-for-itself. However, Being-for-itself is subjected to time and space — both in a physical and social context. In the case of the latter, it is Historical Materialism that determines the characteristic of Being-for-itself both as an individual and a part of the collective.

4. *Freedom:*

Now let us try to appreciate Sartre's conception of freedom though we have had a glimpse of it when he discussed his theory of negation, and particularly negatite. Though we had objected to his concept, we felt that this deserved elaborate discussion as Sartre devoted a full chapter on the concept of freedom.

In a sub-chapter entitled 'Freedom: the first condition of action' Sartre says: "It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free will, to cite examples in favour of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structures contained in the very idea of action- The concept of an act contains, in fact, numerous subordinate notions which we shall have to organise and arrange in a hierarchy: to act is to modify the shape of the world; it is to arrange means in view of an end; it is to produce an organised instrumental complex such that by a series of Concatenations and connections the modification effected on one of the links causes modifications throughout the whole series and finally produces an anticipated result. But this is not what is important for us here. We should observe first that an action is on principle intentinal. The careless smoker who has through negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted. On the other hand the worker who is charged with dynamiting a quarry and who obeys the given orders has acted when he has

produced the expected explosion; he knew what he was doing or, if you prefer, he intentionally realized a conscious project" (p. 559).

This is all very well, but where do we find the Sartrian linkage between action and freedom and the concept of negatite? Sartre continues, "The Emperor Constantine, when he established himself of Byzantium, did not foresee that he would create a centre of Greek culture and language, the appearance of which would ultimately provoke a schism in the Christian Church and which would contribute to weakening the Roman Empire. Yet he performed an act just in so far as he realized his project of creating a new residence for emperors in the Orient. Equating the result with the intention is here sufficient for us to be able to speak of action. But if this is the case, we establish that the action necessarily implies as its condition the recognition of a 'desideratum'; that is, of an objective lack or again of a negatite. The intention of providing a rival for Rome can come to Constantine only through the apprehension of an objective lack: Rome lacks a counterweight; to this still profoundly pagan city ought to be opposed a Christian city which at the moment is missing. Creating Constantinople is understood as an act only if first the conception of a new city has preceded the action itself or at least if this conception serves as an organising theme for all later steps. But this conception can not be the pure representation of the city as possible. It apprehends the city in its essential characteristic, which is to be a desirable and not yet realized possible' (p. 560).

This leads to the relationship between lack and action or if one prefers, the cause for action. The question is how does Sartre turn two independent explanations into one, i.e. the necessity of a new residence and providing a counterweight for Rome? However, even if the second explanation is correct, we do not have any quarrel with Sartre. It is a subjective assessment and can only be proved with historical data. From this seemingly innocent base, Sartre now launches his theory — the same theory, the embryo of which we had found in his conception of negatite.

Sartre continues, "This means that from the moment of the first conception of the act consciousness has been able to withdraw itself from the full view of the world of which it is consciousness and to leave the level of being in order frankly to approach that of non-being. Consciousness, in so far as it is considered exclusively in its being, in perpetually referred from being to being and cannot find in being any motive for revealing non-being. The imperial system with Rome as its capital functions positively and in a certain real way which can be easily discovered. Will someone say that the taxes are collected badly, that Rome is not secure from invasions, that it does not have the geographical location which is suitable for the capital of a Mediterranean empire which is threatened by barbarians, that its corrupt morals make the spread of the Christian religion difficult? How can one fail to see that all these considerations are negative; that is, that they aim at what is not, not at what is. To say that sixty percent of the anticipated taxes have been collected can pass, if need be, for a positive appreciation of the situation such as it is. To say that they are badly collected is to consider the situation across a situation which is posited as an absolute end, but which precisely is not. To say that the corrupt morals at Rome hinder the spread of Christianity is not to consider this diffusion for what it is; that is, for a propagation at a rate which the reports of the clergy can enable us to determine. It is to posit the diffusion in itself as insufficient; that is, as suffering from a secret nothingness. However, it appears as such only if it is surpassed, toward a limiting-situation posited a priori as a value (for example, toward a certain rate of religious conversions, toward a certain mass morality). This limiting situation can not be conceived in terms of the simple consideration of the real state of things; for the most beautiful girl in the world can offer only what she has, and in the same way the most miserable situa-

tion can by itself be designated only as it is without any reference to an ideal nothingness (pp. 560-1).

The reader will notice that Sartre is restating his thesis about nothingness. The negative aspects of Rome urged the Emperor to build Constantinople. Right from the very beginning Sartre's consciousness leaves the full view of the world in order to apprehend non-being. What a simplistic thesis! It is not the inner contradictions of the Roman Empire but a Sartrian lack that urged Constantine to build another capital; Sartre will not, we know, limit himself to this alone. He has other thesis in mind which he will present to his readers. There he takes into consideration the 'lack' and by overcoming this he transcends into the future. He writes, "A worker in 1830 is capable of revolting if his salary is lowered, for he easily conceives of a situation in which his wretched standard of living would be not as low as the one which is about to be imposed on him. But he does not represent his sufferings to himself as unbearable; he adapts himself to them not through resignation but because he lacks the education and reflection necessary for him to conceive of a social state in which these sufferings would not exist. Consequently he does not act. Masters of Lyon following a riot, the workers at Croix-Rousse do not know what to do with their victory; they return home bewildered and the regular army has no trouble in overcoming them. Their misfortunes do not appear to them 'habitual' but rather natural; they are, that is all, and they constitute the workers' condition. They are not detached; they are not seen in the clear light of day, and consequently they are integrated by the worker with his being. He suffers without considering his suffering and without conferring value upon it. To suffer and to be are one and the same for him. His suffering is the pure affective tenor of his non-positional consciousness but he does not contemplate it. Therefore this suffering cannot be in itself a motive for his acts. Quite the contrary, it is after he has formed the project of changing the situation that it will appear intolerable to him. This means that he will have had to give himself room, to withdraw in relation to it, and will have to have effected a double nihilation: on the one hand, he must posit an ideal state of affairs as a pure present nothingness; on the other hand, he must posit the actual situation as nothingness in relation to this state of affairs. He will have to conceive of a happiness attached to his class as a pure possible — that is, presently as a certain nothingness — and on other hand, he will return to the present situation in order to illuminate it in the light of this nothingness and in order to nihilate it in turn by declaring: "I am not happy" (pp. 561-2).

The above explanation of inaction on the part of the worker and positing of an end as the requisite condition for workers' upsurge cannot be accepted as universal fact. Sartre has described the condition in 1830. But only after eighteen years and quite vigorously after forty years, the workers of France rose in revolt against the existing system though there is no reason to assume that their general consciousness rose to the required level. They also rose in revolt — though fewer in number — in 1789. On the contrary, after the general consciousness of the French workers considerably increased, the number of revolts and agitations have shown a decline say after 1917. Hence there arc two interdependent factors that give rise to workers' upsurge — or for that matter, all upsurges and they are: (1) The objective condition prevailing in a certain society. (2) The workers' consciousness, quality of leadership, organisational strength etc. Sporadic revolts may take place due to (1) and workers' organisation may develop due to (2) but an actual blending of the two is required for a sustained revolutionary movement. Hence we cannot accept Sartre's thesis that connects 'action' with the end. He has found only a superficial connection between these two.

Sartre continues. 'Two important consequences result. (1) No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure of society, the psychological "state" etc.) is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever. For an act is a projection of the for-itself toward what is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not. (2) No factual state can determine consciousness to apprehend it as a *negatite* or as a lack. Better yet, no factual state can determine consciousness to define it and to circumscribe it since, as we have seen, Spinoza's statement, 'Omnis determinatio est negatio', remains profoundly true. Now every action has for its express condition not only the discovery of a state of affairs as "lacking in" — i.e. as a negatite — but also, and before all else, the constitution of the state of things under consideration into an isolated system. There is a factual state —• satisfying or not — only by means of the nihilating power of the For-itself. But this power of nihilation cannot be limited to realizing a simple withdrawal in relation to the world. In fact in so far as consciousness is "invested" by being, in so far as it simply suffers what is, it must be included in being. It is the organized form — worker-finding-his-suffering-natural which must be surmounted and denied in order for it to be able to form the object of a revolting contemplation. This means evidently that it is by a pure wrenching away from himself and the world that the worker can posit his "suffering as unbearable suffering and consequently can make of it the motive for his revolutionary action. This implies for consciousness the permanent possibility of effecting a rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from its past so as to be able to consider it in the light of a non-being and so as to be able to confer on it the meaning, which it has in terms of the project of a meaning which it does not have. Under no circumstances can the past in any way by itself produce an act; that is, the positing of an end which turns buck upon itself so as to illuminate it. This is what Hegel caught sight of, when he wrote that 'the mind is negative', although he seems not to have remembered this when he came to presenting his own theory of action and of freedom. In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative power with respect to the world and itself, as soon as the nihilation forms an integral part of the positing of an end, we must recognize that the indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the acting being' (pp. 562-3).

So far as 'lack' or negatite is concerned we have discussed the concept in a previous chapter. Here we will just refer to the extremely subjective bias that the author has displayed while dealing with a socio-logical issue like the revolt of workers. The role attributed to 'consciousness', 'mind', 'for-itself' for effecting a nihilating withdrawal shows all too clearly that Sartre considers sociological transformation as the outcome of the concept 'the mind is the negative.' What Sartre loses sight of, due to his lack of acquaintance with the scientific and materialist conception of History, is that the transformation of society from one stage to another primarily depends on the contradiction between productive forces and production relations. It can only accelerate or decelerate depending on the factors referred to in the previous paragraph — objective situation, level of consciousness of the people, quality of leadership, strength of organisation etc. This is the fundamental mistake that Sartre makes. His philosophy suffers from a characteristic unidimensionalism. He has developed a certain scheme and man's history has to conform to that. Unfortunately natural and social laws exist independently of man's own will, and man can only know it by making a scientific study. As Sartre says, "In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative power with respect to the world and itself, as soon as the nihilation forms an integral part of the positing of an end, we must recognize that the indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the acting being'. There does not seem to be any reason for us to attribute to consciousness what Sartre wants to attribute. It does not agree with the

history of the development of the society. Logically, if seen from a scientific point of view, Sartre's conception of human freedom also fails to be accurate. This refutation may sound like a fallacy of logic to our readers and hence to put the matter straight we will now discuss Sartre's conception of freedom.

As if taking his cue from our discussion, Sartre continues 'if the fundamental condition of the act is freedom, we must attempt to describe this freedom more precisely. But at the start we encounter a great difficulty. Ordinarily, to describe something is a process of making explicit by aiming at the structures of a particular essence. Now freedom has no essence. It is not subject to any logical necessity; we must say of it what Heidegger said of the Dasein in general: "In it existence precedes and commands essence." Freedom makes itself an act and we ordinarily attain it across the act which it organises with the causes, motives and ends which the act implies. But precisely because this act has an essence, it appears to us as constituted; if we wish to reach the constitutive power, we must abandon any hope of finding it an essence. That would in fact demand a new constitutive power and so on to infinity. How then are we to describe an existence which perpetually makes itself and which refuses to be confined in a definition? The very use of the term "freedom" is dangerous if it is to imply that the word refers to a concept as words ordinarily do. Indefinable and unnamable is freedom also indescribable?' (p. 565).

From the above quotation the reader may infer that Sartrian freedom closely resembles a figment of Sartre's imagination. 'Freedom has no essence'. 'It is not subject to any logical necessity'. 'It is indefinable and unnamable'. Then how does Sartre describe it?

Sartre continues, "Earlier when we wanted to describe nothingness and the being of the phenomenon, we encountered comparable difficulties. Yet they did not deter us. This is because there can be descriptions which do not aim at the essence but at the existent itself in its particularity. To be sure I could not describe a freedom which would be common to both the Other and myself; I could not therefore con-template an essence of freedom. On the contrary, it is freedom which is the foundation of all essences since man reveals intramundane essences by surpassing the world toward his own possibilities. But actually the question is of my freedom. Similarly when I described consciousness, I could not discuss a nature common to certain individuals but only my particular consciousness, which like my freedom is beyond essence, or as we have shown with considerable repetition — for which to be is to have been. I discussed this consciousness so as to touch it in its very existence as a particular experience — the cogito. Husserl and Descartes, as Gaston Berger has shown, demand that the cogito release to them a truth as essence: with Descartes we achieve the connection of two simple natures; with Husserl we grasp the eidetic structure of consciousness. But if in consciousness its existence must precede its essence, then both Descartes and Husserl have committed an error. What we can demand from the cogito is only that it discover for us a factual necessity. It is also to the cogito that we appeal in order to determine freedom as the freedom which is ours, as a pure factual necessity; that is, as a contingent existent but one which I am not able not to experience. I am indeed an existent who learns his freedom through his acts, but I am also an existent whose individual and unique existence temporalizes itself as freedom. As such I am necessarily a consciousness (of) freedom since nothing exists in consciousness except as the non-thetic consciousness of existing. Thus my freedom is perpetually in question in my being; it is not a quality added on or a property of my nature. It is very exactly the stuff of my being; and as in my being, my being is in question, I must neces-sarily possess a certain comprehension of freedom' (pp. 565-6).

The dilemma of describing freedom without taking recourse to anthropological, social, economic and related sciences and depending solely on his own imaginary scheme

reveals all too glaringly the errors in his argument. Sartre is in the dilemma of distinguishing my freedom from the freedom of the Other, my consciousness from the consciousness of the Other. He knows all too clearly that my urge for freedom is intricately woven with the unfreedom that Fascism wants to impose. To achieve my freedom I shall have to act. But then the Fascists arc also acting to snatch away my freedom. Hence from Sartrian logic both are giving proof of their respective freedom by acting. From this analysis can we conclude that both the subjugated Frenchman and the subjugating German are equally free because both of them are acting and presumably as a part of a Sartrian 'project'? In the same way the freedom of the worker can be shown to be similar to that of the capitalist; the landless peasant may be assumed to be as free as the landowner and so on. Hence there is no lack of freedom as long as the For-itself, — whatever may be his class position, — is ekstatically acting according to the Sartrian plan. If that be so, then why does Sartre state so much on freedom when For-itself is not able not to experience it? If his freedom is not at stake because he is a Frenchman in the German-occupied Paris, why is he writing his epitaph? He as a petit-bourgeois was subjected to all the freedom — and unfreedom — that a member of his class could enjoy, neither more nor less; nor is freedom indefinable and unnamable. Freedom is not an essenceless and abstract figment of one's imagination. The concept of human freedom is closely related with the human society in its multifarious complexity of existence. One's freedom is related to one's national, social and individual existence. The concept of human freedom is both simple and complicated. Simple, if one can grasp the essence of the natural and social laws. Complicated, if one leaves the path of science and takes recourse to individual idiosyncrasies.

In our attempt to reach to the heart of freedom continues Sartre, 'we may be helped by the few observations which we have made on the subject in the course of this work and which we must summarize here. In the first chapter we established the fact that if negation comes into the world through human-reality, the latter must be a being who can realize a nihilating rupture with the world and with himself; and we established that the permanent possibility of this rupture is the same as freedom. But on the other hand, we stated that this permanent possibility of nihilating what I am in the form of "having-been" implies for man a particular type of existence. We were able then to determine by means of analyses like that of bad faith that human reality is its own nothingness. For the for-itself, to be is to nihilate the in-itself which it is. Under these conditions freedom can be nothing other than this nihilation. It is through this that the for-itself escapes its being as its essence; it is through this that the for-itself is always something oilier than what can be said of it. For in the final analysis the For-itself is the one which escapes this very denomination, the one which is already beyond the name which is given to it, beyond the property which is recognized in it. To say that for-itself has to be what it is, to say that it is what it is not while not being what it is, to say that in it existence precedes and conditions essence or inversely, according to Hegel, that for it 'Wesen ist was gewesen ist" — all this is to say one and the same thing: to be aware that man is free. Indeed by the sole fact that I am conscious of the causes which inspire my action, these causes are already transcendent objects for my consciousness; they are outside. In vain shall I seek to catch hold of them; I escape them by my very existence. I am condemned to exist forever beyond my essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free. This means that no limit to my freedom can be found except freedom itself, or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free. To the extent that the for-itself wishes to hide its own nothingness from itself and to incorporate the in-itself as its true mode of being, it is trying also to hide its freedom from itself (pp. 566-7).

The objective of the above formulation is that Sartre wants to philosophically establish that man is free. It may be compared to Russeau's formulation that man is born free but is everywhere in chains. It is true that man is free— in fact, freer than all other creatures on earth. But the reason for this does not lie in the nihilation or negation that Sartre proposes. It lies in the fact that man unlike any other being has tried to understand the natural and social laws. After becoming aware of the laws of nature, he has applied this knowledge in his day to day existence. We have already shown how he could do it. For example, by applying the natural law that water flows from a higher to a lower level, man has built irrigation canals that have freed him from his dependence on rains. Similarly by building dams and reservoirs he has freed himself from the natural bondage of the seasons that used to determine his rhythm of sowing and harvesting. The history of man throughout the ages can furnish us with numerous examples of the application of natural laws that have freed man from various unfreedoms — big and small. The freedom enjoyed in the conditions of living have given him the unique opportunity to free himself spiritually. Art liberated man spiritually, and freed him from biological bondage. With the development of the arts, man's freedom widened tremendously— so much so that he thought himself as being distinct from the rest of the living world — a unique creature created by God himself. But although truth is stranger than fiction, there are many who would rather believe in fiction than accept truth. Sartre does not know where his theory is leading man to. Even Sartre would go so far as to 'condemn' man to freedom rather than scientifically analyse the origin and development of human freedom. If man is condemned to be free, he does not remain free any longer. It is like forcing a man to eat his favourite food until he dies of diarrhoea. Lack of scientific understanding has led Sartre — a great exponent of freedom — to take this attitude which is condemnable. Sartre's thesis on freedom has not been able to rise above the biological. It is almost a condition for the biological existence of man. He has to transcend to the future by negating the past on the threshold of the present. He is 'condemned' to traverse this path No, Monsieur Sartre. Man's real freedom starts when he steps on the threshold of the non-biological. Man will really become free — in the truest sense of the word — when he reaches that stage of his, existence when there is no exploitation of man by man, or nation by nation. When man extricates himself from the day to day biological existence, then the whole of human society will have reached a level of harmonious development. When man's energies are utilized in the unvelling of the mysteries of nature and development of his being, when his freedom. is not curtailed by internal strife and contradiction, then there will remain only one principal contradiction — contradiction between man and nature. Life will be as it existed in the era of primitive communism but on a much higher plane. Even then his freedom will not be unlimited — it will be limited by the coordination of space and time — extended far wider than we can even imagine today.

Cause, act and end', continues Sartre, 'constitute a continuum, a plenum. These abortive attempts to stifle freedom under the weight of being (they collapse with the sudden upsurge of anguish before freedom) show sufficiently that freedom in its foundation coincides with the nothingness which is at the heart of man. Human-reality is free because it is not enough. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be. It is free, finally, because its present being is itself a nothingness in the form of the "reflection — reflecting". Man is free because he is not himself but presence to himself. The being which is what it is cannot be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and which forces human-reality make itself instead of to be. As we have seen, for human-reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes to it either from the outside or from within which it can receive or accept. Without any help

whatsoever, it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself be — down to the slightest detail. Thus freedom is not a being; it is the being of man — i.e. his nothingness of being. If we start by conceiving of man as a plenum, it is absurd to try to find in him afterwards moments or psychic regions in which he would be free. As well look for emptiness in a container which one has filled beforehand upto the brim! Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all" (pp.568-9).

Sartre says that human reality is free because it is not enough. But is it not a purely bourgeois concept about man's freedom? The fundamental and unique property of Capitalism is to urge for more profit. Hence the very ethos of the capitalist society is to crave for more. To equate this idea with human freedom is nothing but a reflection of the ideology of a writer born and brought up in a capitalist state. Sartre says that man is free because he is perpetually wrenched away from itself and is separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be. We have already analysed that it is not because of his confrontation with nothingness, but within the real material world that man is free. Sartre says that freedom is precisely the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man and which forces human-reality to make itself instead of to be. Again this is a subjective proposition. It is not by his own will that man makes himself instead of 'being'. It is primarily due to the dialectical subject-object relationship that exists between man and the material world. If conditions for change are not present in the material world it is immaterial whether man wishes strongly to 'make' himself, he will not be able to 'make' it. Similarly for human reality 'to be' is not to choose oneself because choice is very limited in bourgeois society. To be in a bourgeois society is similar to walking on a delicate tight-rope where maximum energy of a common man is expended solely in 'being' or maintaining an existence. Choice can be a fundamental proposition only if society permits an individual to choose freely. This is only possible in an ideal Socialist '< or Communist society where man's becoming is not restricted by capital. In a bourgeois society there is the belief that one can choose freely. This is an illusion because only a microscopic minority can 'choose' at the cost of the majority.

Summing up the series of arguments that Sartre has collected in favour of freedom, he writes:

'(1) … human reality does not exist first in order to act later; but for human reality, to be is to act, and to cease to act is to cease to be.

'(2) If human reality is action, this means evidently that its determination to action is itself action.

'(3) If the act is not pure motion, it must be defined by an intention. … If the drive or the act is to be interpreted by its end, this is because the intention has for its structure positing its end outside itself Thus the intention makes itself be by choosing the end which makes it known.'

"(4) Since the intention is a choice of the end and since the world reveals itself across our conduct, it is the intentional choice of the end which reveals the world, and the world is revealed as this or that (in this or that order) according to the end chosen. The end, illuminating the world, is a state of the world to be obtained and not yet existing .... by a double but unitary upsurge the intention illuminates the world in terms of an end not yet existing and is itself defined by the choice of its possible. My end is a certain objective state of the world, my possible is a certain structure of my subjectivity; the one is revealed to the thetic consciousness, the other flows back over the non-thetic consciousness in order to characterize it.

‘(5) .... the intention by a single unitary upsurge posits the end, chooses itself, and appreciates the given in terms of the end. Under these conditions the given is appreciated in terms of something which does not yet exist; it is in the light of non-being that being-in-itself is illuminated. There results a double nihilating coloration of the given: on the one hand, it is nihilated in that the rupture makes it lose all efficacy over the intention; on the other hand ‘it undergoes a new nihilation due to the fact that efficacy is returned to it in terms of a nothingness appreciation. Since human reality is act, it can be conceived only as being at its core a rupture with the given. It is the being which causes there to be a given by breaking with it and illuminating it in the light of the not-yet existing.

‘(6) .... This characteristic of the For-itself implies that it is the being which finds no help, no pillar of support in what it was. But on the other hand the for-itself is free and can cause there to be a world because the for-itself is the being which has to be what it was in the light of what it will be. Therefore the freedom of the For-itself appears as its being. Bui since this freedom is neither a given nor a property, it can be only by choosing itself. The freedom of the For-itself is always engaged : there is no question here of a freedom which could be undetermined and which would pre-exist its choice. We shall never apprehend ourselves except as a choice in the making. But freedom is simply the fact that this choice is always unconditioned.

‘(7) .... freedom is not a pure and simple contingency in so far as it turns back towards its being in order to illuminate its being in the light of its end. It is the perpetual escape from contingency; it is the interiorization, the nihilation, and the subjectivizing of the contingency, which thus modified passes wholly into the gratuity of the choice.

‘(8) The free project is fundamental, for it is my being. Neither ambition nor the passion to be loved nor the inferiority complex can be considered as fundamental projects. On the contrary, they of necessity must be understood in terms of a primary project which is recognized as the project which can no longer be interpreted in terms of any other and which is total. A special phenomenological method will be necessary in order to make this initial project explicit. This is what we shall call existential psychoanalysis. … For the present we can say that the fundamental project which I am is a project concerning not my relations with this or that particular object in the world, but my total being-in-the-world; since the world itself is revealed only in the light of an end, this project posits for its end a certain type of relation to being which the for-itself wills to adopt. This project is not instantaneous for it cannot be “in” time. Neither is it non-temporal in order to “give times to itself” afterwards. That is why we reject Kants “choice of intelligible character”. The structure of the choice necessarily implies that it be a choice in the world. A choice which would be a choice in terms of nothing, a choice against nothing, would be a choice of nothing and would be annihilated as choice. There is only phenomenal choice, provided that we understand that the phenomenon is here the absolute. But in its very upsurge, the choice is temporalized since it causes a future to come to illuminate the present and to constitute it as a present by giving the meaning of pastness to the in-itself “data”. However, we need not understand by this that the fundamental project is coextensive with the entire “life” of the For-itself. Since freedom is a being without support and without-a-springboard, the project in order to be must be constantly renewed. I choose myself perpetually and can never be merely by virtue of having-been-chosen; otherwise I should fall into the pure and simple existence of the in-itself. The necessity of perpetually choosing myself is one with the pursued-pursuit which I am. But precisely because here we are dealing with a choice, this choice as it is made indicates in general other choices as possibles. The possibility of these other choices is neither made explicit nor posited, but it is Jived in the feeling of unjustifiability; and it is

this which is expressed by the fact of the absurdity of my choice and consequently of my being. Thus my freedom eats away my freedom. Since I am free, I project my total possible, but I thereby posit that I am free and that I can always nihilate this first project and make it past.

'Thus at the moment at which the for-itself thinks to apprehend itself and make known to itself by a projected nothingness what it is, it escapes itself; for it thereby posits that it can be other than it is. It will be enough for it to make explicit its unjustifiability in order to cause the instant to arise; that is, the appearance of a new project on the collapse of the former. Nevertheless this upsurge of the new project has for its express condition the nihilation of the former, and hence the For-itself cannot confer on itself a new existence. As soon as it rejects the project which has lapsed into the past, it has to be this project in the form of the "was"; this means that this lapsed project belongs henceforth to the For-itself's situation. No law of being can assign an a priori number to the different projects which I am. The existence of the for-itself in fact conditions its essence. But it is necessary to consult each man's history in order to get from it a particular idea with regard to each individual For-itself. Our particular projects, aimed at the realization in the world of a particular end, are united In the global project which we are. But precisely because were wholly choice and act, these partial projects are not determined by the global project. They must themselves be choices; and a certain margin of contingency, of unpredictability, and of the absurd is allowed to each of them although each project as it is projected is the specification of the global project on the occasion of particular elements in the situation and so is always understood in relation to the totality of my being-In-the world (pp. 613-8).

The summary provided by Sartre on the relationship among being, doing, intending and choosing (all having an underlying relationship with freedom) is so subjective that no student of scientific philosophy will give much credence to it. For Sartre, to be is to act, and ceasing to be is ceasing to act. Further, action is synonymous to determination to act and intention for action is not to be distinguished from action itself. Thus it follows logically that if I do not act but simply intend to do no. I do my duty as For-itself. It would seem that this theory would lead one to deceive oneself — an expression of 'bad faith', to borrow one of Sartre's own phrases. Similar objections can be raised against his theory of choosing the possible. The For-itself can choose any of the possibles according to his project. Sartre believes that as long as the For-itself can do it, he is free. What a foolish idea! He has never bothered to pause and think over the idea of choosing one's own project. It is only an anarchist's idea that freedom is unbound and unlimited. Freedom of real men in the real world must have time-space correlates. There cannot be a 'free' project for a 'free' man because man is a social being. Any theory of freedom that does not take into consideration the social, economic, scientific and technological parameters is bound to lead nowhere however philosophical it may appear.

We present below our objection to Sartre's various theses presented in this chapter:

Firstly, Sartre's proposition is based on the consideration that man is an isolated being without any social existence. It hinges on one man's being, doing, intending and choosing a project. The For-itself's being, doing, intending and choosing cannot be isolated from the similar functions of society or of various classes within society. Real men in the real world posit their ends as part of social end, class end etc. His theory starts from the individual and ends in the individual. As such, he ideally posits a bourgeois conception because after all Capitalism as a system of economic relation dissociates man from his 'social' existence and makes him isolated — a loner.

Secondly, for Sartre's for-itself "being" is "doing", but for the vast majority of the oppressed "being" is not "doing". They are harnessed to the yoke of drudgery — like a cow or horse. They eke out an existence from day to day. For them, Sartre's being and doing are meaningless.

Thirdly, there is a gulf of difference between an intention and act to realize that. Sartre was the first to understand it when he failed to arouse a sufficient number of people against the German invaders.

Fourthly, one can intend a choice of end but in reality one may not be able to choose it. Even if one is able to choose the possible, it is not always realized. Sartre does not take into consideration the conditions as they exist in the real world. I may intend to see that the Germans are defeated, but when the question of taking up arms arises I may feel scared. Thus I may have good intentions, but when it comes to the point, I fail to carry them out. I can take up arms but even after that I may not realize the possible. Sartre says that at that instant I can choose another project and abandon the former. Does this not show clearly that Sartre's For-itself can vacillate from one project to another.

Fifthly, human reality cannot be a 'free' project.

In fact, if one makes an in-depth study of Sartre's own life and compares the cardinal points of his own development with the theory provided by him, one finds an invisible thread linking his life-experiences with the theory that he has developed. Let us take his first proposition, "being is doing". As we know, for young Sartre the be-all and end-all of his life was literature. Then Hitler invaded France. While in prison he decided that he would act. To become a literatteur in occupied France it was necessary that he should act. Thus came his theory: being is doing because if one does not 'act', one cannot even 'be'. However 'action' was not so easy, Sartre realized it when he went into organising "Socialisme et Liberte". Instead he decided that he would write. His intention was that by writing against the Germans he would help to overthrow them. Hence he equated 'action' with 'intention'. Previously he had chosen an end. Faced with the machineries of the Germans, he abandoned that project and took up another. From his feelings of guilt he propounded the theory of 'instant' when one could abandon one project in favour of another. Thus he tried to absolve himself from, the guilt of his limitations. He termed it freedom. Seen from this angle it would appear that he developed his theory of freedom from his own experiences. Possibly this was the only way he could free himself from the burden of the guilt of his actions.

Like many of his predecessors, as well as contemporaries, Sartre's concept of human freedom is both unreal and imaginary — although his concern for freedom is genuine. Being philosophically unsound, Sartre's freedom has no foundation in the world of reality. His theory of freedom emanating from his concept of 'negatite' has no sociological and anthropological basis and is based on an absurd hypothesis (and like his ideas about negation, lack and temporality), is devoid of all objectivity. All of Sartre's ideas centre round his hypothetical being-in-itself and being-for-itself, and the unceasing striving of being-for-itself to negate the past and transcend towards the future. This hypothesis itself being a questionable one, the results thus arrived at are also bound to be questionable. Hence Sartre's conception about freedom does not tally with real freedom — freedom of real men in the real world. His freedom has no 'essence' as such, and according to him it is also undefinable and unnamable. Nameless, dimensionless and essenceless, Sartre's freedom is a figment of his own imagination. But, then, Sartre himself has declared elsewhere that imagination is the driving force of human-history. How does Sartre describe freedom and what are the constitutive elements of this freedom? If Sartrian freedom is imaginary, what is real freedom? The first part of this

question has been answered in the preceding pages. The answer to the second part will be attempted below.

The concept of freedom has been variously interpreted in the course of human history. Russeau's concept of freedom is different from that of Bakunin's. Plato's concept differs from that of Thomas Aquinas; Kant's conception varies from that of Hegel. In fact, we shall not be able to cite a single example where two thinkers of two different ages, or belonging to the same age, but hailing from different stratas of society, agree on an identical concept of freedom. Even the present-day concept of freedom, cherished by the workers differs from that of the mill-owners. The peasant's idea of freedom disagrees with that of the landowners, while the petit-bourgeois's idea of freedom is again not in agreement with the concepts upheld by other classes. Hence should we echo Sartre's words that freedom is unnamable, indefinable and essence-less? The answer is definitely in negative. Because the concept of freedom is itself a relative one and it can only be understood if studied from the appropriate perspective.

Let us go back to the dawn of life on earth. As all life-scientists will agree, the plants constitute the earliest inhabitant of this planet. We all know that plants strike roots and with the help of roots, they collect and assimilate nutrients from under the earth. Their initial advantages help them to strengthen themselves, and capitalising on this they further spread themselves capturing the source of nutrients available from the earth and the sky. If a big tree happens to strike root very near to a small tree it will completely dominate its minor neighbour. Due to lack of sunrays and vital nutrients, I he small one will suffer a slow process of death. With a fixed root, the manouverability of a tree is very limited.

Now let us consider the plight of a unicellular organism known as free. Every biologist knows that the freedom of the animal in its natural environment is extremely limited, and a single false step away from the natural circle is punishable by death — i.e. being a prey to another species. On almost identical grounds a tribal man with primitive traits is not more free than modern man.

How could man decisively change itself to the Cro-Magnon stage? Or how could the primitive Cro-Magnon man develop into the 'civilized' one? In biological evolution of animals only those species survived which could adapt to nature. But this adaptation through biological evolution was a slow process and took millions of years. In the case of animals there was no question of exerting power over nature, it was only a passive adaptation. But for human development, as already pointed out, this adaptation was both biological and sociological. Moreover, for animals it was passive adaptation, for man and his ancestors, it was an active adaptation. It was working upon nature and in turn being worked upon by nature. It was reciprocal process. Man worked on nature by knowing the operation and function of nature. Nature reciprocated by obeying man's dictates which were nothing but natural dictates. Hence the relation of man and nature is a subject-object relationship. Man, the subject, strives to know the laws of nature, and once armed with the knowledge of the laws of nature, he utilizes them for the development of his own conditions of living. Take for example the simple natural law that water flows downwards. This law can be utilized when excavating irrigation canals. As it is natural for water to flow downwards the canal dug by man will flow in the direction man wishes it to flow. This canal may change the existing crop-pattern of a particular area through which it passes, and therefore it can change the food habits of the inhabitants of a particular place. This can also transform a hunting, semi-nomadic tribe into an agri-cultural one with all the associated social changes.

Take another example of a group of our primitive ancestors who led an animal-like existence. Like a herd of animals, they also lived together. But unlike animals they had a

rudimentary social existence. They helped each other in hunting, therefore providing food, and igniting fire. We can presume that like dogs or cats they also used to communicate with each other through sounds — though these would be unintelligble in our sophisticated world. These sounds gradually developed into articulate speech. By working on their vocal organs, they at last could produce this. It was fundamentally due to a social necessity of communication that speech was developed. This development necessitated the biological transformation of the larynx, the organ for speech. Once speech was developed, it became the instrument and conveyor of thought. Without speech coherent and organised thought was impossible, and without thought writing was impossible. This leads us to investigate the realsms of freedom from the aspect of development of speech. With the development of speech man's horizon of freedom enlarged immensely. Previously man used only gestures. With speech a qualitative difference in communication between man and man arose. Man without speech was restricted because he had little freedom in communication and expression. He was limited both biologically and spiritually. With the development of articulate speech his freedom of expression increased immensely and qualitatively. He was capable of expressing his inner thoughts — moods — his joy and sorrow, likes and dislikes, hatred and love. Initial crudities gradually became sophisticated and the communication process became more artistic. Art is the highest expression of man's mental freedom.

Thus science and art express the two realms of human freedom. By knowing the laws of nature man frees himself from the natural constraints. By giving expression to his moods, he enjoys emotional freedom. These two aspects of freedom which express man's freedom in totality can only be relative. The development of science depends on the particular stage of social development, so does art. Science and art arc highly interdependent. Take for example the case of music. Development and perfection of musical instruments are the domains of science. An assimilation of sounds produced by these instruments fits into the domain of art. Cinema is a unique example of the intermingling of science and art. With the further development of science, expression of art will also become different. If we take a look at the development of art, we will observe that with the development of society art transformed and orientated itself. That is why one art form gives way to another with the development of society from one stage to another.

At a certain stage of social development, division of labour—mental and physical — drove a wedge into the harmonious development of society. Mental labour was dissociated from physical labour. Those owning the means of production did practically no physical labour while those who had to do all sorts of physical labour were detached from mental labour and its fruits in the form of arts. Freedom from exploitation was rewarded with the freedom of development of the mental faculty. Not occupied with social production, this minority could utilise their free time for the development of art and science. The majority were harnessed to the system for the development of social surplus for consumption by the minority and for the survival of the majority. Thus the objective of the development of science and art also became truncated. The objective of science no longer remained the sole purpose of freeing man from natural constraints. It became an instrument for the development of the surplus. Art no longer expressed the emotions of all. It only served the purpose of a few. Though this truncated development went a long way towards the development of society, the concept of freedom lost the universal connotation that it used previously to enjoy. Earlier, freedom, or lack of it, was applicable to all. But now, in class society, freedom of one class stood opposed to another. The freedom of the Greek citizens was established by captivity of slaves. The freedom of the feudal lords depended on the enslavement of the serfs. The freedom of the bourgeoisie

was dependent on the bondage of the proletariat, and that is why the Greek Aristotle's concept of freedom was different from that of the Roman Spartacus because for Aristotle slavery was only natural and to the slave Spartacus it was the lowest type of unfreedom. Thus the concept of freedom and unfreedom developed different meanings — often one opposed to the other. That is why no two philosophers hailing from different strata of society could agree on its definition. As long as a multi-class society exists, freedom cannot have any universal definition. Only a class-less society can provide unanimity in the definition and interpretation of freedom.

5. *Sartre's Conception of Death*

We have already referred to the essential difference between Sartre and Heidegger. While Sartre's existentialist philosophy is a philosophy of this world, Heidegger's philosophy is diametrically opposite. The most glaring proof of this is observed in their respective view about death. At the very outset Sartre presents the arguments of Heidegger in favour of death: "death is a boundary, and every boundary (whether it be final or initial) is a Janus bifrons. Whether it adhering to the nothingness of being which limits the process considered or whether on the contrary it is revealed as adhesive to the series which it terminates, in either case it is a being which belongs to an existent process and which in a certain way constitutes the meaning of the process. Thus the final chord of a melody always looks on the one side toward silence —that is, toward the nothingness of sound which will follow the melody; in one sense it is made with the silence since the silence which will follow is already present in the resolved chord as its meaning. But on the other side it adheres to this plenum of being which is the melody intended; without the chord this melody would remain in the air and this final indecision would flow back from note to note to confer on each of them the quality of being unfinished … (pp. 680-1). "Hut death thus recovered does not remain simply human; it becomes mine. By being interiorized it is individualised. Death is no longer the great unknowable which limits the human; it is the phenomenon of my personal life — that is, a life which does not begin again, a life in which one never recovers his stroke. Hence I become responsible for my death as for my life. Not for the empirical and contingent phenomenon of my decease but for this character of finitude which causes my life like my death to be my life. It is in this sense that Rilke attempts to show that the - end of each man resembles his life because all his individual life has been preparation for this end. In this sense Malraux in Les Conquerants shows that European culture by giving to certain Asiatics the meaning of their death suddenly penetrates them with this despairing and intoxicating truth that 'life is unique'. It was left to Heidegger to give a philosophical form to this humanization of death. In fact if the Dasein actually suffers nothing precisely because it is a project and an anticipation, then it must be an anticipation and a project of its own death as the possibility of no longer realizing presence in the world. Thus death has become the peculiar possibility of the Dasein, the- being of the human reality is defined as Sein Zum Tode. Inasmuch as the Dasein determines the project toward death, it realizes freedom-to-die constitutes itself as a totality by its free choice of finitude (pp.681-682)

With these words Sartre presents in a nutshell the argument of the philosophers of death — particularly that of Heidegger. Now he proceeds refute their contention, He writes, 'It appears at first that we cannot but be attracted to such a theory: by interiorizing death, it serves our own ends; this apparent limit of our freedom by being interiorized is recovered by freedom. Yet neither the advantage of these views nor the undeniable portion of truth which they include should mislead us. It is necessary to take the question up again from the beginning ... (p. 682).

‘What must be noted first is the absurd character of death. In this sense every attempt to consider it as a resolved chord at the end of a melody must be sternly rejected. It has often been said that we are in the situation of a condemned man among other condemned men who is ignorant of the day of his execution but who sees each day that his fellow prisioners are being executed. This is not wholly exact. We ought rather to compare ourselves to a man condemned to death who is bravely preparing himself for the ultimate penalty, who is doing everything possible to make a good showing on the scaffold and who meanwhile is carried off by a flu epidemic. This is what Christian wisdom understands when it recommends preparing oneself for death as it could come at any hour. Thus one hopes to recover it by metamorphosing it into an expected death. If the meaning of our life becomes the expectation of death, then when death occurs it can only put its seal upon life. This is basically the most positive content of Heidegger’s ‘resolute decision’ (pp. 682-3).

‘Unfortunately this advice is easier to give than to follow, not because of a natural weakness in human reality or because of an original project of unauthenticity but because of death itself. One can, in fact, expect a particular death but not death. The sleight of hand introduced by Heidegger is easy enough to detect. He begins by individualizing the death of each one of us, by pointing out to us that it is the death of a person, of an individual, the “only thing which nobody can do for me”. Then this incomparable individuality which he has conferred upon death in terms of the Dasein, he uses to individualize the Dasein itself; it is by projecting itself freely towards its final possibility that the Dasein will attain authentic existence and wrench itself away from everyday banality in order to attain the irreplaceable uniqueness of the person. But there is a circle here. How indeed can one prove that death has this individuality and the power of conferring it? Of course, if death is described as my death, I can await it; it is a possibility which is characterized and distinct. But is the death which will overtake me my death? In the first place it is perfectly gratuitous to say that “to die is the only thing which nobody can do for me.” Or rather there is here an evident bad faith in the reasoning; if one considers death as the ultimate subjective possibility, the event which concerns only the for-itself, then it is evident that nobody can die for me. But then it follows that none of my possibilities taken from this point of view— which is that of the cogito — whether taken in authentic existence or unauthentic—can be projected by anyone other than me. Nobody love for me — if we mean by that to make vows which are my vows, to experience the emotions (however common place they may be) which are my emotions … Thus from this point of view the most commonplace love is, like death, irreplaceable and unique; nobody can love for me (pp. 683-4).

Demolishing Heidegger’s arguments bit by bit, Sartre continues, “Thus I cannot say that the minute which is passing is bringing death closer to me. It is true that death is coming to me if I consider very broadly that my life is limited. But within these very elastic limits (I can die at the age of a hundred or at thirty seven tomorrow) I cannot know whether this end is coming closer to me or being removed further from me. This is because there is considerable difference in quality between death at the limit of old age and sudden death which anihilates us at the prime of life or in youth. To wait for the former is to accept the fact that life is a limited enterprise; it is one among many others of chousing finitude and electing our ends on the foundation of finitude. To wail for the second would be to wait with the idea that my life is an enterprise which is lacking. If only deaths from old age existed (or deaths by explicit condemnation), then I could wait for my death. But the unique quality of death is the fact that it can always before the end surprise those who wait for it at such and such a date. And while death from old age can

be confused with the finitude of our choice and consequently can be lived as the resolved chord of our life (we are given a task and we are given time to accomplish it), sudden death, on the contrary, is such that it can in no way be waited for, Sudden death is undetermined and by definition cannot be waited for at any date; it always, in fact, includes the possibility that we shall die in surprise before the awaited dale and consequently that our waiting may be, qua wailing, a deception or that we shall survive beyond this date ; in the latter case since we were only this waiting, we shall outlive ourselves' (p. 686).

Summing up the arguments Sartre says, 'Thus the perpetual appearance of chance at the heart of my projects cannot be apprehended as my possibility, but on the contrary, as the nihilation of all my possibilities, a nihilation which itself is no longer a part of my possibilities. Thus death is not my possibility of no longer realizing a presence in the world but rather an always possible nihilation of my possibles which is outside my possibilities' (p. 687). Counterpoising his philosophy against that of Heidegger, Sartre says 'This can be expressed in a slightly different way, if we approach the problem from the consideration of meanings. Human reality is meaningful, as we know. This means that human reality makes known to itself what it is by means of that which is not,. . . that it is to come to itself. If therefore it is perpetually engaged in its own future, this compels us to say that it waits for the confirmation of this future. As future, in fact, that which is to come is pre-outlined by a present which will be; one puts oneself in the hands of this present which alone, by virtue of being present, is to be able to confirm or invalidate the preoutlined meaning which I am. As this present will be itself a free recovery of the past in the light of a new future we shall not be able to determine it but only to project it and wait for it' (p. 687).

Sartre further argues that 'If death is not the free determination of our being, it cannot complete our life. If one minute more or less may perhaps change everything and if this minute is added to or removed from my account, then even admitting that I am free to use my life, the meaning of my life escapes me. Now the Christian death comes from God. He chooses our hour, and in a general way I know clearly that even if it is I who by temporalizing myself cause there to be minutes and hours in general, still the minute of my death is not fixed by me; the sequences of the universe determine it (p. 689).

'If this is the case, we can no longer even say that death confers a meaning on life from outside; a meaning can come only from subjectivity. Since death does not appear on the foundation of our freedom, it can only remove all meaning from life. If I am a waiting for waitings for waiting and if suddenly the object of my final waiting and the one who awaits it are suppressed, the waiting takes on retrospectively the character of absurdity. For example, this young man has lived for thirty years in the expectation of becoming a great writer, but this waiting itself is not enough; it becomes a vain and senseless obstinacy or a profound comprehension of his value according to the books which he writes. His first book has appeared, but by itself what does it mean? It is the book of a beginner. Let us admit that it is good; still it gets its meaning through the future. If it is unique, it is at once inauguration and testament. He has only one book to write, he is limited and cut off by his work; he will not be a "great writer". If the novel is one in a mediocre series, it is an "accident". If it is followed by other better books, it can classify its author in the first rank. But exactly at this point death strikes the author-—at the very moment when he was anxiously testing himself to find out "whether he had the staff" to write another work, at the moment when he was still expecting to be a great writer. This is enough to cause everything to fall into the undetermined: I can not say that the dead writer is the author of a single book (in the sense that he would have had only one book to

write) nor that he would have written several (since in fact only one has appeared). I can say nothing. Suppose that Balzac had died before Les Chouans; he would remain the author of some execrable novels of intrigue. But suddenly the very expectation which this young man was, this expectation of being a great man, loses any kind of meaning; it is neither an obstinate and egotistical blindness nor the true sense of his own value since nothing shall ever decide it. It would be useless indeed to try to decide it by considering the sacrifices which he made to his art, the obscure and hard life which he was willing to lead; just as many mediocre figures have had the strength to make comparable sacrifices. On the contrary, the final value of this conduct remains forever in suspense; or if you prefer, the ensemble (particular kinds of conduct, expectations, values) falls suddenly into the absurd. *Thus death is never that which gives life its meanings; it is, on the contrary, that which on principle removes all meaning from life. If we must die, then our life has no meaning because its problems receive no solution and because the very meaning of the problems remains undetermined'* (pp.689-90).

The reader may please note how gradually Sartre arrived at a conclusion which is exactly opposite to that of Heidegger. Sartre further adds, These remarks, it will be noted, are not derived from the consideration of death but on the contrary, from the consideration of life; this is because the for-itself is the being in whose being is in question; since the for-itself is the being which always lays claim to an "after", there is no place for death in the being which is for-itself. What then could be the meaning of a waiting for death if it is not the waiting for an undetermined event which would reduce all waiting to the absurd, even including that of death itself? A waiting for death would be self-destructive for it would be the negation of all waiting. My project toward a particular death is comprehensible (suicide, martyrdom, heroism) but not the project toward my death as the undetermined possibility of no longer realizing a presence in the world, for this project would be the destruction of all projects. Thus death cannot be my peculiar possibility; it cannot even be one of my possibilities' (p. 691).

'Furthermore, death, in so far as it can be revealed to me, is not only the always possible nihilation of my possibles, a nihilation outside my possibilities. It is not only the project which destroys all projects and which destroys itself, the impossible destruction of my expectations. It is also the triumph of the point of view of the Other over the point of view which I am toward myself. This is doubtless what Malraux means when in *I'Espoir* he says of death that it "transforms life into destiny". Death, in fact, is only on its negative side the nihilation of my possibilities; since indeed I am my possibilities only through the nihilation of being-in-itself which I have to be, death as the nihilation of a nihilation is a positing of my being as in-itself in the sense in which for Hegel the negation of a negation is an affirmation. So long as the for-itself is "in life" it surpasses its past toward its future, and the past is that which the for-itself has to be. When the for-itself 'ceases to live', this past is not thereby abolished. The disappearance of the nihilating being does not touch that part of its being which is of the type of the in-itself; it is engulfed in the in-itself. My whole life is. This means not that it is an harmonious totality but that it has ceased to be its own suspense and that it can no longer change itself by the simple consciousness which it has of itself. Quite the contrary, the meaning of any phenomenon whatsoever in that life is henceforth fixed not by itself but by this open totality which is the arrested life. This meaning in the primary and fundamental sense is an absence of meaning, as we have seen. But in a secondary and derived sense thousands of shimmering, iridescent relative meanings can come into play upon this fundamental absurdity of a "dead" life (pp. 691-2).

And now Sartre makes some very interesting observations with the help of his philosophy of Other. It shows Sartre's profound wisdom on a very delicate question: 'The unique characteristic of a dead life is that it is a life of which the Other makes himself the guardian. This does not mean simply that the other preserves the life of the "deceased" by effecting an explicit, cognitive reconstruction of it. Quite the contrary, such a reconstruction is only one of the possible attitudes of the Other in relation to the dead life; consequently the character of a 'reconstructed life' (in the midst of the family through the memories of the relatives, in the historic environment) is a particular destiny which is going to mark some lives to the exclusion of others. The necessary result is that the opposite quality— "a life fallen into oblivion"— also represents a specific destiny capable of description, one which comes to certain lives again in terms of the Other. To be forgotten is to be made the object of an attitude of another, and of an implicit decision on the part of the Other. To be forgotten is, in fact, to be resolutely apprehended forever as one element dissolved into a mass (the "great feudal lords of the thirteenth century", the "bourgeois Whigs" of the eighteenth, the "Soviet officials" etc.); it is in no way to be annihilated, but it is to lose one's personal existence in order to be constituted with others in a collective existence' (pp. 692-3).

Thus from this point of view we can see clearly the difference between life and death: life decides its own meaning because it is always in suspense; it possesses essentially a power of self-criticism and self-metamorphosis which cause it to define itself as a 'not-yet' or, if you like, makes it be as the changing of what it is. The dead life does not thereby cease to change, and yet it is all done. This means that for it the chips arc down and that it will henceforth undergo its changes without being in any way responsible for them. For this life it is not a question only of an arbitrary and definitive, totalization. In addition there is a radical transformation: nothing more can happen to it inwardly; it is entirely closed; nothing more can be made to enter there; but its meaning does not cease to be modified from the outside. Until the death of this apostle of peace the meaning of his enterprises (as folly or as a profound sense of the truth of things, as successful or a failure) was in his own hands. "So long as I am here, there will not be any war." But to the extent that this meaning surpasses the limits of a simple individuality, to the extent that the person makes himself known to himself through an objective situation to be realized (the peace in Europe), death represents a total dispossession; it is the Other who dispossesses the Apostle of peace of the very meaning of his efforts and therefore of his being, for the Other despite himself and by his very upsurge undertakes to transform into failure or success, into folly or an intuition of genius the very enterprise by which the person made himself known to himself and which he was in his being' (pp. 694-5).

'Thus', says Sartre, 'we must conclude in opposition to Heidegger that death, far from being my peculiar possibility, is a contingent fact which as such on principle escapes me and originally belongs to my facticity. I can neither discover my death nor wait for it nor adopt an, attitude toward it, for it is that which is revealed as undiscoverable that which disarms all waiting, that which slips into all attitudes (and particularly into those which are assumed with respect to death) so as to transform them into externalised and fixed conducts whose meaning is forever entrusted to others and not to ourselves. Death is a pure fact as is birth; it comes to us from outside and it transforms us into outside. At bottom it is in no way distinguished from birth, and it is the identity of birth and death that we call facticity' (pp. 697-8).

The 'proxy war' between life and death, between the philosophy of life and the philosophy of death, should not be viewed in isolation from the real war of ideologies.

6. *Characteristic Features of Being-for-itself*

(1) FUTURIST

The Being-for-itself is futurist. It negates the past on the threshold of the present and transcends into the future. For it, the past is in-itself; the present is reducible to an instant; only the future is meaningful. The future is ingrained in its very being and there is only one objective of the Being-for-itself—a journey towards the future. The 'hole' in the Being-for-itself is negated in the realms of the future. In short, Being-for-itself exists for the future.

(2) INDIVIDUALIST

Being-for-itself is a loner in the world. It revolves round itself in its existence and docs not enter into any man-to-man relationship with fellow beings. Isolated, lonely, and egoistic, Being-for-itself's is a 'selfish' existence in the world. For Being-for-itself any other member of the society is an 'Other'. Being-for-itself casts look on the 'Other' as an object. Similarly the 'Other' also looks at it in the same way.

Relationship with the 'Other' is based on conflict. Even love is a conflict. The Other is an enemy of Being-for-itself. Being-for-itself interprets all human relationships in terms of love, hate, pride, sadism, masochism etc.

(3) FREE

Being-for-itself has an intrinsic urge for freedom. The concept of freedom is so much intertwined with the existence of Being-for-itself that it considers freedom as its very foundation. Always crazy over freedom, always conscious of it, Being-for-itself's very being is freedom. But this freedom is nameless and essenceless and eludes any definition. It is a limitless, boundless freedom. Its nature is such that Being-for-itself eternally negates the past, on the threshold of the present and transcends to the future.

Now these characteristics of Being-for-itself may be found in Sartre's own life experience.

The futurist outlook possibly developed in Sartre at a specific juncture of his life when he realized that for him the life of inaction and fence-sitting was a thing of the past and quite incompatible with his mode of thinking. From an observer of events he was now transformed into one who wanted to change the course of events. Yet the present was not to his liking — the present of the 'instants' of 1942-43 when he had been forced to leave the path of direct resistance and adopt other ways and means. The present was dominated by the presence of the Nazi Germans and by wishing away the present as an instant he was laying all his cards in favour of the future. If neither the past nor the present was of any significance then the future must hold out the meaning of existence. Even a mechanistic futurism was preferable because in that case he would at least be able to assert himself in some future. Only a future pregnant with meaning and significance could bring some solace to him torn apart by qualms of conscience over his own past and present. Though philosophically poised for the future, in reality, he remained bogged clown in the prejudices of the past. His attitude toward other members of the society continued to remain unsocial if not outright anti-social in content. He reduced all human relations to a subject-object one. Thus he degraded and dehumanized man's relation to man. But why did Sartre portray Being-for-itself as an unsocial being? The reasons would be found in his own life-experience. As a child he was a loner. Even in his youth he shunned collective living. He visualized himself as a writer who would be an outsider.

Only in the German prison did he experience some sort of collective existence. But this experience was very short-lived. When he came out of it and decided to organise a resistance movement he found that only a few were willing to take that course of action. All his attempts to organise direct resistance failed and in great disappointment he decided to write. This could have revived in him the age-old suspicion of the Other. The compulsion of life under Occupation, constant suspicion and chances of betrayal by friends and acquaintances might have led him to view the Other as an object, an enemy.

The concept of freedom was rooted in Sartre's thinking. He considered man's existence in the world to be absolutely free. He visualized that as a writer he would make tremendous journeys and gain unheard of experiences which he would later give expression to in his works. And these would be the most uninhibited and free expression of a writer. These were his thoughts in the 1930's when the Fascists had initiated suppression of freedom of expression in Germany. The reader may recollect that during this period he had told the Trotskyte Collette Audry that he would fight tooth and nail to resist Fascism because he did not want to eat his own manuscripts.

Then came the War and occupation. He was now faced with a future that was too real. Now he was not permitted to write anything controversial or even critical to Occupation and Vichy regime. He was forced not to speak anything openly. His journalistic writings in 'Socialism and Liberty' bulletins if caught by the Germans or the Vichy agents could cost him his life. Now he started writing allusive plays. Instead of enjoying unlimited, boundless freedom, he was under seize, with all his freedom suspended. Thus cry for freedom became the single-point agenda of his life. This also became the foundation of his thesis.

4
CONSCIOUSNESS

1. *Genesis of the Psyche*

To investigate the genesis of the psyche we must first make explicit what we understand by "the mind". According to our understanding, the mind is a property of living, highly organised material bodies, that consist in their ability to reflect through their states the reality around them, which exists independently of them. Psychic phenomena, i.e., sensations, presentations, concepts, etc. are more or less precise, profound, reflections, images or pictures of reality. They are consequently secondary 'to the reality they reflect, which is, on the contrary, primary and determined.

The above definition, then, suggests our course of investigation. What kind of reflection then does the mind have of reality? Is it a mirror-reflection? No. Mirror-reflection is passive. Eyes take in a mirror-reflection of reality but the message is transmitted to the brain. On the basis of the message the person decides the next course of action. Hence it is active reflection; not only active but analytic. The qualitative difference is this: The mind has the ability to relate itself to the object it reflects and place itself in a subject-object relationship vis-a-vis the object.

As mind or consciousness is a property of the living organism at its highest development, to investigate genesis of the psyche we will have to understand the genesis of living organism, albeit briefly, and find out how and from what condition the psyche at its most rudimentary form appeared.

The earliest living organism is the protoplasmic cell called protoamoeba in an aqueous solution. It had several properties which permitted the simplest form of metabolism and the simplest structure of the organisms themselves: uniformity, a capacity to dissolve substance necessary to maintain the simplest form of life, and relatively high thermal stability. Hence it could assimilate and dissimilate constantly the substances in the medium, and incorporate within its system nutrients through the movements of the particles of the body.

The primordial organism received nutrients from the medium itself by direct adsorption. The self-movement of the organism was used to serve the process of direct assimilation of assimilable substances. It follows that the living body would act positively or negatively towards nutrients or non-nutrients. Consequently the positive response of the organism while in contact with nutrients would be visible in 'irritation'. Thus the property of 'irritability' was the most important characteristic of the unicellular protoplasmic body. This irritability enabled it to respond when in contact with the nutrients in the aqueous medium.

With the change in the physical and chemical conditions of the earth's surface and atmosphere, new situations arose that necessitated adaptability on the part of the living organism, and the transmission of the biological characteristics through heredity. Thus heredity and adaptability coupled with protollaxic changes facilitated the growth of a complex structure and differentiation of the assimilative and dissimilative organs of the living organism. This phase was coincident with life sustained on formed things, not directly dissolved in the medium itself, but given in the environment and the capacity on the part of the organism to locate the object in the environment and assimilate it. This process caused differentiation of the assimilative organ; previously where irritation and adsorption were done by the same organ through cellular contacts, this same irritation was caused by one organ and assimilation by another both united through a form of psychic mechanism. An example will make the statement clear:

When a frog is sensitized by a rustle in the green grass, it orientates itself towards the rustling sound. This means that although the frog does not respond to other forms of sound, it responds to a rustle — it is irritated. This irritation is directly connected with the process of assimilation. What really happens is that the frog, as soon as it is irritated by a rustling sound caused by the movement of insect in the grass, orientates itself towards the sound and catches it. Hence we find here a number of actions together. First, sensitization by a particular sound; second, a dissimilative movement; and third, the act of assimilation by swallowing the insect. This means that whereas for the primordial organism irritation was caused by the nutrients, now a particular sound caused the irritation. Thus we can conclude: the mechanism to cause irritation has become more sophisticated; the dissimilative movement has been externalized; the system of assimilation has become more complicated — gulping by mouth and digesting through the system. Hence metabolism does not occur directly as in adsorption, but takes place through some intermediate processes whereby the process of dissimilation and assimilation are mediated in stages. This mechanism of mediation is the orgin of the psyche.

Through the process of evolution a living body became sensitive towards certain characteristics of the environment, and insensitive towards some others. This sensitivity in turn, sharpened and developed certain organs more than other organs; some even completely lost the role they had played at the beginning. Organs of locomotion developed and became sophisticated. Organs developed for locating external objects — becoming sensitive to sound, light, smell etc. The degree of adaptability to changing

environmental conditions determined the chances of survival through the process of natural selection.

Hence sensitivity, which we have denoted as the earliest form of psyche, was not added to the living organism but became a quality that developed through evolution — a mediation by which the living organism reflected the external world to locate its object of survival. At a definite stage of the evolutionary process the cells of the living organism which were diffused all over the body began to concentrate at the anterior so that being light-sensitive they could reflect sunlight. At a still higher evolutionary process a cavity appeared within the premise of the light-sensitive part which had the ability to reflect the external reality.

Along with the development of the organs of sensitivity and locomotion, an organ for co-ordination also evolved — a nervous system. Originally the nervous system was a simple network of fibres running in different directions and uniting sensitive cells located on the surface of the body. These were connected directly with the animal's contractile tissues, however this primitive nervous system gave only diffused signals. With evolution, a ganglia (nerve-joint) developed that could co-ordinate the motor-function activities of the various organs. This necessitated future changes in the anatomical structure of the various species operating on the system. The next improvement was the separation of neuron from the ganglia which eventually developed into an anterior ganglia. The anterior ganglia subordinated the function of the ganglia under itself.

The evolution of such a ganglial nervous system took the direction of increasing differentiation associated with segmentation of the animal's body. This stage of evolution did not enable the living body to reflect 'things' as 'things', it was the stage of partial reflection. Further evolution saw development in two different directions, of which one was the evolution from worms to insects and spiders, the other was more progressive. It led to the change in structure of activity itself, and on that basis to the rise of a new form of reflection of the environment, characterised by an already higher, second stage of evolution in the animal's psyche, that of perceptive psyche.

The stage of development of perceptive psyche is characterised by the organism's capacity for reflection of external reality as 'thing' and not as something which evokes sensation in one form or another. The 'thing' that the organism perceives at this stage is given in the environment, and some of the organs of the organism become so developed that they are capable of searching for it in order to take hold of it. It means further differentiation of some of the organs that 'resonate' with the object from an world of objects.

When a mammal is given an object behind an obstacle, it sees both the object and obstacle. Unlike a toad which when given a worm behind a glass sheet continuously strikes on the glass, a mammal tries to overcome the obstacle. This is the fundamental distinction of this stage. It coincides with the animal's reflection of both the obstacle and object not through, olfactory, audio or light signal received from them but by direct perception. It is this differentiation that indicates specialization in the physical structure of the organism. Some organs respond to the 'object' in the environment, some others facilitate movement towards it, and still some others actually consume it. The majority of the vertebrates belong to this stage of psychic life which originated with a predominantly terrestrial mode of existence.

Origin and development of perceptive psyche in animals were associated with several anatomical and physiological changes. The most important among these was the development of distant sense organs, primarily of vision. Simultaneously, there took place

anatomical interconnections with the central nervous system. Among vertebrates the leading organs gradually became those which integrated external stimuli. This was made possible by the further development of the central nervous system and the formation of a forebrain, and then a cerebral cortex. Originally the forebrain (among reptiles, fish and amphibians) was an olfactory formation—an extension of the animal's olfactory apparatus. In subsequent evolutions other sense organs developed which reduced the importance of the olfactory formation.

Vision appeared first with reptiles through corticalisation i.e. when unlike the light sensitive cavity of lower animals, it could act as a central perceptory organ of external reality. In birds, eyes became the main receptor. The development from ganglial formation to forebrain and finally to cerebral cortex also resulted in further development of the anatomical structure. This greatly facilitated external movements of the animal. This, in turn, resulted in the development of the animal's natural tools which enabled it to perform the complicated operations demanded by life in a terrestrial environment, i.e. running, climbing, pursuing prey, overcoming obstacles etc. The animal's motor functions wore also progressively corticalised — i.e., transferred to the cortex of the brain.

The fixing of the animal's experience in the form of motor habits is also the characteristic of this stage. This resulted for the first time in the development of sense-representation in animal — in other words, a primitive form of memory. The mnemonic function operated in the. motor sphere in the form of a primitive image memory. Transition to the stage of perceptive psyche also developed the animal's ability differentiate and generalise i.e., the ability of analysis and synthesis. However it was closely associated with the vital biological role that it played. For example, a dog can differentiate odour of organic acid even if one part per million is present in solution, but the animal does not react to the smell of a plant, or perfume. The reason is that for a dog. organic acid conveys biological association to it. As mentioned already the transition to this stage is associated with the animal's ability to differentiate and generalise the image of a thing. Take for Instance a tiger's prey, a lamb. Now, the ability to distinguish a lamb from other external objects is the process of differentiation, and any lamb as prey, be whatever its size and shape, is the generalisation. This simultaneous process of differentiation and generalisation makes the stage of perceptive psyche important towards evolution of still higher animals, and finally of man. Further precision of perceptive psyche demanded further development of the cerebral cortex and finally a qualitative change in its operation. This is visible in the next higher stage — which is that of intellect. This qualitative improvement is visible in anthropoid ape.

The stage of intellect coincides with further differentiation of the sensory organs. The organs of reflection and mediation — the affective organs — have also attained further perfection to reflect reality more precisely. The operation of the cerebral cortex and its relationship with nervous motor functions have achieved further sophistication at this stage. Memory in the form of experience shows improvement. Further changes in the anatomical and physiological structure are observed as the animal uses the forelegs as hands, tries to stand upright on the two hind legs etc. Simultaneously the animal shows an ability to find a solution to complicated problems sheerly by means of its intellect, and not by any trial and error method. A few examples will clarify the last point.

Scientists have conducted several experiments with anthropoid apes.

The animal is kept in a cage and a bait is placed outside beyond the reach of the animal's hand. A stick is kept in the cage which the animal can use. How does the animal react? It first tries to take hold of the bait by hand. It makes several attempts but to no

avail. Then suddenly, it seizes the stick and with the help of it draws the object nearer and then catches hold of it.

A bait is kept in a cage, one side of which is made of steel bars through which the hands of the animal can pass. The opposite side is made of brick which contains apertures through which the bait can be seen. The animal cannot reach the bait through the apertures except by means of a stick. A stick tied to a long chain is kept nearby, outside the cage. How does the animal get the reward? The animal tries several times unsuccessfully and then suddenly it sees the stick. It introduces the stick through the aperture of the wall and pushes the bait to the opposite side. Then it comes to the front of the cage and picks up the reward through the bars.

Scientists observed that the animal, in this case anthropoid ape, when faced again with the same problem could solve it immediately. Even if some essential elements in the experiment were replaced by others, the animal would show similar ingenuity to solve the problem.

II. *Rise of Human Consciousness:*

Evolution of man had several intermediate stages and different laws were operative at each stage. The first stage is one of the preparation to the transition to man. It begins in the late Tertiary and continues till the beginning of the Quarternary. The representative of this stage — Australopithecus — were apes that led a terrestrial and collective mode of life. They had an upright gait and a capacity for complicated manual operations which made it possible to use rough, unfinished tools. They also used a primitive form of communication. The second stage — that of Pithecanthropus — is called transitional to man of the Neoanthropus type and is characterised by the fashioning of tools and primitive cooperative activity. The third stage is known as Neanderthal or Paleanthropus and precedes modern or cromagnon stage of man.

The only laws of development operating at the Australopithecus stage were those of evolution. These remained in force upto Pithecanthropus and Paleanthropus stages when a series of morphological changes took place. Rudimentary social laws also began to be operative I'm in the Pithecanthropus stage. The skull of the inner surface of the cerebral portion, known as endocranium, underwent significant changes. The morphological changes reinforced by heredity which took place in connection with labour activity and speech communication were at this is stage governed by biological laws proper. The development of social production changed the whole scenario whereby the development shifted from mere biological to social-historical.

In the earlier stages the individuals were subjected to both biological and social laws which explain the morphological changes that took place simultaneously with the development of social relations of primitive type. The most significant aspect of these whole processes however, was that although morphological changes were more pronounced than social development, it was the latter that ultimately created the wonder the development of fully formed homosapiens or man as we call him.

The second turning point in human phylogenesis occurred with the transition to the stage of Neoanthropus when the biologically fully developed man arose. At this point man's social-historical development was the only criteria for its development, and morphology played no significant part. If a line is drawn at the Neoanthropus stage, stages preceding it made the contribution to morphological and social-historical factors, and stages following it made the contribution to social-historical factors only. The era of complete dominance of social laws alone began.

What is the basic characteristic that distinguished man from all previous evolutions? Anthropologists will declare that it is social labour that made all the difference. 'Social labour' achieved the great leap forward and brought about the revolution in the process of evolution of the species. 'Social labour', as is apparent, is the combination of two distinct processes: labour and social communication. Let us first dwell on labour. This was an activity that was instrumental in the process of transition to Cromagnon man from its previous stages. The first use of human labour found expression in the fashioning of tools. Previously, the mediation necessary for metabolism used to be carried out by the organs of the animal itself. The only arms it had were sharp claws, strong teeth, capacity to run fast and instinctive response. This is true for most of the higher animals. The fashioning of tools meant that an external object was used as an extension of body limbs, thus achieving the vital biological task of metabolism. This use of tools was not simply an extension of body organs for catching prey; it was also an extension of intellect which prompted man to fashion tools, sharpen them and make them usable for a purpose. If we look back to the dawn of human history, say the First Stone Age, and compare the gigantic progress that man has made over millions of years, we will observe that this extension has become more and more sophisticated over the years. What is the tiny tool of a jeweler, or a huge crane that can carry hundreds of tons of goods, if not the extension of man's hands? What is the fastest train on earth, if not the extension of his organs of locomotion? And what is the most powerful computer, if not the extension of his brain?

Secondly, cooperative social activity; unlike evolutionary development, social cooperative labour is the key to man's ontogenetic development. An animal fights alone and either wins or loses. For man, this could have been disastrous but fortunately a man confronts nature through joint social effort. An animal cannot relate things, but man can. It is this ability to relate, even apparently opposite actions, which achieves the ultimate goal in a cooperative, joint social activity and is the key to his ascendance.

These two aspects combined into one—man's social labour — point to the fact that man creates his conditions of living whereas an animal lives in the condition endowed by nature. Thus man struggles with nature with a view to change it as far as practicable and advisable and according to the progress of the productive forces and development of science and technology in the society concerned. For an animal, the process is the other way round. It also struggles with nature, but as a result, changes itself to adapt to the conditions dictated by nature through the evolutionary process of heredity and adaptability. This is the reason that thousands of years of human progress go far ahead of millions of years of existence of life on earth.

Man is a social animal and communicates and interacts with other men. This inter-action and experience percolate through from one generation to the next, as well as to the members of each generation. Man dies but the experiences — in the form of words and sentences, anecdotes and stories, essences of the struggles against nature,— stay on and become enriched through generations. Thus a new born has in store for him the treasures of the experiences of the human race right from its very inception.

The ascendance of man over all other creatures on earth started with his ability to think. The emancipation of hands was instrumental in the development of man's labour. The development of speech, which was the basis of social labour, transformed man into a thinking being. These two factors brought about morphological and phylogenetic changes in the brain. This in turn grew in size and shape during the precromagnon stages and became four to five times the size of the brain of the higher ape.

The subjective world of man, his world of poetry and painting, songs of love and despair, yearning for eternity and posterity, all these are intimately connected with the

objective world that surrounds him. It is the human brain that transforms objects into subjects of thought. The relation between subject and object starts with the transformation of object into the realm of the subject. This is determined by the brain. This is the basic organ which stands in direct relation to the consciousness of man. In other words, the human brain is the seat of human consciousness.

Speech is that unique property that distinguishes man from all other living creatures. Speech is the fore-runner of thought or concept. The moment someone pronounces a word, the phonetic symbol is transformed by the brain of the person who hears the sound into a perceptive idea. Thus a particular sound conveys a certain idea or concept. This transformation of sound into an idea, or concept is peculiarly and uniquely human and has elevated man from the first level of sense-perception to that of forming an idea. This has, thus, transformed man into a thinking being. Pavlov called it the Second Signaling System.

In the course of his social development and labour activity man developed this extraordinary addition to the mechanism of brain-function based on verbal signals i.e., speech. This highly developed system consists of the perception of words uttered (either aloud or to oneself), heard or seen (reading). The development of the Second Signaling system immeasurably broadened and qualitatively transformed man's higher nervous activity. The development of verbal signals also introduced new mechanisms into the activity of the cerebral hemispheres. Pavlov said that if man's sensations and concepts connected with the external environment were the first signals of reality, then speech, kinesthetic stimuli going to the cortex from the speech organs, were the second signals i.e., signal of signals. They are an abstraction of reality and consist of generalisations.

Consciousness by which man is distinguished from animal is the ability peculiar and unique to man; it is the process by which he can think. Thinking, thought process, concept, idea etc. are abstractions and generalizations of the world of reality through spoken or written symbols. Man uses verbal signals for everything he perceives through the receptors. The word as a signal of signals enables him to abstract from concrete objects and phenomena. The Second Signaling System is integrally connected with man's social life, and is the result of intricate relations between the individual and his social environment. Verbal signaling, speech and language are the means of communication between people, developed in the course of social labour. Thus the second signaling system is socially determined.

The reality that we perceive by our senses is the primary source of our information of the external world. This direct, immediate, un-abstracted and particularised perception of reality constitutes the First Signaling System. As the Second Signaling System is an extension of the first, we will discuss the first Signaling System first and then proceed to the discussion of the Second Signaling System.

When I look at the sky and am overwhelmed by its star-studded canopy, I distinguish it from the ocean with flashes of phosphorous disintegrating on the crest of waves. How do I do it? Or when I look at a zebra and differentiate it from a horse, what am I doing? Or how does an orinthologist distinguish one bird from another? In all these cases, we distinguish them with our visual or auditory perception, i.e., with the help of our First Signaling System. This system develops in a more or less similar manner in man and animal.

The cerebral hemisphere — cortex and adjacent subcortical formations — is the highest decision-making body that determines the organism's reaction as a whole vis-a-vis, the external environment. It also registers the activity of the internal organs so that

the organism as a whole can survive. The cortex may be compared to the caretaker of a multistoried building who receives information about every part of the complex from the deputy caretakers. They in turn receive information from him with the help of CCTV network. The various receptors — visual, auditory, tactile etc. — may be compared with CCTV channels. The cortex receives various information through the subcortical formations (there are, of course, some receptors who directly communicate with the cortex). This in turn receives information from the various receptors that collect information about the external environment and internal organism. All this information is analysed in the cortex, and on the basis of the analysis the cortex directs the various organs to lake appropriate steps.

III

In the course of the long process of evolution, animals developed a nervous system. Due to the continuous changes in the conditions of existence of animal organisms, the structure and function of the nervous system became increasingly more complicated, although the physiological functions controlled by it became more unified so as to ensure effective maneuvering vis-a-vis the external environment. The nervous system is especially highly developed in man. His brain is the organ of his thinking.

The nervous system regulates the activities of the various organs of the human body and also directs the functioning of the body as a whole. Muscular contraction, glandular secretion, heart action, metabolism and many other processes continuously operating on the organism are controlled by the nervous system. It also links the various organs and systems of the body, co-ordinates all their activities and ensures the integrity of the organism.

The Central Nervous System receives information about the outside world and the inner state of the organism from receptor organs which are specially developed to perceive stimuli. In ordinary usage many of them are known as sense-organs because their stimulation and emission of impulses to the cerebral hemisphere give rise to various forms of sensory impression of the external world. It is only on the basis of information supplied by the receptor organs to the cerebral cortex that simple reflexes and complex psychic activities are possible.

Receptors are nerve endings sensitive to stimulation, or specialized nerve cells reacting to definite changes in the external environment. From the receptors impulses are transmitted along the sensory nerve fibbers to the C.N.S. From the first receptors neuron excitation is transmitted to a second and then to a third neuron in the thalamus and reaches the cerebral cortex. All links of this neuronal chain are important for analysis of the perceived stimuli. Higher form of analysis is performed by the cortex. According to Pavlov the entire aggregate of neurons involved in receiving stimuli, transmitting impulses, and the sensory cells of the cerebral cortex constitute a unified system. He termed it ‘analyser’.

There is numerous receptor apparatus which differs in both morphological characteristic and physiological specialization. While morphological characteristic is evident in the structure, the specialization consists in their sensitivity to a specific type of stimulation (light, sound, chemical, mechanical stimuli, heat, cold etc.) and their extremely high excitability. They can be divided into two large groups — internal and external. Internal receptors, or interceptors, emit impulses that signal the condition of visceral organs, also called visceroceptors. They also send impulses to the cerebral cortex about the position and movement of the body and individual organs in space, and hence

are also termed as vestibuloceptors and proprioceptors. The exteroceptors signal the properties of objects and phenomena of the outside world and their influences on the organism.

Receptors can also be classified according to the physical nature of the stimuli to which they are sensitive e.g. phonorcceptors, photoreceptors, mechanoreceptors, thermoreceptors, chemoreceptors, and baroreceptors. Similarly there are distance receptors e.g. visual, acoustic, olfactory etc. Contact receptors are sensitive to touch.

Under the influences of stimulation, receptors generate nerve impulses i.e. they transform the stimulation into excitation. The mechanism is somewhat complicated. An external stimulus acting on a receptor causes depolarisation of the surface membrane. This depolarisation is called receptor or generator potential. It is not governed by the all-or-none law, but depends on the strength of the stimulus. It is capable of summation under the action of the stimuli following in rapid succession and does not spread along the nerve fibre. When the receptor potential reaches a certain critical level, it triggers off a discharge of nerve impulses in the nerve fibres connected with the receptor. As has been demonstrated by direct measurements made on certain experimental objects, the frequency of afferent impulses in the nerve fibres is directly proportional to the level of depolarisation of the receptor membrane. At the same time, the frequency of afferent discharges is proportional to the logarithm of the stimulus strength. From a comparison of these facts it follows that there is a logarithmic, rather than a direct relationship, between stimulus strength and the value of the receptor potential. The innumerable variety of changes taking place in the external environment and internal organs bring about various stimuli aimed a (I lie CNS and cortex. These stimuli are transmitted by the afferent nerve fibres in the form of a flow of nerve impulses. Irrespective of whether the stimulus is produced by light, sound, heat or cold, the impulses arc conveyed in the form of homogeneous signals. The question may now be asked how the signal is deciphered by the CNS? The discoveris of electrophysiology, development of communication techniques, and the theory of information ‘have thrown light on this fascinating phenomenon.

Electrophysiological analysis of the signals transmitted from receptor to CNS by one afferent nerve fibre indicates that the information is conveyed in the form of individual groups or “volley” of impulses. The amplitude and duration of the individual impulses are identical, but the frequency and number in a volley may differ. It therefore follows that during one brief time interval, the fibre may or may not conduct an impulse, i.e., it is one or the other of the two states, excited or unexcited. It is supposed that its transmission is affected by a binary code.

The character of signals is differentiated to a certain extent in the peripheral receptors which are ‘tuned’ to strictly defined signals. Certain sense organs, for example the eye, contain receptors that react differently to the action of the stimulus and its cessation. Some receptors are excited only at the very outset of stimulation (on-receptors); others activate at the moment of cessation (off-receptors); still others are excited both at the beginning and end of stimulation (on-and-off receptors). There are also receptors that are sources of a constant (background) flow of impulses supplying information on the state of readiness of organs for work (their tone) and on the condition of the organism. These can react with an increase, or decrease, or cessation of the frequency of impulses under the action of the stimuli.

One more significant detail: the spatial distribution or topography of the excited receptors can vary widely according to the way the stimuli acting on them are combined. For example, when we look at two different landscapes or listen to two different pieces of music, different groups of receptors are excited, and volleys of impulses differing in both

frequency and number are transmitted to the CNS by different nerve fibres. Exciting many differently located neurons, these impulses supply them with extraordinarily extensive information, all of which are analysed by the CNS and cerebral cortex.

IV

The Central Nervous System includes the brain, spinal cord and nerves. The brain gives rise to twelve pairs of cranial nerves, and the spinal cord to thirty one pairs of spinal nerves. These nerves give off branches to the different organs and tissues. The nerves and their branches constitute the peripheral nervous system.

The spinal cord is located in the vertebral canal. In the centre of the spinal cord there is a canal like narrow slit. Along the anterior and posterior surfaces of the cord run longitudinal fissures which divide it completely into symmetrical halves. The spinal cord consists of white and grey matter. A horizontal section of the spinal cord shows the grey matter in the form of a butterfly with two anterior projections, the ventral horns and two posterior projections, the dorsal horns. The ventral horns contain motor nerve cells while the dorsal horns contain internuncial nerve cells which effect communication among other nerve cells, for example, between sensory and motor nerve cells. In addition to ventral and dorsal horns, there are also lateral horns consisting of sympathetic nerve cells.

The spinal cord performs two basic functions, one reflex and the other condition. It receives impulses from the receptors — the exteroceptors of the skin, the proprioceptors and visceroceptors of the trunk and extremities. It innervates the entire skeleta1 musculature (apart from the head muscles served by the cranial nerves). It is involved in the performance of complex motor functions of the body. Many of these result from the reflex of the spinal cord itself, and others from reflex acts of higher parts of the CNS where the spinal cord acts as a conductor of impulses.

The transmission of impules from the peripheral receptors to the brain, and from the latter to the effector apparatus is an important conduction function of the spinal cord. As already mentioned, information is supplied to the spinal cord from the receptors. This is transmitted along the numerous pathways of its posterior and lateral columns to the centres of the brain stem and finally to the cerebral cortex and cerebellum. In turn, the spinal cord receives impulses from the higher parts of the CNS conveyed to it through the lateral and anterior columns. These impulses produce a stimulating or inhibiting effect on the internuncial and motor-neurones of the spinal cord with the effect that the activity of the skeletal muscles or visceral organs change. The spinal cord is connected with the peripheral receptors by means of nerve fibres passing through the spinal nerve roots. It is along these roots that afferent impulses are transmitted to it, and efferent impulses from it to the periphery.

V

The seat of human consciousness is the brain. Weighing between thirteen hundred to fourteen hundred grammes approximately, this mass of grey and white matter is located in the cranial cavity. The brain has a very complicated structure. It develops from the anterior or cerebral part of the so-called neural tube which separates from the ectodernal neural plate in the early stages of man’s embryonic life. During development this part of the neural tube is divided by two constrictions into three dilations — the anterior, middle and the posterior primary brain vesicles. Later anterior and posterior vesicles each divide

into two vesicles, resulting in the formation of five secondary brain vesicles. Each brain vesicle develops into a definite part of the brain.

Since the brain develops from five brain vesicles, five parts of the brain are distinguished; end-brain or cerebral hemisphere, between-brain consisting of the thalami, geniculate bodies and hypothalamus, mid-brain which includes the corpora quadrigemina and the cerebral peduncles, hindbrain which includes the cerebellum and the pons and medulla oblongata.

Inside the brain there are ventricles (cavities) that communicate with each other. Two lateral ventricles are located in the cerebral hemispheres, the third ventricle is situated in the between-brain and the fourth ventricle is a common cavity of the hindbrain and medulla oblongata. The ventricles contain cerebrospinal fluid. The medulla oblongata is situated in the sloping part of the cranial cavity; below it is the spinal cord and above it is the pons varolii. The medulla oblongata and pons varolii are taken together under the common name of hind-brain. Together with the midbrain they form the brain stem which incorporates a large number of nuclei and ascending and descending tracts.

The medulla oblongata and the pons, like the spinal cord, have two functions: one is a reflex function and the other is the conduction of nerve impulses. The reflex function is due to the fact that these structures contain nuclei of the cranial nerves and the centres of various reflexes.

The medulla oblongata contains vitally important centres including that of cardiac activity and respiration. Each centre is an accumulation of nerve cells regulating the activity of certain organs. When a nerve is stimulated nerve impulses are transmitted along motor nerves to an organ and excite or inhibit it.

It also contains vasomotor centre which when excited produces changes in the lumens of the blood vessels. Centres of many digestive reflexes (salivation, secretion of gastric or pancreatic juices, deglutition etc.), and defence reflexes (coughing, vomiting, etc.) are also situated here. The reflexes effected through the medulla oblongata and pons are more complex than those effected through the spinal cord. The medulla oblongata and pons simultaneously regulate many functions of the organism, both directly and through the centres of the spinal cord.

The conduction function of the medulla oblongata and the pons varolii is made possible by ascending and descending tracts. Impulses are transmitted along the nerve fibres of these tracts from the spinal cord to the brain, and from the brain to the spinal cord.

The functions of the medulla oblongata and the pons are influenced by the cerebral cortex and other parts of the brain. The mid-brain lies anteriorly of the pons. It contains the nuclei of the corpora quadrigemina, the red nucleus, the nuclei of the oculomotor and trochlcar nerves and the substantia negra. All the ascending tracts carrying impulses to the thalamus, cerebral hemispheres and cerebellum, pass through the mid-brain and also the descending tracts transmitting impulses to medulla oblongata and the spinal cord. The neroncs of the reticular formation are also present in the mid-brain.

The nuclei of the mid-brain perform a number of important reflex functions.

The nuclei of the corpora quadrigemina are centres of the orientation reflexes i.e., they regulate the complex movements of the body in response to sudden optic and acoustic stimuli. The anterior bodies are the primary optic centres and are involved in certain reflexes responding to light stimuli including visual orientation reflex. An animal with no cerebral hemispheres, but possessing mid brain, reacts to light stimulus by moving its

eyes and body. The posterior bodies are the primary auditory centres. They are involved in the performance of sound orientation reflexes: the pricking up of ears of animals, and the turning of the head and body towards a new sound.

The nuclei of the quardrigeminal bodies are instrumental for 'guarding' reflex. Its function is to keep the organism in a state of readiness to respond to any new, sudden stimulation. An essential component of this reflex is a redistribution of muscular tone, increased tone of the flexor muscles etc. which enable the animal to escape or attack its prey. A person with derangements in this region is unable to react quickly to an unexpected stimulus.

The substantia negra is directly related to the co-ordination of the complex acts of deglutition and mastication. An electrical stimulus applied to it evokes swallowing movements and the corresponding changes in respiration. There is also evidence that it takes part in regulating plastic tone and is important in the performance of delicate movements of the fingers requiring great accuracy, and consequently fine regulation of tone. That is perhaps the reason why the substantia negra is better developed in man than in other animals. With damage to this part of the mid-brain, increased muscular tone or hypertone, is observed. The hypertone, however, cannot be attributed solely to the role of the substantia negra since damage to it disturbs the connections with the red nucleus and reticular formation, which are closely connected with the regulation of the muscular tone.

An animal with an intact mid-brain has a normal distribution of muscular tone and is able to recover and maintain its normal posture. This is made possible mainly by the functions of the red nucleus and the reticular formation of the mid-brain.

Higher up in the ladder, though younger than its neighbours below, is the cerebellum which consistes of a middle part called vermis, flanked by two hemispheres on each side. These again have a lateral lobe on each side. The youngest formation of the cerebellum is the anterior part of the posterior lobe called neocerebellum. It is most developed in man and the higher apes. As a middle-ranker in its duties and responsibilities the cerebellum is connected with other divisions of the central nervous system by a great many fibres forming thick bundles: the inferior, middle and superior cerebellar peduncles. The inferior bundle communicates with the medulla oblongata, the middle contacts the cerebral cortex and the superior receives signals from the anterior quadrigeminal bodies.

The cerebellum has zones that influence functioning of tactile, musculo-articular, light and sound receptor systems. The frontal zone has representation of posterior extremities, behind it that of trunk, further back that of anterior extremities, and further back still that of the head. Behind these zones in the cerebellar cortex lies an auditory area, with an optic zone in the middle.

The main duty of the cerebellum is co-ordination of all complex motor acts of the organism including voluntary movement. In fact it has been observed that if the cerebellum is extirpated, it causes disturbance in the static and stato-kinelic reflexes. The voluntary movements of the body are also sharply affected. As we know the brain stem is actually instrumental in tonic postural reflex and righting reflex. Finer touches are rendered by the cerebellum. On the other hand voluntary muscular movements with which the cerebral cortex is also involved are affected while the functioning of the cerebellum is disturbed. A person with a cerebellar disorder staggers greatly while standing, and falls down as soon as the eyes are closed. He cannot walk straight either. His movements are inco-ordinated and he is unable to perform movements quickly with groups of antagonistic muscles. Disequilibration (disturbance of balance), Atony (loss of muscular tone), Astasia (loss of the ability of the muscle to perform harmonius

contraction), Asthenia (quick tiring), Ataxia (inadequate coordination of movements) are the symptoms of cerebellar disorder. As already pointed out, the cerebellum corrects the motor reaction of the organism. This role is manifested with particular clarity in the performance of voluntary movements: its chief function is to coordinate the quick (phasic) and slow (tonic) components of motor acts.

The thalamus is the gateway to the cerebral cortex but it is the exit and entrance for the secondary receptors only. The motor nerves do not use this pathway; in so far as the sensory nerves are concerned, (except the olfactory, which also by suggestion of recent researches has connection with the thalamus) all afferent impulses converge here only to be allowed to pass on to the appropriate areas of the cerebral cortex. Hence any damage to the thalamus or part of it may deprive the cerebral cortex with vital information of various kinds: visual, auditory, gustatory, tactile etc. Structurally the thalamus consists of white matter and is divided into three layers — anterior, lateral and medial, each of them is an aggregation of nuclei.

It has been suggested that all thalamic nuclei may be divided into two distinct groups: specific and non-specific. The fibres of the specific nuclei are terminated in the third and fourth layer of the cerebral cortex. They form limited synapses with the neurones of the cortex. The non-specific nuclei give off many arborizations in various areas of the cerebral cortex and involve a large number of cortical neurones.

The specific nuclei can be subdivided into two groups: relay neuclei (thalainic or cortical relay) and association nuclei. They differ in that each cortical relay nucleus receives impulses coming from a definite sensory tract (optic, auditory, lemniseus, spinolhalamic, etc.). The association nuclei on the other hand receive impulses from the thalamic relay nuclei and send them to the association areas of the cerebral cortex.

The principal relay nuclei are the antetior (dorsal, ventral and medial), the ventrolateral, the posterior ventral (lateral and medial) and the geniculate bodies (lateral and medial). The lateral and medial geniculate bodies are the relay nuclei for the visual and auditory signals. They pass on the information to the appropriate areas of the cerebral cortex. Similarly impulses from the receptors of the skin, face trunk, extremities, and the tactile receptors are supplied to the posterior ventral nucleus of the thalamus and passed on to the somatosensory area of the cerebral cortex. The ventro-lateral neucleus receives impulses from the cerebellum which are passed to the anterior central convolution of the cerebral cortex. Similarly there are other areas in the thalami that receive other impulses.

The association nuclei of the thalamus are chiefly located in the anterior part, and receive impulses from the relay nuclei and send them to the association areas of the cerebral cortex. They comprise lateral, dorsomedial and pulvinar nuclei.

The cerebral cortex is the highest decision-making organ of the body. Through evolution the cortex has grown in size and complexity and progressive centralisation (corticalisation) of all functions of the nervous system has made it the single most important organ of the human brain. It has direct and indirect connection with all parts of the body system and all actions of the various organs of the body are monitored here. If the human brain is the seat of human consciousness, the cortex is the focal point. That through evolution it has assumed unusual importance in higher apes and especially in man has been proved by experiments. It has been observed that after the removal of the cerebral hemispheres in the bird it is capable of flying when thrown up into the air. If pushed it may move about but usually sits motionless. It has to be fed by hand. It does not completely lose its reaction to auditory or visual stimuli and can avoid obstacles that throw intense shadows. Mammals that are higher up in the evolutionary ladder show

severe behavioural disorders when decerebrated. A dog can walk almost normally. Its sex instinct is completely lost but the alternation of sleep and wakefulness is normal though the period of sleep is longer, however severe disturbances are observed in the sensory sphere. After the operation a dog becomes almost blind and is partially deaf. It runs into obstacles, fails to recognize its master, does not respond to its name or approach food set before it. It cannot discriminate between different smells, it does not respond to weak external stimuli. However, it still retains some visual and auditory perception. It turns its head from bright light. It also retains its perception of taste.

Still higher up the ladder, the Rhesus monkeys cannot tolerate extirpation of the cortex and soon die. Their individually-acquired reactions to stimuli disappear. The motor acts of a monkey operated on are clearly deranged. No voluntary movements occur, mimicry and gesticulation are absent. Movements elicited by external stimuli are weak and slow. When not under stimulation the monkey is motionless and sleeps most of the time.

In man disorders due to lesions of the cerebral cortex arc extremely severe.

Lower down on the evolutionary ladder, fish and amphibians retain intact their visual perception, and a frog or tortoise can even develop conditioned reflex even after extirpation of the cerebral cortex.

How does it look—this enigma of philosophers and religionists, the creators of art and science, the architects of history? Do the brains of Newton and Einstein look alike? Do those of Tagore, Shakespeare, Marx or Lenin, Alexander, Hannibal or Hitler show similarities? The brain resembles a lump of grey matter similar to the shape of a frog only slightly bigger in size. The thickness varies from one and a half millimeters to three millimeters and covers a total area of fourteen hundred and fifty to seventeen hundred square centimeters. But quantitatively and qualitatively it far exceeds other areas of the brain in terms of accumulation of nerve cells, as for example, the brain-stem or spinal cord. There are twelve to eighteen thousand million neurones in the cerebral hemisphere. This lump of grey matter embodies the superiority of the human race over all other earthly living beings. It is also the blank page on which life writes its story.

Under the microscope the biologist can look at it more discriminatingly. There this unassuming grey lump can be seen to be divided into six layers — one below the other. The first, or molecular, layer contains few nerve cells and is mainly Conned by the interlacing of" nerve fibres. The second, or outer granular layer, contains small, closely packed cells, four to eight in diameter which look like round, triangular or polygonal granules. The third layer is thicker than the preceding two and contains pyramidal cells of varying sizes. The fourth or inner granular layer consists of small cells. The fifth layer consists of giant pyramidal Betz cells. The upper part gives off a thick process that forms multiple arborizations in the superficial layers. The other, the axons, extend down to the subcortical nuclei or the spinal cord. The sixth, or polymorphous layer, consists of triangular or spindle-shaped cells.

Apart from this six-layered cellular structure, the cortex has a complex accumulation of nerve fibres—horizontal ones connecting its various areas, and radial ones connecting white and grey matter. These fibres are also arranged in six layers and their structure and relations to each other are even more complex and variable. The cortex is divided into a number of sectors called cortical areas according to the features of its composition and structure. Brodmann's widely accepted cyco-architectonic chart contains 52 cortical areas.

These cortical areas may be divided into sensory and motor areas of the cortex. There are different zones for sensory and motor areas although each zone is not exclusive and contains the representation from the other.

So far as the sensory areas are concerned, we know that the cerebral cortex receives afferent impulses from all the receptors of the organism through the neuclei of the thalamus (except the olfactory which it receives directly). These are the central division of the analyser. Their spatial division over the cortical area partly overlap with one another. This region is also known as sensory area. In each cerebral hemisphere there are two areas of representation of somatic and visceral sensitivity which are conventionally called first and second somatosensory areas. The first is situated in the post central gyrus and it is considerably larger than the second. It is supplied with information by the skin, articulo-muscular and visceral receptors on the opposite side of the body. The largest area is occupied by cortical projection of the receptors of the hand, the vocal apparatus, and the face, the smallest by that of the trunk, thigh and leg.

The second somatosensory area is situated below Rolando's fissure and extends to the upper edge of the Sylvian fissure. This area also receives afferent impulses from the posterior ventral muscles of the thalamus.

The cortical ends of the optic analyser are situated on the medial surface of the occipital lobes of both hemispheres. It is a projection of the retina. The end of auditory analyser is located in the first temporal and transverse temporal gyri of Heschl. The cortical end of the taste analysers are situated near the Sylvian and circular fissures. The ends of the olfactory analyser are situated in the anterior part of the pyriform lobe.

The motor analyser is located in the ascending frontal gyrus. Here the proprioceptive stimuli are perceived and analysed and temporary connections, reflex muscular movements are formed. The superior part of the gyrus is functionally connected with the muscles of the lower extremities. The inferior part contains nerve cells concerned with the muscles of the head. The middle part is connected with other muscles.

The function of speech is found only in man. It requires the participation of the entire cortex, but certain areas take a dominant role. These areas include the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus which contains the motor speech analyser (in right-handed people this lies on the left, in left-handed people on the right). Lesions to this analyser are characterized by disorders of oral speech.

VI

We had abruptly parted company with the First Signaling System only to explain the necessary details about the functioning of the brain In. our discussion we have touched on the reflex arc which is instrumental in receiving a signal and reactions to it. It has been demonstrated by Pavlov that reflex reactions in the lower divisions of the Central Nervous System, the subcortical nuclei, the brain stem and the spinal cord are accomplished through inborn, inherited nervous pathways. However, nervous associations are developed in the cerebral cortex in the course of individual life process, as the result of the combination of innumerable stimuli acting on the organism.

Thus all reflexes are divided into two groups: instinctual response of inborn reflex reactions called Unconditioned Reflex and reflexes developed during the life process known as Conditioned Reflex.

It has been observed by experiments that unconditioned reflexes are specific i.e. similar in all representations of a given species. These are also stable i.e. these reflexes do

not die out during the life of the organism. Conditioned reflexes on the other hand are individual. These are also unstable, i.e. may die out if the organism is out of practice.

Unconditioned reflexes are all instincts. Conditioned reflexes are instincts mediated by the cerebral cortex. As we move up the evolutionary ladder living organisms develop cortical connections progressively. Thus the role of the cortex becomes more and more pronounced as we move from mammals to apes, higher apes and finally man. The complexities of the cortex also develop accordingly. Thus if the cerebral cortex of a dog or cat is extirpated, the animal will still be able to react even if clumsily to the unconditioned reflexes. However the same operation in monkey or man will create disturbances of a pathological nature and some unconditioned reflexes may disappear altogether.

Conditioned reflexes are formed on the basis of unconditioned reflexes. If some sort of cerebral mediation coincides with the unconditioned stimuli, then condition reflexes are formed. For example, if one smells something and food appears, then salivary secretion, an unconditioned reflex reaction of the organism, is mediated by the perception by the cortex in advance — through the small of the food product. If a dog hears the bell several times, and for each ringing of the bell it is provided with food, after certain experiments the secretion of the salivary glands will be observed on its hearing the ringing of the bell, even if it is not followed by food. Thus the conditioned stimuli of the ringing of the bell is accompanied by an unconditioned stimuli of the salivary glands and the gustatory organs. This is the beginning of the appearance of the First Signaling System. The most important thing about the relationship between conditioned and unconditioned reflex is that temporary connections are formed between the cortical cells, perceiving the conditioned stimuli, and those involved in the unconditioned reflex arc. During the coincidence and combination of the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli a connection is established among different neurones in the cortex, and a process of closure occurs within them.

The totality of unconditioned reflexes and the conditioned reflexes formed on them may be divided into a number of groups according to their functional importance. The chief ones are nutritional, defensive, sexual, stato-kinetic and locomotor, orientations homeostatic etc. Each group also involves other unconditioned reactions. For example, the unconditioned defensive reactions aroused in a dog by the application of a strong electric current not only comprises the defensive muscular movements proper, but also deepens and quickens respiration, accelerates the heart beat, produces vocal reactions, and brings about changes in the blood system. Hence though termed ‘defensive’ reflex reaction it produces a host of other reflex arcs. Conditioned reflexes, as a rule, reproduce the structure of an unconditioned reflex, since the conditioned stimulus excites the same nerve centres as the unconditioned one. Therefore, the components of a conditioned reflex are similar to those of an unconditioned reaction. They include primary component, specific for the type of reflex, and secondary unspecific components. In the defensive reflex the leading role is played by the motor component, others being auxiliary.

The concept that the building of a conditioned reflex is based on the formation of temporary connections between two groups of cortical cells, those receiving conditioned stimulation and those receiving unconditioned, is now widely accepted. It was initially supposed that horizontal nerve fibres within the depths of the cortex were the pathways for the excitation among the cells and the white matter of the hemispheres also played a significant role. It has since been established that an important role in the mechanism of interaction of the different cortical regions was played by the cortico-subcortico-cortical pathways. The following facts corroborate this statement: Dissociation of different areas of the cortex in dogs, by section of the grey matter, does not prevent the formation of

temporary connections between the cells in these areas. In man, separation by a deep section of the posterior central gyrus (first somato-sensory area) from the anterior (motor area) docs not disturb motor habits, in spite of the complete severance of all horizontal connections between them. Section of the corpus collosum in man also does not cause serious disorders in motor habits. Thus in all these cases, the interaction of the cortical regions takes place. Afferent impulses generated by a conditioned stimulus are conveyed via thalamus and reticular formation to the sensory areas of the cortex. There they are processed and returned by descending pathways to the specific and non-specific subcortical formations. From here they are again transmitted to the cortex, to the area of cortical projection of the unconditioned reflex.

It is now believed that an important role in the mechanism by which a conditioned reflex is established is played by the phenomenon of dominant. It is held that during the unconditioned stimulation the excitability of the cortical cells of the analyser concerned is sharply heightened, so that the cells become capable of responding to stimulation of other cortical regions. Thus, when neutral and unconditioned stimuli are combined, the excitation aroused by them is summated and a summation reflex occurs.

The phenomena of dominant and summation of excitation take place in all divisions of the Central Nervous System (CNS) but while the summation reflex is transient in the subcortical and spinal centres, it becomes firmly impressed in the cerebral cortex and results in a conditioned reflex.

Modern experimental research employing electrophysiological techniques has confirmed the hypothesis of the summation of excitation at the moment when different stimuli are combined. It has also been established that the cortex, reticular formation and the thalamic nuclei contain many cells on which afferent impulses converge from different receptors: visual, auditory, thermal, tactile muscular etc. It is natural to assume that it is these cells that are active in the formation of temporary connections.

The question that remains still unanswered is how the interaction of nerve cells occurring at the moment stimuli are combined is impressed on the cortex. Some investigators suggest that cortical cells excited by conditioned and unconditioned stimuli are involved in a circular rhythmic activity and that the circulation of impulses through closed neuronal chains ensures the formation of temporary connections. However specific experimentation has shown that established condition reflexes do not disappear after deep general anesthesia, extreme chilling of the brain, cumulative seizures and other influences causing almost complete inhibition of cortical activity. At these moments, continuity of the circulation of rhythms, and changes in excitability are disturbed but the connections are retained.

The most probable theory suggested now is that functional changes occurring during combination of stimuli are important only for brief impression of traces of stimuli on the cortex (short memory). Long retention of temporary connections (long memory) is based on some molecular, plastic changes taking place in the synapses or even in the cerebrocortical cells themselves. Many theories have been offered to explain the essence of the plastic changes. According to one theory frequent transmission of impulses to a cell along the same pathway results in proliferation of presynaptic terminals and an increase in the number of synapses. On the other hand there is the theory that repeated passage of impulses through a synapse causes persistent changes in the enzyme systems in the nerve endings as a result of which the transmission of impulses is made easier. The recent discovery that stimulation of nerve cells increases its content of nucleic acid is now considered to be a very important finding. The impression of traces of preceding stimulations of the cell is supposed to be due to the changes in the structure of ribonucleic

acid. This leads to a change in protein synthesis in the cell protoplasm processes and synapse-s and this may lead to proliferation of synapses in certain nerve cells.

When the cortex receives a set of stimuli through various receptor organs of the body, to arrive at a definite conclusion it employs the mechanism of analysis and synthesis. These two are inseparably connected. During the action of two separate stimuli on the organism the most primitive forms of analysis and synthesis are observed. For the investigation of complex forms of cortical analysis and synthesis a Russian investigator Ivanov-Smolensky established a stable conditioned reflex in animals to a sequence of four sounds A+B+C+D. Then over live months the animals were taught to differentiate that sequence from another sound sequence A + C + B + D. Dogs were unable In differentiate these complex stimuli in full. Humans, however, were a Me to differentiate these easily after an average of seven attempts.

Simple forms of analysis are developed much better in many animals than in man. It is common knowledge, for example, that the sense of smell and differentiation of odorous is incomparably better in dog than in man. However higher forms of analysis and synthesis of stimuli are much superior in man to those in animals.

In the process of synthesis an important role is played in man, not only by the temporary connections between the cells of the cortical zones of representation of the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli, but also by those established between the groups of nerve cells involved in perceiving the aggregate of neutral stimuli. When a melody is heard, the appropriate cortical cells of the auditory analyser are excited in a definite sequence of stimuli arriving from the peripheral receptors, and temporary connections are established between them. The memorizing of a melody is the formation of temporary connections in the auditory analyser. It is proved by the fact that hearing of a few notes is enough to reproduce the melody in full from memory. When a picture or object is looked at, afferent impulses from the retina and the ocular muscles are conveyed in a definite sequence to the cortical cells of the optic and proprioceptive analyser. This leads to the establishment of temporary connection between them and as a result a visual image is retained in the memory.

The motor habits develop through the establishment and consolidation of temporary connections in the cerebral cortex. A large number of such habits develop in man—they include standing, walking, running and various other movements performed in work and sport. These habits are the result of temporary neuronal connections between the effector, or pyramidal neurones of the cortex, and the sensory cortical cells of the motor and other analysers.

A motor act arises from conditioned or unconditioned reflex excitation of the pyramidal neurones of the cortex. At the same time every movement is accompanied by an inflow of afferent impulses to the cortex from both the proprioceptors of the motor apparatus itself and the neurone receptors involved in perception of the result, i.e. of the working effects of this movement. Repeated combination of the excitation of the motor area of the cortex and the neurones of various other areas receiving afferent impulses generated by a movement and its result leads to the formation of temporary connections that facilitate voluntary movements, i.e. motor acts directed to obtaining specific results.

Trial and error methods are usually employed by man and animals in the development of motor habits. This is evident from the observation of the development of motor habits in children. At the age of 4-5 months a child begins to grasp objects. In the beginning its movement is uncontrolled because it has not yet acquired the temporary connections ensuring coordinated movement of eyes and hand. It is by trial and error that the child

learns to grasp the object with its palm. From this clumsy body movement in the beginning the child learns to restrict movement to a particular organ of the body — in this case the hand. It is only through a series of trial and error methods over a period o f time that the child learns to take hold of an object accurately. The same is true for learning standing, walking, running etc. The motor acts that ensure the maintenance of body balance, or its movement in space, are consolidated whereas all other movements that disturb or interfere with this are inhibited. When a movement ceases for some reason to produce the desired result, the inhibition takes place and the reason to produce the desired result, the inhibition takes place and the conditioned excitation no longer receives unconditioned reinforcements. Analysis of various voluntary movements lead to the conclusion that the beginning of each one of them is preceded by conditioned reflex excitation of the same complex of the cortical cells to which afferent impulses are conveyed when the desired result of movement is obtained. This complex is termed action acceptor. Conditioned-reflex excitation of the cells of the action-acceptor can be regarded as the physiological mechanism of anticipating the results of a movement. The transmission of afferent impulses to the cells, when the results are being obtained, is the physiological basis of the emotions of satisfaction, encouragement and achievement of purpose. These are the grounds for considering that the reactions in this case also extend to definite subcortical structures with which positions emotions are associated.

The First Signaling System is concerned with perception which can be visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory or olfactory. The development of internal temporary connections of the First Signaling System lakes place gradually, and through the trial and error method. We have already mentioned the case of a child and how it learns to grasp an object. The same is true for perception of colour. However unlike animals, a human being's first and second Signaling System start developing almost simultaneously. From the childhood it is addressed verbally by its parents and acquaintances. Although it is not able to speak at this stage, its auditory analysers start responding to verbal sounds. While its First Signaling System of perception is developing, the Second Signaling System is also operative. The unique result is that the child at the very early stage of muttering associates objects with words. Of course it makes mistakes, but with time it learns (he correct word for the object and the process continues for a few more years. The cerebral cortex thus registers the combination of first and second signaling system. For an animal the First Signaling System is the highest form of attainment. For human beings it is just the beginning and is quickly superceded by the Second Signaling System. The process develops through trial and error and practice is the only guarantee of obtaining results. There are cases of children who were brought up by animals and who never developed the Second Signaling System. There are also innumerable cases of this when a child has forgotten its mother-tongue.

V

Let us now try to understand the phenomenon of conscious and unconscious in the light of the preceding discussion. It has already been pointed out that there takes place a temporary connection between cerebral cortex and subcortical ganglia during condition reflex. This is the reason why when we talk the thought process is translated into speech through the muscular movements of the larynx and associated organs. Similarly when we write, the musculature of the hand and palm come into action. However what happens when we think silently? Can we suggest that during thinking the same temporary connections come into play but do not activate the motor habits ? During "thinking" the temporary connections according to the law of association become longer and longer, and

various channels open up from the original connection. From the basic principles of psychology we know how the law of association operates. Hence when we think about a subject various arborizations emanate from the original idea. We cannot think simultaneously about several subjects at a time. We can only take up one issue after another, otherwise the phenomenon similar to short-circuit occurs, and we lose all grip on our thinking. Hence all thinking in the waking state is directed thinking. Just as an electric circuit can be extended either in series or in parallel and various branches come up, the synapses in the cerebral cortex also proceed in a similar manner; one thought gives rise to another by the law of association but always in one branch at a time while other branches remain dormant.

An example will clarify the phenomenon: I am introduced to a person today by a friend of mine. After a few days I meet my friend. It is probable that immediately I will recall the meeting with the other person to whom I had been introduced and I will recall the discussions I had with him. Hence for argument's sake we may say that the following synaptic circuits of temporary connection took place:

(1) My meeting with a friend. (2) The friend introducing a person to me. (3) The discussion I had with that person. When I meet my friend again after some days, by the law of association the previous temporary connections may become activated. Through many permutations and combinations the discussion may be recalled. Can we not then suggest that when we are not thinking about the subject these temporary connections remain dormant. When the subject comes up in our thought-process we may say that these are part of my conscious thinking. All the rest remain in the unconscious. From the above discussion we may conclude that consciousness and unconsciousness arc relative phenomena. Something which is in the conscious may relegate to the unconscious later and the ease with which one can recall it to consciousness depends upon the impression made in the cortical cells. Adults do not remember everything from their childhood, but there are some incidents which they can recollect with case. Of course, by law of association, many more incidents may be recalled from childhood memory. Thus unconscious becomes conscious with appropriate innervation, association and stream of thought. From this we may infer that memory is synonymous to unconscious.

Now let us consider the phenomenon of a dream. As we know, one only dreams during sleep. Of course we are not considering the phenomenon of day-dreaming which takes place in a waking state. It has been observed through electroencephalogram (EEG) that a -rhythm is observed when a person is dreaming. In normal sleep EEG records a-rhythm. The subject matters of dreams are usually those with which we are concerned in the waking state. As -rhythm indicates, the person is thinking during sleep. Can we not then suggest that in a dream the same operation takes place in the cortical cells which are operative when a person is thinking in the waking State. Thus various temporary connections are joined together and the person sees a series of appearances. There remains however an essential difference. In the waking slate the thought process is directed, whereas in a dream it is not so. Hence various circuits join together. Some non-associative circuits may also join. This may well be the reason for fantasy in a dream. This short-circuit phenomena may also hinder the quality of the dream images. Sometimes when the process is coherent we have a perfectly interpretable dream. It is not necessary at this stage to go into the various dream theories. However, it may be said, in passing, that if we approach the various dream theories by Freud and others in an objective and scientific manner we may utilize many of their observations for correct analysis.